git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::network_graph::RoutingFees;
  27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  29 use ln::msgs;
  30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  34 use util::errors::APIError;
  35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  36 use util::config::UserConfig;
  37
  38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  44
  45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  47
  48 use regex;
  49
  50 use io;
  51 use prelude::*;
  52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  53 use core::default::Default;
  54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  55
  56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  58
  59 #[test]
  60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  61         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  62         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  63         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  64         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  65         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  66
  67         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  68         // funding satoshis
  69         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  70         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  71         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  72
  73         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  74         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  75
  76         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  77         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  78
  79         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  80         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  81         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  82                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  83                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  84                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  85                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  86                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  87                         match action {
  88                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  89                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  90                                 },
  91                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  92                         }
  93                 } else { assert!(false); }
  94         };
  95
  96         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
  97         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  98
  99         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 100         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 101
 102         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 103
 104         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 105
 106         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 107
 108         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 115 }
 116
 117 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 118         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 119         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 120         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 121         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 122         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 123         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 124         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 125         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 126
 127         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 128         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 129         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 130         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 131         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
 132
 133         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 134         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 135         if !send_from_initiator {
 136                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 137                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 138         }
 139         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 140
 141         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 142         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 143         if send_from_initiator {
 144                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 145                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 146         }
 147         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 148         {
 149                 let mut lock;
 150                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 151                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 152                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 153         }
 154
 155         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 156         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 157         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 158
 159         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 160         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 161         if send_from_initiator {
 162                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 163                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 164                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 165                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 166                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2));
 167         } else {
 168                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 169         }
 170 }
 171
 172 #[test]
 173 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 174         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 175         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 176 }
 177
 178 #[test]
 179 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 180         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 181         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 182         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 183         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 184         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 185
 186         // balancing
 187         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 188
 189         // A                                        B
 190         // update_fee                            ->
 191         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 192         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 193         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 194         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 195         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 196         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 197         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 198         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 199         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 200         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 201         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 202         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 203         //                                       <- RAA
 204         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 205
 206         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 207         {
 208                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 209                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 210         }
 211         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 213
 214         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 215         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 216         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 217                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 218                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 219                 },
 220                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 221         };
 222
 223         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 224
 225         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 226         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 227         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 229
 230         let payment_event = {
 231                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 232                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 233                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 234         };
 235         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 236         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 237
 238         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 239         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 240         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 241         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 242         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 244
 245         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 246         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 247         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 248         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 250
 251         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 252         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 253         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 254         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 255         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 256         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 257         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 259
 260         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 261         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 262         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 263         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 264         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 265         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 266         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 267         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 268
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 270         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 275         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 277
 278         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 280
 281         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 282         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 283         match events_2[0] {
 284                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 285                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 286         }
 287
 288         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 290 }
 291
 292 #[test]
 293 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 294         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 295         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 299         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 300         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 301
 302         // balancing
 303         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 304
 305         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 306         {
 307                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 308                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 309         }
 310         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 312
 313         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 314         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 315         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 316                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 317                         update_fee.as_ref()
 318                 },
 319                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 320         };
 321
 322         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 323
 324         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 325         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 326         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 327         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 328
 329         let payment_event = {
 330                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 331                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 332                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 333         };
 334         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 335         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 336
 337         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 338         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 339         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 340         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 341         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 343
 344         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 346
 347         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 348 }
 349
 350 #[test]
 351 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 352         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 353         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 354         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 355         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 356         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 357
 358         // A                                        B
 359         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 360         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 361         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 362         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 363         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 364         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 365         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 366         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 367         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 368         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 369         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 370         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 371         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 372         //                                          B should send no response here
 373         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 374         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 375         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 376
 377         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 378         let initial_feerate;
 379         {
 380                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 381                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 382                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 383         }
 384         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 386
 387         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 388         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 389         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 390                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 391                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 392                 },
 393                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 394         };
 395
 396         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 397         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 398         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 399         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 401
 402         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 403         // transaction:
 404         {
 405                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 406                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 407         }
 408         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 409         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 410         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 411
 412         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 413         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 414                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 415                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 416         };
 417
 418         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 419
 420         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 421         // Deliver (3)
 422         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 423
 424         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 425         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 426         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 428         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 429         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 430         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 431         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 432         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 433         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 434         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 435
 436         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 437         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 438         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 440         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 441
 442         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 443         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 445
 446         // Delever (4)
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 448         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 450
 451         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 452         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 454
 455         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 456         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 457         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 459
 460         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 461         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 463 }
 464
 465 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
 466         // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
 467         // tests that we properly send one in that case.
 468         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
 469         alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 470         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 471         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 472         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
 473         bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 474         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 475         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 476         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 477         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 478         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
 479         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 480         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
 481
 482         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 483         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
 484         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
 485         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 486
 487         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
 488         let as_msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 489         assert_eq!(as_msg_events.len(), 2);
 490         let as_funding_locked = if let MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } = as_msg_events[0] {
 491                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 492                 msg.clone()
 493         } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
 494         if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } = as_msg_events[1] {
 495                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 496         } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
 497
 498         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
 499         let bs_msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 500         assert_eq!(bs_msg_events.len(), 1);
 501         if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } = bs_msg_events[0] {
 502                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 503         } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
 504
 505         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
 506
 507         // After 6 confirmations, as required by the spec, we'll send announcement_signatures and
 508         // broadcast the channel_announcement (but not before exactly 6 confirmations).
 509         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
 510         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 511         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 512         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
 513         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 514
 515         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
 516         let bs_announce_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 517         assert_eq!(bs_announce_events.len(), 2);
 518         let bs_announcement_sigs = if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } = bs_announce_events[0] {
 519                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 520                 msg.clone()
 521         } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
 522         let (bs_announcement, bs_update) = if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } = bs_announce_events[1] {
 523                 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
 524         } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
 525
 526         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
 527         let as_announce_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 528         assert_eq!(as_announce_events.len(), 1);
 529         let (announcement, as_update) = if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } = as_announce_events[0] {
 530                 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
 531         } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
 532         assert_eq!(announcement, bs_announcement);
 533
 534         for node in nodes {
 535                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
 536                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
 537                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
 538         }
 539 }
 540 #[test]
 541 fn test_1_conf_open() {
 542         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
 543         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
 544         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
 545 }
 546
 547 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 548         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 549         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 550         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 551         // Node objects.
 552
 553         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 554         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 555         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 556         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 557
 558         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 559                 let block = Block {
 560                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 561                         txdata: vec![],
 562                 };
 563                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 564                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 565         }
 566
 567         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 568         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 569         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 570
 571         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 572         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 573         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 574
 575         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 576         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 577
 578         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 579
 580         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 581         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 582         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 583         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 584
 585         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 586         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 587         {
 588                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 589                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 590                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 591                 added_monitors.clear();
 592         }
 593         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 594
 595         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 596         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 597         {
 598                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 599                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 600                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 601                 added_monitors.clear();
 602         }
 603
 604         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 605         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 606
 607         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 608         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 609
 610         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 611         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 612         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 613         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 614 }
 615
 616 #[test]
 617 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 618         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 619         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 620         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 621         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 622         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 623         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 624         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 625         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 626         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 627         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 628         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 629         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 630         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 631         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 632         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 633         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 634         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 635         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 636 }
 637
 638 #[test]
 639 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 640         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 641         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 642         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 643         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 644         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 645
 646         {
 647                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 648                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 649         }
 650         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 652
 653         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 654         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 655         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 656                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 657                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 658                 },
 659                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 660         };
 661         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 662
 663         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 664         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 665         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 666
 667         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 668         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 669         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 670
 671         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 672         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 673         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 674         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 675
 676         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 677         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 678         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 679 }
 680
 681 #[test]
 682 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 683         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 684         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 685         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 686         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 687         let channel_value = 5000;
 688         let push_sats = 700;
 689         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 690         let channel_id = chan.2;
 691         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 692         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 693
 694         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 695         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 696         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 697         // remote limit.
 698         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 699         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
 700         {
 701                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 702                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 703         }
 704         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 705         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 706         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 707
 708         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 709
 710         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 711
 712         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 713         {
 714                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 715
 716                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 717                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 718                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
 719                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 720                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 721                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 722         }
 723
 724         {
 725                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 726                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 727                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 728         }
 729         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 730         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 731         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 732
 733         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 734
 735         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 736         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 737         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 738                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 739                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 740                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 741                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 742                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 743                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 744         };
 745         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 746                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 747                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 748                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 749                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 750                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 751                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 752                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 753         };
 754
 755         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 756         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 757                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 758
 759         let res = {
 760                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 761                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 762                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 763                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 764                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 765                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 766                         push_sats,
 767                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
 768                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
 769                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 770                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 771                         &mut htlcs,
 772                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 773                 );
 774                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 775         };
 776
 777         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 778                 channel_id: chan.2,
 779                 signature: res.0,
 780                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 781         };
 782
 783         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 784                 channel_id: chan.2,
 785                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 786         };
 787
 788         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 789
 790         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 791         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 792         //Should produce and error.
 793         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 794         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 795         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 796         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 797         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 798 }
 799
 800 #[test]
 801 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 802         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 803         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 804         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 805         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 806         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 807
 808         // balancing
 809         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 810
 811         {
 812                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 813                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 814         }
 815         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 817
 818         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 819         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 820         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 821                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 822                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 823                 },
 824                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 825         };
 826         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 827         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 828         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 830
 831         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 832
 833         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 834         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 835         {
 836                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 837                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 838                 added_monitors.clear();
 839         }
 840         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 841         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 842         // node[1] has nothing to do
 843
 844         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 845         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 846         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 847
 848         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 849         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 850         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 851         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 852         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 854         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 855
 856         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 857         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 858         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 859         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 860         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 861         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 862
 863         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 864         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 866         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 867
 868         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 869         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 870         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 871
 872         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 874         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 875         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 876
 877         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 879         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 880
 881         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 882
 883         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 884         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 885         match events[0] {
 886                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 887                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 888         };
 889
 890         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 891
 892         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 893         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 894         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 895         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 896         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 897 }
 898
 899 #[test]
 900 fn test_update_fee() {
 901         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 902         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 903         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 904         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 905         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 906         let channel_id = chan.2;
 907
 908         // A                                        B
 909         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 910         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 911         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 912         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 913         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 914         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 915         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 916         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 917         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 918         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 919         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 920         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 921
 922         // Create and deliver (1)...
 923         let feerate;
 924         {
 925                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 926                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 927                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 928         }
 929         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 930         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 931
 932         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 933         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 934         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 935                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 936                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 937                 },
 938                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 939         };
 940         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 941
 942         // Generate (2) and (3):
 943         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 944         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 946
 947         // Deliver (2):
 948         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 949         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 951
 952         // Create and deliver (4)...
 953         {
 954                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 955                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 956         }
 957         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 959         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 960         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 961         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 962                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 963                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 964                 },
 965                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 966         };
 967
 968         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 969         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 970         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 971         // ... creating (5)
 972         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 973         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 974
 975         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 976         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 977         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 978         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 979         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 980
 981         // Deliver (5):
 982         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 983         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 985
 986         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 987         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 988         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 989         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 990         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 991         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 992         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 993         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 995
 996         // Deliver (7)
 997         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 998         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 999         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1000         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1001
1002         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
1003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1004         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1005
1006         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1007         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1008         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
1009         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1010         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1011 }
1012
1013 #[test]
1014 fn fake_network_test() {
1015         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1016         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
1017         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
1018         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
1019         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
1020         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1021
1022         // Create some initial channels
1023         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1024         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1025         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1026
1027         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1028         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1029         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1030         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1031         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1032
1033         // Send some more payments
1034         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1035         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1036         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1037
1038         // Test failure packets
1039         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1040         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1041
1042         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1043         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1044
1045         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1046         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1047         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1048         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1049         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1050         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1051         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1052
1053         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1054         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1055         hops.push(RouteHop {
1056                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1057                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1058                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1059                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1060                 fee_msat: 0,
1061                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1062         });
1063         hops.push(RouteHop {
1064                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1065                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1066                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1067                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1068                 fee_msat: 0,
1069                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1070         });
1071         hops.push(RouteHop {
1072                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1073                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1074                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1075                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1076                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1077                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1078         });
1079         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1080         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1081         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1082
1083         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1084         hops.push(RouteHop {
1085                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1086                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1087                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1088                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1089                 fee_msat: 0,
1090                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1091         });
1092         hops.push(RouteHop {
1093                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1094                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1095                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1096                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1097                 fee_msat: 0,
1098                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1099         });
1100         hops.push(RouteHop {
1101                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1102                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1103                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1104                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1105                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1106                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1107         });
1108         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1109         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1110         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1111
1112         // Claim the rebalances...
1113         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1114         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1115
1116         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1117         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1118
1119         // Send some payments across both channels
1120         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1121         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1122         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1123
1124
1125         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1126         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1127         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1128         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1129
1130         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1131
1132         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1133         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1134         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1135
1136         // Close down the channels...
1137         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1138         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1139         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1140         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1141         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1142         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1143         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1144         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1145         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1146         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1147         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1148         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1149         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1150         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1151         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1152 }
1153
1154 #[test]
1155 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1156         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1157         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1158         // commitment dance rounds.
1159         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1160         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1161         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1162         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1163         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1164         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1165
1166         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1167         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1168                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1169                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1170                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1171         }
1172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1173
1174         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1175         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1176         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1177         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1178
1179         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1180         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1181         // another HTLC.
1182         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1183         {
1184                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1185                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1186                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1187                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1188         }
1189
1190         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1191         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1192         {
1193                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1194                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1195         }
1196
1197         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1198         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1199         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1200         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1201
1202         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1203         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1204         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1205         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1206         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1207         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1209
1210         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1211         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1212         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1213
1214         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1215
1216         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1217         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1218         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1219         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1220
1221         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1222         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1224         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1225
1226         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1227         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1228         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1229
1230         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1231                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1232         }
1233         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1234         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1235         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1236         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1237         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1238
1239         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1240         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1241         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1242         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1243         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1244
1245         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1247
1248         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1249
1250         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1251         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1252         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1253                 match event {
1254                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1255                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1256                         },
1257                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1258                 };
1259         }
1260
1261         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1262                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1263         }
1264
1265         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1266 }
1267
1268 #[test]
1269 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1270         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1271         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1272         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1273         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1274         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1275         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1276
1277         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1278         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1279         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1280         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1281         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1282         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1283
1284         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1285
1286         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1287         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1288
1289         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1290         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1291
1292         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1293         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1294         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1295 }
1296
1297 #[test]
1298 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1299         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1300         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1301         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1302         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1303         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1304         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1305         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1306
1307         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1308
1309         // balancing
1310         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1311
1312         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1313
1314         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1315         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1316         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1317
1318         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1319         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1321
1322         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1323         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1324
1325         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1326         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1327         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1328                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1329                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1330                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1331                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1332                 }
1333         }
1334         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1335
1336         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1337         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1338         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1339         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1340
1341         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1342         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1343         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1344         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1345         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1346         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1347         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1348         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1349
1350         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1351         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1352         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1353
1354         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1355         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1356         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1357         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1358         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1359         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1360         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1361         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1362
1363         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1364         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1365         for e in events {
1366                 match e {
1367                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1368                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1369                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1370                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1371                         },
1372                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1373                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1374                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1375                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1376                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1377                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1378                         },
1379                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1380                 }
1381         }
1382 }
1383
1384 #[test]
1385 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1386         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1387         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1388         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1389         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1390         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1391
1392         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1393         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1394
1395         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1396         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1397         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1398         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1399         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1400         match err {
1401                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1402                         match &fails[0] {
1403                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1404                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1405                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1406                         }
1407                 },
1408                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1409         }
1410         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1411         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1412
1413         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1414 }
1415
1416 #[test]
1417 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1418         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1419         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1420         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1421         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1422         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1423
1424         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1425         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1426         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1427         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1428
1429         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1430
1431         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1432         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1433         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1434         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1435                 channel_id: chan.2,
1436                 htlc_id: 0,
1437                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1438                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1439                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1440                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1441         };
1442
1443         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1444
1445         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1446         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1447         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1448
1449         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1450
1451         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1452
1453         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1454         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1455         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1456                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1457                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1458                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1459                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1460                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1461
1462                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1463                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1464                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1465                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1466                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1467         };
1468         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1469                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1470                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1471                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1472                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1473                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1474                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1475                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1476         };
1477
1478         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1479         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1480                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1481
1482         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1483         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1484         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1485
1486         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1487                 offered: false,
1488                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1489                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1490                 payment_hash,
1491                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1492         };
1493
1494         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1495
1496         let res = {
1497                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1498                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1499                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1500                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1501                         commitment_number,
1502                         95000,
1503                         local_chan_balance,
1504                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1505                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1506                         feerate_per_kw,
1507                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1508                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1509                 );
1510                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1511         };
1512
1513         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1514                 channel_id: chan.2,
1515                 signature: res.0,
1516                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1517         };
1518
1519         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1520         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1521         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1522
1523         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1524         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1525                 channel_id: chan.2,
1526                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1527                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1528         };
1529         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1530
1531         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1532         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1533         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1534         match events[0] {
1535                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1536                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1537                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1538                 },
1539                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1540         };
1541         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1542                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1543
1544         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1545 }
1546
1547 #[test]
1548 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1549         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1550         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1551         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1552         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1553         // this situation.
1554         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1555         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1556         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1557         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1558
1559         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1560         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1561         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1562
1563         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1564
1565         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1566         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1567                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1568         }
1569
1570         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1571         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1572         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1573                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1574         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1575         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1576 }
1577
1578 #[test]
1579 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1580         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1581         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1582         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1583         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1584         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1585
1586         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1587         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1588         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1589         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1590         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1591         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1592         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1593
1594         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1595         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1596                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1597         }
1598
1599         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1600         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1601         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1602         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1603         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1604         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1605         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1606         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1607         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1608                 channel_id: chan.2,
1609                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1610                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1611                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1612                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1613                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1614         };
1615
1616         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1617         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1618         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1619         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1620         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1621         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1623         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1624 }
1625
1626 #[test]
1627 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1628         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1629         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1630         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1631         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1632
1633         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1634         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1635         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1636
1637         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1638         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1639         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1640         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1641         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1642         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1643         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1644
1645         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1646                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1647         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1648         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1649         // commitment transaction fee.
1650         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1651
1652         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1653         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1654                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1655         }
1656
1657         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1658         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1659         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1660                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1661 }
1662
1663 #[test]
1664 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1665         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1666         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1667         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1668         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1669         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1670         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1671         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1672
1673         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1674         // HTLC.
1675         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1676         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1677         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1678                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1679
1680         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1681         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1682         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1683         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1684         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1685         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1686         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1687
1688         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1689         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1690         match msg_events[0] {
1691                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1692                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1693                 },
1694                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1695         }
1696 }
1697
1698 #[test]
1699 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1700         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1701         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1702         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1703         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1704         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1705         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1706         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1707
1708         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1709         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1710         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1711         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1712         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1713         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1714
1715         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1716         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1717         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1718         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1719         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1720         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1721
1722         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1723         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1724         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1725         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1726 }
1727
1728 #[test]
1729 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1730         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1731         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1732         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1733         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1734         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1735         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1736
1737         let feemsat = 239;
1738         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1739         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1740         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1741
1742         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1743         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1744         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1745         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1746
1747         // Add a pending HTLC.
1748         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1749         let payment_event_1 = {
1750                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1751                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1752
1753                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1754                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1755                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1756         };
1757         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1758
1759         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1760         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1761         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1762         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1763         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1764
1765         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1766         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1767         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1768         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1769         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1770         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1771         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1772         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1773                 channel_id: chan.2,
1774                 htlc_id: 1,
1775                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1776                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1777                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1778                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1779         };
1780
1781         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1782         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1783         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1784         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1785         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1786         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1787         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1788         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1789 }
1790
1791 #[test]
1792 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1793         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1794         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1795         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1796         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1797         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1798         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1799         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1800         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1801         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1802
1803         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1804         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1805         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1806
1807         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1808         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1809 }
1810
1811 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1812         (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1813 }
1814
1815 #[test]
1816 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1817         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1818         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1819         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1820         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1821         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1822         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1823         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1824         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1825         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1826         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1827
1828         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1829         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1830
1831         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1832         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1833
1834         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1835                 ($node: expr) => {{
1836                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1837                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1838                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1839                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1840                         payment_event
1841                 }}
1842         }
1843
1844         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1845         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1846         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1847
1848         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1849
1850         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1851         {
1852                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1853                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1854                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1855                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1856                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1857                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1858                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1859         }
1860
1861         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1862         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1863         loop {
1864                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1865                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1866                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1867                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1868                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1869                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1870                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1871                         break;
1872                 }
1873                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1874
1875                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1876                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1877                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1878                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1879                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1880                 );
1881
1882                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1883                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1884                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1885                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1886                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1887         }
1888
1889         // adding pending output.
1890         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1891         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1892         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1893         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1894         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1895         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1896         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1897         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1898         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1899         // policy.
1900         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1901         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1902         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1903
1904         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1905         let payment_event_1 = {
1906                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1907                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1908
1909                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1910                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1911                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1912         };
1913         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1914
1915         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1916         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1917         {
1918                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1919                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1920                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1921                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1922         }
1923
1924         // split the rest to test holding cell
1925         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1926         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1927         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1928         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1929         {
1930                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1931                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1932         }
1933
1934         // now see if they go through on both sides
1935         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1936         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1937         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1938         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1939         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1940         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1941
1942         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1943         {
1944                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1945                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1946                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1947                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1948                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1949         }
1950
1951         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1952         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1953         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1955         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1956         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1957
1958         // flush the pending htlc
1959         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1960         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1961         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1962
1963         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1964         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1966         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1967
1968         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1969         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1970         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1972
1973         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1974         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1975         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1976
1977         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1978
1979         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1980         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1981         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1982
1983         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1984         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1985
1986         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1987         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1988         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1989         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1990         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1991         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1992
1993         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1994         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1995         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1996         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1997
1998         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1999         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2000
2001         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2002         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2003         match events[0] {
2004                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
2005                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2006                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
2007                         match &purpose {
2008                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2009                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2010                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2011                                 },
2012                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2013                         }
2014                 },
2015                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2016         }
2017         match events[1] {
2018                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
2019                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2020                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
2021                         match &purpose {
2022                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2023                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2024                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2025                                 },
2026                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2027                         }
2028                 },
2029                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2030         }
2031
2032         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2033         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2034         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2035
2036         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
2037         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2038         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2039
2040         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
2041         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2042         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2043         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2044         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2045
2046         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2047         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2048 }
2049
2050 #[test]
2051 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2052         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2053         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2054         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2055         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2056         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2057         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2058         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2059         // To test this we:
2060         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2061         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2062         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2063         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2064         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2065         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2066         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2067         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2068         //    claim,
2069         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2070         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2071         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2072         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2073         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2074         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2075         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2076         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2077         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2078         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2079
2080         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2081         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2082         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2083         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2084
2085         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2086         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2087         let send_1 = {
2088                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2089                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2090                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2091                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2092                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2093         };
2094
2095         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2096         // initial fulfill/CS.
2097         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2098         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2099         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2100
2101         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2102         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2103         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2104         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2105         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2106
2107         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2108         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2110         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2111         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2112
2113         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2114         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2116         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2117         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2118
2119         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2121         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2122
2123         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2124         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2125         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2126
2127         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2129         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2130
2131         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2132         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2133         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2134         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2135         // on-chain as necessary).
2136         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2137         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2139         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2140         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2141
2142         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2145
2146         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2147         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2148
2149         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2150         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2151         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2153         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2154         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2155
2156         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2157         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2158         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2159         let send_2 = {
2160                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2161                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2162                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2163                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2164                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2165         };
2166
2167         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2168         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2170         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2171
2172         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2173
2174         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2176         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2177
2178         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2180
2181         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2183         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2184         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2185
2186         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2188         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2189
2190         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2192
2193         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2194         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2195
2196         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2197         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2198 }
2199
2200 #[test]
2201 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2202         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2203         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2204         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2205         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2206         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2207         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2208
2209         // Create some initial channels
2210         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2211         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2212         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2213         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2214
2215         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2216         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2217         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2218         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2219         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2220         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2221
2222         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2223         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2224         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2225         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2226         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2227
2228         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2229         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2231         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2232         {
2233                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2234                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2235                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2236                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2237                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2238         }
2239         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2240         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2241         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2242         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2243         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2244
2245         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2246         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2247
2248         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2249         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2250         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2251         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2252         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2253         {
2254                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2255                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2256                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2257                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2258                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2259                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2260         }
2261         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2262         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2263         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2264         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2265         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2266
2267         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2268                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2269                         {
2270                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2271                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2272
2273                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2274                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2275                                 match events[0] {
2276                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2277                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2278                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2279                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2280                                         },
2281                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2282                                 };
2283                         }
2284                 }
2285         }
2286
2287         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2288         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2289         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2290         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2291         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2292         let node2_commitment_txid;
2293         {
2294                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2295                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2296                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2297                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2298
2299                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2300                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2301                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2302                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2303                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2304         }
2305         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2306         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2307         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2308         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2309         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2310
2311         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2312         // confusing us in the following tests.
2313         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2314
2315         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2316         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2317         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2318         // buffer space).
2319
2320         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2321                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2322                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2323                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2324                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2325                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2326                                 msg.clone()
2327                         },
2328                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2329                 };
2330                 match events[1] {
2331                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2332                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2333                         },
2334                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2335                 }
2336                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2337
2338                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2339                 {
2340                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2341                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2342                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2343                                         false
2344                                 } else { true }
2345                         });
2346                 }
2347
2348                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2349
2350                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2351                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2352
2353                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2354                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2355                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2356                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2357                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2358                                 msg.clone()
2359                         },
2360                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2361                 };
2362                 match events[1] {
2363                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2364                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2365                         },
2366                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2367                 }
2368                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2369                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2370
2371                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2372                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2373                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2374         };
2375         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2376         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2377         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2378         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2379
2380         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2381         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2382         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2383 }
2384
2385 #[test]
2386 fn test_justice_tx() {
2387         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2388         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2389         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2390         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2391         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2392         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2393         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2394         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2395         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2396         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2397         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2398         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2399         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2400         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2401         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2402         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2403         // Create some new channels:
2404         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2405
2406         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2407         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2408         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2409         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2410         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2411         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2412         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2413         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2414         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2415         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2416         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2417         // Revoke the old state
2418         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2419
2420         {
2421                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2422                 {
2423                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2424                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2425                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2426
2427                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2428                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2429                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2430                 }
2431                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2432                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2433                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2434
2435                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2436                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2437                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2438                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2439                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2440                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2441                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2442                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2443                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2444         }
2445         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2446
2447         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2448         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2449
2450         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2451         // Create some new channels:
2452         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2453         {
2454                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2455                 node_txn.clear();
2456         }
2457
2458         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2459         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2460         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2461         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2462         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2463         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2464         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2465         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2466         // Revoke the old state
2467         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2468         {
2469                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2470                 {
2471                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2472                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2473                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2474
2475                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2476                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2477                 }
2478                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2479                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2480
2481                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2482                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2483                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2484                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2485                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2486                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2487                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2488         }
2489         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2490         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2491         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2492 }
2493
2494 #[test]
2495 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2496         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2497         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2498         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2499         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2500         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2501         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2502         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2503         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2504         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2505         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2506         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2507         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2508         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2509         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2510
2511         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2512         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2513         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2514         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2515         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2516         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2517
2518         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2519         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2520
2521         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2522         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2523         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2524         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2525         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2526 }
2527
2528 #[test]
2529 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2530         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2531         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2532         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2533         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2534         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2535         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2536
2537         // Create some new channel:
2538         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2539
2540         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2541         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2542         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2543         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2544         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2545
2546         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2547         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2548         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2549         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2550         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2551         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2552         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2553         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2554         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2555
2556         //Revoke the old state
2557         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2558
2559         {
2560                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2561                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2562                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2563                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2564                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2565                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2566                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2567                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2568
2569                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2570                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2571
2572                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2573                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2574
2575                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2576                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2577                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2578                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2579                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2580                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2581                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2582                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2583
2584                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2585                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2586                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2587         }
2588         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2589         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2590         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2591 }
2592
2593 #[test]
2594 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2595         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2596         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2597         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2598         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2599         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2600         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2601
2602         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2603
2604         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2605         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2606         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2607         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2608         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2609         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2610
2611         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2612         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2613
2614         //Revoke the old state
2615         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2616
2617         {
2618                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2619                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2620                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2621                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2622                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2623                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2624                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2625                 match events[1] {
2626                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2627                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2628                 }
2629
2630                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2631                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2632
2633                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2634                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2635                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2636                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2637                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2638                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2639
2640                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2641                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2642                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2643                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2644                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2645                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2646                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2647
2648                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2649                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2650                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2651                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2652
2653                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2654                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2655                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2656
2657                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2658                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2659                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2660                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2661                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2662                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2663                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2664                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2665         }
2666         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2667         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2668         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2669 }
2670
2671 #[test]
2672 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2673         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2674         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2675         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2676         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2677         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2678         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2679         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2680         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2681         // towards B.
2682         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2683         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2684         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2685         // PaymentSent event).
2686
2687         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2688         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2689         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2690         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2691
2692         // Create some initial channels
2693         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2694         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2695
2696         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2697         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2698         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2699         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2700         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2701
2702         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2703         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2704         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2705
2706         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2707         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2708
2709         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2710         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2711         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2712         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2713         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2714         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2715         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2716         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2717         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2718         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2719         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2720         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2721         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2722
2723         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2724         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2725         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2726         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2727         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2728         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2729         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2730         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2731         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2732         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2733         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2734         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2735         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2736         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2737         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2738         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2739         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2740
2741         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2742         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2743         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2744         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2745         {
2746                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2747                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2748                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2749                 added_monitors.clear();
2750         }
2751         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2752         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2753         match forwarded_events[0] {
2754                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2755                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2756         }
2757         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2758                 } else { panic!(); }
2759         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2760                 } else { panic!(); }
2761         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2762         {
2763                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2764                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2765                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2766                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2767                 added_monitors.clear();
2768         }
2769         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2770         match events[0] {
2771                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2772                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2773         }
2774         match events[1] {
2775                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2776                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2777         }
2778
2779         match events[2] {
2780                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2781                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2782                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2783                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2784                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2785                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2786                 },
2787                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2788         };
2789         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2790                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2791                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2792                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2793                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2794                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2795                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2796                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2797                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2798                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2799                         if $htlc_offered {
2800                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2801                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2802                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2803                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2804                         } else {
2805                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2806                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2807                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2808                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2809                         }
2810                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2811                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2812                         node_txn.clear();
2813                 } }
2814         }
2815         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2816         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2817         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2818         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2819
2820         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2821         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2822         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2823         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2824         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2825         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2827         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2828         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2829         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2830         let commitment_spend =
2831                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2832                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2833                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2834                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2835                         &node_txn[0]
2836                 } else {
2837                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2838                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2839                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2840                         &node_txn[2]
2841                 };
2842
2843         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2844         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2845         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2846         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2847         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2848         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2849         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2850         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2851         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2852         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2853         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2854         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2855
2856         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2857         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2858         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2859         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2860         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2861         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2862         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2863         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2864         let mut first_claimed = false;
2865         for event in events {
2866                 match event {
2867                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2868                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2869                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2870                                         first_claimed = true;
2871                                 } else {
2872                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2873                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2874                                 }
2875                         },
2876                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2877                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2878                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2879                 }
2880         }
2881         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2882 }
2883
2884 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2885         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2886         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2887         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2888         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2889         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2890         //            \                                  \
2891         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2892
2893         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2894         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2895         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2896         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2897         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2898         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2899         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2900
2901         // Create some intial channels
2902         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2903         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2904
2905         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2906         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2907         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2908
2909         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2910
2911         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2912         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2913         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2914         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2915         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2916         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2918
2919         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2920         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2921         match events[0] {
2922                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2923                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2924                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2925                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2926                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2927                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2928                 },
2929                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2930         };
2931         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2932         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2934         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2935         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2936         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2937         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2938         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2939
2940         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2941         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2942         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2943         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2944         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2945         let timeout_tx;
2946         {
2947                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2948                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2949                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2950                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2951
2952                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2953                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2954
2955                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2956                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2957                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2958                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2959
2960                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2961                 node_txn.clear();
2962         }
2963
2964         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2966         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2967         {
2968                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2969                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2970                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2971                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2972         }
2973
2974         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2975         {
2976                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2977                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2978                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2979                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2980                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2981                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2982                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2983                 } else {
2984                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2985                 }
2986         }
2987
2988         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2990         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2991         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2992         match events[0] {
2993                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2994                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2995                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2996                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2997                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2998                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2999                 },
3000                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3001         };
3002
3003         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3004         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3005         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3006
3007         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3008         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3009
3010         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3012         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3013         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3014         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3015         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3016         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3017         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3018         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3019 }
3020
3021 #[test]
3022 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3023         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3024         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3025         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3026 }
3027
3028 #[test]
3029 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3030         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3031         // and fail backward accordingly.
3032
3033         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3034         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3035         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3036         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3037
3038         // Create some initial channels
3039         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3040         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3041
3042         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3043         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3044         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3045         // Revoke the old state
3046         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3047
3048         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3049
3050         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3051         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3052         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3053         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3054         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3055
3056         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3057         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3058         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3059         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3060         match events[0] {
3061                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3062                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3063                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3064                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3065                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3066                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3067
3068                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3069                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3070                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3071                 },
3072                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3073         }
3074 }
3075
3076 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3077         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3078         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3079         // commitment transaction anymore.
3080         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3081         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3082         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3083         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3084         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3085         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3086         // transactions:
3087         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3088         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3089         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3090         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3091         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3092         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3093         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3094         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3095         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3096
3097         // Create some initial channels
3098         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3099         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3100
3101         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3102         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3103         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3104         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3105         // Revoke the old state
3106         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3107
3108         let value = if use_dust {
3109                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3110                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3111                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3112         } else { 3000000 };
3113
3114         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3115         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3116         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3117
3118         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3119         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3121         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3122         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3123         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3124         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3125         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3126         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3127         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3128         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3129         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3130
3131         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3132         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3134         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3135         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3136         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3137         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3138         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3139         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3140         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3141         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3143         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3144         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3145         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3147
3148         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3149         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3151         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3152         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3153         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3154         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3155         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3156         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3157         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3158         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3159         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3160         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3162         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3163         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3164         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3165         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3166
3167         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3168         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3169         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3170         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3171         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3172         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3173         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3174
3175         if deliver_bs_raa {
3176                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3177                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3178                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3179                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3180                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3181                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3182                 match events[0] {
3183                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3184                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3185                 };
3186                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3187                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3188         }
3189
3190         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3191         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3192
3193         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3194         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3195         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3196         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3197
3198         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3199         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3200         match events[0] {
3201                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3202                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3203         }
3204         match events[1] {
3205                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3206                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3207                 },
3208                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3209         }
3210         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3211                 match events[2] {
3212                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3213                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3214                         },
3215                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3216                 }
3217                 match events[3] {
3218                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3219                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3220                 };
3221         }
3222         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3224
3225         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3226         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3227         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3228                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3229                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3230         }
3231         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3232                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3233                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3234                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3235                 },
3236                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3237         }
3238         if deliver_bs_raa {
3239                 match events[0] {
3240                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3241                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3242                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3243                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3244                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3245                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3246                         },
3247                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3248                 }
3249         }
3250         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3251                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3252                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3253                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3254                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3255                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3256                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3257
3258                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3259                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3260                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3261
3262                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3263
3264                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3265                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3266                         match events[0] {
3267                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3268                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3269                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3270                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3271                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3272                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3273                                         }
3274                                 },
3275                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3276                         }
3277                         match events[1] {
3278                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3279                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3280                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3281                                 },
3282                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3283                         }
3284                         match events[2] {
3285                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3286                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3287                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3288                                 },
3289                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3290                         }
3291                 },
3292                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3293         }
3294
3295         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3296         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3297         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3298 }
3299
3300 #[test]
3301 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3302         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3303         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3304         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3305         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3306 }
3307
3308 #[test]
3309 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3310         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3311         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3312         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3313         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3314 }
3315
3316 #[test]
3317 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3321         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3322         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3323
3324         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3325         {
3326                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3327                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3328                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3329
3330                 let payment_event = {
3331                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3332                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3333                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3334                 };
3335                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3336                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3337         }
3338
3339         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3340         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3341         {
3342                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3343                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3344
3345                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3346         }
3347
3348         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3349         {
3350                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3351
3352                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3353                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3354                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3355                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3356                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3357                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3358
3359                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3360                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3361                         channel_id: chan.2,
3362                         htlc_id: 0,
3363                         amount_msat: 0,
3364                         payment_hash,
3365                         cltv_expiry,
3366                         onion_routing_packet,
3367                 };
3368                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3369         }
3370         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3371         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3372         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3373         match events[0] {
3374                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3375                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3376                 },
3377                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3378         }
3379         match events[1] {
3380                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3381                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3382                 },
3383                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3384         }
3385         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3386         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3387 }
3388
3389 #[test]
3390 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3391         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3392         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3393         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3394         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3395         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3396         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3397         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3398
3399         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3400         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3401         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3402         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3403         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3404         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3405
3406         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3407         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3408         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3409
3410         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3411         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3412         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3413         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3414         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3415
3416         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3417         // registering new transactions
3418         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3419         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3420 }
3421
3422 #[test]
3423 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3424         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3425         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3426         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3427         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3428         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3429         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3430         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3431
3432         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3433
3434         let mut payment_event = {
3435                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3436                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3437
3438                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3439                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3440                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3441         };
3442
3443         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3444         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3445
3446         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3447
3448         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3449         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3450         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3451         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3452
3453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3454         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3455         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3457         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3458
3459         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3460         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3461         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3462
3463         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3464         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3465         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3466         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3467         let tx = {
3468                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3469                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3470                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3471                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3472                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3473                 node_txn.remove(0)
3474         };
3475
3476         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3477
3478         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3479         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3481         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3482
3483         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3484         {
3485                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3486                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3487         }
3488         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3489         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3490         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3491         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3492         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3493         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3494         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3495
3496         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3497 }
3498
3499 #[test]
3500 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3501         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3502         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3503         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3504         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3505
3506         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3507         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3508         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3509         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3510         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3511
3512         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3513
3514         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3515         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3516         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3517         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3518         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3519
3520         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3521         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3522
3523         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3524         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3525 }
3526
3527 #[test]
3528 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3529         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3530         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3531         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3532         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3533         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3534         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3535         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3536
3537         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3538         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3539         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3540
3541         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3542         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3543         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3544         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3545
3546         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3547         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3548         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3549
3550         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3551         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3552         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3553         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3554
3555         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3556         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3557
3558         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3559         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3560
3561         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3562         {
3563                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3564                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3565                 match events[0] {
3566                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3567                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3568                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3569                         },
3570                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3571                 }
3572                 match events[1] {
3573                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3574                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3575                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3576                         },
3577                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3578                 }
3579                 match events[2] {
3580                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3581                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3582                 }
3583         }
3584
3585         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3586         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3587 }
3588
3589 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3590         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3591         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3592         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3593         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3594         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3595
3596         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3597         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3598                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3599                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3600                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3601                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3602                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3603         } else {
3604                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3605         }
3606
3607         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3608
3609         let payment_event = {
3610                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3611                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3612
3613                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3614                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3615                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3616         };
3617         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3618
3619         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3620                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3621         } else {
3622                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3623                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3624                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3625                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3626                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3627
3628                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3629                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3630                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3631                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3632
3633                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3634                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3635                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3636                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3637                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3638
3639                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3640                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3641                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3642                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3643                                         }
3644                                 }
3645                         }
3646                 }
3647         }
3648
3649         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3650         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3651         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3652                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3653                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3654                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3655                         //
3656                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3657                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3658                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3659                         //
3660                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3661                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3662                 }
3663                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3664                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3665                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3666         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3667                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3668                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3669         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3670                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3671                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3672         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3673                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3674                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3675         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3676                 // Everything was delivered...
3677                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3678         }
3679
3680         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3681         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3682         match events_1[0] {
3683                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3684                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3685         };
3686
3687         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3688         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3689         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3690
3691         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3692
3693         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3694         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3695         match events_2[0] {
3696                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3697                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3698                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3699                         match &purpose {
3700                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3701                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3702                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3703                                 },
3704                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3705                         }
3706                 },
3707                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3708         }
3709
3710         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3711         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3712
3713         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3714         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3715         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3716                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3717                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3718                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3719                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3720                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3721                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3722                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3723                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3724                 },
3725                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3726         };
3727
3728         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3729                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3730
3731                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3732                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3733                 match events_4[0] {
3734                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3735                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3736                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3737                         },
3738                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3739                 }
3740
3741                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3742                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3743                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3744                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3745
3746                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3747                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3748                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3749                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3750
3751                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3752                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3753                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3754                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3755                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3756
3757                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3758                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3759                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3760                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3761                                         }
3762                                 }
3763                         }
3764                 }
3765         }
3766
3767         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3768         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3769         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3770                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3771                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3772                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3773                 } else {
3774                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3775                 }
3776         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3777                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3778                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3779         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3780                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3781                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3782         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3783                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3784                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3785         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3786                 // Everything was delivered...
3787                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3788         }
3789
3790         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3791                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3792         }
3793
3794         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3795         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3796         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3797
3798         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3799                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3800         }
3801
3802         // Channel should still work fine...
3803         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3804         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3805         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3806 }
3807
3808 #[test]
3809 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3810         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3811         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3812         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3813         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3814 }
3815
3816 #[test]
3817 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3818         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3819         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3820         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3821         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3822 }
3823
3824 #[test]
3825 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3826         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3827         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3828         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3829         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3830         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3831         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3832         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3833         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3834         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3835
3836         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3837         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3838
3839         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3840         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3841         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3842
3843         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3844
3845         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3846         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3847
3848         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3849         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3850         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3851
3852         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3853         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3854         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3855         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3856
3857         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3858         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3859         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3860         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3861         let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3862                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3863                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3864                         msg.clone()
3865                 },
3866                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3867         };
3868
3869         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3870         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3871         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3872         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3873         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3874         let chan_id;
3875         let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3876                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3877                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3878                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3879                         msg.clone()
3880                 },
3881                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3882         };
3883         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3884                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3885                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3886                         msg.clone()
3887                 },
3888                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3889         };
3890         match events_4[2] {
3891                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3892                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3893                 },
3894                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3895         }
3896
3897         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3898         // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3899         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3900         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3901         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3902         match events_5[0] {
3903                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3904                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3905                 },
3906                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3907         };
3908
3909         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3910         // announcement_signatures.
3911         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3912         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3913         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3914         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3915                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3916                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3917                         msg.clone()
3918                 },
3919                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3920         };
3921
3922         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3923         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3924         // channel_update.
3925         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3926         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3927         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3928         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3929                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3930                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3931                 },
3932                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3933         };
3934
3935         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3936         // same channel_announcement.
3937         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3938         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3939         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3940         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3941                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3942                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3943                         update_msg.clone()
3944                 },
3945                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3946         };
3947
3948         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3949         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3950         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3951         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3952
3953         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3954         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3955         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3956
3957         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3958         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3959         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3960
3961         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3962         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3963         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3964
3965         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3966         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3967         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3968         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3969         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3970         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3971                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3972         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3973
3974         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3975         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3976                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3977                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3978                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3979                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3980                         keys_manager,
3981                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3982                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3983                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3984                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3985                         channel_monitors,
3986                 }).unwrap()
3987         };
3988         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3989         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3990
3991         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3992         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3993         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3994
3995         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3996
3997         // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3998         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3999         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4000         let mut found_announcement = false;
4001         for event in msgs.iter() {
4002                 match event {
4003                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4004                                 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4005                         },
4006                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4007                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4008                 }
4009         }
4010         assert!(found_announcement);
4011 }
4012
4013 #[test]
4014 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4015         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4016         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4017         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4018         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4019         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4020         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4021         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4022
4023         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4024
4025         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4026         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4027         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4029
4030         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4031         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4032         match events_1[0] {
4033                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4034                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4035         }
4036
4037         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
4038         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4039
4040         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4041         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4042         match events_2[0] {
4043                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4044                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4045                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4046                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4047                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4048                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4049                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4050
4051                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4052                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4053                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4054                         match events_3[0] {
4055                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4056                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4057                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4058                                 },
4059                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4060                         }
4061
4062                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4063                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4064                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4065                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4066                 },
4067                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4068         }
4069
4070         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4071         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4072
4073         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4074         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4075         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4076         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4077         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4078         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4079
4080         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4081         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4082         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4083         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4084
4085         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4086         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4087
4088         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4089         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4090
4091         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4092
4093         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4094         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4095         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4096         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4097         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4098         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4099         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4100         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4101         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4102         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4103
4104         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4105         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4106         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4107         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4108         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4109         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4110         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4112
4113         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4114         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4115         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4116         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4117         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4118         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4119         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4121
4122         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4123         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4124         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4126
4127         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4128         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4129         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4130         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4131
4132         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4133         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4135
4136         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4137
4138         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4139         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4140         match events_5[0] {
4141                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4142                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4143                         match &purpose {
4144                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4145                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4146                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4147                                 },
4148                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4149                         }
4150                 },
4151                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4152         }
4153
4154         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4155         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4157
4158         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4159         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4160 }
4161
4162 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4163         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4164         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4165         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4166         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4167         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4168         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4169
4170         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4171
4172         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4173                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4174                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4175                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4176                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4177                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4178                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4179                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4180                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4181                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4182                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4183                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4184                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4185                 our_payment_hash
4186         } else {
4187                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4188         };
4189
4190         let mut block = Block {
4191                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4192                 txdata: vec![],
4193         };
4194         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4195         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4196         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4197         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4198                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4199                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4200                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4201         }
4202
4203         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4204
4205         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4206         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4207         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4208         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4209         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4210         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4211
4212         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4213         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4214         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4215         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4216         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4217         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4218 }
4219
4220 #[test]
4221 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4222         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4223         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4224 }
4225
4226 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4227         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4228         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4229         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4230         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4231         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4232         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4233         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4234
4235         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4236         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4237         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4238         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4239
4240         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4241         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4242         {
4243                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4244         }
4245         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4247
4248         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4249         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4250         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4251         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4252         if forwarded_htlc {
4253                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4254                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4255                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4256                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4257                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4258         }
4259         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4260
4261         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4262         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4263         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4264         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4265
4266         if forwarded_htlc {
4267                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4268                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4269                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4270                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4271                 match fail_commit[0] {
4272                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4273                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4274                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4275                         },
4276                         _ => unreachable!(),
4277                 }
4278                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4279         } else {
4280                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4281                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4282                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4283                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4284                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4285                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4286                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4287                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4288         }
4289 }
4290
4291 #[test]
4292 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4293         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4294         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4295 }
4296
4297 #[test]
4298 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4299         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4300         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4301         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4302         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4303         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4304         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4305         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4306         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4307         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4308
4309         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4310
4311         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4312
4313         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4314         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4315         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4316                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4317
4318         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4319         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4320         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4321         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4322         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4323         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4324         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4325         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4326                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4327         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4328
4329         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4330         let config = UserConfig::default();
4331         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4332                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4333                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4334                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4335                         default_config: config,
4336                         keys_manager,
4337                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4338                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4339                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4340                         logger: &logger,
4341                         channel_monitors,
4342                 }).unwrap()
4343         };
4344         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4345         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4346
4347         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4348         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4349         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4350         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4351
4352         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4353         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4354         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4355         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4356
4357         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4358         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4359         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4360         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4361
4362         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4363         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4364         for node in nodes.iter() {
4365                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4366                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4367                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4368         }
4369
4370         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4371 }
4372
4373 #[test]
4374 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4375         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4376         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4377         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4378         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4379         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4380         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4381         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4382         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4383         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4384         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4385
4386         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4387         let channel_value = 100000;
4388         let push_msat = 10001;
4389         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4390         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4391         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4392         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4393         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4394         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4395         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4396
4397         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4398
4399         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4400         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4401
4402         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4403         {
4404                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4405                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4406                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4407                 added_monitors.clear();
4408         }
4409
4410         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4411         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4412         {
4413                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4414                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4415                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4416                 added_monitors.clear();
4417         }
4418         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4419
4420         nodes.push(node_a);
4421         nodes.push(node_b);
4422
4423         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4424         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4425         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4426         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4427
4428         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4429         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4430         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4431         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4432         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4433         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4434         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4435         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4436                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4437         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4438
4439         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4440         let config = UserConfig::default();
4441         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4442                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4443                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4444                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4445                         default_config: config,
4446                         keys_manager,
4447                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4448                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4449                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4450                         logger: &logger,
4451                         channel_monitors,
4452                 }).unwrap()
4453         };
4454         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4455         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4456
4457         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4458
4459         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4460         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4461
4462         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4463         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4464         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4465         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4466         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4467
4468         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4469         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4470         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4471
4472         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4473         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4474         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4475         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4476
4477         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4478         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4479         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4480         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4481
4482         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4483         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4484         for node in nodes.iter() {
4485                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4486                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4487                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4488         }
4489
4490         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4491 }
4492
4493 #[test]
4494 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4495         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4496         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4497         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4498         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4499         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4500         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4501         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4502         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4503         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4504         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4505
4506         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4507         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4508
4509         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4510
4511         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4512         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4513         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4514
4515         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4516         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4517         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4518         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4519         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4520         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4521         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4522         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4523                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4524         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4525
4526         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4527         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4528                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4529                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4530                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4531                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4532                         keys_manager,
4533                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4534                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4535                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4536                         logger: &logger,
4537                         channel_monitors,
4538                 }).unwrap()
4539         };
4540         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4541         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4542
4543         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4544         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4545         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4546
4547         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4548
4549         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4550         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4551 }
4552
4553 #[test]
4554 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4555         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4556         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4557         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4558         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4559         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4560         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4561         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4562         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4563         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4564         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4565         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4566         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4567         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4568
4569         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4570         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4571                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4572                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4573                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4574         }
4575
4576         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4577
4578         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4579         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4580
4581         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4582         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4583         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4584         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4585
4586         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4587         // nodes[3])
4588         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4589         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4590                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4591                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4592                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4593         }
4594
4595         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4596         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4597         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4598         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4599         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4600         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4601
4602
4603         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4604         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4605                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4606                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4607                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4608                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4609         }
4610
4611         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4612         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4613                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4614                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4615                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4616                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4617         }
4618
4619         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4620         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4621                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4622                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4623                 keys_manager,
4624                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4625                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4626                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4627                 logger: &logger,
4628                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4629         }) { } else {
4630                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4631         };
4632
4633         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4634         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4635                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4636                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4637                 keys_manager,
4638                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4639                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4640                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4641                 logger: &logger,
4642                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4643         }).unwrap();
4644         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4645         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4646
4647         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4648                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4649                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4650                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4651                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4652         }
4653
4654         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4655                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4656                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4657         }
4658         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4659         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4660
4661         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4662         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4663         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4664         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4665         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4666
4667         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4668         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4669         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4670         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4671         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4672         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4673         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4674                 match action {
4675                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4676                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4677                         },
4678                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4679                 }
4680         }
4681 }
4682
4683 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4684         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4685                 {
4686                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4687                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4688                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4689                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4690                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4691                                 match event {
4692                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4693                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4694                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4695                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4696                                                 }
4697                                         },
4698                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4699                                 };
4700                         }
4701                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4702                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4703                                         txn.push(tx);
4704                                 }
4705                         }
4706                         txn
4707                 }
4708         }
4709 }
4710
4711 #[test]
4712 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4713         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4714         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4715         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4716         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4717         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4718
4719         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4720         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4721         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4722         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4723         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4724         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4725         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4726         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4727         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4728
4729         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4730         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4731
4732         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4733         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4734         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4735         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4736         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4737 }
4738
4739 #[test]
4740 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4741         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4742         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4743         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4744         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4745         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4746         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4747
4748         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4749         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4750         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4752         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4753
4754         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4755         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4756         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4757         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4758
4759         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4760         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4761         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4762         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4763         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4764
4765         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4766         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4767         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4768 }
4769
4770 #[test]
4771 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4772         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4773         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4774
4775         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4776         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4777         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4778         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4779
4780         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4781         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4782         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4783         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4784         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4785
4786         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4787         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4788         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4790         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4791
4792         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4793         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4794         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4795
4796         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4797         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4798         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4799         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4800         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4801 }
4802
4803 #[test]
4804 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4805         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4806         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4807         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4808         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4809
4810         // Create some initial channels
4811         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4812
4813         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4814
4815         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4816         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4817         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4818
4819         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4820         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4822         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4823         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4824         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4825         match events[0] {
4826                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4827                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4828         }
4829         match events[1] {
4830                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4831                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4832         }
4833
4834         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4835         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4836         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4837         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4838         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4839         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4840         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4841
4842         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4843         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4844         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4845
4846         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4847         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4848         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4849 }
4850
4851 #[test]
4852 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4853         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4854         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4855         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4856         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4857
4858         // Create some initial channels
4859         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4860
4861         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4862         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4863
4864         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4865
4866         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4867         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4868         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4869
4870         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4871         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4873         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4874         match events[0] {
4875                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4876                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4877         }
4878         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4879
4880         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4881         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4882         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4883         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4884         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4885         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4886
4887         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4888         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4889         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4890         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4891
4892         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4893         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4894         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4895         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4896         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4897 }
4898
4899 #[test]
4900 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4901         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4902         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4903         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4904         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4905
4906         // Create some initial channels
4907         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4908
4909         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4910         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4911         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4912         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4913
4914         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4915
4916         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4917         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4919         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4920
4921         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4922         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4923         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4924         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4925
4926         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4927         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4928
4929         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4930         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4931         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4932 }
4933
4934 #[test]
4935 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4936         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4937         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4938         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4939         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4940         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4941
4942         // Create some initial channels
4943         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4944
4945         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4946         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4947         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4948         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4949
4950         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4951
4952         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4953         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4954         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4956         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4957         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4958
4959         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4960         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4961         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4962         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4963         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4964         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4965         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4966
4967         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4968         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4969         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4970         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4972         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4973
4974         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4975         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4976         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4977         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4978         // transactions next...
4979         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4980         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4981
4982         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4983         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4984         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4985                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4986         } else {
4987                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4988                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4989         }
4990
4991         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4992         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4993
4994         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4995         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4996
4997         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4998         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4999         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5000         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5001         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5002 }
5003
5004 #[test]
5005 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5006         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5007         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5008         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5009         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5010         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5011
5012         // Create some initial channels
5013         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5014
5015         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5016         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5017         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5018         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5019
5020         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5021         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5022
5023         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5024
5025         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5026         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5027         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5029         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5030         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5031
5032         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5033         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5034         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5035         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5036
5037         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5038         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5039         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5040
5041         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5042         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5043         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5044         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5045         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5046         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5047
5048         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5049         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5050
5051         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5052         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5053         // transactions next...
5054         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5055         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5056         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5057                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5058         } else {
5059                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5060                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5061         }
5062
5063         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5064         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5065
5066         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5067
5068         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5069         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5070
5071         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5072         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5073
5074         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5075         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5076         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5077         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5078         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5079         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5080         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5081         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5082 }
5083
5084 #[test]
5085 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5086         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5087         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5088         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5089         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5090         // channel.
5091         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5092         // gets broadcast.
5093
5094         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5095         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5096         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5097         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5098
5099         // Create some initial channels
5100         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5101         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5102
5103         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5104         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5105         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5106         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5107         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5108
5109         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5110         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5111         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5112
5113         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5114         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5115         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5116         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5118         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5119         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5120         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5121         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5122         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5123
5124         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5125         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5127         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5128
5129         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5130         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5131         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5132         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5133         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5134         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5135         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5136         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5137         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5138         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5139
5140         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5141         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5142         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5144         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5145         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5146         match events[0] {
5147                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5148                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5149         }
5150         match events[1] {
5151                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5152                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5153                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5154                 },
5155                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5156         }
5157         {
5158                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5159                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5160                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5161                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5162                 b_txn.clear();
5163         }
5164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5165         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5166         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5167         match msg_events[0] {
5168                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5169                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5170         }
5171         match msg_events[1] {
5172                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5173                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5174         }
5175         match msg_events[2] {
5176                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5177                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5178                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5179                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5180                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5181                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5182                 },
5183                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5184         };
5185         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5186         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5187         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5188         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5189         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5190         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5191         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5192         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5193         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5194         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5195         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5196         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5197         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5198
5199         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5200         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5201 }
5202
5203 #[test]
5204 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5205         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5206         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5207         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5208         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5211         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5212         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5213         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5214         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5215         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5216                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5217         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5218
5219         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5220         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5221         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5222
5223         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5224         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5225         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5226         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5227         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5228
5229         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5230
5231         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5232         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5233         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5234         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5235         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5236         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5237
5238         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5239         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5240         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5241
5242         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5243         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5245         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5246         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5247
5248         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5249         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5250                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5251                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5252                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5253                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5254
5255                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5256                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5257                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5258                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5259                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5260                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5261                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5262
5263                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5264                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5265                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5266                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5267         }
5268
5269         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5270         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5272         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5273         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5274         match events[0] {
5275                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5276                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5277         }
5278         match events[1] {
5279                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5280                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5281         }
5282         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5283         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5284         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5285         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5286         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5287         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5288         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5289         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5290         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5291         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5292         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5293         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5294         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5295
5296         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5297         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5298         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5299         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5300         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5301         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5302         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5303         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5304         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5306
5307         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5308         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5309         {
5310                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5311         }
5312         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5313
5314         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5315         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5316         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5317         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5318         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5319         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5320         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5321         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5322         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5323         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5324         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5325         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5326
5327         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5328         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5329
5330         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5331         match events[0] {
5332                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5333                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5334                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5335                 }
5336                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5337         }
5338 }
5339
5340 #[test]
5341 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5342         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5343         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5344         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5345         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5346
5347         // Create some initial channels
5348         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5349
5350         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5351         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5352         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5353         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5354         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5355
5356         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5357         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5358         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5359         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5360         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5361         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5362         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5363         match events[0] {
5364                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5365                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5366         }
5367         match events[1] {
5368                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5369                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5370         }
5371         let node_tx = {
5372                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5373                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5374                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5375                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5376                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5377                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5378                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5379                 node_txn[0].clone()
5380         };
5381
5382         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5383         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5384
5385         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5386         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5387         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5388         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5389         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5390         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5391 }
5392
5393 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5394         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5395         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5396         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5397         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5398         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5399         // use the same payment hashes.
5400         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5401         //
5402         // A \         / E
5403         //    - C - D -
5404         // B /         \ F
5405         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5406         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5407         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5408         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5409         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5410         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5411         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5412         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5413                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5414         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5415
5416         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5417         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5418         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5419         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5420         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5421
5422         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5423         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5424         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5425         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5426
5427         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5428         // 0th HTLC:
5429         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5430         // 1st HTLC:
5431         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5432         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5433         // 2nd HTLC:
5434         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5435         // 3rd HTLC:
5436         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5437         // 4th HTLC:
5438         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5439         // 5th HTLC:
5440         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5441         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5442         // 6th HTLC:
5443         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5444         // 7th HTLC:
5445         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5446
5447         // 8th HTLC:
5448         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5449         // 9th HTLC:
5450         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5451         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5452
5453         // 10th HTLC:
5454         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5455         // 11th HTLC:
5456         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5457         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5458
5459         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5460         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5461         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5462         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5463         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5464
5465         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5466         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5467         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5468         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5469         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5470         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5472         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5474
5475         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5476         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5477         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5478         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5479         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5480         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5481
5482         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5483         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5484         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5486         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5488
5489         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5490         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5491         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5492         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5493
5494         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5495
5496         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5497         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5498         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5499         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5500         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5501         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5502         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5503         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5504         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5505         if deliver_last_raa {
5506                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5507         } else {
5508                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5509         }
5510
5511         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5512         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5513         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5514         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5515         //
5516         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5517         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5518         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5519         //
5520         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5521         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5522         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5523
5524         if announce_latest {
5525                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5526         } else {
5527                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5528         }
5529         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5530         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5531                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5532                 events[1].clone()
5533         } else {
5534                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5535                 events[0].clone()
5536         };
5537         match close_event {
5538                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5539                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5540         }
5541
5542         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5543         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5544         if deliver_last_raa {
5545                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5546         } else {
5547                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5548         }
5549         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5550
5551         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5552         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5553         let mut a_done = false;
5554         for msg in cs_msgs {
5555                 match msg {
5556                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5557                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5558                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5559                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5560                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5561                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5562                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5563                                         }
5564                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5565                                         assert!(!a_done);
5566                                         a_done = true;
5567                                         &nodes[0]
5568                                 } else {
5569                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5570                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5571                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5572                                         }
5573                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5574                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5575                                         &nodes[1]
5576                                 };
5577                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5578                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5579                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5580                                 if announce_latest {
5581                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5582                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5583                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5584                                         }
5585                                 }
5586                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5587                         },
5588                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5589                 }
5590         }
5591
5592         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5593         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5594         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5595         let mut as_updates = 0;
5596         for event in as_events.iter() {
5597                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5598                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5599                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5600                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5601                         } else {
5602                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5603                         }
5604                         if network_update.is_some() {
5605                                 as_updates += 1;
5606                         }
5607                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5608         }
5609         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5610         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5611         if announce_latest {
5612                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5613                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5614         }
5615         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5616
5617         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5618         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5619         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5620         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5621         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5622                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5623                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5624                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5625                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5626                         } else {
5627                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5628                         }
5629                         if network_update.is_some() {
5630                                 bs_updates += 1;
5631                         }
5632                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5633         }
5634         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5635         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5636         if announce_latest {
5637                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5638         }
5639         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5640
5641         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5642         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5643         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5644         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5645         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5646         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5647 }
5648
5649 #[test]
5650 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5651         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5652 }
5653
5654 #[test]
5655 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5656         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5657 }
5658
5659 #[test]
5660 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5661         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5662         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5663         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5664 }
5665
5666 #[test]
5667 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5668         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5669         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5670         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5671         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5672
5673         // Create some initial channels
5674         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5675
5676         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5677         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5678         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5679         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5680
5681         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5682         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5683         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5684         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5685         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5686         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5687
5688         let htlc_timeout = {
5689                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5690                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5691                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5692                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5693                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5694                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5695                 node_txn[1].clone()
5696         };
5697
5698         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5699         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5700         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5701
5702         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5703         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5704         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5705         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5706         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5707         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5708         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5709         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5710         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5711         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5712                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5713 }
5714
5715 #[test]
5716 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5717         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5718         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5719         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5720
5721         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5722
5723         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5724         let seed = [42; 32];
5725         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5726         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5727         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5728         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5729         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5730         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5731
5732         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5733         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5734
5735         // Create some initial channels
5736         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5737         // for node 0
5738         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5739         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5740         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5741
5742         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5743         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5744         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5745         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5746         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5747
5748         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5749         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5750         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5751         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5752         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5753
5754         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5755         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5756         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5757         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5758             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5759             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5760             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5761                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5762         }
5763
5764         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5765         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5766         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5767         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5768         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5769         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5770
5771         let htlc_timeout = {
5772                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5773                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5774                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5775                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5776                 node_txn[1].clone()
5777         };
5778
5779         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5780         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5781         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5782
5783         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5784         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5785         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5786         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5787         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5788         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5789         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5790         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5791         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5792         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5793         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5794                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5795 }
5796
5797 #[test]
5798 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5799         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5800         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5801         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5802         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5803
5804         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5805
5806         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5807         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5808
5809         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5810         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5811         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5812
5813         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5814         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5815         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5816
5817         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5818         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5819         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5820
5821         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5822         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5823         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5824 }
5825
5826 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5827         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5828         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5829         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5830         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5831         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5832
5833         let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5834
5835         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5836         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5837         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5839
5840         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5841         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5842         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5843
5844         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5845         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5846         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5847         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5849
5850         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5851         let mut block = Block {
5852                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5853                 txdata: vec![],
5854         };
5855         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5856                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5857                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5858         }
5859         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5860         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5861         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5862         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5863 }
5864
5865 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5866         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5867         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5868         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5869         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5870         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5871
5872         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5873         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5875
5876         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5877
5878         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5879         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5880         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5881
5882         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5883         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5884
5885         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5886                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5887                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5888         }
5889         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5890         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5891         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5892         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5893 }
5894
5895 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5896         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5897         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5898         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5899         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5900         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5901
5902         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5903         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5904         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5905         // actually revoked.
5906         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5907         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5908         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5909         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5911
5912         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5913         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5914         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5915         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5916         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5917         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5919         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5921         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5922
5923         if check_revoke_no_close {
5924                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5925                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5926         }
5927
5928         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5929         let mut block = Block {
5930                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5931                 txdata: vec![],
5932         };
5933         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5934                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5935                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5936         }
5937         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5938                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5939                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5940                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5941                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5942         } else {
5943                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5944                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5945                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5946                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5947                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5948                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5949                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5950                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5951         }
5952 }
5953
5954 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5955 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5956 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5957 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5958 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5959 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5960 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5961 // non-dust HTLCs.
5962 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5963 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5964 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5965 #[test]
5966 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5967         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5968         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5969
5970         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5971         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5972 }
5973
5974 #[test]
5975 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5976         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5977         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5978         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5979         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5980 }
5981
5982 #[test]
5983 #[should_panic]
5984 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5985         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5986         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5987         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5988         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5989         //Force duplicate channel ids
5990         for node in nodes.iter() {
5991                 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5992         }
5993
5994         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5995         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5996         let push_msat=10001;
5997         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5998         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5999         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6000
6001         //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
6002         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6003 }
6004
6005 #[test]
6006 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6007         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6008         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6009         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6010         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6011
6012         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6013         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6014         let push_msat=10001;
6015         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6016
6017         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6018         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6019         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6020         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6021         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6022
6023         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6024         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6025         let push_msat=10001;
6026         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6027         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6028         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6029
6030         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6031         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6032         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6033
6034         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6035         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6036         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6037
6038         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6039         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6040         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6041
6042         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6043         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6044         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6045         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6046         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6047         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6048 }
6049
6050 #[test]
6051 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6052         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6053         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6054         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6055         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6056
6057         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6058         let push_msat=10001;
6059         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6060         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6061         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6062         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6063
6064         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6065         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6066         let err_msg = match events[0] {
6067                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6068                         msg.clone()
6069                 },
6070                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6071         };
6072         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6073 }
6074
6075 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6076 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6077 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6078 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6079 #[test]
6080 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6081         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6082         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6083         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6084         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6085         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6086
6087         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6088         // pending_update_fee.
6089         {
6090                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6091                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6092         }
6093         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6094         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6095
6096         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6097         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6098         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6099                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6100                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6101                 },
6102                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6103         };
6104
6105         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6106
6107         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6108         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6109         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6110
6111         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6112         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6113         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6114
6115         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6116         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6117         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6118         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6119
6120         // Flush the pending fee update.
6121         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6122         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6123         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6124         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6126
6127         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6128         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6129         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6130         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6131         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6132         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6133         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6134                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6135         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6136
6137         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6138         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6139         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6140         match &events[0] {
6141                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6142                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6143                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6144                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6145                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6146                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6147                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6148                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6149                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6150                 },
6151                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6152         }
6153 }
6154
6155 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6156 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6157 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6158 #[test]
6159 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6160         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6161         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6162         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6163         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6164         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6165
6166         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6167         // pending_update_fee.
6168         {
6169                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6170                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6171         }
6172         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6173         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6174
6175         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6176         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6177         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6178                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6179                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6180                 },
6181                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6182         };
6183
6184         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6185
6186         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6187         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6188         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6189
6190         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6191         let amt_1 = 20000;
6192         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6193         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6194         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6195
6196         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6197         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6198         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6199         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6200         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6201         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6202         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6203
6204         // Flush the pending fee update.
6205         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6206         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6207         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6208         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6209         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6211
6212         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6213         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6214         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6215         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6216         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6217         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6218         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6219                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6220         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6221
6222         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6223         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6224         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6225         match &events[0] {
6226                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6227                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6228                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6229                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6230                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6231                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6232                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6233                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6234                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6235                 },
6236                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6237         }
6238
6239         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6240         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6241                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6242                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6243                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6244         };
6245         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6246                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6247                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6248         };
6249         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6250         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6251         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6252         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6253         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6254         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6255         match events[0] {
6256                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6257                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6258         }
6259         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6260         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6261         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6262         match events[0] {
6263                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6264                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6265         }
6266         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6267         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6268         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6269         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6270         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6271         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6272 }
6273
6274 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6275 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6276 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6277 // once it's freed.
6278 #[test]
6279 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6280         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6281         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6282         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6283         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6284         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6285         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6286         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6287         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6288         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6289         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6290
6291         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6292         // pending_update_fee.
6293         {
6294                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6295                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6296         }
6297         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6298         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6299
6300         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6301         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6302         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6303                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6304                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6305                 },
6306                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6307         };
6308
6309         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6310
6311         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6312         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6313         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6314
6315         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6316         let feemsat = 239;
6317         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6318         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6319         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6320         let payment_event = {
6321                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6322                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6323
6324                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6325                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6326
6327                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6328         };
6329         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6331         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6332         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6333
6334         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6335         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6336
6337         // Flush the pending fee update.
6338         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6339         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6341         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6342         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6344
6345         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6346         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6347         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6348
6349         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6350                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6351                         msg.clone()
6352                 },
6353                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6354         };
6355
6356         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6357         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6358         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6359
6360         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6361         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6362         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6363         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6364                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6365                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6366         }
6367
6368         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6369         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6371
6372         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6373         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6374         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6375         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6376                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6377                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6378                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6379                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6380                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6381                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6382                 },
6383                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6384         };
6385
6386         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6387         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6388         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6389
6390         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6391         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6392         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6393         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6394         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6395         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6396         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6397         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6398         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6399                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6400                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6401         };
6402         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6403         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6404         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6405 }
6406
6407 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6408 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6409 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6410
6411 #[test]
6412 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6413         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6414         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6415         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6416         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6417         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6418         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6419
6420         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6421         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6422
6423         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6424                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6425         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6426         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6427 }
6428
6429 #[test]
6430 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6431         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6432         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6433         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6434         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6435         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6436         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6437
6438         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6439         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6440         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6441                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6442
6443         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6444         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6445 }
6446
6447 #[test]
6448 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6449         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6450         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6451         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6452         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6453         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6454         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6455
6456         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6457         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6459         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6460         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6461
6462         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6463         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6464         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6465         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6466         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6467 }
6468
6469 #[test]
6470 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6471         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6472         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6473         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6474         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6475         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6476         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6477         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6478
6479         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6480         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6481                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6482 }
6483
6484 #[test]
6485 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6486         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6487         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6488         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6489         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6490         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6491         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6492         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6493         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6494         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6495
6496         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6497                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6498                 let payment_event = {
6499                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6500                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6501
6502                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6503                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6504                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6505                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6506                         } else {
6507                                 assert!(false);
6508                         }
6509                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6510                 };
6511                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6512                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6513                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6514
6515                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6516                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6517         }
6518         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6519         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6520                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6521
6522         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6523         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6524 }
6525
6526 #[test]
6527 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6528         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6529         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6530         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6531         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6532         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6533         let channel_value = 100000;
6534         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6535         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6536
6537         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6538
6539         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6540         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6541         // limits us to.
6542         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6543         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6544                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6545
6546         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6547         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6548
6549         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6550 }
6551
6552 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6553 #[test]
6554 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6555         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6556         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6557         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6558         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6559         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6560         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6561         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6562         {
6563                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6564                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6565                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6566         }
6567
6568         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6569         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6570         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6571         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6572         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6573         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6574         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6575         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6576         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6577         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6578         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6579 }
6580
6581 #[test]
6582 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6583         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6584         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6585         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6586         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6587         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6588         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6589
6590         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6591         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6592         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6593         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6594         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6595
6596         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6597         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6598         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6599         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6600         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6601
6602         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6603         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6604         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6605         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6606         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6607
6608         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6609         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6610         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6611         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6612         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6613 }
6614
6615 #[test]
6616 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6617         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6618         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6619         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6620         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6621         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6622         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6623         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6624
6625         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6626         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6627         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6628         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6629         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6630         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6631
6632         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6633                 channel_id: chan.2,
6634                 htlc_id: 0,
6635                 amount_msat: 1000,
6636                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6637                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6638                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6639         };
6640
6641         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6642                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6643                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6644         }
6645         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6646         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6647
6648         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6649         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6650         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6652         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6653 }
6654
6655 #[test]
6656 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6657         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6661         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6662         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6663
6664         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6665         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6666         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6667         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6668         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6669         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6670
6671         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6672         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6673         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6674         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6675         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6676 }
6677
6678 #[test]
6679 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6680         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6681         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6682         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6683         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6684         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6685
6686         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6687         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6688         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6690         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6691         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6692         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6693
6694         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6695         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6696         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6698         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6699 }
6700
6701 #[test]
6702 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6703         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6704         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6705         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6706         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6707         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6708         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6709         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6710
6711         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6712         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6713         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6714         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6715         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6716         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6717
6718         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6719         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6720         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6721         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6722         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6723         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6724         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6725         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6726         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6727         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6728         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6729         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6730         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6731
6732         //Resend HTLC
6733         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6734         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6735         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6736         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6737         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6738
6739         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6740
6741         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6742         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6743         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6745         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6746 }
6747
6748 #[test]
6749 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6750         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6751
6752         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6753         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6754         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6755         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6756         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6757         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6758         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6759
6760         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6761         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6762         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6763
6764         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6765                 channel_id: chan.2,
6766                 htlc_id: 0,
6767                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6768         };
6769
6770         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6771
6772         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6773         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6774         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6775         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6776         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6777 }
6778
6779 #[test]
6780 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6781         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6782
6783         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6784         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6785         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6786         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6787         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6788
6789         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6790         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6791         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6792         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6793         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6794
6795         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6796                 channel_id: chan.2,
6797                 htlc_id: 0,
6798                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6799         };
6800
6801         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6802
6803         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6804         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6805         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6806         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6807         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6808 }
6809
6810 #[test]
6811 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6812         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6813
6814         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6815         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6816         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6817         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6818         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6819
6820         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6821         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6823         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6824         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6825         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6826                 channel_id: chan.2,
6827                 htlc_id: 0,
6828                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6829                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6830         };
6831
6832         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6833
6834         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6835         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6836         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6837         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6838         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6839 }
6840
6841 #[test]
6842 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6843         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6844
6845         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6846         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6847         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6848         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6849         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6850
6851         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6852
6853         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6854         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6855
6856         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6857         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6858         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6859                 match events[0] {
6860                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6861                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6862                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6863                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6864                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6865                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6866                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6867                         },
6868                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6869                 }
6870         };
6871
6872         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6873
6874         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6875
6876         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6877         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6878         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6879         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6880         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6881 }
6882
6883 #[test]
6884 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6885         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6886
6887         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6888         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6889         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6890         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6891         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6892
6893         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6894
6895         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6897
6898         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6899         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6900         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6901                 match events[0] {
6902                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6903                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6904                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6905                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6906                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6907                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6908                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6909                         },
6910                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6911                 }
6912         };
6913
6914         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6915
6916         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6917
6918         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6919         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6920         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6922         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6923 }
6924
6925 #[test]
6926 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6927         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6928
6929         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6930         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6931         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6932         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6933         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6934
6935         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6936         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6938
6939         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6940         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6941
6942         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6944         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6945
6946         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6947
6948         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6949                 match events[0] {
6950                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6951                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6952                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6953                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6954                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6955                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6956                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6957                         },
6958                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6959                 }
6960         };
6961         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6962         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6963
6964         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6965         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6966         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6968         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6969 }
6970
6971 #[test]
6972 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6973         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6974         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6975
6976         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6977         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6978         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6979         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6980         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6981         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6982
6983         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6984
6985         //First hop
6986         let mut payment_event = {
6987                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6988                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6989                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6990                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6991                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6992         };
6993         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6995         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6996         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6997         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6998         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6999         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7000         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7001         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7002
7003         //Second Hop
7004         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7005         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7007         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7008
7009         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7010         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7011         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7012                 match events_3[0] {
7013                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7014                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7015                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7016                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7017                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7018                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7019                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7020                         },
7021                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7022                 }
7023         };
7024
7025         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7026
7027         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7028         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7029         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7030         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7031         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7032
7033         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7034         match events_4[0] {
7035                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7036                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7037                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7038                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7039                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7040                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7041                 },
7042                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7043         };
7044
7045         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7046 }
7047
7048 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7049         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7050         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7051         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7052
7053         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7054         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7055         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7056         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7057         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7058         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7059
7060         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7061
7062         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7063         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7064         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7065         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7066
7067         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7068         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7069
7070         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7071         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7073         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7075
7076         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7077         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7078         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7080
7081         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7082         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7083
7084         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7085         match events[0] {
7086                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7087                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7088                 },
7089                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7090         }
7091         match events[1] {
7092                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7093                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7094                 },
7095                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7096         }
7097
7098         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7099         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7100         if announce_latest {
7101                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7102         } else {
7103                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7104         }
7105
7106         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7107         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7108         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7109
7110         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7111         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7112         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7113         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7114         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7115         let mut first_failed = false;
7116         for event in events {
7117                 match event {
7118                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7119                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7120                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7121                                         first_failed = true;
7122                                 } else {
7123                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7124                                 }
7125                         }
7126                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7127                 }
7128         }
7129 }
7130
7131 #[test]
7132 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7133         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7134         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7135 }
7136
7137 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7138         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7139         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7140         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7141         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7142         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7143         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7144
7145         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7146         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7147         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7148         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7149         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7150
7151         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7152
7153         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7154         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7155
7156         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7157         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7158
7159         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7160         if revoked {
7161                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7162                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7163         }
7164
7165         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7166         if local {
7167                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7168                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7169                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7170                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7171                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7172
7173                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7174                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7175                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7176                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7177                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7178                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7179                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7180                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7181                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7182                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7183                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7184         } else {
7185                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7186                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7187                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7188                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7189                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7190                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7191                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7192                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7193                 if !revoked {
7194                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7195                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7196                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7197                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7198                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7199                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7200                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7201                 } else {
7202                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7203                         // commitment tx
7204                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7205                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7206                         let first;
7207                         match events[0] {
7208                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7209                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7210                                         else { first = false; }
7211                                 },
7212                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7213                         }
7214                         match events[1] {
7215                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7216                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7217                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7218                                 },
7219                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7220                         }
7221                 }
7222         }
7223 }
7224
7225 #[test]
7226 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7227         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7228         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7229         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7230 }
7231
7232 #[test]
7233 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7234         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7235
7236         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7237         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7238         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7239         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7240         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7241         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7242         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7243         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7244         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7245
7246         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7247         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7248                 match error {
7249                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7250                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7251                 }
7252         } else { assert!(false) }
7253
7254         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7255         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7256         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7257         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7258         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7259                 match error {
7260                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7261                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7262                 }
7263         } else { assert!(false); }
7264
7265         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7266         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7267         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7268         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7269         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7270         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7271         let reason_msg;
7272         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7273                 match action {
7274                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7275                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7276                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7277                         },
7278                         _ => { panic!(); }
7279                 }
7280         } else { panic!(); }
7281         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7282
7283         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7284         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7285         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7286         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7287         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7288                 match error {
7289                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7290                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7291                 }
7292         } else { assert!(false); }
7293 }
7294
7295 #[test]
7296 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7297         // We want to be sure that :
7298         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7299         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7300         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7301         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7302         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7303         let persister;
7304         let logger;
7305         let fee_estimator;
7306         let tx_broadcaster;
7307         let chain_source;
7308         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7309         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7310         // during signing due to revoked tx
7311         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7312         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7313         let monitor;
7314         let node_state_0;
7315         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7316         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7317         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7318
7319         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7320
7321         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7322         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7323         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7324         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7325
7326         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7327         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7328
7329         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7330         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7331
7332         // Restore node A from previous state
7333         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7334         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7335         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7336         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7337         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7338         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7339         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7340         node_state_0 = {
7341                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7342                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7343                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7344                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7345                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7346                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7347                         logger: &logger,
7348                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7349                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7350                         channel_monitors,
7351                 }).unwrap().1
7352         };
7353         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7354         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7355         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7356         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7357
7358         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7359
7360         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7361         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7362
7363         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7364
7365         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7366         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7367         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7368
7369         {
7370                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7371                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7372         }
7373
7374         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7375         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7376                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7377                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7378                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7379                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7380                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7381                         match action {
7382                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7383                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7384                                 },
7385                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7386                         }
7387                 } else {
7388                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7389                 }
7390         }
7391
7392         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7393         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7394         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7395         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7396         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7397
7398         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7399         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7400         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7401         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7402         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7403         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7404         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7405         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7406         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7407         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7408         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7409 }
7410
7411 #[test]
7412 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7413         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7414         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7415         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7416
7417         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7418         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7419         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7420         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7421
7422         // Create some initial channels
7423         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7424
7425         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7426         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7427         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7428         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7429         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7430         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7431         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7432
7433         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7434         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7435         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7436         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7437         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7438
7439         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7440         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7441         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7442         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7443
7444         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7445         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7446         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7447
7448         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7449         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7450         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7451                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7452                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7453                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7454                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7455                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7456                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7457                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7458                 },
7459                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7460         };
7461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7462
7463         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7464         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7465
7466         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7467         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7468         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7469         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7470 }
7471
7472 #[test]
7473 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7474         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7475         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7476
7477         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7478         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7479         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7480         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7481
7482         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7483         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7484         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7485
7486         // Disconnect peers
7487         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7488         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7489
7490         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7491         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7492         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7493         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7494         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7495         for e in msg_events {
7496                 match e {
7497                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7498                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7499                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7500                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7501                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7502                                 }
7503                         },
7504                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7505                 }
7506         }
7507         // Reconnect peers
7508         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7509         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7510         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7511         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7512         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7513         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7514
7515         // Reestablish chan_1
7516         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7517         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7518         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7519         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7520         // Reestablish chan_2
7521         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7522         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7523         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7524         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7525         // Reestablish chan_3
7526         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7527         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7528         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7529         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7530
7531         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7532         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7533         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7534         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7535         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7536         for e in msg_events {
7537                 match e {
7538                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7539                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7540                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7541                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7542                                         // the old one.
7543                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7544                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7545                                 }
7546                         },
7547                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7548                 }
7549         }
7550         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7551         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7552 }
7553
7554 #[test]
7555 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7556         // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7557         // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7558         // to forward through that channel.
7559         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7560         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7561         let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7562         no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7563         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7564         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7565         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7566         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7567         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7568         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7569
7570         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7571
7572         // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7573         // not send for private channels.
7574         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7575         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7576         nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7577         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7578         nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7579
7580         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7581         nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7582         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7583         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7584
7585         let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7586         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7588
7589         let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7590         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7591         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7592         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7593         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7594         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7595         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7596         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7597         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7598         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7599
7600         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7601         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7602         assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7603
7604         // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7605         // channel:
7606         send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7607
7608         // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7609         // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7610         let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7611                 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7612                 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7613                 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7614                 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7615                 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7616                 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7617         }]);
7618         let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7619         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7620
7621         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7623         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7624         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7625         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7626
7627         let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7628         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7629         assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7630         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7631         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7632
7633         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7634         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7635         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7636
7637         // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7638         // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7639
7640         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7641         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7642
7643         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7644         let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7645         let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7646         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7647         get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7648
7649         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7650         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7651         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7652         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7653
7654         let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7655         let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7656         let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7657         let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7658         assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7659         assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7660
7661         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7662
7663         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7664         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7665                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7666                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7667                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7668                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7669                         default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7670                         keys_manager,
7671                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7672                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7673                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7674                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
7675                         channel_monitors,
7676                 }).unwrap()
7677         };
7678         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7679         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7680
7681         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7682         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7683         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7684         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7685
7686         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7687         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7688         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7689         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7690         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7691         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7692         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7693         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7694
7695         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7696         nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7697         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7698         let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7699         nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7700         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7701         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7702         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7703
7704         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7705         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7706         pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7707         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7708 }
7709
7710 #[test]
7711 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7712         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7713         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7714
7715         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7716         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7717         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7718         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7719
7720         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7721
7722         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7723         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7724         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7725
7726         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7727         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7728         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7729         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7730         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7731         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7732
7733         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7734         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7735                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7736                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7737                 }
7738         }
7739
7740         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7741         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7742
7743         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7744         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7745         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7746         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7747         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7748
7749         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7750         let penalty_1;
7751         let feerate_1;
7752         {
7753                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7754                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7755                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7756                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7757                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7758                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7759                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7760                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7761                 node_txn.clear();
7762         };
7763
7764         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7765         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7766         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7767         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7768         {
7769                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7770                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7771                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7772                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7773                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7774                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7775                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7776                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7777                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7778                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7779                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7780                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7781                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7782                         node_txn.clear();
7783                 }
7784         }
7785         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7786
7787         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7788         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7789         let penalty_3;
7790         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7791         {
7792                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7793                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7794                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7795                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7796                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7797                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7798                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7799                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7800                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7801                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7802                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7803                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7804                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7805                         node_txn.clear();
7806                 }
7807         }
7808         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7809
7810         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7811         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7812 }
7813
7814 #[test]
7815 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7816         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7817         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7818
7819         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7820         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7821         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7822         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7823         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7824
7825         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7826         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7827         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7828         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7829         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7830                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7831         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7832         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7833         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7834                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7835         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7836
7837         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7838         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7839         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7840
7841         // Revoke local commitment tx
7842         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7843
7844         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7845         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7846         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7847         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7849         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7850         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7851
7852         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7853         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7854         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7855
7856         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7857         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7858         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7859
7860         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7861         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7862         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7863         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7864
7865         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7866         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7867         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7868         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7869         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7870         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7871         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7872         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7873         match events[1] {
7874                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7875                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7876         }
7877         let first;
7878         let feerate_1;
7879         let penalty_txn;
7880         {
7881                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7882                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7883                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7884
7885                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7886                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7887                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7888                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7889                 // future).
7890                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7891                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7892                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7893                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7894                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7895                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7896
7897                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7898                 // available, which we check here:
7899                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7900                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7901                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7902
7903                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7904                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7905
7906                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7907                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7908                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7909                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7910
7911                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7912                 // output, checked above).
7913                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7914                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7915                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7916
7917                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7918                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7919                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7920                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7921                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7922                 node_txn.clear();
7923         }
7924
7925         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7926         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7927         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7928         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7929         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7930         {
7931                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7932                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7933
7934                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7935                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7936                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7937                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7938                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7939                 } else {
7940                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7941                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7942                 }
7943
7944                 node_txn.clear();
7945         };
7946
7947         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7948         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7949         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7950         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7951         let node_txn = {
7952                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7953                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7954
7955                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7956                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7957                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7958                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7959                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7960                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7961                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7962                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7963                 node_txn.clear();
7964                 txn
7965         };
7966         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7967         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7968         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7969         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7970         {
7971                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7972                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7973                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7974                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7975                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7976                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7977                 // up bumped justice generation.
7978                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7979                 node_txn.clear();
7980         }
7981         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7983 }
7984
7985 #[test]
7986 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7987         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7988         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7989
7990         // Create 2 HTLCs
7991         // Provide preimage for one
7992         // Check aggregation
7993
7994         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7995         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7996         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7997         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7998
7999         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8000         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8001         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8002
8003         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8004         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8005         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8006         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8007         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8008
8009         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8010         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8011         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8012         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8013         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8014
8015         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8016         let timeout;
8017         let preimage;
8018         let preimage_bump;
8019         let feerate_timeout;
8020         let feerate_preimage;
8021         {
8022                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8023                 // 9 transactions including:
8024                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
8025                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8026                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8027                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
8028                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8029                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8030                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8031                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8032                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8033                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
8034                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8035
8036                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8037                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8038                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8039                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8040
8041                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8042                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8043                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8044                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
8045
8046                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8047                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8048                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8049                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8050
8051                 node_txn.clear();
8052         };
8053         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8054         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8055
8056         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8057         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8058         {
8059                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8060                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8061                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8062                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8063                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8064                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8065
8066                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8067                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8068                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
8069                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8070                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8071
8072                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8073                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8074                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8075                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8076                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8077
8078                 node_txn.clear();
8079         }
8080
8081         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8082         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8083 }
8084
8085 #[test]
8086 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8087         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8088         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8089         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8090         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8091         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8092         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8093         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8094         // implement that).
8095         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8096         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8097         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8098         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8099         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8100
8101         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8102         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8103
8104         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8105
8106         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8107         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8108         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8109
8110         // Must revoke without gaps
8111         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8112         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8113
8114         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8115         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8116                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8117
8118         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8119                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8120         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8122         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8123 }
8124
8125 #[test]
8126 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8127         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8128         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8129
8130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8131         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8132         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8133         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8134
8135         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8136         // Lock HTLC in both directions
8137         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8138         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8139
8140         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8141         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8142         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8143
8144         // Revoke local commitment tx
8145         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8146
8147         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8148         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8149         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8150         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8151
8152         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8153         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8155         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8156         let penalty_txn = {
8157                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8158                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8159                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8160                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8161                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8162                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8163                 node_txn.clear();
8164                 penalty_txn
8165         };
8166         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8167         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8168         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8169         {
8170                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8171                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8172                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8173         }
8174 }
8175
8176 #[test]
8177 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8178         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8179         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8180         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8181         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8182         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8183         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8184
8185         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8186
8187         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8188         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8189         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8190         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8191         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8192
8193         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8194         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8195         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8196         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8197
8198         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8200         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8201         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8202         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8203         match close_ev[0] {
8204                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8205                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8206                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8207                 },
8208                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8209         }
8210 }
8211
8212 #[test]
8213 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8214         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8215         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8216         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8217         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8218
8219         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8220         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8221         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8222
8223         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8224
8225         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8226         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8227         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8228         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8229 }
8230
8231 #[test]
8232 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8233         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8234         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8235         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8236         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8237         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8238         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8239
8240         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8241         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8242         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8243
8244         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8245         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8246         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8247 }
8248
8249 #[test]
8250 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8251         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8252         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8253         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8254         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8255         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8256
8257         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8258         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8259         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8260         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8261
8262         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8263         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8264         route.paths.push(path);
8265         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8266         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8267         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8268         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8269         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8270         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8271         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8272         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8273 }
8274
8275 #[test]
8276 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8277         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8278         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8279         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8280         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8281         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8282
8283         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8284
8285         {
8286                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8287                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8288                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8289                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8290                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8291                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8292                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8293                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8294         }
8295         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8296         // values from previous calls.
8297         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8298         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8299         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8300         match events[0] {
8301                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8302                         match &purpose {
8303                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8304                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8305                                 },
8306                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8307                         }
8308                 },
8309                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8310         }
8311 }
8312
8313 #[test]
8314 #[allow(deprecated)]
8315 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8316         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8317         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8321         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8322
8323         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8324
8325         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8326
8327         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8328         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8329         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8330                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8331         } else { panic!(); }
8332         let mut block = {
8333                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8334                 Block {
8335                         header: BlockHeader {
8336                                 version: 0x2000000,
8337                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8338                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8339                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8340                         txdata: vec![],
8341                 }
8342         };
8343         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8344         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8345                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8346         } else { panic!(); }
8347
8348         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8349         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8350         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8351         block.header.time += 1;
8352         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8353         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8354         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8355
8356         {
8357                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8358                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8359                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8360                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8361                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8362                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8363                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8364         }
8365         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8366         // values from previous calls.
8367         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8368         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8369         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8370         match events[0] {
8371                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8372                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8373                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8374                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8375                 },
8376                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8377         }
8378 }
8379
8380 #[test]
8381 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8382         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8383         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8384         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8385         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8386         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8387
8388         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8389
8390         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8391         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8392         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8393         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8394
8395         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8396         // resulting events.
8397         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8398                 () => {
8399                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8400                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8401                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8402                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8403                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8404
8405                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8406                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8407                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8408                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8409                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8410
8411                         // We should fail the payment back
8412                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8413                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8414                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8415                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8416                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8417                                 },
8418                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8419                         }
8420                 }
8421         }
8422
8423         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8424         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8425         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8426
8427         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8428         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8429         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8430         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8431
8432         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8433         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8434         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8435         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8436
8437         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8438         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8439         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8440         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8441 }
8442
8443 #[test]
8444 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8445         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8446         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8447         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8448         //
8449         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8450         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8451         // commitment at same time.
8452
8453         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8454         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8455         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8456         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8457
8458         // Create some initial channel
8459         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8460         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8461
8462         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8463         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8464
8465         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8466         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8467
8468         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8469         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8470         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8471         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8472         let watchtower = {
8473                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8474                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8475                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8476                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8477                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8478                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8479                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8480                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8481                 watchtower
8482         };
8483         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8484         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8485         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8486         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8487         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8488
8489         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8490         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8492         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8493         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8494         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8495         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8496                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8497                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8498                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8499                 } else { assert!(false); }
8500         } else { assert!(false); };
8501         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8502         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8503         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8504         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8505 }
8506
8507 #[test]
8508 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8509         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8510         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8511         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8512         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8513
8514         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8515         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8516         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8517         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8518
8519         // Create some initial channel
8520         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8521         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8522
8523         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8524         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8525
8526         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8527         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8528
8529         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8530         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8531         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8532         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8533         let watchtower_alice = {
8534                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8535                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8536                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8537                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8538                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8539                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8540                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8541                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8542                 watchtower
8543         };
8544         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8545         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8546         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8547         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8548         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8549
8550         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8551         {
8552                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8553                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8554                 txn.clear();
8555         }
8556
8557         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8558         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8559         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8560         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8561         let watchtower_bob = {
8562                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8563                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8564                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8565                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8566                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8567                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8568                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8569                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8570                 watchtower
8571         };
8572         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8573         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8574
8575         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8576         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8577         {
8578                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8579         }
8580         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8581
8582         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8583         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8584         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8585         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8586                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8587                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8588                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8589                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8590                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8591                 } else { assert!(false); }
8592         } else { assert!(false); };
8593         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8594         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8595
8596         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8597         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8598         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8599
8600         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8601         let bob_state_y;
8602         {
8603                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8604                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8605                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8606                 txn.clear();
8607         };
8608
8609         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8610         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8611         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8612         {
8613                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8614                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8615                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8616                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8617                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8618                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8619         }
8620 }
8621
8622 #[test]
8623 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8624         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8625         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8626         // message).
8627         //
8628         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8629         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8630         //
8631         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8632         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8633         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8634         // before receiving funding_signed.
8635         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8636         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8637         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8638         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8639
8640         // Create an initial channel
8641         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8642         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8643         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8644         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8645         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8646
8647         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8648         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8649
8650         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8652
8653         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8654         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8655         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8656         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8657         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8658 }
8659
8660 #[test]
8661 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8662         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8663         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8664         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8665         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8666         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8667         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8668
8669         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8670         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8671         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8672         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8673
8674         // Create some initial channels
8675         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8676
8677         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8678         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8679         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8680         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8681         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8682         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8683
8684         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8685         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8686         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8687         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8688         // this test before #653 fix.
8689         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8690         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8691         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8692         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8693         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8694
8695         let htlc_timeout = {
8696                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8697                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8698                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8699                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8700                 node_txn[1].clone()
8701         };
8702
8703         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8704         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8705         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8706         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8707 }
8708
8709 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8710         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8711         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8712         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8713         //
8714         // Steps of the test:
8715         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8716         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8717         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8718         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8719         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8720         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8721         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8722         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8723         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8724         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8725         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8726         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8727
8728         // Create some initial channels
8729         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8730         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8731
8732         // Steps (1) and (2):
8733         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8734         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8735
8736         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8737         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8738         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8739         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8740         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8741         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8742         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8743
8744         // Steps (3) and (4):
8745         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8746         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8747         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8748         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8749         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8750         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8752         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8753         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8754                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8755                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8756                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8757                 };
8758                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8759                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8760                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8761                 if broadcast_alice {
8762                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8763                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8764                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8765                 }
8766                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8767                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8768         }
8769
8770         // Step (5):
8771         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8772         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8773         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8774         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8775         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8776         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8777         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8778         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8779         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8780         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8781
8782         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8783         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8784         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8785         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8786                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8787                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8788                 match events[0] {
8789                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8790                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8791                         },
8792                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8793                 };
8794         }
8795         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8796         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8797         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8798         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8799
8800         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8801         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8802         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8803                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8804                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8805                         (*msg).clone()
8806                 },
8807                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8808         };
8809         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8810                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8811                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8812                         (*updates).clone()
8813                 },
8814                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8815         };
8816
8817         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8818         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8819         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8821
8822         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8823         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8824         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8825                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8826                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8827                         (*msg).clone()
8828                 },
8829                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8830         };
8831         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8832         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8833
8834         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8835         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8836         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8837         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8838         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8839                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8840                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8841                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8842                 if broadcast_alice {
8843                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8844                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8845                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8846                 }
8847                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8848                 if broadcast_alice {
8849                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8850                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8851                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8852                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8853                         // broadcasted.
8854                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8855                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8856                 } else {
8857                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8858                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8859                 }
8860         }
8861
8862         // Step (6):
8863         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8864         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8865         {
8866                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8867                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8868                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8869                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8870                 }
8871                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8872                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8873                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8874                 };
8875                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8876                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8877                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8878                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8879                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8880                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8881                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8882                 } else {
8883                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8884                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8885                 }
8886         }
8887 }
8888
8889 #[test]
8890 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8891         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8892         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8893         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8894         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8895 }
8896
8897 #[test]
8898 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8899         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8900         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8901         //
8902         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8903         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8904         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8905         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8906         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8907         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8908         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8909         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8910
8911         // Create an initial channel
8912         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8913         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8914         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8915         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8916
8917         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8918         // that it is rejected.
8919         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8920         {
8921                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8922                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8923                 match events[0] {
8924                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8925                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8926                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8927                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8928                                 // move forward with it.
8929                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8930                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8931                         },
8932                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8933                 }
8934         }
8935
8936         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8937         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8938
8939         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8941
8942         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8943         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8944         {
8945                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8946                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8947                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8948                 added_monitors.clear();
8949         }
8950         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8951
8952         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8953         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8954
8955         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8956         // temporary one).
8957
8958         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8959         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8960         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8961         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8962         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8963         {
8964                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8965                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8966                 match events[0] {
8967                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8968                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8969                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8970                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8971                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8972                         },
8973                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8974                 }
8975         }
8976
8977         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8978         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8979         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8980         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8981         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8982         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8983
8984         let funding_created = {
8985                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8986                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8987                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8988                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8989         };
8990         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8991         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8992         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8993         // still needs to be cleared here.
8994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8995
8996         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8997         {
8998                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8999                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9000                 match events[0] {
9001                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9002                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9003                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9004                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9005                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9006                         },
9007                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9008                 }
9009         }
9010
9011         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9012         // everything is functional.
9013         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9014         {
9015                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9016                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9017                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9018                 added_monitors.clear();
9019         }
9020
9021         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9022         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9023         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9024         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9025
9026         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9027         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9028         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9029         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9030 }
9031
9032 #[test]
9033 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9034         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9035         //
9036         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9037         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9038         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9039         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9040         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9041         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9042         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9043
9044         // Create some initial channels
9045         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9046         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9047         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9048
9049         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9050         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9051         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9052
9053         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9054         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9055         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9056
9057         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9058         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9059         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9060         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9061         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9062         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9063         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9064         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9065         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9066
9067         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9068         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9069         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9070         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9071         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9072         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9073         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9074         match events[0] {
9075                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9076                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9077                 },
9078                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9079         }
9080         match events[1] {
9081                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9082                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9083                 },
9084                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9085         }
9086         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9087         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9088         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9089         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9090         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9091         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9092
9093         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9094         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9095         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9096 }
9097
9098 #[test]
9099 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9100         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9101         //
9102         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9103         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9104         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9105         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9106         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9107         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9108         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9109         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9110
9111         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9112         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9113         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9114
9115         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9116         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9117                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9118                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9119         }
9120
9121         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9122         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9123         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9124
9125         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9127
9128         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9129         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9130
9131         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9132         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9133         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9134
9135         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9136         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9137         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9139         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9140         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9141         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9142                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9143                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9144                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9145                 } else { panic!(); }
9146         } else { panic!(); }
9147         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9148 }
9149
9150 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9151         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9152         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9153         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9154         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9155         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9156         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9157         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9158         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9159         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9160         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9161         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9162         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9163         // until we learned about an additional block.
9164         //
9165         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9166         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9167         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9168         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9169         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9170         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9171         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9172
9173         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9174         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9175         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9176         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9177         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9178
9179         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9180         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9181         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9183         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9184         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9185
9186         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9187         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9188                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9189         }
9190         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9191                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9192         if test_height_before_timelock {
9193                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9194                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9195                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9196                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9197         } else {
9198                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9199                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9200                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9201                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9202                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9203                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9204                 // timelock is up).
9205                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9206                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9207
9208                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9209                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9210                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9211                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9212                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9213                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9214                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9215
9216                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9217                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9218                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9219                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9220                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9221                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9222                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9223                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9224                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9225         }
9226 }
9227
9228 #[test]
9229 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9230         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9231         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9232 }
9233
9234 #[test]
9235 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9236         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9237         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9238         // HTLCs.
9239         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9240
9241         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9242         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9243         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9244         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9245         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9246         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9247         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9248         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9249         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9250
9251         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9252         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9253         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9255
9256         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9257         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9258         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9259         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9260         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9261
9262         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9263
9264         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9265         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9266         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9267         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9268
9269         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9270         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9271         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9272         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9273         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9274
9275         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9276         // generated
9277         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9278
9279         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9280         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9281         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9282
9283         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9284         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9285         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9286         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9287         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9288
9289         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9290         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9291         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9292         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9293
9294         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9295         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9296                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9297         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9298         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9299         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9300                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9301         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9302
9303         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9304         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9305                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9306                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9307                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9308                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9309                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9310                         keys_manager,
9311                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9312                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9313                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9314                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9315                         channel_monitors,
9316                 }).unwrap()
9317         };
9318         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9319         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9320
9321         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9322         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9323         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9324         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9325
9326         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9327         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9328         // the commitment state.
9329         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9330
9331         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9332
9333         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9334         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9335         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9336
9337         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9338         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9339         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9340         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9341         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9342         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9343         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9344
9345         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9346         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9347 }
9348
9349 #[test]
9350 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9351         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9352         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9353         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9354         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9355
9356         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9357         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9358         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9359         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9360         let params = RouteParameters {
9361                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9362                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9363                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9364         };
9365         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9366         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9367
9368         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9369         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9371         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9372         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9373         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9374         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9375         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9376         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9377 }
9378
9379 #[test]
9380 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9384         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9385
9386         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9387         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9388         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9389         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9390
9391         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9392         let params = RouteParameters {
9393                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9394                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9395                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9396         };
9397         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9398         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9399         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9400         let route = find_route(
9401                 &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9402                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9403         ).unwrap();
9404
9405         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9406         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9407         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9408         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9409         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9410         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9411         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9412         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9413         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9414 }
9415
9416 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9417 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9418 enum ExposureEvent {
9419         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9420         AtHTLCForward,
9421         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9422         AtHTLCReception,
9423         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9424         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9425 }
9426
9427 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9428         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9429         // policy.
9430         //
9431         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9432         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9433         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9434         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9435         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9436         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9437         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9438         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9439
9440         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9441         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9442         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9443         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9444         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9445         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9446
9447         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9448         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9449         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9450         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9451         if on_holder_tx {
9452                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9453         }
9454         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9455         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9456         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9457
9458         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9459
9460         if on_holder_tx {
9461                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9462                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9463                 }
9464         }
9465
9466         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9467         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9469
9470         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9472
9473         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9474         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9475         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9476
9477         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9478                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9479                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9480                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9481         };
9482         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9483         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9484
9485         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9486         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9487
9488         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9489         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9490
9491         if on_holder_tx {
9492                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9493                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9494                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9495                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9496                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9497                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9498                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9499                         }
9500                 } else {
9501                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9502                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9503                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9504                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9505                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9506                         }
9507                 }
9508         } else {
9509                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9510                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9511                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9512                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9513                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9514                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9515                         }
9516                 } else {
9517                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9518                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9519                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9520                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9521                         }
9522                 }
9523         }
9524
9525         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9526         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9527                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9528                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9529                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9530                 if on_holder_tx {
9531                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9532                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9533                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9534                 } else {
9535                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9536                 }
9537         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9538                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9539                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9540                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9541                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9542                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9543                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9544                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9545                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9546                 if on_holder_tx {
9547                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9548                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9549                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9550                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9551                 } else {
9552                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9553                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9554                 }
9555         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9556                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9557                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9558                 {
9559                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9560                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9561                 }
9562                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9563                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9564                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9565         }
9566
9567         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9568         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9569         added_monitors.clear();
9570 }
9571
9572 #[test]
9573 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9574         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9575         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9576         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9577         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9578         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9579         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9580         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9581         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9582         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9583         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9584         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9585         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9586 }