1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT;
26 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, get_route, get_keysend_route};
27 use routing::network_graph::RoutingFees;
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
64 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
65 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
66 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
67 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
68 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
70 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
72 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
73 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
74 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
76 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
77 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
79 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
80 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
82 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
83 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
84 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
85 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
86 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
87 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
88 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
89 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
91 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
92 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
94 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
96 } else { assert!(false); }
99 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
100 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
102 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
103 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
105 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
107 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
109 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
111 insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
113 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
115 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
117 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
119 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
123 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
124 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
125 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
126 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
127 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
128 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
129 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
132 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
136 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
137 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
138 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
139 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
140 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
141 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
142 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
143 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
144 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
145 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
147 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
149 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
151 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
153 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
156 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
159 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
160 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
161 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
162 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
163 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
165 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
168 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
170 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
171 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
172 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
173 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap(), our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
176 let payment_event = {
177 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
178 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
179 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
181 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
182 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
184 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
185 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
186 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
187 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
188 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
191 // deliver(1), generate (3):
192 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
193 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
194 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
197 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
198 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
199 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
200 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
201 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
202 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
203 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
206 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
207 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
208 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
209 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
210 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
211 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
212 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
215 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
216 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
217 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
220 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
221 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
224 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
227 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
228 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
230 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
231 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
234 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
239 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
240 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
241 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
242 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
243 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
244 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
245 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
246 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
247 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
250 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
252 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
254 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
257 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
260 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
261 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
262 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
263 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
266 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
269 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
271 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
272 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
273 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
274 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap(), our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
277 let payment_event = {
278 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
279 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
280 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
282 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
283 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
285 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
286 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
287 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
288 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
289 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
292 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
295 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
299 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
300 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
301 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
302 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
303 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
304 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
307 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
308 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
309 // update_fee (never committed) ->
311 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
312 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
313 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
314 // <- (1) RAA delivered
315 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
316 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
317 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
318 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
320 // B should send no response here
321 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
322 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
325 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
328 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
329 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
330 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
332 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
335 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
336 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
337 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
338 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
339 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
344 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
345 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
346 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
347 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
350 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
353 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
354 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
356 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
357 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
358 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
360 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
361 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
362 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
363 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
366 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
368 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
370 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
372 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
373 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
374 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
376 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
377 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
378 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
379 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
380 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
381 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
382 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
384 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
385 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
386 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
388 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
390 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
391 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
395 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
396 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
399 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
400 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
403 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
404 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
405 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
408 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
409 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
413 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
414 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
415 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
416 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
417 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
418 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
419 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
420 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
421 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
422 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
423 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
424 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
425 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
426 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
427 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
428 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
430 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
431 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
432 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
434 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
435 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
436 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
439 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
440 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
441 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
445 fn test_1_conf_open() {
446 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
447 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
448 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
451 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
452 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
453 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
454 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
457 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
458 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
459 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
460 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
462 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
464 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
467 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
468 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
471 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
472 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
473 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
475 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
476 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
477 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
479 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
480 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
482 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
484 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
485 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
487 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
489 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
490 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
492 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
493 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
494 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
495 added_monitors.clear();
497 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
499 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
500 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
502 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
503 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
504 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
505 added_monitors.clear();
508 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
509 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
511 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
512 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
514 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
515 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
516 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
517 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
521 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
522 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
523 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
524 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
525 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
526 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
527 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
528 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
529 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
530 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
531 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
532 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
533 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
534 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
535 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
536 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
537 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
538 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
539 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
543 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
544 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
546 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
547 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
548 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
551 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
554 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
557 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
558 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
559 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
560 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
561 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
563 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
565 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
567 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
568 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
571 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
572 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
575 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
576 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
577 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
580 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
581 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
586 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
587 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
588 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
589 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
590 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
591 let channel_value = 1888;
592 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
593 let channel_id = chan.2;
597 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
598 *feerate_lock = feerate;
600 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
602 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
604 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
606 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
608 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
609 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
611 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
613 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
614 let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.output.len() - 2;
615 let total_fee: u64 = feerate as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
616 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
617 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
618 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
621 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
622 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
624 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
625 *feerate_lock = feerate + 2;
627 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
630 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
632 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
634 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
635 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
636 //Should produce and error.
637 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed);
638 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
640 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
644 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
646 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
648 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
649 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
650 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
653 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
656 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
659 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
662 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
663 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
664 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
665 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
666 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
670 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
671 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
672 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
675 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
676 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
677 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
679 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
680 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
682 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
683 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
684 added_monitors.clear();
686 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
687 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
688 // node[1] has nothing to do
690 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
691 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
694 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
695 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
696 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
698 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
700 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
702 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
703 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
704 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
705 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
706 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
707 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
709 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
710 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
712 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
714 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
716 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
718 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
720 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
721 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
723 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
725 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
727 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
729 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
730 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
732 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
736 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
738 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
739 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
740 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
744 fn test_update_fee() {
745 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
746 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
747 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
748 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
749 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
750 let channel_id = chan.2;
753 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
754 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
755 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
756 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
757 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
758 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
759 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
760 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
761 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
762 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
763 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
766 // Create and deliver (1)...
769 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
770 feerate = *feerate_lock;
771 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
773 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
776 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
777 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
778 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
779 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
780 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
784 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
786 // Generate (2) and (3):
787 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
788 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
792 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
793 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
796 // Create and deliver (4)...
798 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
799 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
801 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
803 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
804 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
805 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
806 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
807 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
809 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
812 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
813 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
816 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
817 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
819 // Handle (3), creating (6):
820 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
822 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
823 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
826 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
827 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
830 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
831 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
832 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
833 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
834 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
835 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
836 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
837 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
841 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
843 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
844 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
846 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
848 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
850 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
851 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
852 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
856 fn fake_network_test() {
857 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
858 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
859 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
860 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
861 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
862 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
864 // Create some initial channels
865 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
866 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
867 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
869 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
870 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
871 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
872 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
873 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
875 // Send some more payments
876 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
877 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
878 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
880 // Test failure packets
881 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
882 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
884 // Add a new channel that skips 3
885 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
887 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
888 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
889 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
890 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
891 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
892 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
893 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
895 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
896 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
898 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
899 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
900 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
901 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
903 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
906 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
907 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
908 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
909 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
911 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
914 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
915 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
916 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
917 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
919 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
921 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
922 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
923 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops] }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
925 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
927 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
928 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
929 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
930 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
932 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
935 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
936 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
937 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
938 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
940 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
943 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
944 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
945 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
946 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
948 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
950 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
951 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
952 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops] }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
954 // Claim the rebalances...
955 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
956 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
958 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
959 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
961 // Send some payments across both channels
962 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
963 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
964 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
967 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
968 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
969 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
970 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
972 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
974 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
975 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
976 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
978 // Close down the channels...
979 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
980 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
981 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
982 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
983 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
987 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
988 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
989 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
990 // commitment dance rounds.
991 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
992 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
993 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
994 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
995 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
996 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
997 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
999 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1000 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1001 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1002 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
1003 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
1004 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1005 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1009 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1010 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1011 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1012 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1014 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1015 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1017 let (_, payment_hash_1, payment_secret_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1019 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
1020 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
1021 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1022 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1023 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1024 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1027 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1028 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1030 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
1031 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
1032 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1036 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1037 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1038 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1039 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1041 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1042 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1043 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1044 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1045 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1046 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1049 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1050 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1051 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1053 expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1054 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false);
1056 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1057 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1058 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1061 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1062 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1064 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1066 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1068 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1070 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1071 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1073 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1075 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1077 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1079 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1081 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1083 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1085 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1088 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1090 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1091 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1092 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1094 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1095 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1097 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1101 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1102 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1105 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1109 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1110 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1111 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1112 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1113 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1114 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1115 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1117 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1118 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1124 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1126 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1127 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1129 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1130 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1132 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1133 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1134 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1138 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1139 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1140 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1141 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1142 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1143 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1144 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1145 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1147 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1148 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1151 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1153 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1155 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
1156 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 800_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
1157 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
1158 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1160 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1161 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1164 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1165 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1167 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1168 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1169 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1170 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1171 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1172 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1173 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1176 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1178 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1180 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1182 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1183 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1184 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1185 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1186 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1187 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1188 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1189 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1191 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1192 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1193 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1195 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1196 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1197 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1198 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1199 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1200 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1201 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1202 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1204 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1205 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1208 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1209 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1210 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1211 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1213 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1214 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1215 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1216 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1217 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1218 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1226 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1227 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1228 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1229 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1230 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1231 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1232 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1234 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1235 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1237 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1238 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
1239 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1240 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1241 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
1242 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), max_can_send + 1, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
1243 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1245 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1247 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1248 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1249 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1252 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1254 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1255 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1257 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1261 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1262 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1263 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1264 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1265 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1266 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1268 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1269 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1270 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1271 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1273 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1275 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1276 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1277 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1278 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1281 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1282 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1283 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1284 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1287 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1289 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1290 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1291 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1293 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1295 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1297 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1298 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1299 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1300 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1301 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1302 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1303 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1304 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1306 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1307 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1308 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1309 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1310 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1312 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1313 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1314 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1315 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1316 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1317 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1318 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1319 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1322 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1323 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1324 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1326 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1327 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1328 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1330 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1332 amount_msat: 3460001,
1333 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1335 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1338 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1341 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1342 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1343 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1344 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1348 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1349 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1351 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1352 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1354 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1357 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1360 htlc_signatures: res.1
1363 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1364 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1365 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1367 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1368 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1370 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1371 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1373 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1375 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1376 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1377 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1379 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1380 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1381 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1383 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1385 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1386 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1392 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1393 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1394 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1395 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1396 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1398 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1399 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1400 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1401 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1402 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1403 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1405 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1406 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
1407 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1409 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1411 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1412 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1414 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1415 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1416 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1417 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1418 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1419 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1423 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1424 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1425 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the funder
1426 // receiving 1 update_add_htlc would result in them closing the channel due
1427 // to channel reserve violation. This close could also happen if the fee went
1428 // up a more realistic amount, but many HTLCs were outstanding at the time of
1429 // the update_add_htlc.
1430 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1431 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1432 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1433 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1434 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1435 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1437 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1438 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1439 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1440 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1441 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1442 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1443 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 1000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1444 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1445 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1448 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1449 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1450 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1451 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1454 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1455 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1456 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1457 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1458 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1459 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1464 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1465 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1466 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1467 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1468 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1469 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1470 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1472 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1473 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1474 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1476 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1477 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1478 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1479 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1480 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) / 1000 * 1000;
1481 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1482 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1484 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1485 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1486 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1487 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1488 // commitment transaction fee.
1489 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1491 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1492 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1493 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1494 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1498 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1499 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1500 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1501 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1504 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1505 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1507 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1508 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1509 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1510 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1511 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1512 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1514 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1515 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1516 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1517 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1518 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1519 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1521 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1522 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1523 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1524 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1528 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1529 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1530 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1531 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1532 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1533 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1534 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1537 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1538 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1539 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1541 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1542 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1543 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1544 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1546 // Add a pending HTLC.
1547 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1548 let payment_event_1 = {
1549 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1552 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1553 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1554 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1556 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1558 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1559 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1560 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1561 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1562 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1564 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1565 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1566 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1567 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1568 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1569 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1570 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1571 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1574 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1575 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1576 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1577 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1580 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1581 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1582 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1583 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1584 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1585 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1590 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1591 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1592 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1593 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1594 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1595 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1596 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1597 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1598 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1599 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1601 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1602 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1603 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1605 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1606 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1609 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1610 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1614 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1615 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1616 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1617 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1618 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1619 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1620 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1621 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1622 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1623 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1624 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1626 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1627 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1629 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1630 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1632 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1634 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1635 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1636 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1637 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1642 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1643 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1644 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1646 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1648 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1650 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1651 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1652 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1653 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1654 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1655 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1656 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1659 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1660 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1662 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1663 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1664 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1665 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1666 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1667 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1668 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1671 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1673 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1674 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1675 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1676 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1677 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1680 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1681 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1682 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1683 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1684 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1687 // adding pending output.
1688 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1689 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1690 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1691 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1692 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1693 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1694 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1695 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1696 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1698 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1699 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1700 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1702 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1703 let payment_event_1 = {
1704 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1707 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1708 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1709 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1711 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1713 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1714 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1716 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1717 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1718 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1719 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1722 // split the rest to test holding cell
1723 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1724 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1725 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1726 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1728 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1729 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1732 // now see if they go through on both sides
1733 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1734 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1735 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1737 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1738 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1740 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1742 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1743 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1744 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1745 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1746 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1749 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1750 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1751 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1753 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1754 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1756 // flush the pending htlc
1757 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1758 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1761 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1762 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1764 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1766 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1767 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1768 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1771 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1772 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1775 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1777 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1778 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1779 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1781 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1782 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1784 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1785 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1786 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1787 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1788 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1789 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1791 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1792 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1793 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1794 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1796 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1797 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1799 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1800 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1802 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1803 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1804 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1806 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1807 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1808 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1810 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1813 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1816 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1817 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1818 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1820 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1821 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1822 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1824 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1827 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1830 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1831 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1832 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1834 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1835 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1836 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1838 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1839 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1840 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1841 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1842 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1844 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1845 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1849 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1850 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1851 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1852 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1853 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1854 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1855 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1856 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1858 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1859 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1860 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1861 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1862 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1863 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1864 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
1865 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1867 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1868 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1869 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1870 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1871 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1872 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1873 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1874 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1875 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1876 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1877 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1879 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1880 // Route the first two HTLCs.
1881 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1882 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1884 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1885 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
1887 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
1888 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
1889 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1891 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1892 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1893 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1896 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1897 // initial fulfill/CS.
1898 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1900 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1902 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1903 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
1904 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
1905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1906 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1908 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1909 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
1910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1911 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1912 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
1914 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
1915 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
1916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1917 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
1918 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1920 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1922 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1924 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1926 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1928 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1930 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1932 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
1933 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1934 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
1935 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
1936 // on-chain as necessary).
1937 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1938 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
1939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1940 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1941 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
1943 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1945 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1947 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1948 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
1950 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
1951 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1952 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1954 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1956 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
1957 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
1958 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
1960 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
1961 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 10000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
1962 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
1963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1964 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1965 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1966 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1969 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
1970 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
1971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1972 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1974 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
1976 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1978 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1980 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1983 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1985 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1987 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1989 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1991 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1994 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
1995 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
1997 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
1998 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2002 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2003 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2004 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2005 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2006 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2007 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2008 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2010 // Create some initial channels
2011 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2012 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2013 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2014 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2016 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2017 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2018 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2019 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2020 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2021 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2023 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2024 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2025 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2026 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2027 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2029 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2030 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2032 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2034 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2035 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2036 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2038 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2040 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2041 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2042 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2044 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2045 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2047 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2048 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2049 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2050 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2053 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2054 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2055 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2056 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2058 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2060 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2061 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2062 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2064 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2065 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2067 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2068 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2070 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2071 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2073 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2074 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2075 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2076 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2078 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2084 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2085 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2086 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2088 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2089 let node2_commitment_txid;
2091 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2092 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2093 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2094 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2096 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2097 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2098 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2100 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2102 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2103 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2104 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2106 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2107 // confusing us in the following tests.
2108 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.write().unwrap().remove(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
2110 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2111 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2112 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2115 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2116 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2117 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2118 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2119 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2120 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2123 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2126 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2127 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2129 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2133 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2135 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2136 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2137 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2143 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2145 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2146 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2148 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2149 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2151 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2152 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2158 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2159 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2164 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2166 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2167 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2168 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2170 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2171 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2172 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2173 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2175 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.write().unwrap().insert(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon);
2179 fn test_justice_tx() {
2180 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2181 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2182 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2183 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2184 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2185 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2186 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2187 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2188 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2189 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2190 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2191 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2192 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2193 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2194 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2195 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2196 // Create some new channels:
2197 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2199 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2200 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2201 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2202 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2203 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2204 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2205 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2206 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2207 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2208 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2209 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2210 // Revoke the old state
2211 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2214 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2216 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2217 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2218 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2220 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2221 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2222 node_txn.truncate(1);
2224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2225 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2227 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2228 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2229 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2230 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2232 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2233 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2234 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2236 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2238 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2239 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2241 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2242 // Create some new channels:
2243 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2245 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2249 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2250 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2251 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2252 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2253 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2254 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2255 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2256 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2257 // Revoke the old state
2258 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2260 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2262 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2263 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2264 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2266 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2267 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2270 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2272 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2273 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2275 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2276 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2278 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2279 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2280 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2284 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2285 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2286 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2287 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2288 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2289 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2290 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2291 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2292 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2293 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2294 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2295 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2296 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2297 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2298 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2300 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2301 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2303 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2304 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2306 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2307 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2309 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2310 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2311 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1)
2316 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2317 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2318 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2319 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2320 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2321 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2322 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2324 // Create some new channel:
2325 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2327 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2328 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2329 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2330 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2331 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2333 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2334 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2335 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2336 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2337 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2338 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2339 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2340 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2341 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2343 //Revoke the old state
2344 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2347 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2349 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2351 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2352 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2354 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2355 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2357 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2358 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2360 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2361 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2362 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2363 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2364 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2365 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2366 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2367 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2369 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2370 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2371 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2373 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2374 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2375 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2379 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2380 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2381 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2382 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2383 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2384 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2385 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2387 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2389 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2390 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2391 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2392 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2393 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2394 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2396 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2397 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2399 //Revoke the old state
2400 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2403 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2405 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2407 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
2409 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2410 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2412 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2413 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2414 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2415 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2416 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2417 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2419 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2420 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2421 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2422 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2423 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2424 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2425 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2427 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2428 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2429 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2430 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2432 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2433 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2434 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2436 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2437 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2438 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2439 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2440 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2441 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2442 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2443 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2445 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2446 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2447 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2451 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2452 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2453 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2454 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2455 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2456 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2457 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2458 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2459 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2461 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2462 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2463 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2464 // PaymentSent event).
2466 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2467 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2468 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2469 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2471 // Create some initial channels
2472 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2473 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2475 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2476 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2477 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2478 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2479 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2481 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2482 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2483 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2485 let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2486 let (our_payment_preimage_2, _payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2488 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2489 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2490 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2491 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2492 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2493 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2494 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2496 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2497 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2498 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2499 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2500 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2502 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2503 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2505 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2506 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2507 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2508 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2509 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2510 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2511 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2512 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2513 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2514 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2515 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2516 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2517 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2519 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2520 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2521 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2522 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2524 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2525 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2526 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2527 added_monitors.clear();
2529 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2530 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 2);
2531 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[0] {
2532 } else { panic!(); }
2533 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2534 } else { panic!(); }
2535 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2537 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2538 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2539 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2540 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2541 added_monitors.clear();
2543 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2545 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2546 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2549 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2550 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2554 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2555 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2556 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2557 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2558 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2559 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2561 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2563 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2564 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2565 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2566 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2567 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2568 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2569 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2570 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2571 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2572 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2574 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2575 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2576 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2577 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2579 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2580 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2581 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2582 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2584 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2585 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2589 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2590 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2591 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2592 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2594 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2595 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2596 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2597 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2598 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2599 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2601 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2602 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2603 let commitment_spend =
2604 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2605 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2606 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2607 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2610 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2611 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2612 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2616 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2617 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2618 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2619 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2620 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2621 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2622 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2623 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2624 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2625 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2626 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2627 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2629 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2630 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2631 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2632 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2633 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2635 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2636 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2637 let mut first_claimed = false;
2638 for event in events {
2640 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2641 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage {
2642 assert!(!first_claimed);
2643 first_claimed = true;
2645 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2648 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2651 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2654 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2655 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2656 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2657 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2658 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2659 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2661 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2663 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2664 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2665 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2666 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2667 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2668 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2669 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2671 // Create some intial channels
2672 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2673 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2675 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2676 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2677 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2679 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2681 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2682 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2683 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2684 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2686 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2689 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2690 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2692 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2693 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2694 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2695 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2696 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2697 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2701 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2702 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2704 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2705 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2706 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2707 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2709 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2710 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2711 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2712 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2715 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2716 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2717 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2718 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2720 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2721 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2723 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2724 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2725 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2726 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2728 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2732 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2734 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2736 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2737 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2738 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2739 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2742 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2744 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2745 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2746 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2747 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2748 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2749 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2750 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2752 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2756 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2758 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2759 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2761 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2762 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2763 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2764 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2765 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2766 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2771 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2772 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2773 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2775 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2776 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2778 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2780 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2781 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2782 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2783 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2784 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2785 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2789 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2790 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2791 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2792 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2796 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2797 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2798 // and fail backward accordingly.
2800 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2801 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2802 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2803 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2805 // Create some initial channels
2806 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2807 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2809 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2810 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2811 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2812 // Revoke the old state
2813 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2815 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2817 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2818 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2820 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2822 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2824 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2825 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2827 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2828 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2829 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2830 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2831 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2832 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2834 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2835 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2836 expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2837 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
2839 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2843 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2844 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2845 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2846 // commitment transaction anymore.
2847 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2848 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2849 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2850 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2851 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2852 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2854 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2855 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2856 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2857 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2858 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2859 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2860 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2861 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2862 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2864 // Create some initial channels
2865 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2866 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2868 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2869 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2870 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2871 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
2872 // Revoke the old state
2873 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2875 let value = if use_dust {
2876 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
2877 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
2878 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
2881 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2882 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2883 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2885 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
2886 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2888 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2889 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2890 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2891 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2892 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2893 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2894 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2895 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
2896 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
2898 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
2899 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2901 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2902 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2903 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2904 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2905 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2906 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2907 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2908 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2910 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2911 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2912 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2915 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
2916 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2918 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2919 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2920 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2921 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2922 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2923 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2924 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2925 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
2926 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
2927 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2929 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2930 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2931 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2934 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
2935 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
2936 let (_, fourth_payment_hash, fourth_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
2937 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
2938 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2939 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
2940 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
2941 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2942 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
2946 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2947 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
2948 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
2949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2950 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2951 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2953 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2954 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2956 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
2957 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
2960 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
2961 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2963 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2965 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2967 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2968 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 2 });
2970 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
2971 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
2973 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2975 if !deliver_bs_raa {
2977 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2981 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2984 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2985 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
2986 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
2987 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
2988 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2990 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
2991 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
2992 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
2993 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
2995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2999 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3000 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3001 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3002 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3003 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3004 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3009 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3010 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3011 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3012 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3013 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3014 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3015 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3017 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3018 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3019 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3021 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3023 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3024 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3025 // that we should update our routing table for.
3026 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3027 for event in events {
3029 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
3030 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3033 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3034 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3036 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3037 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3039 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3042 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3043 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3045 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3048 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3049 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3051 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3054 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3057 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3058 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3059 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3063 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3064 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3065 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3066 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3067 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3071 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3072 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3073 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3074 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3075 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3079 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3080 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3081 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3082 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3083 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3084 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3085 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3087 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3089 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3090 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3091 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 50_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3092 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3095 let payment_event = {
3096 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3097 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3098 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3100 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3101 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3104 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3105 let (_, failed_payment_hash, failed_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3107 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3108 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 50_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3109 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3112 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3115 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3117 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3119 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3120 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3121 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3122 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
3123 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 50_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3124 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3125 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3126 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3128 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3129 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3135 onion_routing_packet,
3137 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3140 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3141 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], failed_payment_hash, true);
3142 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3147 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3148 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3149 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3150 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3151 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3152 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3153 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3154 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3156 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3157 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3158 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3159 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3162 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3163 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3164 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3166 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3167 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3168 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3171 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3172 // registering new transactions
3173 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3174 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3178 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3179 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3183 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3184 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3185 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3186 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3188 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
3190 let mut payment_event = {
3191 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3192 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42, &logger).unwrap();
3193 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3196 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3197 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3198 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3201 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3202 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3204 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3206 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3207 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3208 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3209 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3212 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3213 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3215 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3217 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3218 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3219 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3221 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3222 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3225 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3226 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3227 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3228 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3229 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3233 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3235 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3236 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3239 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3241 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
3242 monitors.get(&OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_slice(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]).unwrap(), index: 0 }).unwrap()
3243 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &&logger);
3245 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3246 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3247 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3248 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3249 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3250 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3251 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3253 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3257 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3258 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3259 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3260 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3261 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3263 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3264 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3265 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3266 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3267 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3269 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3271 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3273 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3274 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3275 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3277 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3278 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3280 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3281 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3285 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3286 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3287 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3288 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3289 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3290 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3291 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3292 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3294 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3295 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3296 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3298 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3299 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3300 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3301 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3303 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3304 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3305 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3307 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3308 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3309 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3310 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3312 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3313 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3315 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3316 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
3318 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3320 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3321 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3323 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3324 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3326 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3329 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3330 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3331 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3333 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3337 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3338 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3341 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3342 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3343 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3344 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3345 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3346 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3348 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3349 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3350 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3351 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3352 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3353 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3354 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3356 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3359 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, payment_secret_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3361 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3362 let payment_event = {
3363 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3364 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
3365 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
3366 &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3367 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3370 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3371 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3372 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3374 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3376 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3377 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3379 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3380 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3381 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3383 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3385 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3386 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3387 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3390 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3391 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3392 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3393 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3396 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3397 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3398 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3406 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3407 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3408 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3409 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3410 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3411 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3413 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3414 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3415 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3417 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3418 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3420 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3421 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3422 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3423 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3424 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3425 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3426 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3427 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3428 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3429 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3430 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3431 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3432 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3433 // Everything was delivered...
3434 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3437 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3438 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3440 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3441 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3444 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3445 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3446 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3448 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3450 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3451 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3453 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3454 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3455 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3457 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3458 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3459 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3461 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3464 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3467 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3470 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3471 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3472 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3473 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3474 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3475 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3476 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3477 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3478 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3479 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3480 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3482 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3485 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3486 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3488 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3489 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3491 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
3492 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3494 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3497 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3498 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3500 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3502 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3503 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3504 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3507 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3508 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3509 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3510 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3513 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3514 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3515 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3523 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3524 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3525 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3526 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3527 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3528 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3529 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3531 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
3532 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3534 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3537 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3539 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3540 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3541 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3542 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3543 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3544 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3545 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3546 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3547 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3548 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3549 // Everything was delivered...
3550 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3553 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3555 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3557 // Channel should still work fine...
3558 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3559 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
3560 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
3561 &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3562 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3563 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3567 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3568 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3569 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3570 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3571 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3575 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3576 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3577 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3578 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3579 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3583 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3584 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3585 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3586 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3587 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3588 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3589 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3590 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3591 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3592 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3594 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3595 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3597 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3598 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3599 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3601 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3602 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3604 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3607 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3609 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3610 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3612 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3613 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3614 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3615 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3616 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3617 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3622 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3623 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3624 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3627 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3630 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3632 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3633 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3634 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3635 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3636 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3637 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3638 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3641 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3643 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3644 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3645 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3647 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3650 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3651 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3652 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3653 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3654 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3655 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3657 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3660 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3661 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3662 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3664 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3665 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3666 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3667 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3668 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3670 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3671 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3672 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3674 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3675 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3676 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3678 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3679 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3680 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3681 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3682 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3683 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3684 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3685 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3687 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3688 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3689 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3690 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3691 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3692 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3694 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3695 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3696 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3697 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3701 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3702 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3704 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3705 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3708 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3710 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3711 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3712 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3713 let mut found_announcement = false;
3714 for event in msgs.iter() {
3716 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3717 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3719 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3720 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3723 assert!(found_announcement);
3727 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3728 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3729 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3730 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3731 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3732 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3733 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3734 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3735 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3737 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3739 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3740 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3741 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3742 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3743 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3746 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3747 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3749 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3750 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3753 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3756 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3757 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3759 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3760 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3761 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3762 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3763 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3764 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3765 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3767 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3768 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3769 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3771 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
3772 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3777 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3778 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3779 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3785 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3786 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3788 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3789 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3790 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3791 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3792 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3793 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3795 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3796 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3797 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3798 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3800 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3801 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3803 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3804 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3806 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3808 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3809 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3810 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3811 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3812 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3813 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3814 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3815 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3816 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3819 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3820 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3821 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3822 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3823 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3824 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3825 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3828 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3829 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3830 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3831 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3832 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3833 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3834 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3837 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3838 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3839 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3842 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3843 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3844 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3847 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3848 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3851 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3853 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3854 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3856 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3857 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3859 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3860 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3861 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3863 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3869 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
3870 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3873 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3876 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
3877 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
3878 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
3879 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3880 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3881 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3882 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3884 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3885 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3887 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
3888 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3889 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3890 let (_, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
3891 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
3892 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
3893 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
3894 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
3895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3896 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3897 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3898 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
3899 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
3900 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
3903 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
3906 let mut block = Block {
3907 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
3910 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3911 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3912 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
3913 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
3914 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
3915 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3916 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3919 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3922 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3923 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3924 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3925 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3926 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
3928 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3929 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
3930 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
3931 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
3932 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
3933 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
3937 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
3938 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
3939 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
3942 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
3943 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
3944 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3945 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3946 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3947 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3948 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3949 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3951 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
3952 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
3953 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3954 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3956 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3958 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
3959 let (_, first_payment_hash, first_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
3961 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
3962 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3963 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3965 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
3966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3968 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
3969 let (_, second_payment_hash, second_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
3971 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
3972 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3973 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3975 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
3976 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3977 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3978 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3981 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
3982 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
3983 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3987 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
3988 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3989 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3990 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
3993 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3995 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3996 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
3997 match fail_commit[0] {
3998 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3999 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4000 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4002 _ => unreachable!(),
4004 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false);
4005 expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4007 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4012 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4013 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4014 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4018 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4019 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4020 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4021 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4022 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4023 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4024 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4025 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4026 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4027 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4029 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4031 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4033 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4034 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4035 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4037 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4038 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4039 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4040 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4041 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4042 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4043 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4044 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4045 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4046 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4048 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4049 let config = UserConfig::default();
4050 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4051 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4052 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4053 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4054 default_config: config,
4056 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4057 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4058 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4063 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4064 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4066 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4067 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4068 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4071 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4072 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4073 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4074 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4076 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4077 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4078 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4079 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4081 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4082 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4083 for node in nodes.iter() {
4084 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4085 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4086 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4089 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4093 fn test_dup_htlc_onchain_fails_on_reload() {
4094 // When a Channel is closed, any outbound HTLCs which were relayed through it are simply
4095 // dropped when the Channel is. From there, the ChannelManager relies on the ChannelMonitor
4096 // having a copy of the relevant fail-/claim-back data and processes the HTLC fail/claim when
4097 // the ChannelMonitor tells it to.
4099 // If, due to an on-chain event, an HTLC is failed/claimed, and then we serialize the
4100 // ChannelManager, we generally expect there not to be a duplicate HTLC fail/claim (eg via a
4101 // PaymentFailed event appearing). However, because we may not serialize the relevant
4102 // ChannelMonitor at the same time, this isn't strictly guaranteed. In order to provide this
4103 // consistency, the ChannelManager explicitly tracks pending-onchain-resolution outbound HTLCs
4104 // and de-duplicates ChannelMonitor events.
4106 // This tests that explicit tracking behavior.
4107 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4108 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4109 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4110 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4111 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4112 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4113 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4115 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4117 // Route a payment, but force-close the channel before the HTLC fulfill message arrives at
4119 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4120 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
4121 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4124 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4125 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4127 // Connect blocks until the CLTV timeout is up so that we get an HTLC-Timeout transaction
4128 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
4129 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4130 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4131 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4133 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4136 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4137 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
4138 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4140 let claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4142 header.prev_blockhash = nodes[0].best_block_hash();
4143 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
4145 // Serialize out the ChannelMonitor before connecting the on-chain claim transactions. This is
4146 // fairly normal behavior as ChannelMonitor(s) are often not re-serialized when on-chain events
4147 // happen, unlike ChannelManager which tends to be re-serialized after any relevant event(s).
4148 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4149 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4151 header.prev_blockhash = nodes[0].best_block_hash();
4152 let claim_block = Block { header, txdata: claim_txn};
4153 connect_block(&nodes[0], &claim_block);
4154 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
4156 // ChannelManagers generally get re-serialized after any relevant event(s). Since we just
4157 // connected a highly-relevant block, it likely gets serialized out now.
4158 let mut chan_manager_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4159 nodes[0].node.write(&mut chan_manager_serialized).unwrap();
4161 // Now reload nodes[0]...
4162 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4163 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4164 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4165 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4166 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4167 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4168 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4169 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4171 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4172 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4173 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4174 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>
4175 ::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&chan_manager_serialized.0[..]), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4176 default_config: Default::default(),
4178 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4179 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4180 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4181 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4185 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4187 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4189 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4191 // Note that if we re-connect the block which exposed nodes[0] to the payment preimage (but
4192 // which the current ChannelMonitor has not seen), the ChannelManager's de-duplication of
4193 // payment events should kick in, leaving us with no pending events here.
4194 let height = nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().len() as u32 - 1;
4195 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&claim_block, height);
4196 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4200 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4201 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4202 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4203 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4204 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4205 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4206 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4207 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4208 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4209 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4210 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4212 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4213 let channel_value = 100000;
4214 let push_msat = 10001;
4215 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4216 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4217 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4218 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4219 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4220 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4221 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4223 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4225 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4226 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4228 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4230 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4231 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4232 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4233 added_monitors.clear();
4236 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4238 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4239 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4240 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4241 added_monitors.clear();
4243 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4248 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4249 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4250 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4251 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4253 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4254 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4255 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4256 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4257 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4258 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4259 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4260 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4261 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4262 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4264 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4265 let config = UserConfig::default();
4266 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4267 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4268 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4269 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4270 default_config: config,
4272 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4273 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4274 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4279 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4280 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4282 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4284 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4285 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4287 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4288 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4289 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4290 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4291 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4293 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4294 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4297 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4298 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4299 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4300 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4302 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4303 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4304 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4305 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4307 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4308 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4309 for node in nodes.iter() {
4310 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4311 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4312 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4315 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4319 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4320 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4321 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4322 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4323 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4324 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4325 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4326 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4327 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4328 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4329 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4331 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4332 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4334 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4336 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4337 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4338 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4340 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4341 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4342 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4343 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4344 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4345 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4346 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4347 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4348 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4349 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4351 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4352 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4353 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4354 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4355 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4356 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4358 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4359 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4360 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4365 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4366 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4368 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4369 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4372 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4374 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4375 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4379 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4380 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4384 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4385 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4386 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4387 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4388 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4389 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4390 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4391 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4392 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4394 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4395 for monitor in nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter() {
4396 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4397 monitor.1.write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4398 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4401 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4403 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4404 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4406 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4407 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4408 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4409 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4411 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4413 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4414 for monitor in nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter() {
4415 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4416 monitor.1.write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4417 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4420 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4421 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4422 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4423 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4424 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4425 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4428 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4429 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4430 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4431 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4432 assert!(read.is_empty());
4433 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4436 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4437 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4438 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4439 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4440 assert!(read.is_empty());
4441 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4444 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4445 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4446 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4447 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4449 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4450 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4451 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4453 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4455 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4458 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4459 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4460 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4461 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4463 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4464 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4465 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4467 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4469 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4470 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4472 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4473 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4474 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4475 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4476 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4479 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4480 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4483 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4485 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4486 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4487 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4488 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4489 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4491 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4492 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4493 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4494 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4495 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4496 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4497 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4499 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4500 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4502 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4507 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4508 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4510 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4511 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4512 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4513 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4514 for event in events.drain(..) {
4516 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4517 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4518 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4519 all_outputs.push(outp);
4522 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4525 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4526 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4536 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4537 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4538 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4539 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4540 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4541 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4543 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4544 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4545 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4547 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4548 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4549 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4550 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4552 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4553 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4555 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4556 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4557 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4558 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4559 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4563 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4564 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4565 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4566 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4569 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4571 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4572 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4573 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4576 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4577 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4578 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4579 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4581 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4582 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4584 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4586 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4587 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4588 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4592 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4593 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4594 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4596 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4597 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4598 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4599 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4601 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4602 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4603 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4604 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4605 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4607 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4608 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4609 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4612 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4613 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4614 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4616 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4617 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4618 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4619 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4620 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4624 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4625 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4626 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4627 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4628 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4630 // Create some initial channels
4631 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4633 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4635 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4636 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4637 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4639 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4640 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4642 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4644 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4646 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4647 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4650 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4651 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4654 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4655 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4656 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4657 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4658 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4659 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4660 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4662 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4663 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4665 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4666 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4667 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4671 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4672 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4673 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4674 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4675 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4677 // Create some initial channels
4678 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4680 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4681 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4683 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4685 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4686 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4687 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4689 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4690 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4692 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4694 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4695 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4697 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4699 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4700 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4701 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4702 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4703 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4704 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4706 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4707 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4708 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4710 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4711 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4712 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4713 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4714 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4718 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4719 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4720 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4721 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4722 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4724 // Create some initial channels
4725 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4727 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4728 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4729 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4730 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4732 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4734 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4735 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4738 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4739 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4740 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4741 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4743 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4744 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4746 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4747 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4748 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4752 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4753 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4754 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4755 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4756 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4757 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4759 // Create some initial channels
4760 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4762 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4763 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4764 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4765 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4767 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4769 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4770 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4771 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4773 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4775 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4776 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4777 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4778 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4779 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4780 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4781 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4783 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4784 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4785 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4786 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4789 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4790 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4791 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4792 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4793 // transactions next...
4794 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4795 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4797 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4798 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4799 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4800 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4802 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4803 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4806 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4807 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4809 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4810 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4812 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4813 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4814 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4815 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4816 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4820 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4821 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4822 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4823 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4824 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4825 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4827 // Create some initial channels
4828 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4830 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4831 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4832 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4833 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4835 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4836 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4838 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4840 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4841 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4842 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4844 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4846 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4847 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4848 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4849 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4851 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4852 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4853 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4855 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4856 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4857 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4858 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4861 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4862 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4864 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4865 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4866 // transactions next...
4867 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4868 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4869 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4870 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4872 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4873 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4876 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4877 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4879 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4881 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4882 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4884 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4885 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4887 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4888 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4889 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4890 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4891 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4892 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4893 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4894 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4898 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4899 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4900 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4901 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4902 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4904 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4907 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4908 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4909 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4910 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4912 // Create some initial channels
4913 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4914 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4916 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4917 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4918 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4919 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4920 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4922 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4923 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4924 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4926 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4927 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4928 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4929 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4931 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4932 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4933 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4934 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4935 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4937 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4938 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4941 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4942 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4943 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4944 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4945 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4946 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4947 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4948 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4949 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4950 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4952 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4953 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4954 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4956 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(1000), true);
4958 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4959 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4960 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4961 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4964 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4965 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4967 match msg_events[0] {
4968 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4971 match msg_events[1] {
4972 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4973 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4975 match msg_events[2] {
4976 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4977 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4978 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4979 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4980 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4981 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4983 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4985 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4986 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4987 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4988 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4989 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4990 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4991 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4992 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4993 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4994 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4995 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4996 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4998 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5003 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5004 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5005 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5006 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5007 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5008 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5009 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5010 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5011 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5012 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5013 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5014 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5015 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5016 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5018 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5019 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5020 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5022 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5023 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5024 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5025 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5026 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5028 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5030 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5031 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5032 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5033 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5034 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
5035 &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5036 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5038 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5039 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5040 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5042 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5043 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5045 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5047 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5048 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5049 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5050 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5051 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5052 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5054 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5055 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5056 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5057 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5058 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5059 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5060 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5062 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5063 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5064 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5065 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5068 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5069 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5071 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5073 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5074 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5077 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5078 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5080 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5081 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5082 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5083 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5084 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5085 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5086 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5087 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5088 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5089 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5090 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5091 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5092 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5094 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5095 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5096 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5097 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5098 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5099 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5100 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5101 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5102 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5105 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5106 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5108 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5109 expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5111 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false);
5113 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5114 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5115 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5116 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5117 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5118 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5119 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5120 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5121 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5122 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5123 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5126 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5127 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5129 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5131 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5132 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5139 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5140 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5141 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5142 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5143 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5145 // Create some initial channels
5146 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5148 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5149 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5150 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5151 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5152 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5154 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5155 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5157 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5159 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5161 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5165 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5166 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5169 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5170 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5171 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5172 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5173 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5174 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5175 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5179 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5180 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5182 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5183 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5184 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5185 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5186 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5187 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5190 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5191 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5192 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5193 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5194 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5195 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5196 // use the same payment hashes.
5197 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5202 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5203 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5204 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5205 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5206 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5207 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5208 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5209 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5210 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5211 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5212 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5214 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5216 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5218 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5220 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5221 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5222 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5223 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5225 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5227 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5229 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5230 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
5231 let our_node_id = &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5232 let route = get_route(our_node_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), ds_dust_limit*1000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5234 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5236 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5238 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5240 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5241 let route = get_route(our_node_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5243 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5245 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5248 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5250 let route = get_route(our_node_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), ds_dust_limit*1000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5251 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5254 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5256 let route = get_route(our_node_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5257 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5259 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5260 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5261 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5262 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5263 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5265 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5266 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5267 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5268 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5269 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5270 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5272 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5275 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5276 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5277 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5278 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5279 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5280 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5282 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5283 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5284 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5286 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5289 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5290 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5291 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5292 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5294 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5296 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5298 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5299 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5300 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5301 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5302 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5303 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5304 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5305 if deliver_last_raa {
5306 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5308 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5311 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5312 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5313 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5314 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5316 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5317 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5318 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5320 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5321 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5322 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5324 if announce_latest {
5325 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5327 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5329 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5330 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5331 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5334 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5335 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5336 let mut a_done = false;
5337 for msg in cs_msgs {
5339 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5340 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5341 // should be failed-backwards here.
5342 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5343 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5344 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5345 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5347 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5352 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5353 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5354 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5356 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5357 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5360 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5361 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5362 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5363 if announce_latest {
5364 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5365 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5366 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5369 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5371 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5375 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5376 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5377 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5378 for event in as_events.iter() {
5379 if let &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } = event {
5380 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5381 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5382 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5384 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5386 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5388 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5389 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5390 if announce_latest {
5391 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5392 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5394 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5396 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5397 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5398 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5399 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5400 if let &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } = event {
5401 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5402 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5403 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5405 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5407 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5409 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5410 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5411 if announce_latest {
5412 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5414 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5416 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5417 // get a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due
5418 // to unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5419 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2
5420 // PaymentFailureNetworkUpdates.
5421 let as_msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5422 assert_eq!(as_msg_events.len(), if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5423 let bs_msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5424 assert_eq!(bs_msg_events.len(), if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5425 for event in as_msg_events.iter().chain(bs_msg_events.iter()) {
5427 &MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
5428 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5434 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5435 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5439 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5440 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5444 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5445 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5446 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5447 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5451 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5452 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5453 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5454 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5455 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5457 // Create some initial channels
5458 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5460 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5461 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5462 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5463 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5465 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5466 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5467 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5469 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5471 let htlc_timeout = {
5472 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5473 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5474 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5475 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5476 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5477 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5481 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5482 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5483 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5485 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5486 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5487 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5488 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5489 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5490 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5491 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5492 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5493 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5494 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5495 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5499 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5500 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5501 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5502 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5504 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5506 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5507 let seed = [42; 32];
5508 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5509 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5510 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5511 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5512 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5513 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5516 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5518 // Create some initial channels
5519 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5521 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5522 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5523 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5525 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5526 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5527 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5528 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5529 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5531 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5532 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5533 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5534 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5535 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5537 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5538 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5539 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5540 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5541 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5542 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5543 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5544 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5547 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5548 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5549 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5550 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5553 let htlc_timeout = {
5554 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5555 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5556 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5557 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5561 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5562 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5563 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5565 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5566 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5567 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5568 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5569 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5570 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5571 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5572 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5573 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5574 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5575 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5576 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5580 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5584 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5586 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5588 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5589 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5591 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5592 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5594 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5595 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5596 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5598 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5599 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5601 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5602 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5603 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5606 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5607 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5608 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5609 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5610 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5611 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5613 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5615 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5616 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5617 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5620 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5621 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5622 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5623 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5625 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5626 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5631 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5633 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5634 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5637 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5638 let mut block = Block {
5639 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5642 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5643 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5644 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5646 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5647 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5651 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5652 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5653 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5654 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5655 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5656 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5657 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5659 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
5660 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5661 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5662 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5665 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5667 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5668 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5669 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5671 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5672 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5674 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5675 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5676 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5678 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5679 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5683 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5684 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5685 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5686 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5687 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5688 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5690 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5691 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5692 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5693 // actually revoked.
5694 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5695 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5696 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5697 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5700 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5701 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5702 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5704 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5705 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5707 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5709 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5711 if check_revoke_no_close {
5712 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5716 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5717 let mut block = Block {
5718 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5721 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5722 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5723 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5725 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5726 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5727 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5730 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5734 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5735 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5736 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5737 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5738 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5739 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5740 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5742 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5743 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5744 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5746 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5747 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5748 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5750 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5751 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5755 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5756 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5757 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5758 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5759 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5764 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5765 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5766 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5767 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5768 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5769 //Force duplicate channel ids
5770 for node in nodes.iter() {
5771 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5774 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5775 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5776 let push_msat=10001;
5777 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5778 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5779 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5781 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5782 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5786 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5787 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5788 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5789 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5790 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5792 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5793 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5794 let push_msat=10001;
5795 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5797 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5798 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5799 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5800 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5801 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5803 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5804 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5805 let push_msat=10001;
5806 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5807 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5808 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5810 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5811 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5812 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5814 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5815 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5816 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5818 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5819 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5820 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5822 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5823 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5824 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5825 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5826 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5827 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5831 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5832 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5833 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5834 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5835 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5837 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5838 let push_msat=10001;
5839 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5840 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5841 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 661;
5842 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5844 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5845 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5846 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5847 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5852 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (661) is greater than the implementation limit (660)");
5855 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5856 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5857 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5858 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5860 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5864 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5865 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5866 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5868 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5869 // pending_update_fee.
5871 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5872 *feerate_lock += 20;
5874 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5875 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5877 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5878 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5879 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5880 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5881 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5883 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5886 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5888 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5889 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5890 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5892 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5893 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
5894 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5895 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5896 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], max_can_send, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5898 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5899 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5900 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5901 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5903 // Flush the pending fee update.
5904 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5905 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5907 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5910 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5911 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5912 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5913 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5914 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5915 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5916 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5917 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5918 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5920 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5921 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5922 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5924 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref error_code, ref error_data } => {
5925 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5926 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5927 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5928 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5930 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5934 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5935 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5936 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5938 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5939 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5940 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5941 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5942 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5943 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5944 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5946 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5947 // pending_update_fee.
5949 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5950 *feerate_lock += 200;
5952 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5955 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5956 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5957 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5958 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5959 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5961 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5964 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5966 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5967 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5968 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5970 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5971 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, payment_secret_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
5973 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
5974 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
5975 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5976 let route_1 = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], amt_1, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5977 let route_2 = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], amt_2, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5979 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5980 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
5981 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5982 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5983 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
5984 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5985 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5987 // Flush the pending fee update.
5988 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5989 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5991 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5992 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5995 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5996 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5997 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5998 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5999 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6000 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6001 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6002 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6003 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6005 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6006 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6007 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6009 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref error_code, ref error_data } => {
6010 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6011 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6012 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6013 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6015 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6018 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6019 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6020 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6021 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6022 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6024 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6025 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6026 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6028 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6030 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6031 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6032 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6033 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6035 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6036 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6038 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6039 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6040 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6042 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6043 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6045 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6047 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6048 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6049 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6050 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6051 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6053 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6054 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6056 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6060 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6061 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6062 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6065 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6068 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6069 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6070 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6071 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6072 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6073 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6074 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6075 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6076 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6078 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6079 // pending_update_fee.
6081 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6082 *feerate_lock += 20;
6084 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6087 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6088 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6089 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6090 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6091 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6093 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6096 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6098 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6099 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6100 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6102 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6104 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6105 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
6106 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6107 let payment_event = {
6108 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6109 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], max_can_send, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6110 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6113 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6114 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6116 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6118 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6120 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6121 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6123 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6124 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6126 // Flush the pending fee update.
6127 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6128 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6130 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6131 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6134 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6135 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6136 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6138 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6139 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6142 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6145 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6147 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6149 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6150 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6151 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6152 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6153 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6157 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6158 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6161 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6162 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6163 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6164 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6165 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6166 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6167 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6168 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6169 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6170 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6172 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6175 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6176 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6177 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6179 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6180 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6182 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6183 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6185 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6186 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6187 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6188 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6191 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6192 expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6193 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
6194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6197 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6198 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6199 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6202 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6203 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6204 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6205 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6206 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6207 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6208 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6210 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6211 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6212 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6213 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6214 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6216 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6217 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6218 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6219 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6223 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6224 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6225 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6226 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6227 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6228 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6229 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6230 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6232 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6233 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6234 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6235 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6236 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6237 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6239 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6240 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6244 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6245 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6246 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6249 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6250 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6252 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6253 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6254 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6255 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6256 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6258 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6259 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6261 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6262 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6263 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6268 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6269 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6270 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6271 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6272 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6273 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6274 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6275 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6276 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6278 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6280 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6281 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000000, 500000001, &logger).unwrap();
6282 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6283 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6287 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6288 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6289 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6290 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6291 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6292 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6293 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6294 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6295 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6296 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6298 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6299 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6300 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6301 let payment_event = {
6302 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6303 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6304 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6307 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6308 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6309 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6310 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6314 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6316 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6318 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6320 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6321 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6323 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6324 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6325 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6326 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6327 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6329 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6330 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6334 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6335 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6336 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6337 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6338 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6339 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6340 let channel_value = 100000;
6341 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6342 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6344 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6346 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6347 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6349 let route = Route { paths: vec![vec![RouteHop {
6350 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), node_features: NodeFeatures::known(), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
6351 short_channel_id: nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
6352 fee_msat: max_in_flight + 1, cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV
6354 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6355 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6357 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6358 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6360 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6363 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6365 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6366 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6367 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6368 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6369 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6370 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6371 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6372 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6374 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6375 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6376 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6379 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6380 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6381 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6382 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], htlc_minimum_msat, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6383 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6385 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6386 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6387 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6388 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6389 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6390 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6395 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6396 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6397 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6398 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6399 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6400 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6401 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6402 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6404 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6405 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6406 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6407 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6408 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6410 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6411 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6412 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6413 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], max_can_send, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6414 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6416 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6418 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6419 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6420 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6421 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6422 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6424 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6425 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6426 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6431 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6432 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6433 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6434 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6435 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6436 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6437 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6438 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6439 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6441 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6442 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6444 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6445 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6447 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6448 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6449 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6450 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6452 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6456 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6457 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6458 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6461 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6462 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6463 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6465 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6466 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6468 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6469 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6470 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6475 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6476 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6477 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6478 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6479 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6480 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6481 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6482 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6484 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6485 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6486 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6487 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6489 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6490 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6491 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6493 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6494 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6495 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6500 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6501 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6502 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6503 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6504 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6505 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6506 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6508 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6509 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6510 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6511 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6512 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6514 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6515 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6516 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6518 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6519 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6520 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6525 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6526 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6527 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6528 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6529 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6530 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6531 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6532 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6533 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6535 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6536 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6537 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6538 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6539 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6541 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6542 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6544 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6545 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6546 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6547 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6548 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6549 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6550 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6551 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6552 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6553 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6554 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6555 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6556 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6559 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6560 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6561 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6563 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6565 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6567 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6568 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6569 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6574 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6575 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6577 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6578 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6579 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6580 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6581 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6582 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6583 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6584 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6585 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6586 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6589 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6590 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6592 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6595 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6598 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6600 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6601 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6602 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6607 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6608 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6610 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6611 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6612 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6613 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6614 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6615 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6617 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6618 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6619 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6620 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6622 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6623 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6625 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6628 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6631 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6633 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6634 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6635 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6640 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6641 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6646 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6647 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6648 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6650 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6651 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6652 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6653 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6655 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6656 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6657 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6660 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6661 failure_code: 0x8000,
6664 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6666 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6667 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6668 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6673 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6674 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6676 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6677 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6678 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6679 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6680 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6682 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6684 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6687 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6688 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6689 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6691 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6692 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6693 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6694 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6695 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6696 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6697 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6703 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6705 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6707 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6708 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6709 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6714 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6715 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6717 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6718 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6719 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6720 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6721 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6723 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6725 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6728 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6729 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6730 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6732 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6733 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6734 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6735 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6736 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6737 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6738 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6744 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6746 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6748 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6749 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6750 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6755 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6756 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6758 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6759 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6760 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6761 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6762 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6763 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6765 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
6766 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6767 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6768 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6771 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6772 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6774 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6776 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6778 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6780 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6782 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6783 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6784 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6785 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6786 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6787 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6788 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6790 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6793 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6794 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6796 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6797 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6798 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6803 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6804 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6805 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6807 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6808 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6809 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6810 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6811 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6812 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6813 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6815 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
6818 let mut payment_event = {
6819 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6820 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6821 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6823 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6824 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6825 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6827 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6829 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6830 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6831 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6832 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6834 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6835 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6838 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6839 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6841 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6843 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6844 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6845 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6847 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6848 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6849 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6850 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6851 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6852 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6853 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6855 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6859 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6862 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6863 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6864 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6865 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6867 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6869 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6870 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6871 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6872 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6873 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6874 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6882 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6883 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6884 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6885 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6887 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6888 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6889 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6890 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6891 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6892 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6894 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6896 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6897 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6898 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6899 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6901 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6902 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6904 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6905 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6907 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6910 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6911 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6912 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6915 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6916 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6918 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6920 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6921 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6926 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6927 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6929 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6932 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6933 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6934 if announce_latest {
6935 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6937 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6940 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6943 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6944 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6945 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6946 // Only 2 PaymentFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6947 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6948 let mut first_failed = false;
6949 for event in events {
6951 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6952 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6953 assert!(!first_failed);
6954 first_failed = true;
6956 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6959 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6965 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6966 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6967 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6970 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6971 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6972 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6973 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6974 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6975 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6976 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6978 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6979 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6981 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6982 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6984 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6986 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6987 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6989 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6990 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6992 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6994 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6995 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6998 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7000 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7001 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7002 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7003 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7005 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7006 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7008 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7009 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7010 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7011 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7012 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7013 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7014 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7015 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7017 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7018 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7019 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7021 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7022 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7023 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7025 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7026 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7027 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7028 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7029 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7030 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7031 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7033 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7035 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7036 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7039 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7040 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7041 else { first = false; }
7043 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7046 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7047 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7048 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7050 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7057 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7058 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7059 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7060 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7064 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7065 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7067 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7068 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7069 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7070 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7071 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7072 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7073 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7074 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7075 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7077 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7078 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
7080 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7083 } else { assert!(false) }
7085 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7086 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7087 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7088 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7089 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
7091 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7092 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7094 } else { assert!(false); }
7096 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7097 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7098 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7099 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7100 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7101 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7102 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7104 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7105 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7107 _ => { assert!(false); }
7109 } else { assert!(false); }
7111 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7112 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7113 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7114 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7115 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config) {
7117 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7118 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7120 } else { assert!(false); }
7124 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7125 // We want to be sure that :
7126 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7127 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7128 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7129 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7130 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7136 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7137 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7138 // during signing due to revoked tx
7139 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7140 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7143 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7144 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7145 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7147 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7149 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7150 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7151 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7152 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7154 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7155 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7157 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7158 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7160 // Restore node A from previous state
7161 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7162 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7163 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7164 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7165 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7166 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7167 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7169 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7170 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7171 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7172 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7173 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7174 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7176 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7177 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7181 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7182 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7183 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7184 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7188 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7189 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7191 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7193 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7194 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7198 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7199 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7202 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7203 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7204 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7205 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7206 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7207 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7208 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7210 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7211 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7216 panic!("Unexpected event")
7220 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7221 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7222 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7226 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7227 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7228 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7229 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7230 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7231 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7232 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7233 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7234 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7235 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7239 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7240 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7241 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7242 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7244 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7245 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7246 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7247 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7249 // Create some initial channels
7250 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7252 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
7253 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7254 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, 0).unwrap();
7255 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7258 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7259 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7260 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7261 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7262 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7264 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7265 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7266 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7267 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7269 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7270 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7271 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7273 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7274 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7275 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7276 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7277 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7278 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7279 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7280 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7281 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7282 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7284 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7288 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7289 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7291 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7292 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7293 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7294 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7298 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7299 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7300 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7302 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7303 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7304 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7305 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7307 let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7308 let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7309 let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7312 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7313 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7315 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7316 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7317 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7318 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7319 let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7320 for e in msg_events {
7322 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7323 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7324 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7325 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7326 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7333 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7334 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7335 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7336 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7337 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7338 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7340 // Reestablish chan_1
7341 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7342 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7343 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7344 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7345 // Reestablish chan_2
7346 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7347 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7348 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7349 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7350 // Reestablish chan_3
7351 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7352 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7353 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7354 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7356 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7357 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7358 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7359 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7360 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7361 chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7362 for e in msg_events {
7364 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7365 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7366 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7367 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7368 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7371 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7377 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7378 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7379 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7380 // to forward through that channel.
7381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7383 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7384 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7385 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7386 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7387 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7388 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7389 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7390 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7392 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7394 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7395 // not send for private channels.
7396 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7397 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7398 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7399 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7400 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7402 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7403 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7404 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7407 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7410 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7411 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7412 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7413 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7414 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7415 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7416 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7417 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7418 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7419 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7421 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7422 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7423 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7425 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7427 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7429 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7430 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7431 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
7432 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7433 &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7434 &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None,
7435 &[&RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7436 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7437 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7438 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7439 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7440 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7441 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7442 }])], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
7444 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7446 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7447 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7448 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7450 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7451 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7452 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7453 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7454 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7456 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7457 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7458 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
7459 expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7461 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7462 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7464 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7465 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7467 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7468 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7469 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7471 let mons = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
7472 let mut mon_iter = mons.iter();
7473 mon_iter.next().unwrap().1.write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7474 mon_iter.next().unwrap().1.write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7477 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7478 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7479 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7480 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7482 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7483 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7484 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7485 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7486 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7487 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7489 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7491 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7492 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7493 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7494 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7495 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7496 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7497 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7499 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7500 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7501 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7502 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7506 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7507 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7509 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7510 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7512 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7514 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7515 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7516 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7517 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7518 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7519 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7520 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7521 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7523 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7524 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7525 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7526 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7527 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7528 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7529 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7530 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7532 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7534 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7535 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7539 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7540 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7541 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7543 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7546 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7548 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7549 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7551 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7552 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
7553 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3000000, 30, &logger).unwrap();
7554 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7556 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7557 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7558 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7559 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7560 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7561 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7563 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7564 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7565 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7566 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7570 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7571 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7573 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7574 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7575 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7576 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7579 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7583 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7584 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7585 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7586 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7587 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7588 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7589 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7590 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7594 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7595 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7596 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7597 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7599 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7600 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7601 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7602 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7603 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7604 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7605 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7606 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7607 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7608 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7609 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7610 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7611 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7615 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7617 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7618 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7620 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7622 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7623 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7624 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7625 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7626 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7627 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7628 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7629 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7630 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7631 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7632 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7633 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7634 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7638 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7640 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7641 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7645 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7646 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7647 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7649 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7650 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7651 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7652 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7653 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7655 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7656 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7657 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7658 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
7659 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7660 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7661 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
7662 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7664 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7665 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7666 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7668 // Revoke local commitment tx
7669 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7671 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7672 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7673 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7674 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7676 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7678 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7679 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7680 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7682 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7683 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7684 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7686 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7687 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7688 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7689 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7691 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7692 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7693 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7694 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7695 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7696 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7697 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7702 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7703 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7704 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7706 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7707 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7708 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7709 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7711 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7712 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7713 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7714 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7715 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7716 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7718 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7719 // available, which we check here:
7720 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7721 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7722 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7724 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7725 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7727 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7728 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7729 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7730 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7732 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7733 // output, checked above).
7734 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7735 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7736 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7738 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7739 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7740 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7741 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7742 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7746 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7747 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7748 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7749 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7750 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7752 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7753 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7755 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7756 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7757 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7758 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7759 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7761 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7762 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7768 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7769 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7770 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7771 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7773 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7774 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7776 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7777 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7778 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7779 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7780 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7781 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7782 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7783 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7787 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7788 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7789 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7790 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7792 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7793 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7794 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7795 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7796 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7797 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7798 // up bumped justice generation.
7799 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7802 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7807 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7808 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7809 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7812 // Provide preimage for one
7813 // Check aggregation
7815 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7816 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7817 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7818 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7820 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7821 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7822 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7824 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7825 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7826 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7827 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7828 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7830 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7831 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7832 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7834 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7836 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7840 let feerate_timeout;
7841 let feerate_preimage;
7843 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7844 // 9 transactions including:
7845 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7846 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7847 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7849 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7850 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7851 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7852 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7853 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7854 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7855 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7857 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7858 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7859 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7860 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7862 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7863 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7864 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7865 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7867 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7868 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7869 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7870 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7874 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7875 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7877 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7878 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7880 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7881 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7882 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7883 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7884 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7885 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7887 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7888 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7889 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7890 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7891 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7893 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7894 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7895 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7896 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7897 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7902 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7903 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7907 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7908 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7909 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7910 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7911 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7912 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7913 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7914 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7916 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7917 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7918 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7919 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7920 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7922 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7923 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7925 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7927 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7928 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7929 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7931 // Must revoke without gaps
7932 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7933 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7935 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7936 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7937 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7939 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7940 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7941 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7946 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7947 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7948 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7950 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7951 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7952 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7953 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7955 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7956 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7957 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7958 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7960 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7961 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7962 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7964 // Revoke local commitment tx
7965 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7967 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7968 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7969 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7970 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7972 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7973 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7976 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7977 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7978 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7979 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7980 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7981 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7985 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7986 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7987 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7989 let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
7990 if let Some(monitor) = monitors.get(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }) {
7991 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7992 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7998 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7999 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8000 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8001 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8002 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8004 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8005 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8006 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8008 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8010 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8011 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8012 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8013 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8017 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8018 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8019 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8023 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8025 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8026 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8027 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8029 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8030 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8031 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8035 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8036 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8037 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8038 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8039 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8040 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8042 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8043 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8044 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8045 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8046 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8048 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
8049 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
8050 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
8051 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8052 route.paths.push(path);
8053 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8054 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8055 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8056 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8057 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8058 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8059 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8060 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8064 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8065 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8068 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8069 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8071 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8074 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, 42);
8076 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8077 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
8078 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
8079 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8081 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8082 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8083 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8084 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8086 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8087 // values from previous calls.
8088 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8089 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8090 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8092 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8094 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, user_payment_id, .. } => {
8095 assert_eq!(*user_payment_id, 42);
8096 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8098 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8101 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8106 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8107 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8108 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8109 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8110 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8111 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8113 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8115 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8117 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8118 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8119 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8120 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8121 } else { panic!(); }
8123 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8125 header: BlockHeader {
8127 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8128 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8129 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8133 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8134 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8135 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8136 } else { panic!(); }
8138 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8139 // again with a different user_payment_id (this time getting a new payment secret).
8140 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8141 block.header.time += 1;
8142 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8143 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 42).unwrap();
8144 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8147 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8148 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
8149 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
8150 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8152 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8153 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8154 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8155 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8157 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8158 // values from previous calls.
8159 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8160 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8161 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8163 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, user_payment_id }, .. } => {
8164 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8165 assert_eq!(user_payment_id, 42);
8166 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8167 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8169 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8174 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8175 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8176 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8177 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8178 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8179 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8181 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8183 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8184 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8185 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8187 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8188 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
8189 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
8191 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8192 // resulting events.
8193 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8196 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8197 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8198 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8199 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8201 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8202 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8203 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8204 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8207 // We should fail the payment back
8208 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8209 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8210 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8211 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8212 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8214 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8219 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8220 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8221 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8223 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8224 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8225 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8226 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8228 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8229 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8230 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8231 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8233 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8234 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8235 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8236 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8240 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8241 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8242 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8243 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8245 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8246 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8247 // commitment at same time.
8249 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8250 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8251 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8252 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8254 // Create some initial channel
8255 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8256 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8258 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8259 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8261 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8262 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8264 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8265 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8266 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8267 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8269 let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
8270 let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
8271 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8272 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8273 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8274 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8275 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8276 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8277 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8280 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8281 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8282 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8283 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8284 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8286 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8287 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8289 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8290 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8291 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8292 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8293 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8294 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8295 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8296 } else { assert!(false); }
8297 } else { assert!(false); };
8298 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8300 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8301 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8305 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8306 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8307 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8308 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8309 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8311 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8312 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8313 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8314 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8316 // Create some initial channel
8317 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8318 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8320 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8321 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8323 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8324 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8326 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8327 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8328 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8329 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8330 let watchtower_alice = {
8331 let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
8332 let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
8333 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8334 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8335 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8336 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8337 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8338 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8339 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8342 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8343 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8344 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8345 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8346 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8348 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8350 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8351 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8355 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8356 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8357 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8358 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8359 let watchtower_bob = {
8360 let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
8361 let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
8362 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8363 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8364 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8365 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8366 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8367 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8368 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8371 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8372 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8374 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8375 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8377 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler;
8378 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3000000 , TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
8379 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8383 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8384 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8385 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8386 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8387 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8388 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8389 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8390 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8391 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8392 } else { assert!(false); }
8393 } else { assert!(false); };
8394 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8397 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8398 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8399 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8401 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8404 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8405 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8406 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8410 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8411 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8412 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8414 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8415 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8416 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8417 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8418 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8419 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8424 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8425 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8426 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8429 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8430 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8432 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8433 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8434 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8435 // before receiving funding_signed.
8436 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8437 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8438 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8439 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8441 // Create an initial channel
8442 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8443 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8444 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8445 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8446 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8448 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8449 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8451 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8454 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8455 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8456 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8457 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8461 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8462 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8463 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8464 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8465 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8466 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8467 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8469 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8470 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8471 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8472 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8474 // Create some initial channels
8475 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8477 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8478 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8479 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8480 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8481 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8482 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8484 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8485 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8486 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8487 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8488 // this test before #653 fix.
8489 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8490 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8492 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8494 let htlc_timeout = {
8495 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8496 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8497 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8498 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8502 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8503 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8504 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8505 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8508 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8509 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8510 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8511 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8513 // Steps of the test:
8514 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8515 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8516 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8517 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8518 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8519 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8520 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8521 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8522 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8523 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8524 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8525 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8527 // Create some initial channels
8528 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8529 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8531 // Steps (1) and (2):
8532 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8533 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8535 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8536 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8537 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8538 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8539 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8540 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8541 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8543 // Steps (3) and (4):
8544 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8545 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8546 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8547 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8548 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8549 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8551 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8552 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8553 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8554 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8556 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8557 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8558 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8559 if broadcast_alice {
8560 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8563 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8564 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8568 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8569 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8570 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8572 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8573 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8574 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8575 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8576 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8577 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8579 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8580 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8581 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8582 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8583 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8584 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8586 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8587 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8589 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8592 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8593 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8594 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8597 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8598 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8599 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8600 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8601 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8604 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8606 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8607 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8608 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8614 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8616 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8619 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8620 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8621 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8622 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8623 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8626 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8628 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8631 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8632 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8633 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8634 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8635 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8636 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8637 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8638 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8639 if broadcast_alice {
8640 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8643 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8644 if broadcast_alice {
8645 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8646 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8647 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8648 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8650 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8651 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8653 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8654 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8659 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8660 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8662 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8663 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8664 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8665 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8667 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8668 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8669 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8671 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8672 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8673 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8674 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8675 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8676 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8677 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8679 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8680 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8686 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8687 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8688 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8689 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8690 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8694 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8695 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8696 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8698 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8699 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8700 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8701 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8702 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8703 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8704 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8705 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8707 // Create an initial channel
8708 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8709 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8710 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8711 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8713 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8714 // that it is rejected.
8715 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8717 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8718 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8720 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8721 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8722 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8723 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8724 // move forward with it.
8725 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8726 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8732 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8733 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8735 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8738 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8739 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8741 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8742 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8743 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8744 added_monitors.clear();
8746 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8748 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8749 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8751 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8754 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8755 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8756 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8757 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8758 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8760 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8761 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8763 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8764 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8765 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8766 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8767 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8773 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8774 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8775 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8776 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8777 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8778 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8780 let funding_created = {
8781 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8782 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8783 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8784 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8787 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8788 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8789 // still needs to be cleared here.
8790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8792 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8794 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8795 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8797 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8798 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8799 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8800 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8801 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8807 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8808 // everything is functional.
8809 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8811 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8812 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8813 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8814 added_monitors.clear();
8817 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8818 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8819 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8820 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8822 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8823 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8824 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8825 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8829 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8830 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8832 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8833 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8834 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8835 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8836 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8837 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8838 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8840 // Create some initial channels
8841 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8842 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8843 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8845 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8846 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8847 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8849 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8850 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8851 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8853 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8854 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8856 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8857 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8858 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8859 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8860 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8862 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8863 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8864 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8866 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8867 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8869 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8870 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8875 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8876 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8880 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8881 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8882 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8883 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8884 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8885 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8887 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8888 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8889 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8893 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8894 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8896 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8897 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8898 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8899 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8900 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8901 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8902 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8903 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8905 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8906 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8907 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8909 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8910 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8911 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8912 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8915 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8916 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8919 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8922 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8923 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8925 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8926 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8927 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8929 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8931 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8932 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8933 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8934 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8935 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8936 assert_eq!(msg.data, "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index");
8937 } else { panic!(); }
8938 } else { panic!(); }
8939 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8942 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8943 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8944 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8945 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8946 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8947 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8948 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8949 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8950 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8951 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8952 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8953 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8954 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8955 // until we learned about an additional block.
8957 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8958 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8959 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8960 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8961 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8962 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8963 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8965 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8966 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8967 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8968 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8969 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8971 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
8972 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8974 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8975 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8977 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8978 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8979 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8981 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8982 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8983 if test_height_before_timelock {
8984 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8985 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8986 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8987 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8989 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8990 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8991 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8992 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8993 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8994 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8996 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8997 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8999 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9000 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9001 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9002 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9003 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9004 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9007 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9008 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9009 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9010 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9011 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9012 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9013 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9014 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9015 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
9016 expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9021 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9022 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9023 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9027 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9028 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9031 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9033 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9034 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
9035 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9036 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9037 let route = get_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey, None,
9038 None, &vec![], 10000, 40,
9039 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
9041 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9042 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9044 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9045 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9046 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9047 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9048 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9049 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9053 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9054 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9055 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9056 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9057 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9059 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9060 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9061 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9062 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9064 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9065 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
9066 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9067 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
9068 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
9069 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
9071 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9072 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9074 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9075 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9076 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9077 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9078 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9079 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9082 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, at_forward: bool, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9083 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat` policy.
9085 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9086 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next counterparty
9087 // commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the update.
9088 // At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound
9089 // and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included on next
9090 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail the update.
9091 // Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel might be
9092 // available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9094 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9095 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9096 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9097 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9098 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(config)]);
9099 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9101 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9102 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9103 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9104 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9105 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9106 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9108 accept_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 660;
9110 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9112 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9115 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9116 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 660;
9120 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9121 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9124 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9127 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9128 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9129 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9132 if dust_outbound_balance {
9134 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 2_300_000);
9135 if let Err(_) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9139 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 2_300_000);
9143 if dust_outbound_balance {
9145 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 200_000); // + 177_000 msat of HTLC-success tx at 253 sats/kWU
9146 if let Err(_) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9150 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000); // + 167_000 msat of HTLC-timeout tx at 253 sats/kWU
9156 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { 2_300_000 } else { 200_000 });
9157 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9159 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", 6_900_000, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9161 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", 5_200_000, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9164 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1 ], if on_holder_tx { 2_300_000 } else { 200_000 });
9165 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9167 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9168 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9169 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9170 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9172 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", 6_900_000, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9174 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", 5_200_000, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9178 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9179 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9180 added_monitors.clear();
9184 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9185 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, true, true);
9186 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, true, true);
9187 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, false, true);
9188 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, false, false);
9189 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, true, false);
9190 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, false, false);
9191 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, false, true);
9192 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, true, false);