1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, MppId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT;
26 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, get_route, get_keysend_route};
27 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
64 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
65 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
66 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
67 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
68 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
70 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
72 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
73 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
74 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
76 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
77 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
79 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
80 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
82 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
83 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
84 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
85 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
86 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
87 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
88 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
89 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
91 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
92 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
94 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
96 } else { assert!(false); }
99 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
100 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
102 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
103 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
105 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
107 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
109 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
111 insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
113 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
115 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
117 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
119 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
123 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
124 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
125 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
126 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
127 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
128 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
129 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
132 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
136 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
137 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
138 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
139 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
140 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
141 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
142 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
143 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
144 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
145 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
147 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
149 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
151 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
153 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
156 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
159 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
160 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
161 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
162 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
163 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
165 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
168 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
170 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
171 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
172 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
173 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap(), our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
176 let payment_event = {
177 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
178 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
179 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
181 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
182 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
184 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
185 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
186 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
187 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
188 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
191 // deliver(1), generate (3):
192 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
193 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
194 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
197 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
198 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
199 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
200 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
201 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
202 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
203 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
206 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
207 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
208 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
209 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
210 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
211 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
212 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
215 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
216 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
217 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
220 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
221 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
224 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
227 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
228 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
230 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
231 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
234 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
239 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
240 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
241 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
242 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
243 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
244 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
245 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
246 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
247 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
250 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
252 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
254 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
257 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
260 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
261 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
262 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
263 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
266 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
269 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
271 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
272 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
273 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
274 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap(), our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
277 let payment_event = {
278 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
279 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
280 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
282 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
283 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
285 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
286 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
287 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
288 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
289 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
292 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
295 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
299 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
300 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
301 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
302 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
303 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
304 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
307 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
308 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
309 // update_fee (never committed) ->
311 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
312 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
313 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
314 // <- (1) RAA delivered
315 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
316 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
317 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
318 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
320 // B should send no response here
321 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
322 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
325 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
328 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
329 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
330 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
332 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
335 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
336 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
337 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
338 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
339 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
344 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
345 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
346 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
347 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
350 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
353 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
354 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
356 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
357 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
358 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
360 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
361 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
362 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
363 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
366 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
368 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
370 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
372 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
373 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
374 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
376 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
377 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
378 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
379 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
380 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
381 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
382 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
384 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
385 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
386 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
388 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
390 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
391 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
395 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
396 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
399 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
400 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
403 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
404 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
405 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
408 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
409 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
413 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
414 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
415 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
416 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
417 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
418 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
419 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
420 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
421 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
422 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
423 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
424 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
425 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
426 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
427 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
428 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
430 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
431 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
432 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
434 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
435 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
436 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
439 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
440 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
441 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
445 fn test_1_conf_open() {
446 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
447 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
448 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
451 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
452 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
453 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
454 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
457 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
458 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
459 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
460 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
462 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
464 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
467 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
468 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
471 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
472 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
473 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
475 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
476 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
477 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
479 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
480 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
482 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
484 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
485 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
487 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
489 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
490 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
492 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
493 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
494 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
495 added_monitors.clear();
497 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
499 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
500 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
502 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
503 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
504 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
505 added_monitors.clear();
508 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
509 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
511 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
512 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
514 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
515 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
516 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
517 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
521 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
522 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
523 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
524 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
525 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
526 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
527 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
528 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
529 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
530 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
531 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
532 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
533 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
534 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
535 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
536 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
537 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
538 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
539 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
543 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
544 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
546 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
547 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
548 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
551 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
554 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
557 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
558 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
559 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
560 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
561 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
563 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
565 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
567 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
568 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
571 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
572 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
575 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
576 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
577 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
580 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
581 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
586 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
587 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
588 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
589 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
590 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
591 let channel_value = 1888;
592 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
593 let channel_id = chan.2;
597 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
598 *feerate_lock = feerate;
600 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
602 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
604 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
606 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
608 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
609 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
611 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
613 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
614 let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.output.len() - 2;
615 let total_fee: u64 = feerate as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
616 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
617 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
618 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
621 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
622 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
624 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
625 *feerate_lock = feerate + 2;
627 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
630 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
632 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
634 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
635 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
636 //Should produce and error.
637 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed);
638 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
640 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
644 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
646 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
648 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
649 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
650 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
653 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
656 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
659 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
662 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
663 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
664 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
665 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
666 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
670 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
671 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
672 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
675 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
676 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
677 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
679 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
680 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
682 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
683 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
684 added_monitors.clear();
686 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
687 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
688 // node[1] has nothing to do
690 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
691 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
694 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
695 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
696 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
698 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
700 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
702 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
703 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
704 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
705 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
706 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
707 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
709 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
710 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
712 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
714 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
716 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
718 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
720 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
721 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
723 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
725 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
727 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
729 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
730 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
732 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
736 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
738 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
739 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
740 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
744 fn test_update_fee() {
745 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
746 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
747 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
748 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
749 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
750 let channel_id = chan.2;
753 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
754 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
755 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
756 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
757 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
758 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
759 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
760 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
761 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
762 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
763 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
766 // Create and deliver (1)...
769 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
770 feerate = *feerate_lock;
771 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
773 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
776 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
777 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
778 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
779 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
780 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
784 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
786 // Generate (2) and (3):
787 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
788 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
792 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
793 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
796 // Create and deliver (4)...
798 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
799 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
801 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
803 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
804 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
805 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
806 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
807 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
809 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
812 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
813 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
816 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
817 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
819 // Handle (3), creating (6):
820 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
822 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
823 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
826 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
827 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
830 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
831 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
832 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
833 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
834 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
835 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
836 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
837 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
841 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
843 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
844 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
846 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
848 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
850 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
851 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
852 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
856 fn fake_network_test() {
857 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
858 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
859 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
860 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
861 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
862 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
864 // Create some initial channels
865 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
866 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
867 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
869 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
870 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
871 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
872 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
873 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
875 // Send some more payments
876 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
877 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
878 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
880 // Test failure packets
881 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
882 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
884 // Add a new channel that skips 3
885 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
887 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
888 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
889 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
890 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
891 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
892 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
893 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
895 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
896 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
898 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
899 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
900 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
901 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
903 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
906 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
907 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
908 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
909 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
911 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
914 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
915 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
916 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
917 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
919 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
921 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
922 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
923 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops] }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
925 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
927 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
928 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
929 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
930 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
932 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
935 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
936 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
937 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
938 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
940 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
943 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
944 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
945 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
946 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
948 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
950 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
951 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
952 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops] }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
954 // Claim the rebalances...
955 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
956 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
958 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
959 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
961 // Send some payments across both channels
962 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
963 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
964 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
967 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
968 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
969 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
970 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
972 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
974 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
975 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
976 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
978 // Close down the channels...
979 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
980 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
981 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
982 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
983 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
987 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
988 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
989 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
990 // commitment dance rounds.
991 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
992 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
993 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
994 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
995 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
996 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
997 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
999 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1000 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1001 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1002 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
1003 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
1004 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1005 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1009 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1010 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1011 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1012 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1014 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1015 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1017 let (_, payment_hash_1, payment_secret_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1019 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
1020 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
1021 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1022 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1023 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1024 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1027 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1028 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1030 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
1031 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
1032 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1036 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1037 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1038 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1039 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1041 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1042 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1043 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1044 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1045 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1046 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1049 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1050 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1051 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1053 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1055 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1056 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1057 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1060 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1061 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1063 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1065 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1067 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1069 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1070 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1072 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1074 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1076 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1078 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1080 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1082 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1084 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1087 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1089 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1090 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1091 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1093 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1094 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1096 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1100 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1101 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1104 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1108 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1109 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1110 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1111 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1112 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1113 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1114 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1116 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1117 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1118 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1123 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1125 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1126 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1128 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1129 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1131 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1132 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1133 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1137 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1138 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1139 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1140 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1141 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1142 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1143 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1144 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1146 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1147 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1150 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1152 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1154 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
1155 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 800_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
1156 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
1157 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1159 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1160 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1163 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1164 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1166 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1167 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1168 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1169 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1170 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1171 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1172 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1175 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1177 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1179 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1181 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1182 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1183 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1184 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1185 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1186 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1187 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1188 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1190 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1191 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1192 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1194 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1195 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1196 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1197 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1198 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1199 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1200 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1201 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1203 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1207 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1208 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1209 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1210 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1212 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1213 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1214 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1215 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1216 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1217 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1225 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1226 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1227 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1229 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1230 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1231 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1233 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1234 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1236 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1237 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
1238 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1239 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1240 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
1241 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), max_can_send + 1, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
1242 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1244 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1246 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1247 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1248 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1251 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1253 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1254 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1256 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1260 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1263 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1264 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1265 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1267 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1268 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1269 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1270 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1272 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1274 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1275 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1276 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1277 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1280 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1281 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1282 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1283 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1286 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1288 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1289 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1290 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1292 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1294 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1296 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1297 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1298 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1299 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1300 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1301 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1302 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1303 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1305 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1306 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1307 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1308 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1309 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1311 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1312 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1313 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1314 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1315 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1316 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1317 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1318 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1321 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1322 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1323 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1325 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1326 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1327 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1329 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1331 amount_msat: 3460001,
1332 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1334 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1337 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1340 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1341 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1342 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1343 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1347 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1348 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1350 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1351 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1353 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1356 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1359 htlc_signatures: res.1
1362 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1363 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1364 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1366 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1367 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1369 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1370 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1372 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1374 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1375 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1376 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1378 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1379 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1380 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1382 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1384 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1385 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1391 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1392 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1393 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1394 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1395 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1397 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1398 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1399 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1400 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1401 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1402 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1404 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1405 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
1406 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1408 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1410 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1411 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1413 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1414 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1415 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1416 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1417 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1418 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1422 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1423 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1424 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the funder
1425 // receiving 1 update_add_htlc would result in them closing the channel due
1426 // to channel reserve violation. This close could also happen if the fee went
1427 // up a more realistic amount, but many HTLCs were outstanding at the time of
1428 // the update_add_htlc.
1429 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1430 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1431 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1432 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1433 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1434 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1436 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1437 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1438 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1439 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1440 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1441 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1442 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 1000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1443 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1444 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1447 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1448 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1449 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1450 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1453 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1454 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1455 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1456 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1457 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1458 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1463 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1464 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1465 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1466 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1467 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1468 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1469 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1471 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1472 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1473 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1475 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1476 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1477 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1478 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1479 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) / 1000 * 1000;
1480 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1481 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1483 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1484 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1485 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1486 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1487 // commitment transaction fee.
1488 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1490 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1491 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1492 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1493 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1497 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1498 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1499 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1503 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1504 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1506 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1507 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1508 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1509 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1510 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1511 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1513 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1514 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1515 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1516 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1517 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1518 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1520 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1521 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1522 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1523 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1527 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1528 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1529 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1530 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1531 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1532 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1533 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1536 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1537 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1538 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1540 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1541 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1542 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1543 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1545 // Add a pending HTLC.
1546 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1547 let payment_event_1 = {
1548 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1551 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1552 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1553 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1555 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1557 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1558 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1559 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1560 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1561 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1563 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1564 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1565 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1566 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1567 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1568 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1569 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1570 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1573 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1574 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1575 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1576 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1579 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1580 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1581 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1582 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1583 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1584 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1589 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1590 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1591 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1592 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1593 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1594 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1595 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1596 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1597 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1598 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1600 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1601 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1602 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1604 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1605 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1608 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1609 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1613 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1614 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1615 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1616 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1617 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1618 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1619 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1620 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1621 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1622 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1623 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1625 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1626 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1628 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1629 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1631 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1633 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1634 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1635 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1636 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1641 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1642 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1643 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1645 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1647 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1649 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1650 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1651 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1652 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1653 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1654 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1655 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1658 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1659 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1661 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1662 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1663 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1664 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1665 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1666 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1667 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1670 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1672 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1673 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1674 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1675 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1676 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1679 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1680 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1681 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1682 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1683 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1686 // adding pending output.
1687 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1688 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1689 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1690 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1691 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1692 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1693 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1694 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1695 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1697 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1698 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1699 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1701 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1702 let payment_event_1 = {
1703 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1706 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1707 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1708 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1710 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1712 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1713 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1715 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1716 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1717 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1718 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1721 // split the rest to test holding cell
1722 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1723 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1724 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1725 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1727 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1728 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1731 // now see if they go through on both sides
1732 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1733 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1734 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1736 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1739 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1741 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1742 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1743 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1744 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1745 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1748 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1749 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1750 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1752 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1753 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1755 // flush the pending htlc
1756 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1757 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1760 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1761 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1763 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1765 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1766 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1767 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1770 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1771 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1774 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1776 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1777 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1778 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1780 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1781 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1783 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1784 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1785 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1786 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1787 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1788 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1790 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1791 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1792 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1793 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1795 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1796 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1798 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1799 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1801 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1802 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1803 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1805 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1806 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1807 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1809 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1812 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1815 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1816 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1817 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1819 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1820 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1821 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1823 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1829 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1830 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1831 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1833 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1834 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1835 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1837 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1838 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1839 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1840 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1841 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1843 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1844 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1848 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1849 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1850 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1851 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1852 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1853 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1854 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1855 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1857 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1858 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1859 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1860 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1861 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1862 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1863 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
1864 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1866 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1867 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1868 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1869 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1870 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1871 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1872 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1873 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1874 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1875 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1876 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1878 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1879 // Route the first two HTLCs.
1880 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1881 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1883 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1884 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
1886 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
1887 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
1888 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1890 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1891 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1892 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1895 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1896 // initial fulfill/CS.
1897 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1899 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1901 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1902 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
1903 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
1904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1905 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1907 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1908 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
1909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1910 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1911 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
1913 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
1914 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
1915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1916 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
1917 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1919 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1921 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1923 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1925 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1927 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1929 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1931 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
1932 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1933 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
1934 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
1935 // on-chain as necessary).
1936 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1937 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
1938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1939 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1940 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
1942 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1944 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1946 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1947 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
1949 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
1950 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1951 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1953 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1955 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
1956 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
1957 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
1959 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
1960 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 10000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
1961 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
1962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1963 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1964 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1965 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1968 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
1969 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
1970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1971 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1973 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
1975 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1977 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1979 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1982 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1984 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1986 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1988 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1990 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1993 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
1994 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
1996 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
1997 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2001 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2002 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2003 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2004 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2005 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2006 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2007 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2009 // Create some initial channels
2010 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2011 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2012 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2013 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2015 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2016 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2017 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2018 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2019 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2020 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2022 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2023 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2024 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2025 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2026 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2028 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2029 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2031 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2033 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2034 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2035 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2037 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2039 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2040 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2041 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2043 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2044 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2046 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2047 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2048 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2049 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2052 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2053 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2054 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2055 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2057 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2059 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2060 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2061 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2063 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2064 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2066 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2067 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2069 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2070 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2072 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2073 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2074 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2075 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2077 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2083 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2084 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2085 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2087 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2088 let node2_commitment_txid;
2090 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2091 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2092 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2093 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2095 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2096 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2097 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2099 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2101 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2102 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2103 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2105 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2106 // confusing us in the following tests.
2107 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.write().unwrap().remove(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
2109 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2110 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2111 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2114 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2115 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2116 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2117 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2118 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2119 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2122 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2125 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2126 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2132 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2134 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2135 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2136 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2142 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2144 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2145 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2147 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2148 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2150 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2151 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2157 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2158 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2160 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2163 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2165 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2166 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2167 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2169 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2170 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2171 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2172 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2174 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.write().unwrap().insert(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon);
2178 fn test_justice_tx() {
2179 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2180 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2181 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2182 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2183 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2184 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2185 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2186 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2187 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2188 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2189 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2190 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2191 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2192 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2193 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2194 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2195 // Create some new channels:
2196 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2198 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2199 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2200 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2201 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2202 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2203 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2204 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2205 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2206 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2207 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2208 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2209 // Revoke the old state
2210 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2213 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2215 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2216 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2217 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2219 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2220 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2221 node_txn.truncate(1);
2223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2224 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2226 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2227 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2228 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2229 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2231 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2232 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2233 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2235 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2237 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2238 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2240 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2241 // Create some new channels:
2242 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2244 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2248 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2249 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2250 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2251 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2252 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2253 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2254 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2255 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2256 // Revoke the old state
2257 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2259 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2261 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2262 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2263 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2265 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2266 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2269 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2271 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2272 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2274 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2275 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2277 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2278 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2279 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2283 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2284 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2285 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2286 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2287 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2288 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2289 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2290 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2291 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2292 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2293 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2294 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2295 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2296 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2297 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2299 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2300 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2302 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2303 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2305 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2306 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2308 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2309 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2310 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1)
2315 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2316 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2317 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2318 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2321 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2323 // Create some new channel:
2324 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2326 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2327 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2328 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2329 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2330 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2332 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2333 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2334 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2335 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2336 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2337 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2338 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2339 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2340 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2342 //Revoke the old state
2343 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2346 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2348 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2350 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2351 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2353 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2354 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2356 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2357 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2359 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2360 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2361 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2362 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2363 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2364 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2365 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2366 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2368 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2369 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2370 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2372 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2373 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2374 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2378 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2379 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2380 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2381 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2384 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2386 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2388 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2389 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2390 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2391 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2392 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2393 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2395 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2396 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2398 //Revoke the old state
2399 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2402 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2404 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2406 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
2408 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2409 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2411 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2412 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2413 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2414 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2415 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2416 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2418 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2419 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2420 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2421 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2422 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2423 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2424 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2426 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2427 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2428 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2429 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2431 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2432 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2433 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2435 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2436 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2437 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2438 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2439 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2440 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2441 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2442 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2444 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2445 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2446 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2450 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2451 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2452 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2453 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2454 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2455 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2456 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2457 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2458 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2460 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2461 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2462 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2463 // PaymentSent event).
2465 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2466 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2467 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2468 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2470 // Create some initial channels
2471 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2472 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2474 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2475 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2476 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2477 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2478 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2480 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2481 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2482 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2484 let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2485 let (our_payment_preimage_2, _payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2487 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2488 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2489 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2490 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2491 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2492 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2493 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2495 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2496 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2497 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2498 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2499 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2501 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2502 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2504 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2505 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2506 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2507 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2508 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2509 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2510 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2511 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2512 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2513 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2514 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2515 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2516 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2518 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2519 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2520 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2521 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2523 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2524 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2525 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2526 added_monitors.clear();
2528 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2529 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 2);
2530 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[0] {
2531 } else { panic!(); }
2532 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2533 } else { panic!(); }
2534 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2536 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2537 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2538 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2539 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2540 added_monitors.clear();
2542 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2544 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2545 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2548 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2549 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2553 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2554 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2555 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2556 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2557 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2558 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2560 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2562 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2563 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2564 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2565 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2566 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2567 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2568 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2569 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2570 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2571 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2573 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2574 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2575 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2576 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2578 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2579 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2580 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2581 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2583 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2584 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2588 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2589 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2590 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2591 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2593 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2594 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2595 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2596 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2597 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2598 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2600 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2601 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2602 let commitment_spend =
2603 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2604 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2605 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2606 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2609 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2610 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2611 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2615 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2616 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2617 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2618 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2619 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2620 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2621 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2622 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2623 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2624 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2625 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2626 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2628 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2629 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2630 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2631 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2632 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2634 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2635 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2636 let mut first_claimed = false;
2637 for event in events {
2639 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2640 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage {
2641 assert!(!first_claimed);
2642 first_claimed = true;
2644 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2647 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2650 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2653 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2654 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2655 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2656 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2657 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2658 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2660 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2665 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2666 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2667 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2668 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2670 // Create some intial channels
2671 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2672 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2674 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2675 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2676 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2678 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2680 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2681 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2682 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2683 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2685 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2688 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2689 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2691 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2692 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2693 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2694 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2695 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2696 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2698 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2700 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2701 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2703 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2704 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2705 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2706 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2708 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2709 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2710 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2711 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2714 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2715 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2716 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2717 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2719 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2720 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2722 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2723 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2724 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2725 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2727 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2731 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2733 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2735 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2736 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2737 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2738 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2741 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2743 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2744 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2745 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2746 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2747 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2748 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2749 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2751 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2755 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2757 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2758 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2760 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2761 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2762 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2763 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2764 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2765 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2770 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2771 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2772 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2774 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2775 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2777 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2779 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2780 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2781 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2782 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2783 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2784 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2788 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2789 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2790 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2791 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2795 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2796 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2797 // and fail backward accordingly.
2799 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2800 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2801 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2802 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2804 // Create some initial channels
2805 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2806 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2808 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2809 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2810 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2811 // Revoke the old state
2812 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2814 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2816 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2817 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2819 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2821 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2823 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2824 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2826 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2827 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2828 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2829 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2830 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2831 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2833 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2834 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2835 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2837 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2841 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2842 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2843 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2844 // commitment transaction anymore.
2845 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2846 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2847 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2848 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2849 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2850 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2852 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2853 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2854 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2855 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2856 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2860 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2862 // Create some initial channels
2863 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2864 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2866 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2867 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2868 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2869 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
2870 // Revoke the old state
2871 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2873 let value = if use_dust {
2874 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
2875 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
2876 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
2879 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2880 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2881 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2883 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
2884 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2886 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2887 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2888 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2889 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2890 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2891 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2892 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2893 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
2894 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
2896 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
2897 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2899 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2900 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2901 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2902 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2903 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2904 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2905 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2906 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2908 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2909 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2910 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2913 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
2914 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2916 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2917 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2918 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2919 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2920 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2921 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2922 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2923 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
2924 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
2925 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2927 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2928 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2929 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2932 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
2933 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
2934 let (_, fourth_payment_hash, fourth_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
2935 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
2936 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2937 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
2938 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
2939 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2940 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
2944 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2945 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
2946 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
2947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2948 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2949 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2951 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2952 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2954 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
2955 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
2958 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
2959 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2961 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2963 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2965 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2966 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 2 });
2968 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
2969 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
2971 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2973 if !deliver_bs_raa {
2975 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2976 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2979 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2982 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2983 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
2984 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
2985 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
2986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2988 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
2989 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
2990 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
2991 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
2993 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2997 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2998 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2999 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3000 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3001 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3002 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3004 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3007 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3008 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3009 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3010 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3011 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3012 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3013 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3015 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3016 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3017 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3019 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3021 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3022 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3024 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3025 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3026 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3027 // that we should update our routing table for.
3028 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3029 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3032 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3035 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3036 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3037 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3039 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3042 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3043 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3044 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3046 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3049 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3052 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3053 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3054 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3058 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3059 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3060 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3061 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3062 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3066 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3067 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3068 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3069 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3070 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3074 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3075 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3076 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3077 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3078 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3079 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3080 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3082 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3084 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3085 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3086 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 50_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3087 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3090 let payment_event = {
3091 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3092 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3093 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3095 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3096 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3099 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3100 let (_, failed_payment_hash, failed_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3102 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3103 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 50_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3104 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3107 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3110 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3112 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3114 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3115 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3116 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3117 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
3118 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 50_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3119 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3120 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3121 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3123 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3124 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3130 onion_routing_packet,
3132 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3135 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3136 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], failed_payment_hash, true);
3137 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3142 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3143 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3144 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3145 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3146 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3147 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3148 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3149 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3151 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3152 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3153 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3154 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3157 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3158 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3159 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3161 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3162 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3163 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3166 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3167 // registering new transactions
3168 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3169 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3173 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3174 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3175 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3176 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3177 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3178 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3179 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3180 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3181 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3183 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
3185 let mut payment_event = {
3186 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3187 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42, &logger).unwrap();
3188 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3191 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3192 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3193 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3196 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3197 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3199 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3201 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3202 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3203 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3204 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3207 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3208 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3210 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3212 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3213 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3214 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3216 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3217 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3220 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3221 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3222 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3223 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3224 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3228 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3230 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3231 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3234 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3236 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
3237 monitors.get(&OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_slice(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]).unwrap(), index: 0 }).unwrap()
3238 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &&logger);
3240 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3241 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3242 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3243 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3244 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3245 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3246 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3248 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3252 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3253 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3254 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3255 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3256 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3258 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3259 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3260 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3261 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3262 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3264 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3266 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3268 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3269 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3270 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3272 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3273 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3275 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3276 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3280 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3281 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3282 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3283 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3284 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3285 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3286 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3287 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3289 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3290 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3291 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3293 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3294 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3295 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3296 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3298 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3299 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3300 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3302 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3303 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3304 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3305 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3307 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3308 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3310 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3311 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3313 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3315 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3316 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3318 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3319 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3321 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3324 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3325 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3326 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3328 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3332 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3333 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3336 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3337 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3338 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3339 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3340 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3341 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3343 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3344 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3345 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3346 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3347 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3348 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3349 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3351 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3354 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, payment_secret_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3356 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3357 let payment_event = {
3358 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3359 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
3360 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
3361 &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3362 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3365 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3366 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3367 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3369 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3371 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3372 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3374 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3375 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3376 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3378 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3380 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3381 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3382 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3385 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3386 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3387 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3388 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3391 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3392 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3393 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3401 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3402 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3403 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3404 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3405 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3406 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3408 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3409 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3410 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3412 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3413 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3415 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3416 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3417 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3418 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3419 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3420 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3421 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3422 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3423 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3424 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3425 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3426 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3427 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3428 // Everything was delivered...
3429 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3432 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3433 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3435 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3436 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3439 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3440 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3441 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3443 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3445 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3446 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3448 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3449 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3450 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3452 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3453 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3454 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3456 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3459 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3462 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3465 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3466 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3467 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3468 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3469 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3470 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3471 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3472 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3473 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3474 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3475 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3477 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3480 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3481 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3483 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3484 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3486 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
3487 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3489 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3492 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3493 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3495 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3497 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3498 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3499 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3502 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3503 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3504 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3505 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3508 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3509 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3510 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3518 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3519 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3520 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3521 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3522 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3523 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3524 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3526 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
3527 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3529 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3532 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3534 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3535 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3536 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3537 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3538 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3539 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3540 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3541 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3542 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3543 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3544 // Everything was delivered...
3545 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3548 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3549 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3550 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3552 // Channel should still work fine...
3553 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3554 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
3555 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
3556 &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3557 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3558 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3562 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3563 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3564 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3565 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3566 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3570 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3571 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3572 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3573 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3574 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3578 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3579 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3580 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3581 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3582 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3583 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3584 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3585 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3586 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3587 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3589 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3590 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3592 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3593 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3594 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3596 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3597 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3602 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3604 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3605 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3607 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3608 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3609 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3610 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3611 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3612 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3615 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3617 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3618 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3619 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3625 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3627 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3628 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3629 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3630 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3631 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3632 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3633 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3636 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3638 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3639 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3640 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3642 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3645 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3646 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3647 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3648 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3649 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3650 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3652 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3655 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3656 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3657 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3659 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3660 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3661 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3662 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3663 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3665 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3666 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3667 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3669 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3670 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3671 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3673 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3674 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3675 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3676 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3677 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3678 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3679 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3680 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3682 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3683 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3684 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3685 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3686 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3687 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3689 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3690 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3691 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3692 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3696 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3697 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3699 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3700 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3703 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3705 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3706 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3707 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3708 let mut found_announcement = false;
3709 for event in msgs.iter() {
3711 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3712 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3714 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3718 assert!(found_announcement);
3722 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3723 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3724 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3725 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3726 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3727 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3728 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3729 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3730 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3732 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3734 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3735 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3736 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3737 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3738 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3741 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3742 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3744 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3748 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3751 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3752 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3754 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3755 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3756 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3757 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3758 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3759 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3760 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3762 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3763 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3764 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3766 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
3767 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3772 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3773 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3774 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3777 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3780 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3781 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3783 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3784 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3785 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3786 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3787 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3788 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3790 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3791 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3792 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3793 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3795 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3796 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3798 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3799 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3801 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3803 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3804 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3805 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3806 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3807 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3808 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3809 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3810 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3811 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3814 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3815 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3816 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3817 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3818 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3819 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3820 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3823 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3824 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3825 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3826 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3827 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3828 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3829 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3832 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3833 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3834 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3837 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3838 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3839 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3842 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3843 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3846 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3848 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3849 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3851 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3852 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3854 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3855 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3856 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3858 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3864 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
3865 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3868 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3871 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
3872 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
3873 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
3874 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3875 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3876 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3877 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3879 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3880 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3882 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
3883 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3884 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3885 let (_, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
3886 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
3887 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
3888 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
3889 let mpp_id = MppId([42; 32]);
3890 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, mpp_id, &None).unwrap();
3891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3892 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3893 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3894 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
3895 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
3896 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
3899 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
3902 let mut block = Block {
3903 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
3906 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3907 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3908 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
3909 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
3910 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
3911 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3912 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3915 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3918 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3919 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3920 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3921 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3922 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
3924 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3925 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
3926 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
3927 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
3928 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
3929 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
3933 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
3934 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
3935 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
3938 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
3939 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
3940 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3941 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3942 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3943 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3944 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3945 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3947 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
3948 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
3949 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3950 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3952 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3954 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
3955 let (_, first_payment_hash, first_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
3957 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
3958 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3959 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3961 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
3962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3964 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
3965 let (_, second_payment_hash, second_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
3967 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3968 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3969 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3971 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
3972 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3973 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3974 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3977 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
3978 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3979 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3983 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
3984 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3985 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3986 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
3989 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3991 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3992 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
3993 match fail_commit[0] {
3994 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3995 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3996 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
3998 _ => unreachable!(),
4000 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4002 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4007 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4008 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4009 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4013 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4014 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4015 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4016 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4017 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4018 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4019 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4020 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4021 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4022 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4024 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4026 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4028 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4029 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4030 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4032 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4033 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4034 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4035 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4036 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4037 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4038 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4039 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4040 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4041 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4043 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4044 let config = UserConfig::default();
4045 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4046 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4047 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4048 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4049 default_config: config,
4051 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4052 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4053 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4058 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4059 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4061 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4062 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4063 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4066 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4067 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4068 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4069 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4071 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4072 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4073 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4074 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4076 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4077 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4078 for node in nodes.iter() {
4079 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4080 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4081 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4084 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4088 fn test_dup_htlc_onchain_fails_on_reload() {
4089 // When a Channel is closed, any outbound HTLCs which were relayed through it are simply
4090 // dropped when the Channel is. From there, the ChannelManager relies on the ChannelMonitor
4091 // having a copy of the relevant fail-/claim-back data and processes the HTLC fail/claim when
4092 // the ChannelMonitor tells it to.
4094 // If, due to an on-chain event, an HTLC is failed/claimed, and then we serialize the
4095 // ChannelManager, we generally expect there not to be a duplicate HTLC fail/claim (eg via a
4096 // PaymentFailed event appearing). However, because we may not serialize the relevant
4097 // ChannelMonitor at the same time, this isn't strictly guaranteed. In order to provide this
4098 // consistency, the ChannelManager explicitly tracks pending-onchain-resolution outbound HTLCs
4099 // and de-duplicates ChannelMonitor events.
4101 // This tests that explicit tracking behavior.
4102 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4103 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4104 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4105 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4106 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4107 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4108 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4110 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4112 // Route a payment, but force-close the channel before the HTLC fulfill message arrives at
4114 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4115 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
4116 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4119 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4120 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4122 // Connect blocks until the CLTV timeout is up so that we get an HTLC-Timeout transaction
4123 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
4124 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4125 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4126 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4128 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4131 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4132 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
4133 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4135 let claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4137 header.prev_blockhash = nodes[0].best_block_hash();
4138 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
4140 // Serialize out the ChannelMonitor before connecting the on-chain claim transactions. This is
4141 // fairly normal behavior as ChannelMonitor(s) are often not re-serialized when on-chain events
4142 // happen, unlike ChannelManager which tends to be re-serialized after any relevant event(s).
4143 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4144 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4146 header.prev_blockhash = nodes[0].best_block_hash();
4147 let claim_block = Block { header, txdata: claim_txn};
4148 connect_block(&nodes[0], &claim_block);
4149 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
4151 // ChannelManagers generally get re-serialized after any relevant event(s). Since we just
4152 // connected a highly-relevant block, it likely gets serialized out now.
4153 let mut chan_manager_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4154 nodes[0].node.write(&mut chan_manager_serialized).unwrap();
4156 // Now reload nodes[0]...
4157 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4158 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4159 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4160 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4161 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4162 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4163 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4164 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4166 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4167 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4168 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4169 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>
4170 ::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&chan_manager_serialized.0[..]), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4171 default_config: Default::default(),
4173 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4174 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4175 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4176 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4180 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4182 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4184 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4186 // Note that if we re-connect the block which exposed nodes[0] to the payment preimage (but
4187 // which the current ChannelMonitor has not seen), the ChannelManager's de-duplication of
4188 // payment events should kick in, leaving us with no pending events here.
4189 let height = nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().len() as u32 - 1;
4190 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&claim_block, height);
4191 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4195 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4196 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4197 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4198 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4199 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4200 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4201 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4202 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4203 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4204 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4205 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4207 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4208 let channel_value = 100000;
4209 let push_msat = 10001;
4210 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4211 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4212 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4213 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4214 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4215 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4216 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4218 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4220 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4221 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4223 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4225 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4226 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4227 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4228 added_monitors.clear();
4231 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4233 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4234 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4235 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4236 added_monitors.clear();
4238 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4243 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4244 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4245 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4246 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4248 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4249 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4250 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4251 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4252 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4253 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4254 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4255 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4256 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4257 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4259 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4260 let config = UserConfig::default();
4261 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4262 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4263 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4264 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4265 default_config: config,
4267 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4268 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4269 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4274 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4275 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4277 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4279 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4280 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4282 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4283 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4284 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4285 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4286 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4288 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4289 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4292 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4293 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4294 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4295 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4297 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4298 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4299 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4300 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4302 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4303 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4304 for node in nodes.iter() {
4305 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4306 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4307 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4310 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4314 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4315 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4316 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4317 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4318 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4319 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4320 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4321 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4322 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4323 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4324 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4326 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4327 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4329 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4331 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4332 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4333 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4335 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4336 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4337 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4338 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4339 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4340 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4341 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4342 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4343 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4344 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4346 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4347 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4348 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4349 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4350 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4351 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4353 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4354 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4355 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4360 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4361 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4363 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4364 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4367 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4369 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4370 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4374 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4375 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4376 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4377 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4378 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4379 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4380 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4381 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4382 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4383 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4384 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4385 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4386 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4387 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4389 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4390 for monitor in nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter() {
4391 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4392 monitor.1.write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4393 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4396 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4398 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4399 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4401 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4402 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4403 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4404 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4406 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4408 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4409 for monitor in nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter() {
4410 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4411 monitor.1.write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4412 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4415 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4416 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4417 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4418 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4419 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4420 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4423 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4424 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4425 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4426 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4427 assert!(read.is_empty());
4428 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4431 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4432 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4433 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4434 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4435 assert!(read.is_empty());
4436 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4439 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4440 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4441 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4442 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4444 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4445 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4446 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4448 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4450 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4453 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4454 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4455 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4456 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4458 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4459 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4460 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4462 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4464 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4465 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4467 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4468 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4469 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4470 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4471 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4474 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4475 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4478 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4480 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4481 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4482 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4483 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4484 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4486 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4487 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4488 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4489 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4490 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4491 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4492 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4494 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4495 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4497 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4502 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4503 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4505 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4506 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4507 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4508 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4509 for event in events.drain(..) {
4511 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4512 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4513 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4514 all_outputs.push(outp);
4517 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4520 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4521 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4531 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4532 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4533 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4534 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4535 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4536 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4538 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4539 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4540 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4542 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4543 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4544 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4545 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4547 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4548 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4550 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4551 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4552 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4553 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4554 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4558 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4559 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4560 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4561 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4562 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4563 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4564 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4566 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4567 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4568 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4571 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4572 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4573 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4574 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4576 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4577 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4579 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4581 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4582 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4583 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4587 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4588 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4589 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4591 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4592 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4593 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4594 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4596 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4597 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4598 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4599 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4600 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4602 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4603 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4604 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4607 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4608 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4609 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4611 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4612 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4613 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4614 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4615 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4619 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4620 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4621 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4622 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4623 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4625 // Create some initial channels
4626 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4628 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4630 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4631 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4632 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4634 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4635 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4637 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4639 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4641 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4642 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4645 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4646 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4649 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4650 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4651 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4652 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4653 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4654 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4655 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4657 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4658 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4660 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4661 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4662 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4666 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4670 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4672 // Create some initial channels
4673 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4675 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4676 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4678 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4680 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4681 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4682 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4684 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4685 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4687 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4689 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4692 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4694 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4695 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4696 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4697 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4698 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4699 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4701 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4702 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4703 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4705 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4706 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4707 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4708 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4709 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4713 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4714 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4715 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4716 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4717 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4719 // Create some initial channels
4720 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4722 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4723 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4724 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4725 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4727 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4729 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4730 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4733 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4734 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4735 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4736 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4738 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4739 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4741 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4742 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4743 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4747 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4748 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4749 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4750 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4751 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4752 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4754 // Create some initial channels
4755 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4757 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4758 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4759 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4760 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4762 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4764 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4765 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4766 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4768 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4770 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4771 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4772 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4773 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4774 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4775 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4776 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4778 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4779 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4780 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4781 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4784 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4785 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4786 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4787 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4788 // transactions next...
4789 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4790 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4792 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4793 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4794 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4795 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4797 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4798 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4801 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4802 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4804 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4805 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4807 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4808 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4809 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4810 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4811 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4815 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4816 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4817 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4818 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4819 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4820 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4822 // Create some initial channels
4823 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4825 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4826 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4827 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4828 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4830 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4831 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4833 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4835 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4836 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4837 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4839 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4841 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4842 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4843 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4844 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4846 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4847 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4848 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4850 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4851 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4852 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4853 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4856 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4857 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4859 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4860 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4861 // transactions next...
4862 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4863 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4864 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4865 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4867 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4868 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4871 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4872 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4874 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4876 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4877 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4879 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4880 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4882 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4883 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4884 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4885 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4886 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4887 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4888 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4889 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4893 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4894 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4895 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4896 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4897 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4899 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4902 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4903 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4904 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4905 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4907 // Create some initial channels
4908 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4909 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4911 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4912 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4913 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4914 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4915 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4917 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4918 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4919 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4921 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4922 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4923 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4924 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4926 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4927 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4928 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4929 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4930 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4932 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4933 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4936 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4937 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4938 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4939 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4940 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4941 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4942 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4943 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4944 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4945 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4947 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4948 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4949 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4951 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(1000), true);
4953 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4954 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4955 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4956 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4959 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4960 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4962 match msg_events[0] {
4963 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4966 match msg_events[1] {
4967 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4970 match msg_events[2] {
4971 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4972 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4973 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4974 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4975 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4976 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4980 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4981 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4982 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4983 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4984 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4985 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4986 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4987 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4988 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4989 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4990 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4991 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4993 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4998 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4999 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5000 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5001 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5002 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5003 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5004 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5005 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5006 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5007 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5008 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5009 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5010 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5011 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5013 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5014 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5015 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5017 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5018 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5019 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5020 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5021 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5023 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5025 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5026 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5027 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5028 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5029 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
5030 &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5031 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5033 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5034 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5035 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5037 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5038 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5040 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5042 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5043 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5044 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5045 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5046 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5047 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5049 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5050 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5051 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5052 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5053 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5054 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5055 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5057 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5058 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5059 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5060 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5063 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5064 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5066 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5068 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5069 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5072 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5073 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5075 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5076 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5077 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5078 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5079 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5080 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5081 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5082 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5083 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5084 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5085 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5086 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5087 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5089 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5090 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5091 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5092 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5093 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5094 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5095 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5096 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5097 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5100 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5101 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5103 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5105 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5107 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5108 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5109 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5110 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5111 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5112 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5113 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5114 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5115 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5116 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5117 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5120 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5121 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5123 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5125 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5126 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5133 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5134 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5135 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5136 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5137 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5139 // Create some initial channels
5140 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5142 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5143 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5144 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5145 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5146 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5148 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5149 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5151 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5153 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5155 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5156 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5159 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5160 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5163 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5164 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5165 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5166 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5167 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5168 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5169 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5173 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5174 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5176 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5177 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5178 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5179 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5180 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5181 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5184 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5185 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5186 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5187 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5188 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5189 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5190 // use the same payment hashes.
5191 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5196 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5197 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5198 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5199 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5200 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5201 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5202 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5203 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5204 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5205 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5206 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5208 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5209 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5210 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5211 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5212 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5214 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5215 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5216 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5217 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5219 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5221 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5223 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5224 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
5225 let our_node_id = &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5226 let route = get_route(our_node_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), ds_dust_limit*1000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5228 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5230 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5232 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5234 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5235 let route = get_route(our_node_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5237 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5239 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5242 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5244 let route = get_route(our_node_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), ds_dust_limit*1000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5245 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5248 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5250 let route = get_route(our_node_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5251 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5253 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5254 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5255 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5256 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5257 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5259 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5260 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5261 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5262 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5263 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5264 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5266 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5269 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5270 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5271 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5272 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5273 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5274 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5276 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5277 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5278 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5280 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5283 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5284 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5285 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5286 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5288 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5290 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5292 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5293 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5294 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5295 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5296 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5297 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5298 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5299 if deliver_last_raa {
5300 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5302 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5305 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5306 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5307 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5308 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5310 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5311 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5312 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5314 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5315 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5316 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5318 if announce_latest {
5319 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5321 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5323 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5324 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5325 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5328 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5329 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5330 let mut a_done = false;
5331 for msg in cs_msgs {
5333 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5334 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5335 // should be failed-backwards here.
5336 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5337 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5338 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5339 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5341 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5346 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5347 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5348 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5350 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5351 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5354 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5355 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5356 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5357 if announce_latest {
5358 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5359 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5360 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5363 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5365 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5369 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5370 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5371 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5372 let mut as_updates = 0;
5373 for event in as_events.iter() {
5374 if let &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5375 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5376 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5377 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5379 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5381 if network_update.is_some() {
5384 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5386 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5387 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5388 if announce_latest {
5389 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5390 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5392 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5394 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5395 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5396 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5397 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5398 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5399 if let &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5400 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5401 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5402 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5404 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5406 if network_update.is_some() {
5409 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5411 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5412 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5413 if announce_latest {
5414 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5416 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5418 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5419 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5420 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5421 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5422 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5423 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5427 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5428 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5432 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5433 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5437 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5438 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5439 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5440 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5444 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5445 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5446 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5447 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5448 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5450 // Create some initial channels
5451 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5453 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5454 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5455 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5456 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5458 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5459 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5460 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5462 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5464 let htlc_timeout = {
5465 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5466 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5467 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5468 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5469 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5470 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5474 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5475 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5476 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5478 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5479 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5480 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5481 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5482 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5483 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5484 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5485 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5486 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5487 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5488 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5492 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5493 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5494 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5495 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5497 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5499 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5500 let seed = [42; 32];
5501 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5502 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5503 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5504 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5505 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5506 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5508 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5509 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5511 // Create some initial channels
5512 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5514 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5515 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5516 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5518 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5519 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5520 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5521 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5522 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5524 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5525 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5526 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5527 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5528 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5530 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5531 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5532 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5533 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5534 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5535 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5536 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5537 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5540 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5541 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5542 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5543 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5546 let htlc_timeout = {
5547 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5548 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5549 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5550 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5554 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5555 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5556 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5558 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5559 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5560 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5561 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5562 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5563 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5564 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5565 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5566 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5567 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5568 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5569 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5573 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5574 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5575 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5576 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5577 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5579 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5581 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5582 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5584 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5585 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5587 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5588 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5589 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5591 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5592 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5594 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5595 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5596 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5599 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5600 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5601 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5602 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5603 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5604 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5606 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5608 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5609 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5610 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5613 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5614 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5615 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5616 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5618 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5619 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5624 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5626 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5627 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5630 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5631 let mut block = Block {
5632 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5635 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5636 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5637 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5639 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5640 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5644 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5646 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5648 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5649 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5650 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5652 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
5653 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5654 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5655 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5658 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5660 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5661 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5662 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5664 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5665 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5667 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5668 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5669 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5671 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5672 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5676 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5677 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5678 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5679 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5680 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5681 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5683 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5684 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5685 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5686 // actually revoked.
5687 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5688 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5689 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5690 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5693 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5694 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5695 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5697 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5698 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5700 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5702 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5704 if check_revoke_no_close {
5705 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5709 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5710 let mut block = Block {
5711 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5714 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5715 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5716 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5718 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5719 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5720 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5723 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5727 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5728 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5729 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5730 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5731 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5732 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5733 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5735 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5736 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5737 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5739 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5740 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5741 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5743 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5744 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5748 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5749 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5750 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5751 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5752 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5757 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5758 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5759 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5760 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5761 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5762 //Force duplicate channel ids
5763 for node in nodes.iter() {
5764 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5767 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5768 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5769 let push_msat=10001;
5770 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5771 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5772 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5774 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5775 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5779 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5780 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5781 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5782 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5783 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5785 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5786 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5787 let push_msat=10001;
5788 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5790 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5791 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5792 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5793 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5794 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5796 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5797 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5798 let push_msat=10001;
5799 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5800 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5801 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5803 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5804 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5805 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5807 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5808 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5809 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5811 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5812 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5813 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5815 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5816 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5817 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5818 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5819 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5820 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5824 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5825 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5826 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5827 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5828 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5830 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5831 let push_msat=10001;
5832 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5833 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5834 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 661;
5835 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5837 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5838 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5839 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5840 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5845 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (661) is greater than the implementation limit (660)");
5848 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5849 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5850 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5851 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5853 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5854 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5855 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5856 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5857 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5858 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5859 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5861 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5862 // pending_update_fee.
5864 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5865 *feerate_lock += 20;
5867 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5870 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5871 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5872 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5873 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5874 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5879 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5881 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5882 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5883 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5885 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5886 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
5887 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5888 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5889 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], max_can_send, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5891 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5892 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5893 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5894 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5896 // Flush the pending fee update.
5897 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5898 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5900 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5903 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5904 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5905 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5906 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5907 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5908 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5909 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5910 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5911 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5913 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5914 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5915 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5917 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref error_code, ref error_data } => {
5918 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5919 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5920 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5921 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5922 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5924 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5928 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5929 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5930 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5932 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5933 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5934 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5935 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5936 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5937 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5938 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5940 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5941 // pending_update_fee.
5943 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5944 *feerate_lock += 200;
5946 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5949 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5950 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5951 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5952 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5953 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5955 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5958 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5960 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5961 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5962 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5964 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5965 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, payment_secret_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
5967 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
5968 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
5969 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5970 let route_1 = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], amt_1, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5971 let route_2 = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], amt_2, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5973 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5974 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
5975 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5976 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5977 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
5978 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5979 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5981 // Flush the pending fee update.
5982 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5983 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5985 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5986 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5989 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5990 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5991 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5992 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5993 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5994 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5995 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5996 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5997 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5999 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6000 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6001 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6003 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref error_code, ref error_data } => {
6004 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6005 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6006 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6007 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6008 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6010 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6013 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6014 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6015 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6016 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6017 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6019 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6020 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6021 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6023 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6025 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6026 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6027 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6028 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6030 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6031 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6033 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6034 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6035 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6037 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6040 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6042 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6043 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6044 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6045 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6046 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6048 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6049 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6051 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6055 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6056 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6057 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6060 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6061 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6062 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6063 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6064 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6065 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6066 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6067 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6068 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6069 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6070 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6071 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6073 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6074 // pending_update_fee.
6076 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6077 *feerate_lock += 20;
6079 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6082 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6083 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6084 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6085 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6086 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6088 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6091 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6093 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6094 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6095 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6097 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6099 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6100 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
6101 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6102 let payment_event = {
6103 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6104 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], max_can_send, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6105 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6108 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6109 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6111 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6113 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6115 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6116 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6118 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6119 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6121 // Flush the pending fee update.
6122 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6123 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6125 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6126 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6129 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6130 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6133 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6134 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6137 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6140 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6142 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6144 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6145 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6146 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6147 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6148 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6149 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6152 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6153 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6156 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6157 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6158 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6159 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6160 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6161 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6162 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6163 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6164 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6165 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6167 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6170 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6171 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6172 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6174 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6175 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6177 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6178 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6180 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6181 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6182 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6183 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6186 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6187 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6191 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6192 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6193 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6196 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6197 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6198 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6199 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6200 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6201 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6202 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6204 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6205 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6206 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6207 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6208 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6210 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6211 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6212 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6213 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6217 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6218 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6219 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6220 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6221 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6222 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6223 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6224 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6226 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6227 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6228 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6229 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6230 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6231 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6233 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6234 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6238 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6239 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6240 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6241 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6242 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6243 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6244 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6246 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6247 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6248 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6249 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6250 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6252 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6253 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6255 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6256 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6257 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6262 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6263 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6264 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6265 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6266 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6267 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6268 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6269 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6270 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6272 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6274 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6275 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000000, 500000001, &logger).unwrap();
6276 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6277 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6281 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6282 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6283 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6284 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6285 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6286 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6287 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6288 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6289 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6290 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6292 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6293 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6294 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6295 let payment_event = {
6296 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6297 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6298 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6301 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6302 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6303 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6304 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6308 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6310 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6312 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6314 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6315 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6317 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6318 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6319 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6320 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6321 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6323 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6324 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6328 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6329 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6333 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6334 let channel_value = 100000;
6335 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6336 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6338 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6340 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6341 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6343 let route = Route { paths: vec![vec![RouteHop {
6344 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), node_features: NodeFeatures::known(), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
6345 short_channel_id: nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
6346 fee_msat: max_in_flight + 1, cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV
6348 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6349 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6351 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6352 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6354 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6357 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6359 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6360 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6361 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6362 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6363 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6364 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6365 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6366 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6368 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6369 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6370 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6373 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6374 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6375 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6376 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], htlc_minimum_msat, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6377 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6379 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6380 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6381 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6382 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6383 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6384 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6389 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6390 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6391 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6392 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6393 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6394 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6395 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6396 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6398 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6399 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6400 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6401 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6402 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6404 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6405 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6406 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6407 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], max_can_send, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6408 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6410 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6412 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6413 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6414 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6415 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6416 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6418 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6419 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6420 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6425 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6426 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6427 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6428 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6430 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6431 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6432 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6433 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6435 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6436 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6438 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6439 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6441 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6442 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6443 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6444 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6446 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6450 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6451 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6452 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6455 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6456 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6457 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6459 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6460 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6462 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6463 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6464 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6469 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6470 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6471 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6472 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6473 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6474 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6475 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6476 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6478 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6479 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6480 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6481 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6483 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6484 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6485 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6487 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6488 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6489 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6494 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6495 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6496 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6497 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6498 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6499 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6500 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6502 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6503 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6504 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6505 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6506 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6508 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6509 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6510 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6512 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6513 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6514 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6519 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6520 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6521 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6522 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6526 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6527 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6529 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6530 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6531 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6532 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6533 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6535 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6536 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6538 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6539 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6540 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6541 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6542 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6543 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6544 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6545 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6546 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6547 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6548 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6549 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6550 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6553 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6554 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6555 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6557 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6559 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6561 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6562 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6563 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6568 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6569 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6571 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6572 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6573 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6574 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6575 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6576 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6577 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6578 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6579 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6580 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6583 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6584 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6586 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6589 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6592 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6594 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6595 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6596 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6601 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6602 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6604 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6607 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6608 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6609 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6611 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6612 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6613 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6614 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6616 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6617 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6619 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6622 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6625 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6627 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6628 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6629 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6634 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6635 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6637 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6638 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6639 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6640 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6641 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6642 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6644 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6645 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6646 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6647 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6649 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6650 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6651 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6654 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6655 failure_code: 0x8000,
6658 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6660 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6661 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6662 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6667 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6668 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6670 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6671 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6672 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6673 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6674 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6676 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6678 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6681 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6682 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6683 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6685 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6686 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6687 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6688 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6689 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6690 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6691 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6693 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6697 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6699 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6701 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6702 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6703 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6708 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6709 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6711 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6712 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6713 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6714 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6715 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6717 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6719 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6722 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6723 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6724 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6726 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6727 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6728 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6729 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6730 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6731 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6732 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6734 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6738 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6740 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6742 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6743 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6744 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6749 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6750 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6752 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6753 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6754 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6755 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6756 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6757 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6759 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6760 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6761 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6762 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6765 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6766 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6768 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6770 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6772 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6774 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6776 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6777 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6778 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6779 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6780 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6781 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6782 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6787 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6788 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6790 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6791 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6792 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6797 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6798 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6799 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6801 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6802 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6803 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6804 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6805 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6806 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6807 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6809 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
6812 let mut payment_event = {
6813 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6814 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6815 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6817 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6818 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6819 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6821 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6823 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6824 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6825 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6826 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6828 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6829 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6832 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6833 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6835 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6837 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6838 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6839 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6841 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6842 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6843 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6844 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6845 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6846 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6847 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6849 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6853 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6856 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6857 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6858 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6859 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6861 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6863 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6864 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6865 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6866 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6867 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6868 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6870 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6876 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6877 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6878 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6879 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6881 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6882 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6883 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6884 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6885 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6886 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6888 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6890 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6891 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6892 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6893 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6895 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6896 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6898 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6899 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6901 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6904 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6905 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6906 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6909 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6910 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6912 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6914 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6915 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6917 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6920 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6921 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6926 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6927 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6928 if announce_latest {
6929 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6931 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6934 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6937 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6938 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6939 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6940 // Only 2 PaymentFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6941 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6942 let mut first_failed = false;
6943 for event in events {
6945 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6946 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6947 assert!(!first_failed);
6948 first_failed = true;
6950 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6959 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6960 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6961 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6964 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6965 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6966 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6967 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6968 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6969 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6970 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6972 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6973 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6974 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6975 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6976 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6978 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6980 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6981 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6983 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6984 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6986 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6988 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6989 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6992 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6994 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6995 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6996 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6997 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
6999 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7000 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7002 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7003 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7004 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7005 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7006 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7007 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7008 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7009 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7011 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7012 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7013 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7015 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7016 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7017 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7019 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7020 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7021 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7022 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7023 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7024 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7025 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7027 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7029 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7030 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7033 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7034 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7035 else { first = false; }
7037 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7040 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7041 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7042 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7044 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7051 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7052 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7053 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7054 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7058 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7059 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7061 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7062 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7063 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7064 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7065 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7068 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7069 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7071 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7072 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
7074 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7075 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7077 } else { assert!(false) }
7079 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7080 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7081 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7082 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7083 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
7085 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7086 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7088 } else { assert!(false); }
7090 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7091 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7092 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7093 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7094 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7095 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7096 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7098 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7099 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7101 _ => { assert!(false); }
7103 } else { assert!(false); }
7105 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7106 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7107 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7108 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7109 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config) {
7111 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7114 } else { assert!(false); }
7118 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7119 // We want to be sure that :
7120 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7121 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7122 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7123 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7124 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7130 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7131 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7132 // during signing due to revoked tx
7133 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7134 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7137 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7138 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7139 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7141 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7143 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7144 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7145 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7146 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7148 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7149 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7151 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7152 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7154 // Restore node A from previous state
7155 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7156 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7157 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7158 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7159 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7160 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7161 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7163 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7164 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7165 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7166 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7167 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7168 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7170 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7171 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7175 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7176 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7177 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7178 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7182 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7183 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7185 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7187 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7188 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7192 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7193 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7196 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7197 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7198 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7199 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7200 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7201 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7202 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7204 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7205 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7207 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7210 panic!("Unexpected event")
7214 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7215 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7216 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7220 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7221 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7222 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7223 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7224 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7225 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7226 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7227 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7228 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7229 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7233 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7234 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7235 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7236 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7238 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7239 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7240 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7241 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7243 // Create some initial channels
7244 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7246 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
7247 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7248 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, 0).unwrap();
7249 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7252 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7253 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7254 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7255 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7256 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7258 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7259 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7260 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7261 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7263 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7264 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7265 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7267 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7268 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7269 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7270 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7271 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7272 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7273 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7274 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7275 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7276 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7282 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7283 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7285 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7286 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7287 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7288 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7292 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7293 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7294 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7299 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7301 let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7302 let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7303 let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7306 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7307 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7309 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7310 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7311 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7312 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7313 let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7314 for e in msg_events {
7316 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7317 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7318 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7319 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7320 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7323 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7327 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7328 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7329 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7330 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7331 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7332 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7334 // Reestablish chan_1
7335 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7336 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7337 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7338 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7339 // Reestablish chan_2
7340 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7341 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7342 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7343 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7344 // Reestablish chan_3
7345 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7346 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7347 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7348 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7350 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7351 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7352 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7353 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7354 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7355 chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7356 for e in msg_events {
7358 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7359 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7360 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7361 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7362 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7365 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7371 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7372 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7373 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7374 // to forward through that channel.
7375 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7376 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7377 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7378 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7379 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7380 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7381 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7382 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7383 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7384 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7386 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7388 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7389 // not send for private channels.
7390 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7391 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7392 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7393 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7394 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7396 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7397 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7398 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7401 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7404 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7405 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7406 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7407 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7408 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7409 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7410 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7411 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7412 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7413 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7415 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7416 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7417 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7419 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7421 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7423 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7424 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7425 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
7426 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7427 &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7428 &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None,
7429 &[&RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7430 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7431 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7432 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7433 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7434 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7435 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7436 }])], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
7438 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7440 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7441 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7442 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7444 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7445 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7446 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7447 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7448 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7450 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7451 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7452 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7454 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7455 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7457 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7458 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7460 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7461 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7462 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7464 let mons = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
7465 let mut mon_iter = mons.iter();
7466 mon_iter.next().unwrap().1.write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7467 mon_iter.next().unwrap().1.write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7470 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7471 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7472 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7473 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7475 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7476 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7477 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7478 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7479 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7480 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7482 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7484 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7485 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7486 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7487 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7488 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7489 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7490 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7492 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7493 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7494 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7495 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7499 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7500 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7502 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7503 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7505 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7507 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7508 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7509 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7510 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7511 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7512 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7513 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7514 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7516 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7517 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7518 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7519 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7520 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7521 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7522 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7523 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7525 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7527 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7528 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7532 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7533 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7534 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7536 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7537 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7538 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7539 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7541 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7542 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7544 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7545 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
7546 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3000000, 30, &logger).unwrap();
7547 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7549 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7550 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7551 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7552 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7553 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7554 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7556 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7557 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7558 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7559 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7563 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7564 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7566 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7567 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7568 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7569 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7572 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7576 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7577 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7578 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7579 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7580 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7581 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7582 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7583 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7587 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7588 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7589 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7590 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7592 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7593 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7594 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7595 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7596 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7597 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7598 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7599 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7600 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7601 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7602 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7603 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7604 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7608 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7610 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7611 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7613 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7615 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7616 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7617 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7618 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7619 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7620 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7621 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7622 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7623 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7624 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7625 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7626 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7627 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7631 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7633 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7634 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7638 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7639 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7640 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7642 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7643 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7646 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7648 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7649 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7650 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7651 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
7652 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7653 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7654 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
7655 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7657 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7658 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7659 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7661 // Revoke local commitment tx
7662 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7664 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7665 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7666 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7667 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7669 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7671 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7672 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7673 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7675 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7676 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7677 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7679 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7680 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7681 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7682 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7684 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7685 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7686 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7687 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7688 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7689 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7690 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7695 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7696 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7697 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7699 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7700 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7701 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7702 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7704 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7705 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7706 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7707 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7708 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7709 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7711 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7712 // available, which we check here:
7713 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7714 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7715 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7717 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7718 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7720 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7721 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7722 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7723 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7725 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7726 // output, checked above).
7727 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7728 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7729 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7731 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7732 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7733 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7734 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7735 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7739 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7740 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7741 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7742 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7743 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7745 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7746 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7748 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7749 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7750 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7751 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7752 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7754 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7755 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7761 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7762 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7763 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7764 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7766 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7767 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7769 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7770 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7771 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7772 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7773 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7774 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7775 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7776 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7780 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7781 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7782 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7783 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7785 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7786 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7787 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7788 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7789 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7790 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7791 // up bumped justice generation.
7792 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7795 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7800 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7801 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7802 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7805 // Provide preimage for one
7806 // Check aggregation
7808 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7809 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7810 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7811 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7813 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7814 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7815 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7817 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7818 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7819 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7820 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7821 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7823 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7824 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7825 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7827 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7829 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7833 let feerate_timeout;
7834 let feerate_preimage;
7836 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7837 // 9 transactions including:
7838 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7839 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7840 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7842 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7843 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7844 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7845 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7846 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7847 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7848 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7850 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7851 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7852 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7853 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7855 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7856 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7857 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7858 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7860 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7861 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7862 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7863 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7867 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7868 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7870 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7871 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7873 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7874 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7875 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7876 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7877 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7878 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7880 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7881 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7882 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7883 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7884 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7886 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7887 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7888 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7889 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7890 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7895 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7896 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7900 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7901 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7902 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7903 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7904 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7905 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7906 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7907 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7909 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7910 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7911 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7912 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7913 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7915 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7916 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7918 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7920 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7921 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7922 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7924 // Must revoke without gaps
7925 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7926 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7928 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7929 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7930 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7932 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7933 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7934 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7939 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7940 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7941 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7943 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7944 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7945 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7946 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7948 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7949 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7950 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7951 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7953 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7954 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7955 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7957 // Revoke local commitment tx
7958 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7960 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7961 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7962 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7963 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7965 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7966 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7969 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7970 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7971 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7972 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7973 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7974 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7978 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7979 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7980 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7982 let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
7983 if let Some(monitor) = monitors.get(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }) {
7984 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7985 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7991 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7992 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7993 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7994 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7995 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7997 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7998 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7999 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8001 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8003 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8004 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8005 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8006 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8010 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8011 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8012 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8013 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8014 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8015 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8016 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8018 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8019 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8020 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8022 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8023 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8024 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8028 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8029 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8030 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8031 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8032 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8033 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8035 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8036 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8037 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8038 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8039 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8041 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
8042 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
8043 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
8044 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8045 route.paths.push(path);
8046 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8047 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8048 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8049 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8050 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8051 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8052 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8053 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8057 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8058 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8059 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8060 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8061 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8062 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8064 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8067 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, 42);
8069 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8070 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
8071 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
8072 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8074 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8075 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8076 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8077 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8079 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8080 // values from previous calls.
8081 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8082 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8083 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8085 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8087 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, user_payment_id, .. } => {
8088 assert_eq!(*user_payment_id, 42);
8089 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8091 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8094 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8099 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8100 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8104 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8106 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8108 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8110 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8111 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8112 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8113 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8114 } else { panic!(); }
8116 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8118 header: BlockHeader {
8120 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8121 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8122 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8126 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8127 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8128 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8129 } else { panic!(); }
8131 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8132 // again with a different user_payment_id (this time getting a new payment secret).
8133 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8134 block.header.time += 1;
8135 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8136 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 42).unwrap();
8137 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8140 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8141 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
8142 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
8143 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8145 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8146 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8147 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8148 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8150 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8151 // values from previous calls.
8152 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8153 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8154 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8156 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, user_payment_id }, .. } => {
8157 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8158 assert_eq!(user_payment_id, 42);
8159 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8160 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8167 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8168 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8169 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8170 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8171 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8172 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8174 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8176 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8177 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8178 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8180 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8181 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
8182 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
8184 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8185 // resulting events.
8186 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8189 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8190 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8191 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8192 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8194 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8195 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8196 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8197 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8200 // We should fail the payment back
8201 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8202 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8203 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8204 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8205 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8207 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8212 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8213 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8214 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8216 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8217 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8218 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8219 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8221 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8222 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8223 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8224 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8226 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8227 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8228 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8229 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8233 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8234 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8235 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8236 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8238 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8239 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8240 // commitment at same time.
8242 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8243 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8244 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8245 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8247 // Create some initial channel
8248 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8249 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8251 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8252 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8254 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8255 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8257 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8258 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8259 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8260 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8262 let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
8263 let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
8264 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8265 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8266 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8267 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8268 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8269 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8270 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8273 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8274 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8275 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8276 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8277 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8279 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8280 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8282 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8283 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8284 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8285 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8286 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8287 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8288 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8289 } else { assert!(false); }
8290 } else { assert!(false); };
8291 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8293 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8294 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8298 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8299 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8300 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8301 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8302 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8304 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8305 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8306 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8307 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8309 // Create some initial channel
8310 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8311 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8313 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8314 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8316 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8317 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8319 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8320 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8321 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8322 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8323 let watchtower_alice = {
8324 let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
8325 let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
8326 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8327 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8328 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8329 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8330 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8331 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8332 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8335 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8336 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8337 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8338 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8339 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8341 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8343 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8344 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8348 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8349 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8350 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8351 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8352 let watchtower_bob = {
8353 let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
8354 let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
8355 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8356 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8357 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8358 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8359 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8360 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8361 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8364 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8365 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8367 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8368 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8370 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
8371 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3000000 , TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
8372 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8376 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8377 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8378 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8379 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8380 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8381 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8382 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8383 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8384 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8385 } else { assert!(false); }
8386 } else { assert!(false); };
8387 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8390 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8391 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8392 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8394 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8397 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8398 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8399 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8403 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8404 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8405 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8407 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8408 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8409 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8410 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8411 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8412 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8417 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8418 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8419 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8422 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8423 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8425 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8426 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8427 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8428 // before receiving funding_signed.
8429 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8430 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8431 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8432 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8434 // Create an initial channel
8435 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8436 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8437 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8438 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8439 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8441 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8442 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8444 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8447 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8448 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8449 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8450 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8454 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8455 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8456 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8457 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8458 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8459 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8460 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8462 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8463 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8464 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8465 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8467 // Create some initial channels
8468 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8470 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8471 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8472 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8473 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8474 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8475 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8477 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8478 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8479 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8480 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8481 // this test before #653 fix.
8482 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8483 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8485 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8487 let htlc_timeout = {
8488 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8489 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8490 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8491 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8495 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8496 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8497 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8498 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8501 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8502 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8503 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8504 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8506 // Steps of the test:
8507 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8508 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8509 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8510 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8511 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8512 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8513 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8514 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8515 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8516 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8517 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8518 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8520 // Create some initial channels
8521 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8522 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8524 // Steps (1) and (2):
8525 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8526 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8528 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8529 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8530 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8531 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8532 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8533 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8534 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8536 // Steps (3) and (4):
8537 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8538 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8539 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8540 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8541 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8542 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8544 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8545 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8546 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8547 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8549 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8550 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8551 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8552 if broadcast_alice {
8553 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8556 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8557 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8561 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8562 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8563 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8565 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8566 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8567 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8568 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8569 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8570 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8572 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8573 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8574 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8575 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8576 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8577 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8579 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8580 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8585 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8586 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8587 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8590 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8591 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8592 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8593 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8594 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8597 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8599 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8600 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8601 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8604 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8607 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8609 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8612 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8613 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8614 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8615 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8616 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8619 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8621 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8624 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8625 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8626 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8627 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8628 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8629 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8630 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8631 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8632 if broadcast_alice {
8633 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8636 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8637 if broadcast_alice {
8638 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8639 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8640 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8641 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8643 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8644 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8646 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8647 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8652 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8653 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8655 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8656 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8657 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8658 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8660 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8661 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8662 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8664 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8665 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8666 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8667 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8668 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8669 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8670 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8672 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8673 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8679 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8680 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8681 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8682 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8683 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8687 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8688 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8689 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8691 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8692 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8693 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8694 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8695 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8696 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8697 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8698 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8700 // Create an initial channel
8701 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8702 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8703 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8704 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8706 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8707 // that it is rejected.
8708 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8710 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8711 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8713 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8714 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8715 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8716 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8717 // move forward with it.
8718 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8719 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8721 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8725 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8726 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8728 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8731 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8732 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8734 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8735 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8736 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8737 added_monitors.clear();
8739 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8741 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8742 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8744 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8747 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8748 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8749 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8750 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8751 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8753 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8754 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8756 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8757 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8758 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8759 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8760 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8762 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8766 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8767 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8768 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8769 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8770 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8771 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8773 let funding_created = {
8774 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8775 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8776 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8777 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8780 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8781 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8782 // still needs to be cleared here.
8783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8785 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8787 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8788 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8790 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8791 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8792 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8793 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8794 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8800 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8801 // everything is functional.
8802 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8804 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8805 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8806 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8807 added_monitors.clear();
8810 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8811 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8812 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8813 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8815 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8816 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8817 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8818 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8822 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8823 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8825 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8826 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8827 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8828 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8829 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8830 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8831 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8833 // Create some initial channels
8834 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8835 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8836 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8838 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8839 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8840 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8842 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8843 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8844 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8846 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8847 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8849 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8850 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8851 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8852 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8853 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8855 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8856 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8857 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8859 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8860 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8862 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8863 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8868 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8869 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8871 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8873 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8874 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8875 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8876 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8877 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8878 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8880 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8881 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8882 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8886 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8887 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8889 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8890 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8891 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8892 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8893 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8894 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8895 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8896 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8898 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8899 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8900 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8902 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8903 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8904 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8905 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8908 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8909 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8912 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8915 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8916 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8918 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8919 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8920 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8922 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8924 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8925 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8926 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8927 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8928 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8929 assert_eq!(msg.data, "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index");
8930 } else { panic!(); }
8931 } else { panic!(); }
8932 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8935 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8936 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8937 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8938 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8939 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8940 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8941 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8942 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8943 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8944 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8945 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8946 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8947 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8948 // until we learned about an additional block.
8950 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8951 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8952 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8953 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8954 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8955 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8956 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8958 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8959 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8960 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8961 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8962 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8964 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
8965 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8967 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8968 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8970 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8971 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8972 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8974 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8975 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8976 if test_height_before_timelock {
8977 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8978 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8979 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8980 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8982 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8983 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8984 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8985 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8986 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8987 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8989 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8990 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8992 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8993 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8994 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8995 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8996 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8997 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9000 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9001 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9002 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9003 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9004 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9005 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9006 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9007 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9008 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9013 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9014 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9015 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9019 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9023 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9025 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9026 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
9027 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9028 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9029 let route = get_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey, None,
9030 None, &vec![], 10000, 40,
9031 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
9033 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9034 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9036 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9037 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9038 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9039 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9040 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9041 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9045 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9046 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9047 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9048 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9049 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9051 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9052 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9053 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9054 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9056 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9057 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
9058 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9059 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
9060 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
9061 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
9063 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9064 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9066 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9067 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9068 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9069 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9070 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9071 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9074 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, at_forward: bool, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9075 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat` policy.
9077 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9078 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next counterparty
9079 // commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the update.
9080 // At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound
9081 // and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included on next
9082 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail the update.
9083 // Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel might be
9084 // available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9086 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9087 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9088 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9089 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9090 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(config)]);
9091 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9093 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9094 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9095 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9096 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9097 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9098 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9100 accept_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 660;
9102 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9104 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9107 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9108 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 660;
9112 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9113 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9116 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9119 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9120 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9121 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9124 if dust_outbound_balance {
9126 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 2_300_000);
9127 if let Err(_) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9131 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 2_300_000);
9135 if dust_outbound_balance {
9137 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 200_000); // + 177_000 msat of HTLC-success tx at 253 sats/kWU
9138 if let Err(_) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9142 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000); // + 167_000 msat of HTLC-timeout tx at 253 sats/kWU
9148 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { 2_300_000 } else { 200_000 });
9149 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9151 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", 6_900_000, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9153 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", 5_200_000, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9156 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1 ], if on_holder_tx { 2_300_000 } else { 200_000 });
9157 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9159 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9160 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9161 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9162 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9164 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", 6_900_000, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9166 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", 5_200_000, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9170 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9171 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9172 added_monitors.clear();
9176 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9177 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, true, true);
9178 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, true, true);
9179 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, false, true);
9180 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, false, false);
9181 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, true, false);
9182 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, false, false);
9183 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, false, true);
9184 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, true, false);