1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
22 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY};
24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route, RouteParameters};
30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
33 use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
34 use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
64 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
67 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
68 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
69 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
70 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
71 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
72 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
73 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
74 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
75 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
77 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
79 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
80 let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
81 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
83 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
84 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
86 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
87 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
89 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
90 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
91 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
92 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
93 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
94 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
95 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
96 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
98 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
99 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
101 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
103 } else { assert!(false); }
106 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
108 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
109 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
110 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
116 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
118 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
124 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
128 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
129 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
131 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
132 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
133 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
134 *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
135 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
136 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
138 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
139 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
140 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
146 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
147 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
148 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
149 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
150 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
151 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
152 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
153 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
154 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
155 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
157 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
158 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
159 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
160 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
161 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
162 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
164 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
165 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
166 if !send_from_initiator {
167 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
168 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
170 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
172 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
173 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
174 if send_from_initiator {
175 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
176 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
178 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
180 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
181 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
182 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
183 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
184 if send_from_initiator {
185 let chan = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
186 chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
187 chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
189 let chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
190 chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
191 chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
195 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
196 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
197 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
199 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
200 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
201 if send_from_initiator {
202 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
203 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
204 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
205 // well as an additional HTLC.
206 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
208 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
213 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
214 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
215 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
219 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
220 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
221 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
222 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
223 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
227 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
231 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
232 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
233 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
234 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
235 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
236 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
237 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
238 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
239 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
240 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
242 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
244 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
246 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
248 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
251 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
254 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
255 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
256 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
257 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
258 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
263 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
265 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
266 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
267 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
268 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
271 let payment_event = {
272 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
273 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
274 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
276 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
279 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
280 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
281 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
282 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
283 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
286 // deliver(1), generate (3):
287 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
288 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
289 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
292 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
293 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
294 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
295 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
296 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
297 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
298 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
301 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
302 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
303 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
304 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
305 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
306 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
307 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
310 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
311 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
312 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
315 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
316 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
319 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
322 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
323 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
325 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
326 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
329 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
334 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
335 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
336 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
337 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
338 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
339 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
340 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
341 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
344 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
346 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
348 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
351 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
354 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
355 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
356 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
357 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
360 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
363 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
365 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
366 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
367 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
368 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
371 let payment_event = {
372 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
373 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
374 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
376 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
377 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
379 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
380 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
381 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
382 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
383 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
386 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
389 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
393 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
397 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
398 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
401 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
402 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
403 // update_fee (never committed) ->
405 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
406 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
407 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
408 // <- (1) RAA delivered
409 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
410 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
411 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
412 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
414 // B should send no response here
415 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
416 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
419 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
422 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
423 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
424 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
426 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
429 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
430 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
431 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
432 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
433 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
438 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
439 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
440 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
441 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
444 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
447 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
448 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
450 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
451 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
452 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
454 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
455 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
456 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
457 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
460 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
462 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
464 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
466 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
467 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
468 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
470 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
471 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
472 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
473 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
474 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
475 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
476 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
478 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
479 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
480 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
482 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
484 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
485 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
489 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
490 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
493 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
494 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
497 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
498 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
499 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
502 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
503 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
507 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
508 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
509 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
510 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
513 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
516 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
518 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
519 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
520 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
521 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
524 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
525 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
526 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
528 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
529 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
530 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
532 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
533 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
535 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
537 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
538 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
540 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
542 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
543 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
545 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
547 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
548 added_monitors.clear();
550 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
552 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
554 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
555 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
557 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
558 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
559 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
560 added_monitors.clear();
563 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
564 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
565 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
567 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
568 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
570 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
571 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
572 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
573 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
574 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
578 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
587 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
588 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
589 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
590 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
591 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
592 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
593 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
594 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
595 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
596 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
600 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
601 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
602 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
603 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
604 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
605 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
608 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
611 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
614 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
615 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
616 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
617 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
618 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
622 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
624 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
625 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
628 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
629 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
632 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
633 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
634 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
637 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
638 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
643 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
648 let channel_value = 5000;
650 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
651 let channel_id = chan.2;
652 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
653 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
654 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
656 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
658 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
659 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
660 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
662 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
663 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
665 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
666 *feerate_lock = feerate;
668 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
670 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
672 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
674 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
676 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
678 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
680 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
681 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
682 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
683 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
684 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
685 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
689 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
690 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
693 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
694 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
697 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
699 // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
700 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
701 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
702 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
703 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
704 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
705 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
706 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
707 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
708 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
710 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
711 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
712 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
713 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
714 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
715 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
716 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
717 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
718 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
721 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
722 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
723 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
726 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
727 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
728 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
729 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
730 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
731 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
732 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
734 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
735 local_funding, remote_funding,
736 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
737 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
739 &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
741 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
744 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
747 htlc_signatures: res.1,
749 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
752 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
754 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
757 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
759 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
760 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
761 //Should produce and error.
762 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
763 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
765 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
766 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
767 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
771 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
772 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
773 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
774 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
775 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
776 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
779 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
782 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
785 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
788 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
789 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
790 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
791 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
792 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
796 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
797 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
798 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
801 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
803 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
804 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
805 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
807 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
808 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
809 added_monitors.clear();
811 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
812 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
813 // node[1] has nothing to do
815 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
816 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
819 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
820 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
821 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
823 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
825 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
827 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
828 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
829 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
830 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
831 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
832 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
834 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
835 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
837 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
839 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
841 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
843 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
845 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
846 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
848 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
850 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
852 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
854 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
855 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
857 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
858 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
861 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
863 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
864 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
865 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
866 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
867 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
871 fn test_update_fee() {
872 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
873 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
874 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
875 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
876 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
877 let channel_id = chan.2;
880 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
881 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
882 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
883 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
884 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
885 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
886 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
887 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
888 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
889 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
890 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
893 // Create and deliver (1)...
896 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
897 feerate = *feerate_lock;
898 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
900 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
903 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
904 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
905 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
906 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
907 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
909 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
911 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
913 // Generate (2) and (3):
914 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
915 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
919 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
920 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
923 // Create and deliver (4)...
925 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
926 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
928 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
930 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
931 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
932 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
933 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
934 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
936 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
939 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
940 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
943 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
944 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
946 // Handle (3), creating (6):
947 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
949 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
950 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
953 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
954 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
957 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
958 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
959 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
960 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
961 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
962 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
963 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
964 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
968 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
970 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
971 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
973 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
975 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
977 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
978 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
979 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
980 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
981 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
985 fn fake_network_test() {
986 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
987 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
988 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
989 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
990 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
991 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
993 // Create some initial channels
994 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
995 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
996 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
998 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
999 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1004 // Send some more payments
1005 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1009 // Test failure packets
1010 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1011 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1013 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1014 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1016 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1017 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1018 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1019 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1020 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1021 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1022 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1024 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1025 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1026 hops.push(RouteHop {
1027 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1028 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1029 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1030 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1032 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1034 hops.push(RouteHop {
1035 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042 hops.push(RouteHop {
1043 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1045 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1048 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1050 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1051 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1052 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1053 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1054 &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1056 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1057 hops.push(RouteHop {
1058 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1059 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1060 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1061 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1063 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1065 hops.push(RouteHop {
1066 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1067 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1068 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1069 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1071 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1073 hops.push(RouteHop {
1074 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1075 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1076 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1077 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1079 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1081 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1082 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1083 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1084 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1085 &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1087 // Claim the rebalances...
1088 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1089 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1091 // Close down the channels...
1092 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1093 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1094 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1095 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1096 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1097 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1098 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1099 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1100 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1101 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1102 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1103 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1107 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1108 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1109 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1110 // commitment dance rounds.
1111 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1112 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1113 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1114 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1115 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1116 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1118 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1119 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1121 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1123 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1124 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1125 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1126 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1130 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1132 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1133 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1135 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1136 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1139 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1140 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1141 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1142 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1145 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1146 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1148 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1149 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1153 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1154 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1155 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1156 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1158 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1159 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1160 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1161 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1162 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1163 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1166 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1167 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1168 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1170 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1172 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1173 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1174 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1177 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1178 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1180 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1182 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1184 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1186 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1187 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1189 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1191 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1193 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1195 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1197 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1199 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1201 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1204 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1206 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1207 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1208 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1210 &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1211 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1217 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1218 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1221 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1225 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1226 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1227 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1228 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1229 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1230 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1231 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1233 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1234 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1235 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1236 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1237 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1238 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1240 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1242 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1243 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1245 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1246 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1248 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1249 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1250 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1254 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1255 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1256 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1257 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1258 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1259 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1260 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1261 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1263 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1266 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1268 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1270 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1271 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1272 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1274 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1275 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1276 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1279 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1280 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1282 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1283 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1284 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1285 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1286 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1287 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1288 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1291 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1293 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1295 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1296 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1298 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1299 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1301 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1302 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1303 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1304 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1305 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1306 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1308 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1311 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1312 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1314 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1315 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1316 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1318 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1319 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1320 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1321 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1323 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1327 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1328 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1329 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1330 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1332 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1333 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1334 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1335 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1336 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1337 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1339 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1345 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1346 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1347 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1348 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1349 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1350 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1352 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1353 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1355 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1356 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1357 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1358 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1359 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1360 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1361 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1362 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1364 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1365 if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1366 else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1368 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1370 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1372 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1376 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1380 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1381 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1383 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1384 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1385 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1386 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1387 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1388 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1390 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1392 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1393 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1394 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1395 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1396 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1399 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1400 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1401 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1402 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1403 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1406 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1408 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1409 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1410 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1412 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1414 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1416 // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1417 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1418 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1419 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1420 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1421 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1422 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1423 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1424 chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1426 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1427 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1428 chan_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1429 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1430 chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1432 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1433 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1434 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1435 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1436 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1437 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1438 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1439 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1440 chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1443 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1444 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1445 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1447 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1448 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1449 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1451 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1453 amount_msat: 3460001,
1454 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1456 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1459 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1462 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1463 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1464 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1465 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1466 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1470 local_funding, remote_funding,
1471 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1473 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1474 &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1476 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1479 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1482 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1484 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1487 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1488 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1489 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1491 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1492 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1494 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1495 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1497 next_local_nonce: None,
1499 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1501 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1502 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1503 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1505 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1506 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1507 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1509 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1511 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1512 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
1514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1518 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1519 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1520 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1521 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1522 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1524 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1525 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1526 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1527 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1528 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1529 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1531 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1532 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1534 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1536 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1538 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1539 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1540 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1541 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1542 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1545 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1546 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1547 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1548 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1549 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1553 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1554 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1555 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1556 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1557 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1558 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1559 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1560 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1562 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1563 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1564 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1565 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1566 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1567 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1568 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1570 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1571 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1572 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1575 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1576 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1577 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1578 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1579 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1580 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1581 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1582 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1583 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1584 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1585 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1586 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1588 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1589 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1590 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1591 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1592 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1593 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1596 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1597 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1598 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1599 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1600 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1601 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1603 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
1604 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1608 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1609 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1610 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1611 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1612 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1614 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1615 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1616 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1617 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1618 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1620 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1621 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1622 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1623 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1624 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1625 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1626 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1628 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1629 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1630 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1631 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1632 // commitment transaction fee.
1633 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1635 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1636 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1637 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1640 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1641 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1642 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1643 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1644 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1645 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1646 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1650 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1651 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1652 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1653 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1654 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1655 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1656 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1657 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1658 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1659 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1661 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1663 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1664 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1665 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1666 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1668 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1669 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1670 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1671 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1672 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1673 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1674 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1676 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1677 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1678 match msg_events[0] {
1679 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1680 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1687 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1688 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1689 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1690 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1691 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1692 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1693 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1694 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1696 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1697 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1698 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1699 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1700 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1701 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1703 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1704 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1705 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1706 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1707 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1708 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1710 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1711 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1712 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1713 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1717 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1718 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1719 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1720 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1721 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1722 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1723 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1726 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1727 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1728 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1729 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1731 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1732 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1733 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1734 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1736 // Add a pending HTLC.
1737 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1738 let payment_event_1 = {
1739 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1740 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1743 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1744 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1745 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1747 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1749 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1750 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1751 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1752 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1753 let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1754 route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1756 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1757 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1758 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1759 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1760 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1761 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1762 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1763 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1764 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1767 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1768 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1769 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1770 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1771 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1774 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1775 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1776 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1777 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1778 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1779 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1781 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
1782 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1786 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1787 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1788 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1789 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1790 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1791 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1792 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1793 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1794 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1795 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1796 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1798 let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1799 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1800 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1802 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1803 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1806 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1807 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1811 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1812 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1813 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1814 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1815 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1816 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1817 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1818 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1819 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1820 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1821 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1823 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1824 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1826 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1827 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1829 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1831 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1832 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1833 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1834 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1839 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1840 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1841 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1842 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1844 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1846 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1848 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1849 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1850 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1851 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1852 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1854 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1855 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1856 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1857 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1860 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1861 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1863 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1864 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1865 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1866 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1867 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1868 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1869 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1873 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1874 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1875 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1876 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1877 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1879 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1880 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1881 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1882 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1883 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1886 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1887 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1888 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1889 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1890 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1893 // adding pending output.
1894 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1895 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1896 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1897 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1898 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1899 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1900 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1901 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1902 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1904 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1905 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1906 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1908 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1909 let payment_event_1 = {
1910 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1911 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1914 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1915 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1916 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1918 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1920 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1921 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1923 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1924 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1925 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1926 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1927 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1928 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1929 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1932 // split the rest to test holding cell
1933 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1934 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1935 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1936 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1938 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1939 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1942 // now see if they go through on both sides
1943 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1944 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1945 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1946 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1948 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1949 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1951 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1953 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1954 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1955 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1956 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1957 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1958 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1959 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1962 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1963 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1964 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1965 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1967 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1968 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1970 // flush the pending htlc
1971 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1972 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1975 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1976 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1978 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1980 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1981 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1982 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1985 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1986 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1989 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1991 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1992 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1993 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1995 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1996 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1998 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1999 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2000 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2001 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2002 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2003 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2005 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2006 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2007 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2008 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2010 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2011 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2013 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2014 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2016 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2017 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2018 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2019 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2020 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2022 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2023 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2024 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2026 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2029 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2032 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2033 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2034 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2035 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2036 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2038 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2039 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2040 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2042 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2045 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2048 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2049 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2050 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2052 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2053 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2054 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2056 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2057 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2058 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2059 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2060 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2062 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2063 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2067 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2068 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2069 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2070 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2071 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2072 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2073 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2074 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2076 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2077 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2078 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2079 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2080 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2081 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2082 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2083 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2085 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2086 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2087 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2088 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2089 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2090 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2091 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2092 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2093 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2094 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2096 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2097 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2098 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2099 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2100 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2102 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2103 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2105 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2106 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2108 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2109 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2110 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2113 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2114 // initial fulfill/CS.
2115 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2116 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2120 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2121 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2122 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2123 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2125 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2127 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2128 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2130 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2131 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);
2133 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2134 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2136 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2137 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2139 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2141 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2143 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2145 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2147 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2149 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2151 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2152 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2153 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2154 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2155 // on-chain as necessary).
2156 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2157 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2159 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2160 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);
2162 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2164 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2166 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2167 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2169 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2170 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2171 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2173 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2174 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2176 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2177 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2178 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2180 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2181 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2183 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2184 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2185 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2188 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2189 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2191 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2193 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2195 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2197 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2199 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2202 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2204 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2205 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2207 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2209 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2211 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2214 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2215 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2217 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2218 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2222 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2223 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2224 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2225 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2226 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2227 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2228 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2230 // Create some initial channels
2231 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2232 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2233 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2234 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2236 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2237 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2238 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2239 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2240 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2241 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2243 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2244 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2245 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2246 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2247 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2249 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2250 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2252 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2254 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2255 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2256 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2258 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2260 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2261 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2262 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2263 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2264 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2266 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2267 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2269 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2270 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2271 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2272 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2275 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2276 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2277 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2278 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2280 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2282 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2283 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2284 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2285 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2286 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2288 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2289 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2291 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2292 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2293 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2295 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2296 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2298 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2299 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2300 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2301 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2309 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2310 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2311 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2313 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2314 let node2_commitment_txid;
2316 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2317 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2318 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2319 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2321 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2322 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2323 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2325 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2327 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2328 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2329 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2330 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2331 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2333 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2334 // confusing us in the following tests.
2335 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2337 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2338 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2339 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2342 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2343 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2344 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2345 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2346 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2347 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2350 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2353 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2354 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2356 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2360 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2362 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2363 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2364 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2370 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2372 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2373 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2375 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2376 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2377 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2378 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2379 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2382 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2385 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2386 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2388 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2391 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2393 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2394 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2395 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2397 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2398 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2399 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2400 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2402 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2403 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2404 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2405 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2409 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2410 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2411 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2412 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2413 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2414 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2415 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2416 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2417 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2418 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2419 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2420 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2421 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2422 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2423 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2424 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2425 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2426 // Create some new channels:
2427 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2429 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2430 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2431 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2432 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2433 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2434 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2435 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2436 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2437 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2438 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2439 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2440 // Revoke the old state
2441 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2444 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2446 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2447 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2448 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2449 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2450 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2453 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2454 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2456 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2457 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2458 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2459 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2461 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2462 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2463 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2464 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2466 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2467 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2468 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2472 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2473 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2474 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2475 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2476 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2477 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2478 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2479 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2480 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2481 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2482 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2483 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2484 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2485 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2486 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2487 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2488 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2489 // Create some new channels:
2490 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2492 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2493 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2494 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2495 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2496 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2497 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2498 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2499 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2500 // Revoke the old state
2501 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2503 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2505 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2506 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2507 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2509 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2510 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2513 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2515 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2516 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2517 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2519 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2520 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2521 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2523 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2524 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2525 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2529 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2530 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2531 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2532 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2533 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2534 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2535 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2536 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2537 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2538 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2539 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2540 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2541 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2542 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2543 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2545 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2546 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2548 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2549 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2550 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2552 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2554 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2555 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2556 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2558 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2562 fn test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates() {
2563 do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(true);
2564 do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(false);
2567 fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: bool) {
2568 // Simple test to make sure that the justice tx formed in WatchtowerPersister
2569 // is properly formed and can be broadcasted/confirmed successfully in the event
2570 // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
2571 // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
2572 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2573 let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
2574 let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
2575 let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
2576 WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
2577 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
2578 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2579 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2580 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2581 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
2583 if !broadcast_initial_commitment {
2584 // Send a payment to move the channel forward
2585 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2588 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output.
2589 // We'll keep this commitment transaction to broadcast once it's revoked.
2590 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel_id);
2591 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2592 let revoked_commitment_tx = &revoked_local_txn[0];
2594 // Send another payment, now revoking the previous commitment tx
2595 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2597 let justice_tx = persisters[1].justice_tx(funding_txo, &revoked_commitment_tx.txid()).unwrap();
2598 check_spends!(justice_tx, revoked_commitment_tx);
2600 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2601 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2604 check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2605 &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2606 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 0);
2608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2609 check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2610 &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2612 // Check that the justice tx has sent the revoked output value to nodes[1]
2613 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel_id);
2614 let total_claimable_balance = monitor.get_claimable_balances().iter().fold(0, |sum, balance| {
2616 channelmonitor::Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. } => sum + amount_satoshis,
2617 _ => panic!("Unexpected balance type"),
2620 // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output
2621 let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value };
2622 let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value;
2623 assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance);
2628 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2629 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2630 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2631 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2632 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2633 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2634 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2636 // Create some new channel:
2637 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2639 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2640 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2641 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2642 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2643 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2645 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2646 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2647 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2648 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2649 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2650 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2651 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2652 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2653 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2655 //Revoke the old state
2656 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2659 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2661 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2662 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2664 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2665 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2666 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2668 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2669 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2671 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2672 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2674 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2675 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2676 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2677 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2678 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2679 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2680 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2681 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2683 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2684 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2685 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2686 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2687 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2689 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2690 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2691 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2695 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2696 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2697 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2698 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2699 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2700 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2701 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2703 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2705 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2706 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2707 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2708 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2709 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2710 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2712 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2713 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2715 //Revoke the old state
2716 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2719 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2721 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2723 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2724 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2725 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2726 match events.last().unwrap() {
2727 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2731 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2732 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2734 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2736 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2737 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2738 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2739 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2740 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2741 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2742 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2744 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2745 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2746 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2748 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2749 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2750 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2752 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2753 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2754 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2756 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2757 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2758 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2759 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2760 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2761 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2762 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2763 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2765 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2766 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2767 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2768 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2769 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2770 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2771 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2773 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2774 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2775 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2779 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2780 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2781 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2782 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2783 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2784 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2785 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2786 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2787 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2789 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2790 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2791 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2792 // PaymentSent event).
2794 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2796 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2797 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2799 // Create some initial channels
2800 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2801 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2803 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2804 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2805 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2806 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2807 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2809 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2810 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2811 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2813 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2814 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2816 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2817 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2818 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2819 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2820 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2821 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2822 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2823 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2824 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2826 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2827 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2828 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2829 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2830 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2832 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2833 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2835 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2836 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2837 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2838 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2839 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2840 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2841 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2842 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2843 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2844 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2845 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2847 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2848 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2849 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2851 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2852 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2853 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2854 added_monitors.clear();
2856 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2857 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2858 match forwarded_events[0] {
2859 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2860 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2862 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2863 match forwarded_events[1] {
2864 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2865 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2866 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2867 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2868 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2869 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2873 match forwarded_events[2] {
2874 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2875 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2876 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2877 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2878 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2879 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2883 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2885 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2886 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2887 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2888 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2889 added_monitors.clear();
2891 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2893 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2894 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2896 match nodes_2_event {
2897 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2898 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2901 match nodes_0_event {
2902 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2903 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2904 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2905 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2906 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2907 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2909 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2912 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2914 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2918 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2919 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2920 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2921 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2922 // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2923 // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2924 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2925 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2926 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2927 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2929 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2930 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2931 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2932 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2934 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2935 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2936 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2937 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2942 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2943 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2945 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2946 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2947 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2948 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2949 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2950 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2952 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2953 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2954 assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2955 let commitment_spend =
2956 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2959 // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2960 // FullBlockViaListen
2961 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2962 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2963 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2964 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2967 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2968 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2969 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2974 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2975 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2976 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2977 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2978 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2979 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2980 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2981 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2983 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2984 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
2985 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2986 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2988 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2989 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2990 let mut first_claimed = false;
2991 for event in events {
2993 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2994 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2995 assert!(!first_claimed);
2996 first_claimed = true;
2998 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2999 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
3002 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3003 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
3004 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3007 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3010 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
3011 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
3012 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
3013 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
3014 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
3015 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
3017 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
3019 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3020 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3021 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3022 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3023 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3024 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3025 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3027 // Create some intial channels
3028 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3029 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3031 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
3032 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3033 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3035 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
3037 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
3038 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3039 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
3040 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
3041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
3042 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
3043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3045 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3046 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3048 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3049 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3050 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3051 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3052 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3053 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3055 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3057 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
3058 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3060 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3061 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3062 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3064 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
3065 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
3066 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
3067 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
3068 , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3069 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3071 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3072 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3073 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3075 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3077 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3078 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3082 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3084 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3086 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3088 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3090 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3091 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3093 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3094 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3095 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3096 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3097 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3098 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3100 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3103 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3104 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3105 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3107 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3108 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3110 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3112 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3113 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3114 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3115 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3116 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3120 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3121 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3122 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3123 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3127 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3128 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3129 // and fail backward accordingly.
3131 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3132 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3134 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3136 // Create some initial channels
3137 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3138 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3140 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3141 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3142 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3143 // Revoke the old state
3144 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3146 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3148 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3149 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3150 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3152 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3154 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3156 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3157 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3159 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3160 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3161 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3162 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3163 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3164 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3166 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3167 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3168 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3174 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3175 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3176 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3177 // commitment transaction anymore.
3178 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3179 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3180 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3181 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3182 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3183 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3185 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3186 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3187 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3188 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3189 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3190 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3191 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3192 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3193 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3195 // Create some initial channels
3196 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3197 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3199 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3200 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3201 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3202 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3203 // Revoke the old state
3204 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3206 let value = if use_dust {
3207 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3208 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3209 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3210 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3213 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3214 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3215 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3217 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3218 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3220 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3221 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3222 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3223 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3224 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3225 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3226 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3227 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3228 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3230 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3231 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3233 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3234 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3235 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3236 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3237 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3238 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3239 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3240 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3242 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3243 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3244 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3247 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3248 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3250 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3251 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3252 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3253 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3254 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3255 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3256 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3257 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3258 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3259 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3261 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3262 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3263 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3266 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3267 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3268 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3269 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3270 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3271 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3272 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3276 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3277 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3278 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3280 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3281 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3283 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3284 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3287 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3290 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3291 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3294 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3295 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3297 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3299 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3301 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3302 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3304 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3305 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3308 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3309 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3311 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3314 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3315 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3320 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3323 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3324 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3327 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3328 match nodes_2_event {
3329 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3330 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3331 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3332 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3333 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3334 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3336 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3340 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3341 match nodes_2_event {
3342 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3343 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3344 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3349 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3350 match nodes_0_event {
3351 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3352 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3353 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3354 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3355 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3356 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3358 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3359 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3360 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3362 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3364 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3365 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3367 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3368 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3369 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3370 // that we should update our routing table for.
3371 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3372 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3375 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3378 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3379 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3381 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3384 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3385 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3387 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3390 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3391 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3393 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3396 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3397 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3399 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3402 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3403 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3405 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3408 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3411 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3413 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3414 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3417 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3418 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3419 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3423 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3424 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3425 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3426 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3427 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3431 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3432 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3433 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3434 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3435 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3439 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3440 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3441 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3442 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3443 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3444 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3446 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3448 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3449 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3450 PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3453 let payment_event = {
3454 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3455 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3456 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3458 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3459 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3462 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3463 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3465 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3466 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3469 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3472 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3474 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3476 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3477 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3478 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3479 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3480 &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3481 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3482 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3484 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3485 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3491 onion_routing_packet,
3492 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3494 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3496 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3497 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3498 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3500 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3501 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3503 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3506 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3507 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3509 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3512 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3513 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3515 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3517 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3522 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3523 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3524 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3525 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3527 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3528 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3529 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3530 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3531 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3535 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3537 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3538 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3539 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3540 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3542 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3544 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3545 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3546 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());
3548 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]);
3549 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3550 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3552 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3554 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3555 // registering new transactions
3556 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3560 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3561 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3562 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3563 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3564 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3565 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3566 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3567 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3569 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3571 let mut payment_event = {
3572 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3573 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3576 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3577 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3578 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3581 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3582 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3584 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3586 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3587 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3588 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3589 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3592 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3593 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3595 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3597 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3598 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3599 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3601 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3602 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3604 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3606 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3607 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3608 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3609 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3610 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3614 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3616 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3617 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3619 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3621 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3623 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3624 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3626 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3627 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3628 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3629 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3630 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3631 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3632 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3634 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3638 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3639 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3640 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3641 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3642 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3648 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3650 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3652 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3653 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3655 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3656 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3657 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
3659 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3660 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3662 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3663 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3664 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3665 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3669 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3670 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3671 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3672 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3673 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3674 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3675 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3677 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3678 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3679 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3680 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3681 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3682 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3683 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3685 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3686 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3688 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3690 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3691 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3693 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3694 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3697 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3700 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3701 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3702 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3703 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3705 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3706 , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3707 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3708 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3712 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3713 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3714 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3715 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3716 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3717 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3718 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3719 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3721 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3722 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3723 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3724 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3725 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3727 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3728 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3729 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3730 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3732 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3733 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3734 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3736 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3737 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3738 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3739 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3741 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3742 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3744 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3745 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3747 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3748 reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
3749 reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3750 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3752 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3753 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3755 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3756 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3757 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3762 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3763 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3766 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3767 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3768 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3770 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3773 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3774 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3779 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
3781 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3782 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3785 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3786 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3787 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3788 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3789 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3790 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3792 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3793 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3794 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3795 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3796 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3797 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3798 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3801 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3804 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3806 let payment_event = {
3807 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3808 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3811 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3812 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3813 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3815 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3817 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3818 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3820 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3821 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3822 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3824 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3826 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3827 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3828 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3831 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3832 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3833 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3834 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3837 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3838 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3839 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3847 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3848 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3849 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3850 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3851 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3852 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3854 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3855 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3856 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3858 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3859 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3861 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3862 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3863 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3864 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3865 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
3866 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3867 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3868 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3869 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3870 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.0 = -1;
3871 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3872 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3873 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3874 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3875 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3876 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.0 = -1;
3877 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3878 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3879 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3880 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3881 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3882 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3883 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3884 // Everything was delivered...
3885 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3888 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3889 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3890 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3892 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3893 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3896 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3900 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3902 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3903 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3907 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3908 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3909 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3911 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3913 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3914 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3916 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3917 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3918 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3919 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3920 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3922 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3923 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3924 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3926 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3929 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3932 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3934 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3936 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3937 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3938 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3939 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3940 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3941 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3942 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3943 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3944 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3945 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3946 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3948 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3951 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3952 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3954 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3955 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3957 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3958 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3959 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3961 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3964 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3965 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3967 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3969 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3970 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3971 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3974 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3975 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3976 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3977 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3980 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3981 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3982 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3990 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3991 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3992 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3993 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3994 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3995 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3996 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3997 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3999 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4001 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4002 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4003 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4004 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = -1;
4005 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
4006 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4007 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4008 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4009 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4010 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = -1;
4011 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4012 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4013 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4014 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4015 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
4016 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4017 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4018 // Everything was delivered...
4019 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4022 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
4023 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4025 if messages_delivered <= 5 {
4026 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4027 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4029 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4031 if messages_delivered > 2 {
4032 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4035 // Channel should still work fine...
4036 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4037 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4038 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4042 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
4043 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
4044 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
4045 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
4046 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
4050 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
4051 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
4052 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
4053 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
4054 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
4058 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4059 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4060 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4061 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4062 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4063 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4064 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4065 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4066 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4067 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4069 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4071 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4072 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4073 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4074 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4075 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4076 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4078 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4079 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4080 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4084 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_leading() {
4085 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4088 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4090 // Let channel_manager get ahead of chain_monitor by 1 block.
4091 // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4092 // in case where client calls block_connect on channel_manager first and then on chain_monitor.
4093 let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4094 let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4096 nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4097 nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4099 // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4100 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4102 // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1,
4103 // but it's best_block is block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager
4104 // was running ahead of chain_monitor at the time of funding_created.
4105 // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4106 // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4107 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4108 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4110 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4111 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4112 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4116 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_lagging() {
4117 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4118 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4119 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4120 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4122 // Let chain_monitor get ahead of channel_manager by 1 block.
4123 // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4124 // in case where client calls block_connect on chain_monitor first and then on channel_manager.
4125 let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4126 let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4128 nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4129 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4131 // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4132 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4134 // channel_manager can't really skip block_1, it should get it eventually.
4135 nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4137 // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1, it's best_block is
4138 // the block before block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager was
4139 // running behind at the time of funding_created.
4140 // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4141 // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4142 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4143 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4145 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4146 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4147 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4151 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4152 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4153 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4154 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4155 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4156 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4157 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4158 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4160 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4162 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4163 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4164 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
4165 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4168 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4169 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4171 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4172 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4175 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4176 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4179 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4180 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4182 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4183 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4184 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4185 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4186 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4187 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4188 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4190 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4191 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4192 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4194 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4195 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4196 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4198 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4201 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4202 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4203 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4209 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4210 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4212 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4213 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4215 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4216 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4217 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4218 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4220 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4221 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4223 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4224 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4225 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4226 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4228 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4229 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4231 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4232 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4234 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4236 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4237 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4238 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4239 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4240 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4241 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4242 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4243 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4244 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4247 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4248 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4249 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4250 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4251 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4252 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4253 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4256 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4257 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4258 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4259 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4260 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4261 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4262 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4265 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4266 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4267 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4270 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4271 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4272 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4275 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4276 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4279 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4281 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4282 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4284 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4285 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4287 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4288 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4289 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4291 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4294 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4297 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4298 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4301 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4302 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4305 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4306 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4307 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4308 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4309 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4310 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4311 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4313 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4315 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4316 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4317 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4318 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4319 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4320 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4321 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4322 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4323 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4324 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4325 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4327 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4328 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4329 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4330 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4331 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4334 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4337 let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4338 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4339 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4340 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4341 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4342 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4343 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4344 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4347 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4350 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4351 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4352 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4353 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4354 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4356 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4357 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4358 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4359 let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4360 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4361 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4365 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4366 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4367 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4370 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4371 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4372 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4373 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4374 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4375 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4376 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4377 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4379 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4380 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4381 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4382 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4384 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4385 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4386 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4387 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4388 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4391 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4392 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4393 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4394 sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4395 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4398 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4399 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4400 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4401 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4405 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4406 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4407 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4408 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4411 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4413 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4414 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4415 match fail_commit[0] {
4416 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4417 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4418 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4420 _ => unreachable!(),
4422 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4424 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4429 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4430 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4431 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4434 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4435 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4437 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4438 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4439 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4440 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4441 for event in events.drain(..) {
4443 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, channel_id: _ } => {
4444 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4445 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4446 all_outputs.push(outp);
4449 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4452 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4453 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4463 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4464 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4465 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4466 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4467 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4468 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4470 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4471 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4472 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4474 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4475 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4476 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4477 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4478 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4480 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4481 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4483 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4484 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4485 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4486 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4487 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4491 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4492 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4493 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4494 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4495 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4496 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4497 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4499 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4500 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4501 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4503 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4505 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4506 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4507 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4508 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4510 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4511 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4513 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4514 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4516 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4517 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4518 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4522 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4523 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4524 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4526 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4527 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4528 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4529 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4531 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4532 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4533 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4534 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4535 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4537 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4538 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4539 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4541 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4543 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4544 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4545 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4547 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4548 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4549 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4550 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4551 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4555 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4556 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4557 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4558 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4559 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4561 // Create some initial channels
4562 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4564 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4566 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4567 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4568 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4570 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4571 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4572 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4574 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4576 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4578 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4579 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4582 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4583 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4586 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4587 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4588 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4589 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4590 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4592 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4593 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4594 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4596 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4597 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4598 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4602 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4603 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4604 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4605 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4606 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4608 // Create some initial channels
4609 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4611 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4612 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4614 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4616 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4617 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4618 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4620 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4621 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4623 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4625 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4626 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4628 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4630 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4631 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4632 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4633 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4634 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4636 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4637 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4638 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4639 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4641 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4642 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4643 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4644 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4645 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4649 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4650 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4651 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4652 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4653 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4655 // Create some initial channels
4656 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4658 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4659 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4660 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4661 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4663 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4665 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4666 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4668 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4670 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4671 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4672 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4673 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4675 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4676 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4678 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4679 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4680 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4684 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4685 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4686 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4689 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4691 // Create some initial channels
4692 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4694 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4695 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4696 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4697 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4699 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4701 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4702 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4703 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4705 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4706 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4708 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4709 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4710 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4711 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4712 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4713 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4715 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4716 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4717 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4719 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4721 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4722 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4723 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4724 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4725 // transactions next...
4726 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4727 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4729 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4730 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4731 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4732 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4734 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4735 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4738 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4739 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4741 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4742 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4743 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4744 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4745 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4749 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4750 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4751 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4752 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4753 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4754 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4756 // Create some initial channels
4757 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4759 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4760 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4761 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4762 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4764 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4765 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4767 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4769 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4770 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4771 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4773 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4774 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4776 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4777 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4778 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4779 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4781 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4782 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4783 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4785 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4786 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4787 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4789 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4791 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4792 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4794 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4795 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4796 // transactions next...
4797 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4798 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4799 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4800 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4802 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4803 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4806 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4807 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4809 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4810 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4812 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4813 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4815 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4816 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4817 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4818 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4819 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4820 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4821 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4822 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4826 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4827 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4828 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4829 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4830 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4832 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4835 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4836 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4837 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4838 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4840 // Create some initial channels
4841 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4842 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4844 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4845 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4846 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4847 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4848 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4850 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4851 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4852 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4854 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4855 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4856 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4857 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4858 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4860 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4861 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4862 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4863 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4864 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4866 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4867 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4869 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4871 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4872 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4873 check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4874 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4875 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4876 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4878 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4879 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4881 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4882 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4884 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4888 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4889 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4890 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4891 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4892 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4893 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4898 let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4899 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4900 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4901 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4903 match nodes_2_event {
4904 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4905 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4908 match nodes_0_event {
4909 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4910 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4911 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4912 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4913 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4914 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4919 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4920 match msg_events[0] {
4921 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4922 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4925 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4926 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4927 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4928 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4929 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4930 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4931 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4932 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4933 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4934 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4935 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4937 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4942 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4943 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4944 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4945 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4946 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4947 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4948 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4949 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4950 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4951 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4952 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4953 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4954 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4955 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4957 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4958 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4959 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4961 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4962 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4963 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4964 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4965 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4967 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4969 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4970 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4971 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4972 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4973 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4974 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
4975 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
4976 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4978 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4979 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4980 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4982 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4983 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4985 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4986 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4988 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4989 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4990 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4991 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4992 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4994 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4995 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4996 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4998 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4999 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5000 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5001 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5002 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5004 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5005 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5006 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
5007 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5009 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5010 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5011 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5012 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5015 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5016 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5017 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
5018 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
5019 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5020 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5021 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5023 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5027 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5028 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5030 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5032 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5033 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5035 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5036 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5039 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5040 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5042 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5043 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5044 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5045 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5046 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5047 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5048 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5049 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5050 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5051 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5053 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5054 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5055 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5056 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5057 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5058 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5059 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5060 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5061 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5064 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5065 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5067 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5069 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5071 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5072 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
5073 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
5074 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5075 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5076 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5077 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5078 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5079 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5082 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5083 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5084 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
5088 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5089 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5090 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5091 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5092 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5094 // Create some initial channels
5095 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5097 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5098 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5099 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5100 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5101 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5103 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5104 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5105 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5108 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5110 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5111 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5113 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5117 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5118 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5121 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5122 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5123 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5124 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5125 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5129 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5130 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5132 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5133 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5134 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5135 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5136 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5137 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5140 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5141 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5142 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5143 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5144 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5145 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5146 // use the same payment hashes.
5147 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5152 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5153 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5154 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5155 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5156 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5157 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5158 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5159 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5160 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5161 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5163 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5164 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5165 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5166 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5167 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5169 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5170 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5171 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5172 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5174 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5175 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5177 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5179 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5180 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5182 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5184 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5186 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5188 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5189 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5191 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5193 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5196 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5198 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5199 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5202 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5204 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5205 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5207 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5208 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5209 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5210 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5211 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5213 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5214 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5215 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5216 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5217 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5218 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5221 let failed_destinations = vec![
5222 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5223 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5224 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5225 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5227 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5230 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5231 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5232 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5233 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5234 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5235 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5237 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5238 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5239 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5242 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5243 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5244 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5246 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5249 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5250 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5251 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5252 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5254 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5256 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5257 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5258 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5259 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5260 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5261 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5262 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5263 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5265 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5267 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5268 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5269 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5270 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5271 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5272 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5273 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5274 if deliver_last_raa {
5275 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5277 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5280 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5281 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5282 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5283 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5285 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5286 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5287 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5289 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5290 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5291 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5293 if announce_latest {
5294 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5296 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5298 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5299 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5300 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5301 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5303 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5304 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5307 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5308 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5311 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5312 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5313 if deliver_last_raa {
5314 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5316 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5317 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5319 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5320 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5322 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5325 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5329 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5330 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5331 let mut a_done = false;
5332 for msg in cs_msgs {
5334 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5335 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5336 // should be failed-backwards here.
5337 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5338 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5339 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5340 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5342 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5347 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5348 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5349 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5351 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5352 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5355 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5356 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5357 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5358 if announce_latest {
5359 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5360 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5361 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5364 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5366 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5370 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5371 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5372 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5373 let mut as_updates = 0;
5374 for event in as_events.iter() {
5375 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5376 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5377 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5378 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5380 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5382 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5385 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5386 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5388 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5389 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5390 if announce_latest {
5391 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5392 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5394 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5396 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5397 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5398 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5399 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5400 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5401 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5402 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5403 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5404 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5406 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5408 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5411 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5412 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5414 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5415 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5416 if announce_latest {
5417 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5419 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5421 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5422 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5423 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5424 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5425 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5426 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5430 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5431 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5435 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5436 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5440 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5441 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5442 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5443 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5447 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5448 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5449 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5450 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5451 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5453 // Create some initial channels
5454 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5456 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5457 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5458 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5459 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5461 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5462 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5463 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5465 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5466 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5468 let htlc_timeout = {
5469 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5470 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5471 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5472 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5473 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5477 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5478 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5479 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5481 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5482 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5483 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5484 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5485 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5486 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5487 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5488 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5489 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5490 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5491 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5495 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5496 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5497 // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5498 // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5499 // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5501 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5503 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5504 let seed = [42; 32];
5505 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5506 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5507 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5508 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5509 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5510 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5511 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5512 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5513 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5516 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5518 // Create some initial channels
5519 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5521 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5522 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5523 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5525 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5526 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5527 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5528 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5529 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5531 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5532 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5533 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5534 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5535 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5537 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5538 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5539 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5540 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5541 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5542 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5543 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5544 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5547 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5548 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5549 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5550 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5552 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5554 let htlc_timeout = {
5555 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5556 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5557 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5558 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5559 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5563 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5564 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5565 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5567 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5568 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5569 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5570 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5571 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5572 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5573 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5574 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5575 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5576 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5577 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5578 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5582 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5588 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5590 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5591 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5593 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5594 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5595 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5597 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5598 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5599 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5601 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5602 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5603 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5605 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5606 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5607 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5610 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5611 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5612 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5613 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5614 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5615 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5617 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5619 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5620 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5621 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5623 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5625 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5626 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5627 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
5629 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5631 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5632 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5635 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5636 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5637 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5638 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5639 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5641 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5642 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5644 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5647 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5648 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5649 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5650 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5651 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5652 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5654 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5655 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5656 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5659 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5661 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5662 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5663 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5665 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5666 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5668 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5669 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5670 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5672 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5673 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5675 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5678 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5679 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5680 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5681 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5682 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5683 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5685 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5686 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5687 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5688 // actually revoked.
5689 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5690 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5691 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5692 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5695 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5696 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5697 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5699 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5700 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5702 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5704 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5706 if check_revoke_no_close {
5707 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5711 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5712 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5713 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5714 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5715 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5717 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5718 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5719 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5721 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5723 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5727 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5728 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5729 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5730 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5731 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5732 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5733 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5735 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5736 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5737 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5739 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5740 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5741 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5743 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5744 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5748 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5749 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5750 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5751 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5752 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5757 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5758 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5759 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5760 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5761 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5762 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5763 for node in nodes.iter() {
5764 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5767 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5768 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5769 let push_msat=10001;
5770 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5771 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5772 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5773 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5775 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5776 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5777 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5781 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5782 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5783 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5784 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5785 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5787 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5788 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5789 let push_msat=10001;
5790 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5792 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5793 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5794 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5795 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5796 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5798 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5799 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5800 let push_msat=10001;
5801 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5802 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5803 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5805 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5806 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5807 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5809 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5810 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5811 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5813 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5814 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5815 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5817 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5818 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5819 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5820 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5821 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5822 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5826 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5827 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5828 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5829 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5830 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5832 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5833 let push_msat=10001;
5834 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5835 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5836 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5837 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5839 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5840 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5841 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5842 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5845 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5847 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5850 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5851 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5852 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5853 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5855 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5856 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5857 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5858 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5859 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5860 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5862 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5863 // pending_update_fee.
5865 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5866 *feerate_lock += 20;
5868 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5871 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5872 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5873 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5874 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5875 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5877 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5880 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5882 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5883 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5884 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5885 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5887 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5888 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5889 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5891 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5892 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5893 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5894 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5895 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5897 // Flush the pending fee update.
5898 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5899 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5901 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5904 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5905 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5906 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5907 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5908 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5909 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5911 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5912 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5913 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5915 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5916 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5917 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5918 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5919 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5921 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5924 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5925 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5927 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5931 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5932 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5933 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5935 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5936 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5937 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5938 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5939 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5940 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5942 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5943 // pending_update_fee.
5945 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5946 *feerate_lock += 200;
5948 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5951 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5952 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5953 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5954 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5955 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5957 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5960 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5962 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5963 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5964 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5965 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5967 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5969 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
5970 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5971 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5973 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5974 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
5975 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5976 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5977 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5978 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5979 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
5980 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5981 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5982 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5984 // Flush the pending fee update.
5985 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5986 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5988 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5989 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5992 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5993 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5994 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5995 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5996 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5997 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5999 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6000 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6001 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6003 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6004 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6005 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6006 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6007 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
6009 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6012 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6013 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6015 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6018 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6019 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6020 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6021 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6022 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6024 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6025 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6026 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6028 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6030 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6031 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6032 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6033 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6035 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6036 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6038 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6039 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6040 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6042 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
6043 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6045 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6047 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6049 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6050 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6051 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6052 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6055 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6056 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6057 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6060 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6061 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6062 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6063 // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
6064 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6065 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
6066 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
6067 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6068 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6069 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6070 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
6072 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6073 // pending_update_fee.
6075 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6076 *feerate_lock += 20;
6078 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6081 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6082 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6083 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6084 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6085 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6087 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6090 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6092 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6093 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6094 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6095 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6097 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6098 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6099 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6100 let payment_event = {
6101 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6102 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6105 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6106 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6108 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6110 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6112 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6113 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6115 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
6116 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6118 // Flush the pending fee update.
6119 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6120 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6122 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6123 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6126 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6127 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6128 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6130 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6131 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6137 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6139 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6141 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6142 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6143 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6144 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6145 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6146 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6149 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6150 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6153 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6154 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6155 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6156 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6157 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6158 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6159 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6160 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6161 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6162 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6167 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6168 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6169 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6171 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6172 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6174 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6175 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6177 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6178 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6179 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6180 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6183 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6184 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6188 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6189 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6190 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6193 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6194 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6195 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6196 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6197 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6198 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6199 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6201 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6202 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6204 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6205 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6206 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6207 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6211 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6212 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6213 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6214 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6215 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6216 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6217 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6219 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6220 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6221 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6222 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6223 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6224 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6226 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6227 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6231 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6232 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6233 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6234 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6235 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6236 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6237 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6239 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6240 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6241 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6243 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6244 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6246 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6247 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6248 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6250 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
6251 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6255 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6256 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6257 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6258 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6259 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6260 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6261 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6262 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6264 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6265 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
6266 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6267 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6268 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6269 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6270 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6271 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6275 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6276 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6277 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6278 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6279 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6280 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6281 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6282 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6283 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6284 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6285 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6287 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6288 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6289 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6290 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6291 let payment_event = {
6292 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6293 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6296 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6298 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6299 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6303 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6305 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6307 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6309 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6310 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6312 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6313 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6314 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6316 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6320 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6321 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6322 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6323 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6324 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6325 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6326 let channel_value = 100000;
6327 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6328 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6330 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6332 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6333 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6335 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6336 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6337 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6338 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6339 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6341 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6344 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6346 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6347 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6348 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6349 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6350 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6351 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6352 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6353 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6355 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6356 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6357 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6358 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6361 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6362 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6363 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6365 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6366 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6367 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6368 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6369 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6370 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6372 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6376 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6377 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6378 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6379 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6380 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6381 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6382 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6384 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6385 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6386 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6387 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6388 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6389 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6391 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6392 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6393 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6394 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6396 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6398 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6399 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6400 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6401 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6402 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6404 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6405 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6406 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6408 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6412 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6413 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6414 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6415 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6416 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6417 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6418 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6419 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6421 let send_amt = 3999999;
6422 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6423 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6424 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6425 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6426 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6427 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6428 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6429 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6430 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6432 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6436 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6437 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6438 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6439 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6443 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6444 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6446 msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6447 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6449 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6450 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6451 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6453 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6457 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6458 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6459 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6460 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6461 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6462 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6463 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6465 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6466 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6467 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6469 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6470 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6471 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6473 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6474 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6475 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6477 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6481 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6482 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6483 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6484 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6485 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6486 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6488 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6489 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6490 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6491 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6493 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6494 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6495 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6497 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6498 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6499 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6501 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6505 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6506 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6507 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6508 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6509 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6510 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6511 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6512 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6514 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6515 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6516 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6517 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6519 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6520 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6522 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6523 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6524 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6525 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6526 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6528 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6529 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6530 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6531 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6533 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6534 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6535 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6536 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6537 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6538 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6541 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6542 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6543 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6545 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6547 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6549 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6550 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6551 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6553 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6557 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6558 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6560 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6561 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6562 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6563 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6564 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6565 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6566 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6567 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6570 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6571 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6573 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6576 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6579 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6581 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6582 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6583 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6585 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6589 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6590 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6595 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6596 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6598 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6599 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6600 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6602 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6603 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6605 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6608 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6611 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6613 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6614 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6615 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6617 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6621 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6622 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6624 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6627 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6628 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6630 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6631 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6632 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6634 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6635 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6636 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6639 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6640 failure_code: 0x8000,
6643 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6645 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6646 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6647 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6649 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6653 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6654 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6656 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6657 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6658 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6659 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6660 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6662 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6664 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6666 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6668 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6669 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6670 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6672 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6673 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6674 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6675 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6676 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6677 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6678 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6684 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6686 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6688 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6689 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6690 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6692 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6696 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6697 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6699 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6700 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6701 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6702 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6703 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6705 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6707 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6709 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6711 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6712 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6713 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6715 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6716 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6717 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6718 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6719 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6720 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6721 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6723 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6727 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6729 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6731 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6732 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6733 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6735 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6739 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6740 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6742 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6743 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6744 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6745 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6746 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6748 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6749 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6750 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6753 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6754 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6756 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6758 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6760 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6762 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6764 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6765 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6766 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6767 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6768 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6769 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6770 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6775 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6776 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6778 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6779 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6780 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6782 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6786 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6787 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6788 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6790 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6791 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6792 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6793 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6794 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6795 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6797 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6800 let mut payment_event = {
6801 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6802 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6804 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6805 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6806 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6808 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6810 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6811 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6812 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6813 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6815 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6816 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6819 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6820 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6822 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6824 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6825 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6826 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6828 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6829 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6830 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6831 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6832 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6833 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6834 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6836 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6840 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6843 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6844 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6845 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6846 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6848 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6850 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6851 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6852 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6853 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6854 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6855 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6857 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6864 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6865 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6866 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6867 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6868 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6869 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6870 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6872 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6875 let mut payment_event = {
6876 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6877 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6879 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6882 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6883 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6884 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6886 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6887 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6890 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6891 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6893 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6895 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6896 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6898 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6899 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6900 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6901 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6903 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6904 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6906 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6909 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6910 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6911 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6912 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6913 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6917 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6918 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6919 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6921 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6924 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6925 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6927 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6928 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6930 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6932 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6933 assert!(is_permanent);
6934 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6936 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6939 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6940 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6945 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6948 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6949 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6950 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6951 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6953 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6954 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6955 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6956 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6957 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6958 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6960 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6961 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6963 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6964 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6965 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6966 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6968 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6969 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6971 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6972 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6974 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6977 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6978 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6979 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6982 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6983 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6985 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6987 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6988 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6990 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6993 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6994 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6996 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6999 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7000 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7001 if announce_latest {
7002 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7004 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7007 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7009 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7011 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7012 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7013 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7014 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7015 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
7016 let mut first_failed = false;
7017 for event in events {
7019 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7020 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7021 assert!(!first_failed);
7022 first_failed = true;
7024 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7027 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
7028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7034 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7035 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7036 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7039 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7040 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7041 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7042 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7043 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7044 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7045 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7047 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7048 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7049 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7050 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7051 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7053 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7054 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7056 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7057 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7059 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7060 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7062 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7064 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7065 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7068 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7070 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7071 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7072 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7073 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7074 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7076 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7077 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7079 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7080 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
7081 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7082 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7083 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7084 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7085 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7086 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7088 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7089 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7090 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7092 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7093 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7095 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7096 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7097 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7098 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7099 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7100 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7101 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7104 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7106 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 11);
7108 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7109 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7110 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7111 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7112 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7117 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7118 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7119 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7120 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7124 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7125 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7127 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7128 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7129 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7130 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7131 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7132 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7133 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7134 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7135 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7137 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
7138 if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7139 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7140 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7143 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7144 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7146 } else { assert!(false) }
7148 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7149 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7150 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7151 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7152 if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7153 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7154 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7157 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7158 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7160 } else { assert!(false); }
7162 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7163 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7164 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7165 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7166 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7167 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7169 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7171 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7172 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7173 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7177 } else { panic!(); }
7178 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7180 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7181 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7182 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7183 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7184 if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7185 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7186 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7189 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7190 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7192 } else { assert!(false); }
7196 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7197 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7198 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7199 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7201 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7202 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7203 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7204 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7206 // Create some initial channels
7207 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7209 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7210 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7211 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7212 TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7213 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
7214 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7215 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7216 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7217 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7218 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7219 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7222 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7223 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7224 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7225 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7226 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7228 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7229 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7230 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7231 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7233 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7234 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7235 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7237 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7238 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7239 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7240 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7241 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7242 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7243 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7244 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7245 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7246 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7248 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7252 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7253 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7255 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7256 let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7257 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7258 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7262 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7263 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7264 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7266 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7267 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7268 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7269 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7271 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7272 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7273 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7276 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7277 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7279 for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7280 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7282 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7283 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7284 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7285 for e in msg_events {
7287 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7288 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7289 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7290 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7291 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7294 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7298 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7299 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7301 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7302 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7303 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7304 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7306 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7307 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7309 // Reestablish chan_1
7310 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7311 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7312 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7313 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7314 // Reestablish chan_2
7315 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7316 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7317 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7318 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7319 // Reestablish chan_3
7320 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7321 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7322 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7323 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7325 for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7326 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7328 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7329 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7330 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7331 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7332 for e in msg_events {
7334 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7335 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7336 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7337 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7339 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7340 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7343 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7346 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7347 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7351 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7352 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7353 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7355 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7356 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7357 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7358 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7360 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7362 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7363 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7364 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7365 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7366 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7368 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7369 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7370 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7371 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7372 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7373 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7375 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7376 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7377 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7378 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7382 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7383 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7385 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7386 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7387 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7390 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7394 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7395 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7396 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7397 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7398 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7399 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7400 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7401 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7405 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7406 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7407 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7408 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7410 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7411 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7412 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7413 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7414 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7415 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7416 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7417 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7418 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7419 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7420 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7421 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7422 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7426 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7428 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7429 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7431 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7433 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7434 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7435 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7436 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7437 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7438 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7439 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7440 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7441 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7442 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7443 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7444 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7445 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7449 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7451 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7452 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7456 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7457 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7458 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7460 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7461 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7462 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7463 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7464 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7466 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7467 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7468 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7469 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7470 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7471 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7472 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7473 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7474 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7475 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7476 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7477 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7478 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7479 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7481 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7482 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7483 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7485 // Revoke local commitment tx
7486 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7488 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7489 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7490 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7492 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7493 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7495 let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7496 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7497 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7499 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7500 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7501 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7503 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7504 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7505 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7506 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7511 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7512 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7513 let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7514 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7515 let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7516 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7517 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7518 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7519 match events.last().unwrap() {
7520 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7521 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7527 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7528 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7529 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7531 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7532 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7533 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7534 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7536 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7537 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7538 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7539 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7540 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7541 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7543 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7544 // available, which we check here:
7545 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7546 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7547 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7549 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7550 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7552 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7553 // output, checked above).
7554 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7555 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7556 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7558 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7559 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7560 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7561 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7562 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7566 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7567 let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7568 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7569 let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7570 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7572 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7573 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7574 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7575 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7577 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7578 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7580 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7581 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7582 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7583 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7584 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7585 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7586 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7587 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7591 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7592 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7593 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7595 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7596 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7597 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7598 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7599 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7600 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7601 // up bumped justice generation.
7602 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7605 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7610 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7611 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7612 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7615 // Provide preimage for one
7616 // Check aggregation
7618 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7619 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7620 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7621 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7623 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7624 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7625 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7627 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7628 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7629 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7630 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7631 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7633 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7634 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7635 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7636 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7638 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7640 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7644 let feerate_timeout;
7645 let feerate_preimage;
7647 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7648 // 3 transactions including:
7649 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7650 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7651 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7652 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7653 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7654 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7655 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7656 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7658 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7659 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7660 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7661 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7663 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7664 (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7666 (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7669 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7670 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7671 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7673 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7674 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7675 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7676 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7680 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7681 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7683 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7684 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7686 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7687 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7688 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7689 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7690 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7691 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7693 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7694 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7695 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7696 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7697 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7699 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7700 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7701 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7702 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7703 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7708 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7709 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7713 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7714 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7715 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7716 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7717 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7718 // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7719 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7720 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7722 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7723 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7724 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7725 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7726 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7728 let per_commitment_secret;
7729 let next_per_commitment_point;
7731 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7732 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7733 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7735 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7737 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7738 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7739 per_commitment_secret = keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7741 // Must revoke without gaps
7742 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7743 keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7745 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7746 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7747 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7750 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7751 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7753 per_commitment_secret,
7754 next_per_commitment_point,
7756 next_local_nonce: None,
7758 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7760 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
7761 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7765 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7766 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7767 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7771 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7772 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7774 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7775 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7776 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7777 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7779 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7780 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7781 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7783 // Revoke local commitment tx
7784 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7786 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7787 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7788 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7789 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7791 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7792 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7794 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7796 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7797 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7798 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7799 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7800 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7801 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7805 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7806 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7808 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7809 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7810 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7815 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7816 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7817 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7818 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7819 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7820 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7821 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7823 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7825 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7826 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7827 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7828 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7829 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7831 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7832 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7834 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7836 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7838 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7839 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7840 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7842 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7843 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7844 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7851 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7857 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7858 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7859 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7861 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7863 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7864 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7865 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7866 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7870 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7871 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7872 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7873 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7874 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7875 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7876 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7878 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7879 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7880 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7882 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7883 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7884 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7888 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7889 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7890 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7891 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7892 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7893 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7895 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7896 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7897 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7898 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7899 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7900 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7901 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7902 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7903 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7904 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7905 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7906 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7908 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7909 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7910 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7911 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7913 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7914 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7915 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7916 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7917 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7919 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7920 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7922 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7923 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7924 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7925 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7926 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7927 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7929 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7930 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7932 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7933 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7934 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7936 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7940 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7941 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7942 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7943 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7944 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7945 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7946 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7948 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7949 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7951 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7953 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7954 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7955 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7957 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7959 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7960 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7962 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7965 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7966 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7968 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7969 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7970 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7975 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7977 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7978 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7980 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7982 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7983 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7985 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7990 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7991 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7992 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7993 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7994 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7995 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7996 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7998 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7999 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8001 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8003 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8004 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8005 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8007 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8009 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8010 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8015 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8016 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8018 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8019 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8020 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8025 // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
8026 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8030 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8031 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8032 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8033 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8034 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8035 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8036 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8038 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8039 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8041 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8043 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8044 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8045 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8047 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8049 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8050 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8051 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8053 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8054 assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8056 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8057 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
8060 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8063 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8064 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8065 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8067 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8068 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8069 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8071 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8076 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8077 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8078 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8079 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8080 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8082 let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
8083 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8085 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8086 assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8088 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8089 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
8094 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8095 // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8096 // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8097 // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8098 // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8099 // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8104 let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8106 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8107 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8108 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8109 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8111 let total_msat = 100_000;
8112 let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8113 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8114 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8116 let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8117 path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8118 path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8119 path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8120 path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8121 path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8122 route.paths.push(path_1);
8124 let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8125 path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8126 path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8127 path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8128 path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8129 path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8130 route.paths.push(path_2);
8133 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8134 let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8135 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8136 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8137 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8140 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8141 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8144 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8145 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8146 let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8148 for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8149 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8151 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8152 let session_priv = [3; 32];
8153 let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8154 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8155 let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8156 let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8157 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8158 // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8159 // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8160 if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive { ref mut amt_msat, .. } = onion_payloads[1] {
8163 let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8164 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8167 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8168 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8169 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8170 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8173 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8174 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8175 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8176 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8177 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8179 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8180 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8187 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8188 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8190 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8193 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8195 let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8196 let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8198 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8199 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8200 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8201 let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8206 // Create channels for each amount
8207 let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8208 let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8209 let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8210 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8211 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8212 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8213 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8214 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8215 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8216 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8217 expected_paths.push(path);
8219 let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8221 // Create a route for each amount
8222 let example_amount = 100000;
8223 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8224 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8225 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8226 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8227 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8228 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8229 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8230 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8231 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8232 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8233 route.paths.push(path);
8236 // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8237 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8238 let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8239 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8240 nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8241 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8244 let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8245 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8246 let mut amount_received = 0;
8247 for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8248 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8250 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8251 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8252 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8253 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8256 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8260 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8261 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8262 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8266 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8267 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8268 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8269 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8270 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8271 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8273 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8274 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8275 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8276 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8278 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8279 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8280 route.paths.push(path);
8281 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8282 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8283 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8284 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8285 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8286 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8287 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8288 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8292 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8293 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8294 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8295 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8296 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8297 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8299 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8302 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8303 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8304 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8305 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8307 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8308 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8309 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8310 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8312 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8313 // values from previous calls.
8314 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8315 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8316 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8318 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8320 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8321 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8323 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8326 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8331 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8332 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8333 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8334 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8335 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8336 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8338 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8340 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8341 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8342 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8343 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8345 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8346 // resulting events.
8347 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8348 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8350 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8351 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8352 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8353 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8355 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8356 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8357 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8358 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8361 // We should fail the payment back
8362 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8363 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8364 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8365 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8366 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8368 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8373 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8374 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8375 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8377 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8378 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8379 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8380 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8381 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8383 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8384 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8385 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8386 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8387 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8389 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8390 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8391 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8392 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8393 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8397 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8398 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8399 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8400 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8403 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8404 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8405 // commitment at same time.
8407 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8408 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8409 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8410 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8412 // Create some initial channel
8413 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8414 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8416 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8417 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8419 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8420 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8422 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8423 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8424 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8425 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8428 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8429 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8430 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8431 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8434 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8435 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8438 let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8439 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8440 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8441 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8442 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8444 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8445 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8447 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8449 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8450 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8451 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8453 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8454 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8455 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8456 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8457 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8458 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8459 } else { assert!(false); }
8461 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8463 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8464 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8468 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8469 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8470 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8471 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8472 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8474 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8475 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8477 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8479 // Create some initial channel
8480 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8481 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8483 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8484 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8486 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8487 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8489 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8490 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8491 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8492 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8493 let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8494 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8496 let watchtower_alice = {
8498 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8499 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8500 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8501 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8504 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8505 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8508 let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8509 // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8510 // requirements here.
8511 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8512 alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8513 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8515 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8517 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8518 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8522 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8523 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8524 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8525 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8526 let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8527 let watchtower_bob = {
8529 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8530 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8531 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8532 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8535 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8536 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8539 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8541 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8542 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8543 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8544 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8547 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8548 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8549 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8551 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8552 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8553 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8554 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8555 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8556 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8557 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8558 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8559 } else { assert!(false); }
8561 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8564 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8565 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8567 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8570 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8571 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8572 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8575 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8576 let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8577 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8578 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8579 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
8580 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8581 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8582 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8584 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8585 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8586 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8587 // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
8588 // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
8589 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
8594 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8595 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8596 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8599 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8600 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8602 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8603 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8604 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8605 // before receiving funding_signed.
8606 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8607 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8608 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8609 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8611 // Create an initial channel
8612 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8613 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8614 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8615 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8616 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8618 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8619 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8621 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8624 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8625 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8626 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8627 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8628 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
8629 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
8633 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8634 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8635 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8636 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8637 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8638 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8639 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8641 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8642 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8643 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8644 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8646 // Create some initial channels
8647 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8649 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8650 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8651 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8652 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8653 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8654 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8656 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8657 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8658 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8659 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8660 // this test before #653 fix.
8661 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8662 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8664 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8665 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8667 let htlc_timeout = {
8668 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8669 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8670 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8671 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8672 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8676 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8677 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8678 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8681 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8682 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8683 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8684 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8686 // Steps of the test:
8687 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8688 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8689 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8690 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8691 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8692 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8693 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8694 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8695 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8696 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8697 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8698 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8700 // Create some initial channels
8701 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8702 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8704 // Steps (1) and (2):
8705 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8706 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8708 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8709 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8710 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8711 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8712 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8713 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8714 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8716 // Steps (3) and (4):
8717 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8718 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8719 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8720 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8723 if !broadcast_alice {
8724 force_closing_node = 1;
8725 counterparty_node = 0;
8727 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8728 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8730 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8731 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8732 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8733 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8734 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8736 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8737 if broadcast_alice {
8738 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8740 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8745 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8746 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8747 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8749 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8751 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8752 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8753 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8754 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8755 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8756 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8758 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8759 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8760 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8761 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8762 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8763 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8765 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8766 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8771 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8772 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8773 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8776 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8777 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8778 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8779 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8780 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8785 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8786 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8787 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8790 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8793 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8795 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8798 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8799 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8800 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8801 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8802 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8807 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8810 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8811 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8812 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8813 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8814 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8815 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8816 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8817 if broadcast_alice {
8818 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8820 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8822 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8823 if broadcast_alice {
8824 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8825 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8827 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8828 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8833 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8834 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8836 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8837 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8838 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8840 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8841 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8842 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8843 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8844 if broadcast_alice {
8845 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8846 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8847 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8849 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8850 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8851 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8857 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8858 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8859 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8860 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8861 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8865 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8866 // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8867 // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8868 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8869 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8870 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8871 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8873 // Create an first channel channel
8874 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8875 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8877 // Create an second channel
8878 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8879 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8881 // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8882 // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8883 open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8885 // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8886 // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8887 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8889 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8890 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8892 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8893 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8894 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8900 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8902 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8903 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8905 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8906 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8907 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8909 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8915 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8916 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8917 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8919 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8920 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8921 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8922 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8923 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8924 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8925 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8926 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8928 // Create an initial channel
8929 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8930 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8931 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8932 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8934 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8935 // that it is rejected.
8936 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8938 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8939 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8941 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8942 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8943 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8944 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8945 // move forward with it.
8946 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8947 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8949 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8953 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8954 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8956 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8959 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8960 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8962 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8963 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8964 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8965 added_monitors.clear();
8967 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8969 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8971 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8972 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8974 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8977 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8978 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8979 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8980 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8981 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8983 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8984 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8986 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8987 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8988 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8989 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8990 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8992 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8996 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8997 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8998 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8999 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9000 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9001 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9003 let (_, funding_created) = {
9004 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9005 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9006 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9007 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9008 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9009 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9010 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9011 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9012 as_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
9014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9015 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9016 // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
9017 // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
9018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9020 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9022 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9023 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9025 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9026 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9027 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9028 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9029 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9031 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9035 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9036 // everything is functional.
9037 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9039 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9040 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9041 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9042 added_monitors.clear();
9044 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9046 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9047 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9048 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9049 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9051 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9052 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9053 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9055 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9059 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9060 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9062 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9063 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9064 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9065 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9066 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9067 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9068 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9070 // Create some initial channels
9071 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9072 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9073 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9075 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9076 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9077 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9079 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9080 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9081 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9083 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9084 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9086 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9087 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9088 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9089 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9090 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9091 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9092 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9094 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9095 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9096 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9098 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9099 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
9100 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9101 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9103 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9104 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9106 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9109 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9110 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9114 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9115 // peer_disconnected.
9116 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9117 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9119 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9120 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9121 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9125 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9126 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9128 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9129 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9130 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9131 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9133 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9134 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9135 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9136 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9137 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9138 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9139 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9141 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9142 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9143 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9145 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9147 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9148 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9149 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9151 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9152 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9153 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9154 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9155 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9158 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9159 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9161 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9163 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9165 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9167 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9168 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9170 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9171 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9172 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9174 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9175 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9176 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
9177 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9179 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9180 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9181 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9182 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9183 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9184 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9185 } else { panic!(); }
9186 } else { panic!(); }
9187 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9189 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9190 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9191 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9192 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9193 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9194 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9195 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9199 script_sig: Script::new(),
9200 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9201 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9203 output: vec![TxOut {
9205 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9208 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9209 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9213 fn test_coinbase_funding_tx() {
9214 // Miners are able to fund channels directly from coinbase transactions, however
9215 // by consensus rules, outputs of a coinbase transaction are encumbered by a 100
9216 // block maturity timelock. To ensure that a (non-0conf) channel like this is enforceable
9217 // on-chain, the minimum depth is updated to 100 blocks for coinbase funding transactions.
9219 // Note that 0conf channels with coinbase funding transactions are unaffected and are
9220 // immediately operational after opening.
9221 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9222 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9223 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9224 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9226 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9227 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9229 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9230 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9232 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9234 // Create the coinbase funding transaction.
9235 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_coinbase_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9237 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9239 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9241 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9243 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9245 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9247 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9250 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9251 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9253 // Starting at height 0, we "confirm" the coinbase at height 1.
9254 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 1);
9255 // We connect 98 more blocks to have 99 confirmations for the coinbase transaction.
9256 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9257 // Check that we have no pending message events (we have not queued a `channel_ready` yet).
9258 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9259 // Now connect one more block which results in 100 confirmations of the coinbase transaction.
9260 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
9261 // There should now be a `channel_ready` which can be handled.
9262 let _ = &nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(&nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9264 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9265 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9266 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9267 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
9268 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9269 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9272 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9273 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9274 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9275 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9276 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9277 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9278 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9279 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9280 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9281 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9282 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9283 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9284 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9285 // until we learned about an additional block.
9287 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9288 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9289 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9290 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9291 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9292 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9293 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9295 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9296 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9297 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9298 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9299 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9301 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9302 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9303 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9305 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9306 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9308 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9309 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9310 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9312 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9313 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9314 if test_height_before_timelock {
9315 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9316 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9317 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9318 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9320 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9321 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9322 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9323 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid());
9324 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9325 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9327 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9328 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9330 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9331 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9332 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9333 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9334 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9335 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9338 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9339 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9340 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9341 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9342 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9343 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9344 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9345 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9346 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9351 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9352 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9353 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9356 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9357 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9358 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9360 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9362 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9364 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9365 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9366 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9368 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9371 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9372 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9374 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9375 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9376 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9377 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9378 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9380 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9381 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9384 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9385 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9386 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9388 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9389 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9390 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9391 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9392 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9393 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9394 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9395 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9396 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9399 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9400 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9402 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9403 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9404 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9406 let expected_destinations = vec![
9407 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9408 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9410 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9411 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9414 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9415 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9417 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9418 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9419 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9421 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9422 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9423 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9424 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9425 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9426 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9428 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9429 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9430 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9433 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9434 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9435 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9437 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9439 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9444 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9445 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9446 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9447 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9448 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9449 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9453 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9454 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9455 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9456 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9460 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9461 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9462 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9463 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9464 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9465 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9466 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9468 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9469 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9470 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9471 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9473 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9474 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9475 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9476 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9477 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9478 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9479 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9480 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9483 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9485 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9486 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9488 let session_privs = {
9489 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9490 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9491 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9492 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9493 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9494 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9496 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9497 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9498 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9502 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9503 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9504 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9506 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9508 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9509 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9513 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9514 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9515 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9517 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9518 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9520 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9523 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9524 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9525 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9527 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9529 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9531 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9532 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9533 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9535 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9536 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9537 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9538 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9542 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9543 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9544 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9546 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9549 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9550 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9551 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9553 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9555 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9556 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9557 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9560 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9561 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9562 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9564 do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9565 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
9569 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9570 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9571 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9572 // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9574 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9575 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9576 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9577 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9579 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9580 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9581 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9582 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9584 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9585 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9586 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9587 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9588 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9589 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9592 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9593 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9594 // amount of time to respond to.
9596 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9597 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9598 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9600 let failed_destinations = vec![
9601 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9602 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9604 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9606 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9608 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9609 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9610 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9613 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9614 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9615 let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9616 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9618 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9619 // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9620 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9622 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9625 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9626 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9627 enum ExposureEvent {
9628 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9630 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9632 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9633 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9636 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9637 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9640 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9641 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9642 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9643 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9644 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9645 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9646 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9647 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9649 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9650 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9651 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9652 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9653 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9654 // originally written.
9655 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
9656 } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
9657 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9658 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9659 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9661 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9662 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9663 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9664 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9666 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9668 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9669 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9670 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9672 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9674 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9677 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9678 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9679 let mut chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9680 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9683 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9684 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9686 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9688 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9690 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9692 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9693 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9694 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9696 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9697 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9698 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9700 let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
9701 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9702 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9703 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9704 (chan.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
9705 chan.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
9707 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9708 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9710 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9711 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9713 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9714 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9717 if dust_outbound_balance {
9718 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9719 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9720 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9721 for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9722 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9723 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9724 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9727 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9728 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9729 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9730 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9731 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9735 if dust_outbound_balance {
9736 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9737 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9738 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9739 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9740 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9741 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9744 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9745 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9746 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9747 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9752 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9753 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
9754 if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
9755 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9757 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9758 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9759 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9761 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9762 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9763 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9765 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9766 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
9767 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9768 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9770 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9771 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9772 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9773 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9774 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9776 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9777 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9778 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9779 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9781 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9782 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
9783 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
9784 dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
9785 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9787 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9788 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
9789 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
9790 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
9791 // to cross the threshold.
9793 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
9794 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9795 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9798 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9799 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9801 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9803 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9806 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9807 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9808 added_monitors.clear();
9811 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9812 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9813 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9814 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9815 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9816 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9817 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9818 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9819 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9820 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9821 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9822 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9823 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9827 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9828 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
9829 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
9833 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9834 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9835 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9836 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9837 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9839 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9840 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9841 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9842 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9843 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9845 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9847 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9848 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9849 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9850 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9851 let mut tx = match events[0] {
9852 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9853 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
9854 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 2), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9855 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9858 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9860 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9861 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9862 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9863 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9868 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
9869 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9870 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9871 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9875 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9876 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9877 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9878 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9879 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9880 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9881 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9882 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9884 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9886 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9888 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9889 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9892 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9894 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9895 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9897 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9900 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9901 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9903 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9904 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9905 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9910 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9913 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9914 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9916 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9919 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9920 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9922 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9923 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9924 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9929 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9932 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9933 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9935 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9938 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9939 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9941 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9942 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9943 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9944 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() },
9945 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9946 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9949 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9953 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9954 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9955 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9956 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9957 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9958 let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9959 let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9960 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9961 let recv_value = 100_000;
9963 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9965 let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9966 let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9967 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9968 Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9969 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9971 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9972 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9974 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
9975 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9976 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9978 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9979 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9980 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9981 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9982 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9983 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9986 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9987 None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9989 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9991 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9995 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9996 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9997 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9999 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10004 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
10005 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
10006 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
10007 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
10008 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
10012 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
10013 // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
10014 // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10015 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10016 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10017 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10018 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10020 // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
10021 let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
10022 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10023 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
10024 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
10033 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
10036 // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
10037 // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10038 let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
10039 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
10040 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10042 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
10043 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
10044 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10045 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10048 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
10049 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10050 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10052 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
10053 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10054 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10057 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10059 // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
10060 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
10061 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10062 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10063 let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10064 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10065 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
10066 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
10068 // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
10069 let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10070 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
10071 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10072 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
10073 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10075 // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
10076 // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
10077 // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10078 let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10079 check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10081 // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10083 // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10084 // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10085 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10086 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10087 let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10088 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10090 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10091 let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10092 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10094 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10096 // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10097 // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10098 // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10099 let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10100 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10102 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10103 check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10105 // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10106 let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10107 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10108 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10114 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10116 // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10117 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10118 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10119 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10122 // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10123 // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10124 check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10126 // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10127 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10128 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10130 // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10131 // waiting on any messages.
10132 for node in &nodes {
10133 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10134 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10135 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10141 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
10142 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10143 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10144 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10145 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10147 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10148 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10149 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10150 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10151 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10153 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10154 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10156 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10157 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10160 // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
10161 let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10162 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10163 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10164 assert_eq!(chan_lock.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10167 // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10168 check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
10170 // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10171 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10172 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10173 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
10176 // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10177 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10178 check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
10180 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10181 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10182 match msg_events[0] {
10183 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10184 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10186 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10188 check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10192 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
10193 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10194 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10195 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10196 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10198 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10199 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10200 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10201 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10202 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10204 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10205 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10207 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10211 // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10212 let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10213 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10214 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10215 assert_eq!(chan_lock.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10218 // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10219 check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10221 // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10222 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10223 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10224 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10227 // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10228 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10229 check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10231 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10232 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10233 match msg_events[0] {
10234 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10235 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10239 check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10242 fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
10243 // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
10244 // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
10245 // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
10247 // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
10248 // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
10249 // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
10250 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10251 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10252 let (persister, chain_monitor);
10253 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10254 let nodes_0_deserialized;
10255 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10257 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
10258 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;
10260 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10261 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10263 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10264 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10266 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
10267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10268 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
10270 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
10271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10272 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
10274 for dest in &[1, 2] {
10275 let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10276 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10277 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
10278 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
10281 let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
10282 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
10283 let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
10284 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
10285 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
10286 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10288 let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
10289 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
10290 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
10291 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10294 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
10295 let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
10296 let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
10297 reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10299 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10300 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10302 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
10303 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
10306 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10307 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
10308 if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
10309 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10310 } else { panic!(); }
10311 if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
10312 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10313 } else { panic!(); }
10314 if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
10315 if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
10317 // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
10318 // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
10319 get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10320 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
10324 fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
10325 do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
10326 do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);