1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::network_graph::RoutingFees;
27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
53 use core::default::Default;
54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
61 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
62 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
63 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
64 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
65 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
67 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
69 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
70 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
71 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
73 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
74 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
76 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
77 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
79 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
80 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
81 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
82 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
83 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
84 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
85 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
86 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
88 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
89 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
91 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
93 } else { assert!(false); }
96 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
97 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
99 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
100 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
102 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
104 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
106 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
117 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
118 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
119 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
120 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
121 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
122 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
123 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
124 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
125 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
127 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
128 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
129 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
130 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
131 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
133 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
134 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
135 if !send_from_initiator {
136 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
137 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
139 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
141 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
142 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
143 if send_from_initiator {
144 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
145 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
147 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
150 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
151 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
152 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
155 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
156 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
157 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
159 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
160 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
161 if send_from_initiator {
162 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
163 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
164 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
165 // well as an additional HTLC.
166 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2));
168 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
173 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
174 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
175 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
179 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
183 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
184 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
187 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
191 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
192 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
193 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
194 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
195 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
196 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
197 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
198 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
199 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
200 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
202 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
204 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
206 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
208 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
211 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
214 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
215 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
216 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
217 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
218 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
223 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
225 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
226 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
227 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
230 let payment_event = {
231 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
232 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
233 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
235 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
236 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
238 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
239 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
240 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
241 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
242 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
245 // deliver(1), generate (3):
246 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
247 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
248 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
251 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
252 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
253 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
254 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
255 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
256 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
257 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
260 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
261 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
262 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
263 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
264 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
265 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
266 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
269 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
270 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
271 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
274 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
275 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
278 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
281 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
282 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
284 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
285 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
293 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
294 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
295 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
299 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
300 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
303 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
305 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
307 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
310 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
313 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
314 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
315 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
316 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
322 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
324 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
325 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
326 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
329 let payment_event = {
330 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
331 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
332 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
334 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
335 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
337 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
338 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
339 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
340 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
341 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
344 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
347 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
351 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
352 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
353 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
354 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
355 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
356 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
359 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
360 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
361 // update_fee (never committed) ->
363 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
364 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
365 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
366 // <- (1) RAA delivered
367 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
368 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
369 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
370 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
372 // B should send no response here
373 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
374 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
377 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
380 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
381 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
382 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
384 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
387 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
388 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
389 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
390 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
391 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
393 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
396 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
397 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
398 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
399 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
402 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
405 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
406 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
408 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
409 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
410 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
412 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
413 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
414 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
415 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
418 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
420 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
422 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
424 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
425 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
426 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
428 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
429 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
430 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
431 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
432 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
433 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
434 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
436 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
437 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
438 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
440 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
442 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
443 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
447 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
448 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
451 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
452 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
455 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
456 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
457 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
460 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
461 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
465 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
466 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
467 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
468 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
469 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
470 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
471 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
472 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
473 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
474 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
475 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
476 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
477 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
478 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
479 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
480 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
482 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
483 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
484 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
485 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
487 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
488 let as_msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
489 assert_eq!(as_msg_events.len(), 2);
490 let as_funding_locked = if let MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } = as_msg_events[0] {
491 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
493 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
494 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } = as_msg_events[1] {
495 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
496 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
498 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
499 let bs_msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
500 assert_eq!(bs_msg_events.len(), 1);
501 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } = bs_msg_events[0] {
502 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
503 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
505 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
507 // After 6 confirmations, as required by the spec, we'll send announcement_signatures and
508 // broadcast the channel_announcement (but not before exactly 6 confirmations).
509 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
510 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
511 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
512 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
513 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
515 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
516 let bs_announce_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
517 assert_eq!(bs_announce_events.len(), 2);
518 let bs_announcement_sigs = if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } = bs_announce_events[0] {
519 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
521 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
522 let (bs_announcement, bs_update) = if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } = bs_announce_events[1] {
523 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
524 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
526 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
527 let as_announce_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
528 assert_eq!(as_announce_events.len(), 1);
529 let (announcement, as_update) = if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } = as_announce_events[0] {
530 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
531 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
532 assert_eq!(announcement, bs_announcement);
535 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
536 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
537 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
541 fn test_1_conf_open() {
542 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
543 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
544 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
547 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
548 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
549 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
550 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
553 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
554 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
555 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
556 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
558 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
560 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
563 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
564 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
567 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
568 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
569 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
571 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
572 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
573 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
575 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
576 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
578 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
580 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
581 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
583 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
585 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
586 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
588 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
589 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
590 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
591 added_monitors.clear();
593 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
595 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
596 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
598 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
599 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
600 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
601 added_monitors.clear();
604 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
605 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
607 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
608 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
610 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
611 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
612 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
613 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
617 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
618 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
619 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
620 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
621 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
622 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
623 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
624 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
625 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
626 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
627 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
628 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
629 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
630 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
631 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
632 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
633 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
634 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
635 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
639 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
640 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
641 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
643 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
644 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
647 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
650 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
653 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
654 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
655 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
656 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
657 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
659 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
661 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
663 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
664 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
667 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
668 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
671 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
672 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
673 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
676 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
677 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
682 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
683 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
684 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
685 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
686 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
687 let channel_value = 5000;
689 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
690 let channel_id = chan.2;
691 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
692 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
694 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
695 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
696 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
698 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
699 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
701 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
702 *feerate_lock = feerate;
704 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
706 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
708 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
710 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
712 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
714 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
716 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
717 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
718 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
719 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
720 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
721 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
725 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
726 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
729 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
730 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
733 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
735 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
736 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
737 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
738 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
739 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
740 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
741 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
742 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
743 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
745 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
746 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
747 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
748 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
749 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
750 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
751 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
752 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
755 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
756 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
757 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
760 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
761 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
762 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
763 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
764 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
765 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
767 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
768 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
769 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
770 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
772 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
774 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
777 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
780 htlc_signatures: res.1
783 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
785 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
788 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
790 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
791 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
792 //Should produce and error.
793 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
794 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
796 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
797 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
801 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
802 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
803 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
804 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
805 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
806 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
809 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
812 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
815 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
818 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
819 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
820 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
821 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
822 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
824 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
826 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
827 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
828 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
831 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
833 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
834 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
836 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
837 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
838 added_monitors.clear();
840 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
841 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
842 // node[1] has nothing to do
844 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
845 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
848 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
849 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
850 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
852 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
854 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
856 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
857 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
858 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
859 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
860 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
861 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
863 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
864 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
866 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
868 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
870 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
872 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
874 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
875 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
877 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
879 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
881 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
883 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
884 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
886 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
890 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
892 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
893 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
894 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
895 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
896 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
900 fn test_update_fee() {
901 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
902 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
903 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
904 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
905 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
906 let channel_id = chan.2;
909 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
910 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
911 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
912 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
913 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
914 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
915 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
916 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
917 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
918 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
919 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
922 // Create and deliver (1)...
925 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
926 feerate = *feerate_lock;
927 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
929 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
932 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
933 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
934 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
935 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
936 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
940 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
942 // Generate (2) and (3):
943 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
944 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
948 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
949 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
952 // Create and deliver (4)...
954 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
955 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
957 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
959 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
960 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
961 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
962 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
963 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
965 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
968 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
969 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
972 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
973 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
975 // Handle (3), creating (6):
976 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
978 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
979 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
982 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
983 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
986 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
987 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
988 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
989 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
990 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
991 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
992 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
993 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
997 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
999 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1000 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1002 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
1003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1004 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1006 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1007 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1008 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
1009 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1010 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1014 fn fake_network_test() {
1015 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1016 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
1017 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
1018 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
1019 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
1020 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1022 // Create some initial channels
1023 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1024 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1025 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1027 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1028 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1029 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1030 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1031 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1033 // Send some more payments
1034 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1035 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1036 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1038 // Test failure packets
1039 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1040 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1042 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1043 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1045 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1046 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1047 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1048 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1049 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1050 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1051 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1053 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1054 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1055 hops.push(RouteHop {
1056 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1057 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1058 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1059 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1061 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1063 hops.push(RouteHop {
1064 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1065 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1066 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1067 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1069 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1071 hops.push(RouteHop {
1072 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1073 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1074 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1075 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1077 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1079 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1080 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1081 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1083 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1084 hops.push(RouteHop {
1085 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1086 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1087 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1088 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1090 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1092 hops.push(RouteHop {
1093 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1094 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1095 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1096 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1098 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1100 hops.push(RouteHop {
1101 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1102 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1103 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1104 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1106 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1108 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1109 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1110 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1112 // Claim the rebalances...
1113 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1114 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1116 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1117 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1119 // Send some payments across both channels
1120 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1121 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1122 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1125 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1126 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1127 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1128 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1130 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1132 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1133 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1134 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1136 // Close down the channels...
1137 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1138 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1139 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1140 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1141 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1142 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1143 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1144 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1145 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1146 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1147 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1148 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1149 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1150 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1151 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1155 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1156 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1157 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1158 // commitment dance rounds.
1159 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1160 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1161 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1162 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1163 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1164 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1166 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1167 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1168 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1169 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1170 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1174 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1175 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1176 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1177 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1179 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1180 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1182 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1184 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1185 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1186 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1187 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1190 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1191 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1193 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1197 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1198 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1199 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1200 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1202 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1203 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1204 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1205 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1206 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1207 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1210 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1211 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1212 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1214 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1216 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1217 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1218 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1221 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1222 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1224 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1226 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1228 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1230 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1231 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1233 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1235 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1237 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1239 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1241 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1243 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1245 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1248 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1250 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1251 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1252 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1254 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1255 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1257 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1261 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1262 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1265 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1269 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1270 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1271 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1272 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1273 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1274 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1275 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1277 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1278 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1279 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1280 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1281 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1282 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1284 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1286 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1287 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1289 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1290 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1292 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1293 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1294 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1298 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1299 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1300 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1301 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1302 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1303 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1304 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1305 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1307 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1310 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1312 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1314 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1315 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1316 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1318 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1319 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1322 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1323 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1325 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1326 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1327 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1328 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1329 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1330 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1331 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1334 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1336 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1338 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1339 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1341 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1342 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1343 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1344 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1345 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1346 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1347 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1348 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1350 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1351 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1352 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1354 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1355 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1356 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1357 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1358 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1359 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1360 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1361 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1363 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1364 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1367 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1368 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1369 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1370 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1372 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1373 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1374 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1375 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1376 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1377 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1379 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1385 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1386 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1387 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1388 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1389 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1390 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1392 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1393 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1395 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1396 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1397 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1398 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1399 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1401 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1403 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1404 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1405 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1408 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1410 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1411 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1413 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1417 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1418 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1419 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1420 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1421 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1422 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1424 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1425 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1426 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1427 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1429 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1431 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1432 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1433 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1434 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1437 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1438 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1439 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1440 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1443 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1445 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1446 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1447 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1449 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1451 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1453 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1454 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1455 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1456 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1457 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1458 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1459 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1460 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1462 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1463 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1464 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1465 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1466 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1468 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1469 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1470 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1471 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1472 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1473 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1474 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1475 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1478 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1479 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1480 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1482 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1483 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1484 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1486 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1488 amount_msat: 3460001,
1489 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1491 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1494 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1497 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1498 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1499 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1500 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1504 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1505 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1507 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1508 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1510 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1513 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1516 htlc_signatures: res.1
1519 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1520 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1521 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1523 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1524 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1526 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1527 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1529 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1531 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1532 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1533 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1535 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1536 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1537 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1539 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1541 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1542 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1548 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1549 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1550 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1551 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1552 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1554 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1555 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1556 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1557 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1559 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1560 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1561 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1563 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1565 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1566 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1567 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1570 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1571 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1572 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1573 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1574 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1575 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1579 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1580 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1581 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1584 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1586 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1587 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1588 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1589 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1590 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1591 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1592 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1594 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1595 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1596 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1599 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1600 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1601 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1602 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1603 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1604 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1605 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1606 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1607 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1609 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1610 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1611 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1612 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1613 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1616 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1617 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1618 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1619 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1620 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1621 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1623 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1627 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1628 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1629 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1630 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1631 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1633 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1634 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1635 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1637 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1638 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1639 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1640 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1641 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1642 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1643 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1645 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1646 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1647 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1648 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1649 // commitment transaction fee.
1650 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1652 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1653 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1654 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1657 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1658 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1659 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1660 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1664 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1665 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1666 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1667 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1668 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1669 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1670 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1671 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1673 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1675 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1676 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1677 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1678 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1680 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1681 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1682 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1683 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1684 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1685 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1686 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1688 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1689 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1690 match msg_events[0] {
1691 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1692 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1694 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1699 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1700 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1701 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1702 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1703 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1704 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1705 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1706 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1708 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1709 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1710 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1711 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1712 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1713 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1715 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1716 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1717 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1718 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1719 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1720 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1722 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1723 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1724 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1725 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1729 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1730 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1731 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1732 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1733 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1734 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1735 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1738 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1739 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1740 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1742 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1743 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1744 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1745 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1747 // Add a pending HTLC.
1748 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1749 let payment_event_1 = {
1750 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1753 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1754 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1755 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1757 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1759 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1760 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1761 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1762 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1763 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1765 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1766 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1767 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1768 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1769 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1770 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1771 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1772 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1775 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1776 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1777 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1778 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1781 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1782 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1783 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1784 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1785 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1786 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1788 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1792 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1793 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1794 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1795 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1796 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1797 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1798 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1799 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1800 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1801 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1803 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1804 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1805 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1807 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1808 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1811 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1812 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1816 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1817 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1818 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1819 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1820 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1821 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1822 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1823 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1824 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1825 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1826 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1828 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1829 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1831 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1832 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1834 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1836 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1837 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1838 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1839 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1844 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1845 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1846 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1848 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1850 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1852 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1853 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1854 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1855 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1856 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1857 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1858 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1861 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1862 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1864 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1865 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1866 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1867 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1868 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1869 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1870 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1873 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1875 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1876 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1877 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1878 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1879 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1882 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1883 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1884 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1885 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1886 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1889 // adding pending output.
1890 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1891 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1892 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1893 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1894 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1895 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1896 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1897 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1898 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1900 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1901 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1902 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1904 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1905 let payment_event_1 = {
1906 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1909 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1910 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1911 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1913 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1915 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1916 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1918 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1919 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1920 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1921 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1924 // split the rest to test holding cell
1925 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1926 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1927 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1928 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1930 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1931 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1934 // now see if they go through on both sides
1935 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1936 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1937 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1939 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1940 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1942 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1944 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1945 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1946 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1947 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1948 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1951 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1952 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1953 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1955 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1956 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1958 // flush the pending htlc
1959 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1960 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1963 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1964 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1966 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1968 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1969 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1970 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1973 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1974 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1977 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1979 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1980 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1981 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1983 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1984 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1986 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1987 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1988 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1989 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1990 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1991 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1993 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1994 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1995 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1996 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1998 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1999 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2001 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2002 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2004 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
2005 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2006 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
2008 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2009 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2010 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2012 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2015 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2018 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
2019 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2020 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
2022 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2023 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2024 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2026 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2029 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2032 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2033 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2034 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2036 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
2037 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2038 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2040 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
2041 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2042 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2043 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2044 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2046 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2047 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2051 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2052 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2053 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2054 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2055 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2056 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2057 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2058 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2060 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2061 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2062 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2063 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2064 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2065 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2066 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2067 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2069 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2070 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2071 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2072 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2073 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2074 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2075 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2076 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2077 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2078 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2080 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2081 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2082 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2083 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2085 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2086 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2088 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2090 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2091 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2092 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2095 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2096 // initial fulfill/CS.
2097 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2099 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2101 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2102 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2103 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2105 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2107 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2108 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2110 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2111 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2113 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2114 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2116 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2117 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2119 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2121 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2123 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2125 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2127 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2129 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2131 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2132 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2133 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2134 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2135 // on-chain as necessary).
2136 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2137 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2139 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2140 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2142 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2146 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2147 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2149 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2150 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2151 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2153 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2154 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2156 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2157 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2158 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2160 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2162 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2163 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2164 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2167 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2168 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2170 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2172 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2174 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2176 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2178 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2181 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2183 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2184 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2186 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2188 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2190 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2193 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2194 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2196 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2197 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2201 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2202 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2203 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2204 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2205 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2206 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2207 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2209 // Create some initial channels
2210 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2211 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2212 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2213 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2215 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2216 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2217 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2218 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2219 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2220 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2222 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2223 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2224 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2225 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2226 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2228 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2229 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2231 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2233 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2234 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2235 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2237 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2239 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2240 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2241 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2242 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2243 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2245 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2246 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2248 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2249 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2250 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2251 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2254 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2255 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2256 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2257 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2259 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2261 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2262 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2263 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2264 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2265 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2267 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2268 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2270 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2271 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2273 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2274 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2276 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2277 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2278 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2279 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2281 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2287 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2288 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2289 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2291 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2292 let node2_commitment_txid;
2294 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2295 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2296 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2297 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2299 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2300 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2301 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2303 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2305 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2306 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2307 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2308 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2309 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2311 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2312 // confusing us in the following tests.
2313 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2315 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2316 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2317 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2320 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2321 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2322 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2324 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2325 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2328 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2331 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2332 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2334 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2338 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2340 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2341 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2342 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2348 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2350 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2351 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2353 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2354 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2355 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2356 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2357 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2360 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2363 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2364 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2366 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2369 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2371 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2372 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2373 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2375 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2376 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2377 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2378 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2380 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2381 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2382 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2386 fn test_justice_tx() {
2387 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2388 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2389 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2390 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2391 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2392 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2393 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2394 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2395 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2396 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2397 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2398 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2399 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2400 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2401 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2402 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2403 // Create some new channels:
2404 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2406 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2407 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2408 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2409 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2410 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2411 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2412 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2413 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2414 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2415 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2416 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2417 // Revoke the old state
2418 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2421 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2423 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2424 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2425 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2427 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2428 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2429 node_txn.truncate(1);
2431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2432 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2433 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2435 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2436 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2437 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2438 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2440 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2441 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2442 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2443 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2445 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2447 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2448 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2450 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2451 // Create some new channels:
2452 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2454 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2458 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2459 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2460 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2461 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2462 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2463 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2464 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2465 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2466 // Revoke the old state
2467 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2469 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2471 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2472 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2473 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2475 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2476 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2479 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2481 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2482 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2483 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2485 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2486 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2487 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2489 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2490 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2491 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2495 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2496 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2497 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2498 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2499 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2500 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2501 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2502 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2503 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2504 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2505 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2506 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2507 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2508 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2509 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2511 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2512 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2514 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2515 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2516 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2518 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2519 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2521 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2522 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2523 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2525 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2529 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2530 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2531 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2532 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2533 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2534 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2535 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2537 // Create some new channel:
2538 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2540 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2541 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2542 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2543 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2544 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2546 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2547 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2548 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2549 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2550 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2551 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2552 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2553 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2554 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2556 //Revoke the old state
2557 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2560 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2562 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2563 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2565 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2566 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2567 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2569 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2570 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2572 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2573 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2575 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2576 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2577 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2578 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2579 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2580 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2581 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2582 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2584 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2585 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2586 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2588 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2589 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2590 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2594 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2595 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2596 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2597 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2598 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2599 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2600 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2602 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2604 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2605 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2606 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2607 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2608 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2609 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2611 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2612 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2614 //Revoke the old state
2615 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2618 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2620 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2622 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2623 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2624 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2626 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2627 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2630 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2631 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2633 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2634 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2635 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2636 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2637 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2638 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2640 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2641 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2642 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2643 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2644 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2645 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2646 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2648 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2649 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2650 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2651 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2653 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2654 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2655 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2657 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2658 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2659 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2660 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2661 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2662 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2663 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2664 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2666 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2667 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2668 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2672 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2673 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2674 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2675 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2676 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2677 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2678 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2679 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2680 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2682 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2683 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2684 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2685 // PaymentSent event).
2687 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2688 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2689 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2690 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2692 // Create some initial channels
2693 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2694 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2696 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2697 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2698 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2699 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2700 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2702 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2703 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2704 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2706 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2707 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2709 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2710 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2711 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2712 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2713 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2714 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2715 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2717 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2718 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2719 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2720 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2721 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2723 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2724 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2726 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2727 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2728 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2729 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2730 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2731 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2732 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2733 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2734 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2735 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2736 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2737 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2738 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2739 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2741 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2742 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2743 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2744 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2746 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2747 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2748 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2749 added_monitors.clear();
2751 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2752 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2753 match forwarded_events[0] {
2754 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2755 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2757 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2758 } else { panic!(); }
2759 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2760 } else { panic!(); }
2761 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2763 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2764 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2765 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2766 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2767 added_monitors.clear();
2769 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2771 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2775 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2780 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2781 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2782 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2783 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2784 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2785 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2789 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2790 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2791 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2792 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2793 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2794 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2795 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2796 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2797 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2798 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2800 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2801 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2802 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2803 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2805 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2806 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2807 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2808 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2810 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2811 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2815 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2816 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2817 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2818 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2820 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2821 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2822 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2823 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2824 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2825 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2827 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2828 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2829 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2830 let commitment_spend =
2831 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2832 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2833 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2834 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2837 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2838 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2839 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2843 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2844 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2845 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2846 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2847 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2848 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2849 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2850 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2851 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2852 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2853 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2854 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2856 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2857 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2858 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2859 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2860 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2862 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2863 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2864 let mut first_claimed = false;
2865 for event in events {
2867 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2868 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2869 assert!(!first_claimed);
2870 first_claimed = true;
2872 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2873 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2876 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2877 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2881 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2884 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2885 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2886 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2887 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2888 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2889 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2891 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2893 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2894 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2895 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2896 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2897 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2898 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2899 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2901 // Create some intial channels
2902 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2903 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2905 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2906 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2907 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2909 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2911 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2912 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2913 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2914 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2916 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2919 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2920 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2922 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2923 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2924 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2925 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2926 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2927 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2929 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2931 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2932 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2934 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2935 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2936 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2937 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2938 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2940 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2941 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2942 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2943 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2944 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2947 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2948 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2949 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2950 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2952 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2953 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2955 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2956 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2957 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2958 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2960 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2964 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2966 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2968 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2969 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2970 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2971 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2974 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2976 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2977 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2978 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2979 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2980 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2981 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2982 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2984 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2988 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2990 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2991 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2993 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2994 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2995 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2996 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2997 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2998 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3003 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3004 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3005 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3007 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3008 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3010 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3012 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3013 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3014 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3015 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3016 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3017 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3018 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3022 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3023 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3024 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3025 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3029 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3030 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3031 // and fail backward accordingly.
3033 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3034 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3035 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3036 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3038 // Create some initial channels
3039 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3040 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3042 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3043 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3044 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3045 // Revoke the old state
3046 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3048 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3050 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3051 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3052 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3054 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3056 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3058 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3059 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3061 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3062 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3063 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3064 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3065 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3066 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3068 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3069 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3070 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3072 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3076 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3077 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3078 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3079 // commitment transaction anymore.
3080 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3081 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3082 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3083 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3084 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3085 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3087 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3088 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3089 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3090 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3091 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3092 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3093 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3094 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3095 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3097 // Create some initial channels
3098 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3099 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3101 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3102 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3103 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3104 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3105 // Revoke the old state
3106 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3108 let value = if use_dust {
3109 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3110 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3111 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3114 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3115 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3116 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3118 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3119 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3121 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3122 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3123 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3124 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3125 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3126 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3127 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3128 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3129 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3131 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3132 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3134 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3135 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3136 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3137 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3138 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3139 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3140 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3141 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3143 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3144 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3145 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3148 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3149 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3151 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3152 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3153 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3154 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3155 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3156 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3157 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3158 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3159 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3160 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3162 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3163 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3164 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3167 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3168 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3169 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3170 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3171 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3172 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3176 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3177 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3178 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3180 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3181 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3183 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3186 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3187 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3190 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3191 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3193 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3195 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3196 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3198 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3199 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3201 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3202 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3205 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3206 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3210 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3212 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3213 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3218 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3222 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3225 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3226 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3227 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3228 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3231 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3232 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3233 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3234 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3240 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3241 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3242 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3243 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3244 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3245 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3247 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3250 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3251 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3252 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3253 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3254 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3255 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3256 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3258 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3259 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3260 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3262 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3264 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3265 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3267 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3268 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3269 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3270 // that we should update our routing table for.
3271 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3272 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3275 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3278 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3279 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3280 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3282 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3285 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3286 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3287 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3292 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3295 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3296 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3297 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3301 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3302 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3303 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3304 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3305 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3309 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3310 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3311 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3312 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3313 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3317 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3321 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3322 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3324 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3326 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3327 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3330 let payment_event = {
3331 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3332 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3333 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3335 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3336 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3339 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3340 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3342 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3345 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3348 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3350 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3352 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3353 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3354 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3355 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3356 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3357 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3359 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3360 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3366 onion_routing_packet,
3368 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3370 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3371 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3372 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3374 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3375 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3380 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3381 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3383 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3385 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3390 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3391 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3392 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3393 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3394 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3395 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3396 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3397 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3399 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3400 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3401 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3402 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3404 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3406 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3407 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3408 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3410 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3411 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3412 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3414 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3416 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3417 // registering new transactions
3418 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3419 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3423 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3424 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3425 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3426 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3427 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3428 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3429 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3430 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3432 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3434 let mut payment_event = {
3435 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3438 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3439 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3440 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3443 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3444 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3446 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3448 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3449 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3450 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3451 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3454 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3455 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3457 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3459 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3460 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3461 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3463 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3464 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3466 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3468 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3469 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3470 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3471 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3472 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3476 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3478 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3479 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3481 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3483 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3485 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3486 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3488 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3489 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3490 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3491 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3492 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3493 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3494 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3496 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3500 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3501 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3502 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3503 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3504 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3506 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3507 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3508 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3509 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3510 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3512 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3514 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3516 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3517 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3518 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3520 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3521 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3523 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3524 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3528 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3529 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3530 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3531 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3532 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3533 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3534 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3535 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3537 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3538 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3539 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3541 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3542 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3543 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3544 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3546 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3547 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3548 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3550 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3551 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3552 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3553 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3555 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3556 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3558 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3559 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3561 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3563 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3564 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3566 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3567 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3568 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3570 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3573 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3574 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3575 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3577 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3580 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3581 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3585 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3586 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3589 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3590 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3591 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3592 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3593 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3594 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3596 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3597 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3598 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3599 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3600 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3601 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3602 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3604 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3607 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3609 let payment_event = {
3610 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3613 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3614 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3615 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3617 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3619 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3620 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3622 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3623 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3624 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3626 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3628 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3629 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3630 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3633 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3634 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3635 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3636 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3639 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3640 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3641 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3649 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3650 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3651 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3652 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3653 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3654 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3656 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3657 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3658 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3660 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3661 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3663 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3664 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3665 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3666 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3667 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3668 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3669 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3670 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3671 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3672 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3673 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3674 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3675 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3676 // Everything was delivered...
3677 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3680 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3681 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3683 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3684 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3687 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3688 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3689 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3691 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3693 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3694 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3696 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3697 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3698 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3700 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3701 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3702 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3704 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3710 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3713 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3714 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3715 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3716 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3717 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3718 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3719 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3720 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3721 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3722 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3723 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3725 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3728 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3729 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3731 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3732 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3734 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3735 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3736 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3738 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3741 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3742 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3744 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3746 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3747 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3748 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3751 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3752 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3753 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3754 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3757 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3758 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3759 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3767 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3768 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3769 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3770 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3771 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3772 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3774 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3776 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3777 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3778 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3779 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3780 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3781 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3782 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3783 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3784 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3785 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3786 // Everything was delivered...
3787 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3790 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3791 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3794 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3795 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3796 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3798 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3799 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3802 // Channel should still work fine...
3803 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3804 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3805 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3809 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3810 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3811 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3812 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3813 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3817 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3818 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3819 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3820 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3821 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3825 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3826 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3827 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3828 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3829 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3830 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3831 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3832 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3833 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3834 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3836 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3837 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3839 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3840 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3841 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3843 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3845 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3846 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3848 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3849 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3850 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3852 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3853 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3854 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3855 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3857 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3858 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3859 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3860 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3861 let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3862 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3863 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3869 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3870 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3871 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3872 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3873 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3875 let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3876 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3877 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3878 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3881 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3883 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3884 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3885 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3891 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3892 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3897 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3898 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3899 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3900 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3901 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3903 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3904 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3906 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3909 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3910 // announcement_signatures.
3911 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3912 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3913 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3914 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3915 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3916 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3922 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3923 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3925 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3926 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3927 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3928 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3929 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3930 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3935 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3936 // same channel_announcement.
3937 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3938 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3939 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3940 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3941 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3942 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3948 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3949 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3950 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3951 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3953 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3954 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3955 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3957 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3958 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3959 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3961 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3962 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3963 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3965 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3966 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3967 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3968 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3969 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3970 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3971 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3972 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3974 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3975 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3976 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3977 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3978 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3979 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3981 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3982 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3983 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3984 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3988 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3989 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3991 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3992 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3995 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3997 // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3998 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3999 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4000 let mut found_announcement = false;
4001 for event in msgs.iter() {
4003 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4004 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4006 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4007 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4010 assert!(found_announcement);
4014 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4015 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4016 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4017 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4018 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4019 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4020 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4021 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4023 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4025 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4026 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4027 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4030 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4031 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4033 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4037 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
4038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4040 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4041 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4043 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4044 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4045 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4046 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4047 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4048 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4049 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4051 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4052 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4053 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4055 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4056 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4057 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4062 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4063 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4064 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4067 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4070 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4071 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4073 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4074 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4075 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4076 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4077 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4078 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4080 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4081 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4082 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4083 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4085 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4086 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4088 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4089 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4091 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4093 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4094 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4095 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4096 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4097 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4098 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4099 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4100 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4101 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4104 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4105 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4106 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4107 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4108 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4109 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4110 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4113 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4114 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4115 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4116 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4117 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4118 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4119 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4122 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4123 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4124 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4127 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4128 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4129 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4132 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4133 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4136 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4138 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4139 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4141 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4142 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4144 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4145 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4146 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4148 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4151 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4154 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4155 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4158 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4159 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4162 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4163 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4164 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4165 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4166 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4167 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4168 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4170 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4172 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4173 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4174 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4175 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4176 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4177 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4178 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4180 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4181 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4182 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4183 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4184 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4187 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4190 let mut block = Block {
4191 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4194 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4195 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4196 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4197 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4198 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4199 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4200 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4203 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4206 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4207 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4208 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4209 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4210 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4212 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4213 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4214 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4215 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4216 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4217 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4221 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4222 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4223 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4226 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4227 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4228 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4229 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4230 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4231 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4232 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4233 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4235 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4236 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4237 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4238 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4240 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4241 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4243 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4245 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4248 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4249 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4250 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4251 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4254 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4255 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4256 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4257 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4261 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4262 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4263 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4264 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4267 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4269 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4270 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4271 match fail_commit[0] {
4272 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4273 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4274 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4276 _ => unreachable!(),
4278 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4280 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4281 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4282 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4283 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4284 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4285 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4286 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4287 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4292 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4293 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4294 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4298 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4299 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4300 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4301 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4302 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4303 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4304 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4305 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4306 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4307 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4309 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4311 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4313 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4314 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4315 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4316 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4318 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4319 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4320 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4321 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4322 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4323 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4324 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4325 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4326 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4327 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4329 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4330 let config = UserConfig::default();
4331 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4332 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4333 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4334 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4335 default_config: config,
4337 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4338 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4339 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4344 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4345 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4347 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4348 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4349 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4352 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4353 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4354 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4355 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4357 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4358 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4359 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4360 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4362 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4363 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4364 for node in nodes.iter() {
4365 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4366 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4367 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4370 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4374 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4375 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4376 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4377 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4378 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4379 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4380 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4381 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4382 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4383 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4384 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4386 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4387 let channel_value = 100000;
4388 let push_msat = 10001;
4389 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4390 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4391 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4392 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4393 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4394 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4395 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4397 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4399 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4400 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4402 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4404 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4405 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4406 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4407 added_monitors.clear();
4410 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4411 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4413 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4414 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4415 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4416 added_monitors.clear();
4418 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4423 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4424 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4425 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4426 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4428 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4429 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4430 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4431 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4432 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4433 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4434 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4435 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4436 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4437 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4439 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4440 let config = UserConfig::default();
4441 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4442 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4443 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4444 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4445 default_config: config,
4447 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4448 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4449 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4454 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4455 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4457 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4459 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4460 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4462 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4463 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4464 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4465 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4466 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4468 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4469 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4472 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4473 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4474 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4475 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4477 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4478 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4479 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4480 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4482 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4483 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4484 for node in nodes.iter() {
4485 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4486 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4487 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4490 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4494 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4495 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4496 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4497 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4498 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4499 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4500 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4501 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4502 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4503 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4504 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4506 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4507 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4509 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4511 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4512 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4513 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4515 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4516 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4517 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4518 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4519 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4520 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4521 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4522 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4523 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4524 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4526 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4527 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4528 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4529 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4530 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4531 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4533 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4534 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4535 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4540 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4541 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4543 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4544 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4547 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4549 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4550 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4554 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4555 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4556 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4557 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4558 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4559 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4560 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4561 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4562 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4563 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4564 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4565 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4566 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4567 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4569 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4570 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4571 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4572 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4573 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4576 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4578 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4579 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4581 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4582 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4583 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4584 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4586 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4588 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4589 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4590 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4591 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4592 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4595 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4596 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4597 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4598 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4599 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4600 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4603 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4604 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4605 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4606 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4607 assert!(read.is_empty());
4608 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4611 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4612 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4613 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4614 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4615 assert!(read.is_empty());
4616 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4619 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4620 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4621 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4622 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4624 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4625 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4626 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4628 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4630 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4633 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4634 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4635 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4636 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4638 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4639 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4640 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4642 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4644 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4645 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4647 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4648 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4649 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4650 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4651 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4654 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4655 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4658 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4659 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4661 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4662 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4663 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4664 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4665 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4667 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4668 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4669 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4670 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4671 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4672 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4673 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4675 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4676 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4678 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4683 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4684 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4686 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4687 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4688 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4689 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4690 for event in events.drain(..) {
4692 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4693 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4694 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4695 all_outputs.push(outp);
4698 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4701 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4702 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4712 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4713 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4714 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4715 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4716 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4717 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4719 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4720 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4721 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4723 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4724 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4725 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4726 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4727 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4729 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4730 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4732 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4733 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4734 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4735 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4736 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4740 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4741 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4742 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4743 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4744 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4745 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4746 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4748 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4749 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4750 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4752 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4754 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4755 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4756 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4757 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4759 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4760 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4762 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4763 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4765 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4766 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4767 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4771 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4772 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4773 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4775 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4776 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4777 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4778 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4780 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4781 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4782 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4783 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4784 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4786 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4787 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4788 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4790 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4792 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4793 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4794 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4796 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4797 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4798 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4799 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4800 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4804 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4805 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4806 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4807 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4808 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4810 // Create some initial channels
4811 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4813 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4815 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4816 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4817 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4819 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4820 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4822 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4824 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4826 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4827 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4830 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4831 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4834 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4835 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4836 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4837 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4838 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4839 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4840 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4842 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4843 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4844 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4846 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4847 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4848 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4852 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4853 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4854 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4855 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4856 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4858 // Create some initial channels
4859 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4861 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4862 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4864 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4866 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4867 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4868 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4870 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4871 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4873 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4875 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4878 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4880 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4881 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4882 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4883 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4884 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4885 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4887 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4888 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4889 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4890 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4892 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4893 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4894 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4895 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4896 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4900 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4901 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4902 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4903 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4904 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4906 // Create some initial channels
4907 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4909 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4910 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4911 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4912 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4914 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4916 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4917 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4919 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4921 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4922 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4923 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4924 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4926 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4927 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4929 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4930 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4931 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4935 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4936 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4937 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4938 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4939 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4940 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4942 // Create some initial channels
4943 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4945 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4946 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4947 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4948 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4950 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4952 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4953 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4954 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4956 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4957 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4959 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4960 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4961 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4962 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4963 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4964 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4965 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4967 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4968 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4969 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4970 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4972 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4974 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4975 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4976 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4977 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4978 // transactions next...
4979 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4980 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4982 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4983 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4984 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4985 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4987 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4988 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4991 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4992 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4994 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4995 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4997 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4998 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4999 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5000 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5001 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5005 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5006 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5007 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5008 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5009 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5010 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5012 // Create some initial channels
5013 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5015 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5016 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5017 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5018 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5020 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5021 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5023 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5025 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5026 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5027 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5029 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5030 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5032 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5033 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5034 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5035 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5037 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5038 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5039 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5041 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5042 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5043 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5044 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5046 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5048 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5049 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5051 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5052 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5053 // transactions next...
5054 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5055 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5056 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5057 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5059 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5060 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5063 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5064 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5066 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5068 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5069 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5071 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5072 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5074 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5075 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5076 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5077 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5078 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5079 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5080 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5081 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5085 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5086 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5087 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5088 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5089 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5091 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5094 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5095 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5096 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5097 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5099 // Create some initial channels
5100 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5101 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5103 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5104 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5105 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5106 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5107 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5109 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5110 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5111 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5113 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5114 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5115 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5116 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5118 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5119 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5120 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5121 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5122 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5124 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5125 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5127 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5129 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5130 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5131 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5132 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5133 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5134 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5135 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5136 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5137 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5138 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5140 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5141 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5142 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5144 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5145 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5147 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5148 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5151 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5152 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5153 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5158 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5159 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5160 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5161 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5165 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5166 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5167 match msg_events[0] {
5168 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5169 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5171 match msg_events[1] {
5172 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5175 match msg_events[2] {
5176 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5177 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5178 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5179 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5180 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5181 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5185 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5186 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5187 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5188 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5189 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5190 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5191 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5192 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5193 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5194 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5195 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5196 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5197 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5199 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5204 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5205 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5206 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5207 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5208 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5211 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5212 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5213 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5214 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5215 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5216 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5217 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5219 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5220 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5221 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5223 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5224 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5225 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5226 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5227 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5229 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5231 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5232 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5233 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5234 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5235 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5236 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5238 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5239 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5240 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5242 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5243 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5245 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5246 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5248 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5249 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5250 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5251 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5252 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5253 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5255 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5256 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5257 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5258 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5259 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5260 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5261 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5263 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5264 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5265 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5266 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5269 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5270 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5272 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5273 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5275 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5279 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5280 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5282 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5283 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5284 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5285 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5286 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5287 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5288 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5289 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5290 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5291 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5292 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5293 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5294 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5296 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5297 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5298 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5299 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5300 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5301 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5302 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5303 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5304 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5307 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5308 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5310 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5312 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5314 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5315 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5316 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5317 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5318 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5319 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5320 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5321 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5322 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5323 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5324 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5327 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5328 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5330 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5332 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5333 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5334 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5336 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5341 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5342 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5343 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5344 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5345 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5347 // Create some initial channels
5348 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5350 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5351 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5352 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5353 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5354 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5356 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5357 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5359 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5361 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5362 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5364 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5365 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5368 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5369 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5372 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5373 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5374 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5375 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5376 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5377 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5378 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5382 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5383 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5385 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5386 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5387 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5388 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5389 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5390 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5393 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5394 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5395 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5396 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5397 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5398 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5399 // use the same payment hashes.
5400 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5405 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5406 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5407 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5408 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5409 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5410 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5411 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5412 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5413 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5414 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5416 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5417 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5418 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5419 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5420 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5422 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5423 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5424 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5425 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5427 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5429 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5431 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5432 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5434 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5436 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5438 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5440 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5441 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5443 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5445 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5448 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5450 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5451 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5454 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5456 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5457 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5459 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5460 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5461 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5462 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5463 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5465 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5466 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5467 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5468 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5469 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5470 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5472 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5475 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5476 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5477 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5478 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5479 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5480 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5482 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5483 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5484 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5486 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5489 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5490 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5491 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5492 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5494 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5496 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5498 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5499 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5500 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5501 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5502 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5503 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5504 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5505 if deliver_last_raa {
5506 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5508 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5511 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5512 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5513 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5514 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5516 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5517 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5518 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5520 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5521 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5522 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5524 if announce_latest {
5525 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5527 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5529 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5530 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5531 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5534 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5538 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5539 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5542 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5543 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5544 if deliver_last_raa {
5545 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5547 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5551 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5552 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5553 let mut a_done = false;
5554 for msg in cs_msgs {
5556 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5557 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5558 // should be failed-backwards here.
5559 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5560 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5561 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5562 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5564 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5569 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5570 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5571 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5573 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5574 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5577 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5578 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5579 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5580 if announce_latest {
5581 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5582 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5583 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5586 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5588 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5592 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5593 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5594 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5595 let mut as_updates = 0;
5596 for event in as_events.iter() {
5597 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5598 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5599 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5600 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5602 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5604 if network_update.is_some() {
5607 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5609 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5610 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5611 if announce_latest {
5612 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5613 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5615 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5617 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5618 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5619 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5620 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5621 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5622 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5623 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5624 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5625 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5627 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5629 if network_update.is_some() {
5632 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5634 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5635 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5636 if announce_latest {
5637 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5639 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5641 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5642 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5643 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5644 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5645 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5646 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5650 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5651 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5655 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5656 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5660 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5661 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5662 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5663 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5667 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5668 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5669 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5670 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5671 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5673 // Create some initial channels
5674 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5676 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5677 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5678 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5679 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5681 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5682 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5683 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5685 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5686 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5688 let htlc_timeout = {
5689 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5690 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5691 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5692 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5693 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5694 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5698 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5699 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5700 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5702 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5703 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5704 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5705 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5706 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5707 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5708 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5709 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5710 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5711 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5712 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5716 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5717 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5718 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5719 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5721 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5723 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5724 let seed = [42; 32];
5725 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5726 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5727 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5728 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5729 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5730 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5732 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5733 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5735 // Create some initial channels
5736 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5738 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5739 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5740 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5742 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5743 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5744 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5745 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5746 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5748 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5749 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5750 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5751 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5752 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5754 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5755 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5756 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5757 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5758 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5759 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5760 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5761 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5764 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5765 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5766 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5767 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5769 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5771 let htlc_timeout = {
5772 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5773 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5774 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5775 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5779 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5780 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5781 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5783 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5784 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5785 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5786 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5787 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5788 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5789 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5790 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5791 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5792 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5793 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5794 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5798 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5799 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5800 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5801 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5802 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5804 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5806 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5807 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5809 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5810 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5811 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5813 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5814 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5815 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5817 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5818 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5819 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5821 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5822 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5823 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5826 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5827 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5828 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5829 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5830 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5831 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5833 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5835 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5836 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5837 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5840 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5841 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5842 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5844 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5846 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5847 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5850 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5851 let mut block = Block {
5852 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5855 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5856 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5857 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5859 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5860 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5862 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5865 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5866 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5867 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5868 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5869 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5870 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5872 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5873 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5876 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5878 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5879 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5880 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5882 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5883 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5885 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5886 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5887 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5889 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5890 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5892 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5895 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5896 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5897 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5898 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5899 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5900 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5902 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5903 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5904 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5905 // actually revoked.
5906 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5907 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5908 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5909 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5912 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5913 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5914 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5916 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5917 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5919 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5921 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5923 if check_revoke_no_close {
5924 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5928 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5929 let mut block = Block {
5930 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5933 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5934 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5935 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5937 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5938 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5939 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5941 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5943 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5944 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5945 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5946 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5947 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5948 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5949 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5950 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5954 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5955 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5956 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5957 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5958 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5959 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5960 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5962 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5963 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5964 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5966 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5967 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5968 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5970 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5971 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5975 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5976 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5977 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5978 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5979 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5984 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5985 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5986 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5987 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5988 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5989 //Force duplicate channel ids
5990 for node in nodes.iter() {
5991 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5994 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5995 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5996 let push_msat=10001;
5997 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5998 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5999 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6001 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
6002 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6006 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6007 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6008 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6009 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6010 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6012 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6013 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6014 let push_msat=10001;
6015 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6017 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6018 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6019 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6020 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6021 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6023 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6024 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6025 let push_msat=10001;
6026 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6027 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6028 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6030 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6031 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6032 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6034 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6035 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6036 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6038 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6039 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6040 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6042 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6043 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6044 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6045 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6046 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6047 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6051 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6052 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6053 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6054 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6055 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6057 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6058 let push_msat=10001;
6059 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6060 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6061 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6062 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6064 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6065 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6066 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6067 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6072 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6075 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6076 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6077 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6078 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6080 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6081 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6082 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6083 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6084 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6085 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6087 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6088 // pending_update_fee.
6090 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6091 *feerate_lock += 20;
6093 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6096 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6097 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6098 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6099 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6100 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6102 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6105 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6107 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6108 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6109 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6111 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6112 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6113 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6115 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6116 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6117 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6118 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6120 // Flush the pending fee update.
6121 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6122 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6124 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6127 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6128 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6129 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6130 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6131 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6132 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6133 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6134 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6135 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6137 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6138 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6139 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6141 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6142 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6143 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6144 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6145 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6146 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6147 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6148 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6149 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6151 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6155 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6156 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6157 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6159 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6160 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6161 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6162 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6163 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6164 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6166 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6167 // pending_update_fee.
6169 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6170 *feerate_lock += 200;
6172 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6175 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6176 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6177 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6178 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6179 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6184 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6186 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6187 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6188 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6190 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6192 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6193 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6194 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6196 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6197 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6198 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6199 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6200 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6201 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6202 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6204 // Flush the pending fee update.
6205 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6206 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6208 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6209 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6212 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6213 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6214 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6215 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6216 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6217 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6218 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6219 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6220 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6222 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6223 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6224 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6226 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6227 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6228 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6229 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6230 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6231 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6232 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6233 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6234 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6239 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6240 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6241 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6242 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6243 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6245 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6246 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6247 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6249 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6251 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6252 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6253 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6254 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6256 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6257 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6259 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6260 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6261 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6263 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6266 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6268 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6269 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6270 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6271 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6274 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6275 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6276 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6279 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6280 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6281 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6282 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6283 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6284 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6285 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6286 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6287 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6288 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6289 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6291 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6292 // pending_update_fee.
6294 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6295 *feerate_lock += 20;
6297 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6300 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6301 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6302 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6303 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6304 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6306 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6309 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6311 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6312 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6313 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6315 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6317 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6318 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6319 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6320 let payment_event = {
6321 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6324 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6325 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6327 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6329 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6331 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6332 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6334 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6335 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6337 // Flush the pending fee update.
6338 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6339 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6341 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6342 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6345 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6346 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6347 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6349 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6350 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6353 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6356 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6358 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6360 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6361 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6362 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6363 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6364 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6365 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6368 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6369 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6372 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6373 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6374 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6375 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6376 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6377 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6378 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6379 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6380 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6381 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6383 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6386 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6387 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6388 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6390 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6391 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6393 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6394 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6396 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6397 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6398 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6399 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6400 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6402 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6403 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6407 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6408 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6409 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6412 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6413 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6414 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6415 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6416 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6417 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6418 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6420 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6421 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6423 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6424 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6425 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6426 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6430 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6431 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6432 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6433 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6434 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6435 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6436 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6438 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6439 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6440 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6441 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6443 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6444 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6448 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6449 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6450 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6451 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6452 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6453 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6454 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6456 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6457 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6459 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6460 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6462 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6463 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6464 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6466 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6470 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6471 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6472 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6473 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6474 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6475 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6476 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6477 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6479 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6480 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6481 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6485 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6486 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6487 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6488 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6489 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6490 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6491 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6492 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6493 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6494 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6496 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6497 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6498 let payment_event = {
6499 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6502 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6503 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6504 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6505 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6509 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6511 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6513 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6515 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6516 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6518 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6519 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6520 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6522 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6523 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6527 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6528 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6529 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6530 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6531 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6532 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6533 let channel_value = 100000;
6534 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6535 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6537 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6539 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6540 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6542 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6543 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6544 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6546 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6547 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6549 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6552 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6554 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6555 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6556 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6557 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6558 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6559 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6560 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6561 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6563 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6564 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6565 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6568 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6569 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6571 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6572 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6573 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6574 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6575 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6576 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6578 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6582 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6583 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6584 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6585 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6586 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6587 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6588 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6590 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6591 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6592 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6593 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6594 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6596 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6597 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6598 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6600 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6602 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6603 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6604 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6605 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6606 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6608 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6609 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6610 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6612 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6616 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6617 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6618 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6619 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6620 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6621 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6622 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6623 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6625 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6626 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6627 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6628 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6629 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6630 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6632 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6636 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6637 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6638 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6641 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6642 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6643 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6645 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6646 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6648 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6649 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6650 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6652 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6656 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6657 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6658 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6659 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6660 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6661 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6662 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6664 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6665 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6667 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6668 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6669 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6671 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6672 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6673 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6675 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6679 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6680 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6681 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6682 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6683 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6684 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6686 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6687 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6688 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6690 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6691 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6692 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6694 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6695 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6696 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6698 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6702 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6703 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6704 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6705 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6706 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6707 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6708 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6709 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6711 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6712 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6713 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6715 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6716 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6718 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6719 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6720 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6721 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6722 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6723 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6724 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6725 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6726 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6727 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6728 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6729 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6730 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6733 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6734 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6735 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6737 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6739 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6741 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6742 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6743 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6745 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6749 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6750 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6752 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6753 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6754 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6755 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6756 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6757 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6758 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6761 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6762 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6764 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6767 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6770 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6772 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6773 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6774 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6776 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6780 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6781 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6783 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6784 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6785 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6786 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6787 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6789 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6790 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6792 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6793 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6795 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6798 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6801 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6803 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6804 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6805 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6807 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6811 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6812 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6814 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6815 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6816 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6817 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6818 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6820 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6821 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6823 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6824 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6825 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6828 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6829 failure_code: 0x8000,
6832 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6834 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6835 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6836 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6838 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6842 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6843 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6845 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6846 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6847 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6848 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6849 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6851 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6853 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6856 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6857 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6858 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6860 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6861 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6862 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6863 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6864 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6865 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6866 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6868 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6872 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6874 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6876 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6877 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6878 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6880 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6884 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6885 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6887 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6888 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6889 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6890 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6891 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6893 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6895 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6898 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6899 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6900 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6902 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6903 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6904 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6905 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6906 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6907 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6908 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6914 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6916 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6918 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6919 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6920 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6922 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6926 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6927 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6929 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6930 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6931 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6932 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6933 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6935 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6936 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6939 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6940 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6942 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6944 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6946 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6948 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6950 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6951 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6952 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6953 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6954 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6955 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6956 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6961 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6962 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6964 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6965 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6966 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6968 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6972 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6973 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6974 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6976 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6977 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6978 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6979 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6980 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6981 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6983 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6986 let mut payment_event = {
6987 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6989 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6990 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6991 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6993 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6995 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6996 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6997 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6998 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7000 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7001 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7004 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7005 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7007 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7009 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7010 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7011 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7013 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7014 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7015 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7016 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7017 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7018 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7019 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7021 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7025 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7028 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7029 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7030 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7031 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7033 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7035 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7036 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7037 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7038 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7039 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7040 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7048 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7049 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7050 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7051 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7053 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7054 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7055 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7056 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7057 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7058 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7060 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7062 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7063 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7064 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7065 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7067 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7068 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7070 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7071 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7073 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7076 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7077 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7078 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7081 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7082 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7084 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7086 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7087 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7089 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7092 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7093 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7098 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7099 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7100 if announce_latest {
7101 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7103 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7106 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7108 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7110 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7111 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7112 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7113 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7114 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7115 let mut first_failed = false;
7116 for event in events {
7118 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7119 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7120 assert!(!first_failed);
7121 first_failed = true;
7123 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7126 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7132 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7133 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7134 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7137 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7138 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7139 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7140 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7141 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7142 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7143 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7145 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7146 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7147 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7148 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7149 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7151 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7153 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7154 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7156 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7157 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7159 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7161 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7162 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7165 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7167 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7168 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7169 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7170 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7171 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7173 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7174 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7176 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7177 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7178 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7179 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7180 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7181 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7182 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7183 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7185 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7186 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7187 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7189 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7190 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7191 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7192 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7194 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7195 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7196 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7197 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7198 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7199 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7200 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7202 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7204 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7205 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7208 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7209 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7210 else { first = false; }
7212 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7215 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7216 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7217 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7226 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7227 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7228 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7229 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7233 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7234 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7236 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7237 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7238 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7239 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7240 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7241 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7242 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7243 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7244 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7246 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7247 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7249 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7252 } else { assert!(false) }
7254 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7255 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7256 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7257 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7258 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7260 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7261 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7263 } else { assert!(false); }
7265 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7266 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7267 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7268 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7269 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7270 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7272 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7274 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7275 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7276 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7280 } else { panic!(); }
7281 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7283 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7284 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7285 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7286 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7287 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7289 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7292 } else { assert!(false); }
7296 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7297 // We want to be sure that :
7298 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7299 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7300 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7301 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7302 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7308 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7309 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7310 // during signing due to revoked tx
7311 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7312 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7315 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7316 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7317 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7319 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7321 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7322 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7323 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7324 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7326 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7327 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7329 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7330 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7332 // Restore node A from previous state
7333 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7334 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7335 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7336 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7337 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7338 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7339 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7341 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7342 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7343 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7344 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7345 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7346 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7348 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7349 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7353 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7354 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7355 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7356 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7360 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7361 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7363 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7365 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7366 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7370 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7371 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7374 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7375 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7376 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7377 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7378 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7379 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7380 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7382 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7383 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7385 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7388 panic!("Unexpected event")
7392 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7393 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7394 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7395 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7398 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7399 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7400 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7401 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7402 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7403 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7404 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7405 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7406 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7407 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7408 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7412 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7413 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7414 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7415 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7417 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7418 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7419 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7420 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7422 // Create some initial channels
7423 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7425 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7426 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7427 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7428 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7429 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7430 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7433 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7434 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7435 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7436 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7437 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7439 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7440 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7441 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7442 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7444 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7445 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7446 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7448 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7449 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7450 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7451 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7452 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7453 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7454 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7455 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7456 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7457 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7459 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7463 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7464 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7466 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7467 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7468 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7469 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7473 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7474 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7475 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7477 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7478 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7479 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7480 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7482 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7483 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7484 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7487 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7488 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7490 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7491 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7492 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7493 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7494 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7495 for e in msg_events {
7497 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7498 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7499 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7500 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7501 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7508 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7509 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7510 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7511 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7512 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7513 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7515 // Reestablish chan_1
7516 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7517 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7518 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7519 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7520 // Reestablish chan_2
7521 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7522 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7523 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7524 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7525 // Reestablish chan_3
7526 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7527 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7528 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7529 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7531 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7532 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7533 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7534 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7535 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7536 for e in msg_events {
7538 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7539 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7540 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7541 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7543 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7544 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7547 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7550 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7551 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7555 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7556 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7557 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7558 // to forward through that channel.
7559 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7560 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7561 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7562 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7563 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7564 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7565 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7566 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7567 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7568 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7570 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7572 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7573 // not send for private channels.
7574 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7575 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7576 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7577 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7578 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7580 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7581 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7582 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7585 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7586 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7589 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7590 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7591 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7592 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7593 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7594 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7595 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7596 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7597 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7598 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7600 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7601 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7602 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7604 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7606 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7608 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7609 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7610 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7611 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7612 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7613 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7614 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7615 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7616 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7618 let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7619 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7621 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7623 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7624 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7625 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7627 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7628 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7629 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7630 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7631 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7633 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7634 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7635 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7637 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7638 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7640 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7641 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7643 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7644 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7645 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7646 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7647 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7649 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7650 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7651 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7652 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7654 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7655 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7656 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7657 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7658 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7659 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7661 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7663 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7664 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7665 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7666 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7667 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7668 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7669 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7671 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7672 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7673 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7674 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7678 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7679 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7681 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7682 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7684 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7686 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7687 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7688 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7689 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7690 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7691 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7692 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7693 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7695 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7696 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7697 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7698 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7699 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7700 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7701 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7702 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7704 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7706 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7707 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7711 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7712 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7713 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7715 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7716 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7717 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7718 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7720 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7722 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7723 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7724 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7726 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7727 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7728 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7729 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7730 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7731 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7733 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7734 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7735 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7736 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7740 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7741 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7743 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7744 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7745 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7746 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7749 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7753 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7754 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7755 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7756 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7757 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7758 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7759 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7760 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7764 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7765 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7766 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7767 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7769 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7770 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7771 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7772 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7773 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7774 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7775 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7776 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7777 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7778 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7779 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7780 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7781 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7785 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7787 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7788 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7790 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7792 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7793 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7794 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7795 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7796 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7797 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7798 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7799 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7800 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7801 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7802 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7803 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7804 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7808 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7810 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7811 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7815 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7816 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7817 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7819 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7820 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7821 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7822 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7823 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7825 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7826 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7827 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7828 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7829 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7830 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7831 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7832 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7833 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7834 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7835 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7837 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7838 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7839 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7841 // Revoke local commitment tx
7842 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7844 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7845 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7846 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7847 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7849 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7850 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7852 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7853 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7854 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7856 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7857 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7858 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7860 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7861 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7862 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7863 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7865 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7866 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7867 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7868 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7869 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7870 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7871 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7872 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7874 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7875 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7881 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7882 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7883 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7885 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7886 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7887 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7888 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7890 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7891 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7892 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7893 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7894 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7895 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7897 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7898 // available, which we check here:
7899 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7900 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7901 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7903 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7904 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7906 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7907 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7908 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7909 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7911 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7912 // output, checked above).
7913 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7914 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7915 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7917 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7918 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7919 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7920 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7921 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7925 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7926 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7927 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7928 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7929 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7931 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7932 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7934 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7935 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7936 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7937 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7938 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7940 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7941 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7947 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7948 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7949 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7950 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7952 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7953 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7955 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7956 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7957 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7958 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7959 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7960 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7961 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7962 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7966 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7967 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7968 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7969 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7971 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7972 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7973 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7974 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7975 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7976 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7977 // up bumped justice generation.
7978 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7981 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7986 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7987 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7988 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7991 // Provide preimage for one
7992 // Check aggregation
7994 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7995 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7997 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7999 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8000 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8001 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8003 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8004 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8005 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8006 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8007 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8009 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8010 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8011 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8013 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8015 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8019 let feerate_timeout;
8020 let feerate_preimage;
8022 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8023 // 9 transactions including:
8024 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
8025 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8026 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8028 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8029 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8030 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8031 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8032 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8033 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
8034 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8036 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8037 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8038 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8039 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8041 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8042 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8043 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8044 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
8046 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8047 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8048 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8049 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8053 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8054 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8056 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8057 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8059 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8060 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8061 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8062 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8063 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8064 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8066 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8067 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8068 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
8069 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8070 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8072 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8073 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8074 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8075 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8076 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8081 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8082 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8086 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8087 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8088 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8089 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8090 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8091 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8092 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8093 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8095 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8096 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8097 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8098 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8099 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8101 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8102 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8104 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8106 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8107 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8108 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8110 // Must revoke without gaps
8111 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8112 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8114 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8115 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8116 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8118 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8119 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8120 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8122 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8126 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8127 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8128 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8131 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8132 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8133 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8135 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8136 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8137 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8138 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8140 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8141 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8142 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8144 // Revoke local commitment tx
8145 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8147 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8148 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8149 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8150 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8152 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8153 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8155 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8157 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8158 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8159 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8160 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8161 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8162 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8166 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8167 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8168 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8170 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8171 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8172 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8177 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8178 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8179 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8183 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8185 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8187 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8188 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8189 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8190 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8191 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8193 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8194 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8196 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8198 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8200 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8201 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8202 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8204 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8205 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8206 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8213 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8214 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8217 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8219 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8220 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8221 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8223 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8225 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8226 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8227 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8228 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8232 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8233 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8234 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8235 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8236 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8237 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8238 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8240 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8241 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8242 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8244 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8245 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8246 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8250 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8251 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8252 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8253 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8254 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8255 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8257 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8258 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8259 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8260 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8262 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8263 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8264 route.paths.push(path);
8265 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8266 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8267 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8268 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8269 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8270 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8271 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8272 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8276 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8277 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8278 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8279 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8280 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8281 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8283 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8286 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8287 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8288 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8290 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8291 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8292 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8293 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8295 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8296 // values from previous calls.
8297 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8298 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8299 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8301 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8303 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8304 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8306 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8309 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8314 #[allow(deprecated)]
8315 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8316 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8317 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8321 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8323 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8325 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8327 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8328 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8329 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8330 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8331 } else { panic!(); }
8333 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8335 header: BlockHeader {
8337 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8338 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8339 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8343 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8344 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8345 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8346 } else { panic!(); }
8348 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8349 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8350 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8351 block.header.time += 1;
8352 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8353 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8354 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8357 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8358 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8360 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8361 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8362 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8363 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8365 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8366 // values from previous calls.
8367 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8368 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8369 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8371 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8372 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8373 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8374 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8376 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8381 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8382 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8383 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8384 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8385 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8386 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8388 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8390 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8391 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8392 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8393 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8395 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8396 // resulting events.
8397 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8400 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8401 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8402 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8403 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8405 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8406 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8407 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8408 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8411 // We should fail the payment back
8412 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8413 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8414 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8415 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8416 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8418 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8423 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8424 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8425 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8427 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8428 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8429 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8430 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8432 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8433 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8434 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8435 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8437 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8438 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8439 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8440 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8444 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8445 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8446 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8447 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8449 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8450 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8451 // commitment at same time.
8453 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8454 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8455 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8456 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8458 // Create some initial channel
8459 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8460 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8462 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8463 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8465 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8466 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8468 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8469 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8470 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8471 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8473 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8474 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8475 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8476 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8477 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8478 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8479 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8480 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8483 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8484 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8485 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8486 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8487 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8489 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8490 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8492 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8493 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8494 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8495 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8496 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8497 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8498 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8499 } else { assert!(false); }
8500 } else { assert!(false); };
8501 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8503 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8504 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8508 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8509 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8510 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8511 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8512 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8514 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8515 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8516 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8517 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8519 // Create some initial channel
8520 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8521 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8523 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8524 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8526 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8527 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8529 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8530 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8531 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8532 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8533 let watchtower_alice = {
8534 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8535 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8536 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8537 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8538 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8539 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8540 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8541 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8544 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8545 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8546 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8547 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8548 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8550 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8552 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8553 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8557 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8558 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8559 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8560 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8561 let watchtower_bob = {
8562 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8563 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8564 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8565 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8566 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8567 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8568 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8569 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8572 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8573 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8575 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8576 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8578 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8582 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8583 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8584 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8585 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8586 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8587 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8588 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8589 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8590 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8591 } else { assert!(false); }
8592 } else { assert!(false); };
8593 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8596 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8597 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8598 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8600 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8603 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8604 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8605 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8609 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8610 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8611 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8613 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8614 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8615 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8616 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8617 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8618 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8623 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8624 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8625 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8628 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8629 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8631 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8632 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8633 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8634 // before receiving funding_signed.
8635 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8636 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8637 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8638 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8640 // Create an initial channel
8641 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8642 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8643 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8644 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8645 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8647 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8648 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8650 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8653 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8654 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8655 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8656 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8657 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8661 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8662 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8663 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8664 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8665 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8666 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8667 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8669 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8670 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8671 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8672 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8674 // Create some initial channels
8675 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8677 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8678 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8679 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8680 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8681 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8682 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8684 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8685 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8686 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8687 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8688 // this test before #653 fix.
8689 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8690 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8692 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8693 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8695 let htlc_timeout = {
8696 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8697 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8698 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8699 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8703 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8704 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8705 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8706 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8709 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8710 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8711 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8712 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8714 // Steps of the test:
8715 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8716 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8717 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8718 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8719 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8720 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8721 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8722 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8723 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8724 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8725 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8726 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8728 // Create some initial channels
8729 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8730 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8732 // Steps (1) and (2):
8733 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8734 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8736 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8737 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8738 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8739 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8740 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8741 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8742 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8744 // Steps (3) and (4):
8745 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8746 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8747 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8748 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8749 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8750 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8752 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8753 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8754 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8755 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8756 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8758 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8759 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8760 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8761 if broadcast_alice {
8762 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8764 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8766 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8767 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8771 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8772 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8773 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8775 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8776 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8777 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8778 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8779 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8780 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8782 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8783 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8784 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8785 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8786 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8787 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8789 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8790 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8792 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8795 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8796 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8797 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8800 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8801 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8802 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8803 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8804 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8807 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8809 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8810 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8811 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8814 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8817 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8819 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8822 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8823 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8824 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8825 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8826 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8831 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8834 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8835 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8836 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8837 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8838 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8839 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8840 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8841 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8842 if broadcast_alice {
8843 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8845 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8847 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8848 if broadcast_alice {
8849 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8850 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8851 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8852 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8854 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8855 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8857 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8858 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8863 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8864 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8866 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8867 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8868 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8869 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8871 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8872 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8873 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8875 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8876 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8877 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8878 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8879 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8880 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8881 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8883 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8884 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8890 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8891 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8892 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8893 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8894 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8898 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8899 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8900 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8902 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8903 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8904 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8905 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8906 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8907 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8908 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8909 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8911 // Create an initial channel
8912 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8913 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8914 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8915 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8917 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8918 // that it is rejected.
8919 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8921 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8922 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8924 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8925 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8926 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8927 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8928 // move forward with it.
8929 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8930 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8936 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8937 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8939 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8942 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8943 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8945 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8946 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8947 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8948 added_monitors.clear();
8950 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8952 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8953 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8955 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8958 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8959 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8960 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8961 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8962 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8964 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8965 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8967 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8968 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8969 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8970 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8971 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8973 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8977 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8978 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8979 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8980 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8981 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8982 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8984 let funding_created = {
8985 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8986 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8987 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8988 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8991 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8992 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8993 // still needs to be cleared here.
8994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8996 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8998 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8999 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9001 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9002 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9003 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9004 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9005 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9007 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9011 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9012 // everything is functional.
9013 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9015 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9016 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9017 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9018 added_monitors.clear();
9021 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9022 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9023 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9024 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9026 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9027 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9028 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9029 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9033 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9034 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9036 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9037 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9038 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9039 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9042 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9044 // Create some initial channels
9045 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9046 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9047 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9049 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9050 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9051 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9053 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9054 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9055 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9057 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9058 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9060 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9061 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9062 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9063 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9064 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9065 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9067 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9068 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9069 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9071 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9072 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9073 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9075 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9076 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9078 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9081 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9082 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9084 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9086 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9087 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9088 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9089 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9090 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9091 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9093 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9094 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9095 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9099 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9100 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9102 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9103 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9104 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9105 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9106 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9107 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9108 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9109 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9111 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9112 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9113 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9115 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9116 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9117 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9118 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9121 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9122 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9125 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9128 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9129 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9131 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9132 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9133 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9135 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9136 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9137 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9139 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9140 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9141 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9142 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9143 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9144 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9145 } else { panic!(); }
9146 } else { panic!(); }
9147 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9150 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9151 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9152 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9153 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9154 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9155 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9156 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9157 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9158 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9159 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9160 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9161 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9162 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9163 // until we learned about an additional block.
9165 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9166 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9167 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9168 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9169 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9170 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9171 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9173 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9174 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9175 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9176 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9177 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9179 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9180 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9181 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9183 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9184 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9186 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9187 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9188 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9190 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9191 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9192 if test_height_before_timelock {
9193 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9194 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9195 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9196 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9198 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9199 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9200 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9201 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9202 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9203 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9205 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9206 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9208 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9209 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9210 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9211 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9212 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9213 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9216 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9217 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9218 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9219 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9220 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9221 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9222 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9223 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9224 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9229 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9230 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9231 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9235 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9236 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9237 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9239 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9241 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9242 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9243 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9244 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9245 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9246 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9247 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9248 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9249 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9251 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9252 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9253 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9256 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9257 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9258 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9259 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9260 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9262 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9264 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9265 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9266 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9269 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9270 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9271 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9272 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9273 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9275 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9277 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9279 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9280 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9281 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9283 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9284 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9285 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9286 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9287 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9289 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9290 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9291 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9292 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9294 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9295 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9296 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9297 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9298 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9299 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9300 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9301 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9303 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9304 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9305 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9306 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9307 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9308 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9309 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9311 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9312 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9313 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9314 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9318 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9319 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9321 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9322 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9323 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9326 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9327 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9328 // the commitment state.
9329 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9331 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9333 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9334 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9337 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9338 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9339 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9340 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9341 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9342 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9343 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9345 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9346 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9350 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9351 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9352 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9353 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9354 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9356 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9357 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9358 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9359 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9360 let params = RouteParameters {
9361 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9362 final_value_msat: 10000,
9363 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9365 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9366 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9368 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9369 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9371 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9372 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9373 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9374 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9375 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9376 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9380 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9384 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9386 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9387 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9388 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9389 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9391 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9392 let params = RouteParameters {
9393 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9394 final_value_msat: 10000,
9395 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9397 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9398 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9399 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9400 let route = find_route(
9401 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9402 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9405 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9406 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9408 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9409 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9410 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9411 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9412 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9413 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9416 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9417 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9418 enum ExposureEvent {
9419 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9421 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9423 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9424 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9427 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9428 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9431 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9432 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9433 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9434 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9435 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9436 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9437 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9438 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9440 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9441 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9442 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9443 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9444 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9445 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9447 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9448 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9449 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9450 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9452 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9454 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9455 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9456 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9458 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9461 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9462 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9466 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9467 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9470 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9473 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9474 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9475 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9477 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9478 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9479 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9480 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9482 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9483 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9485 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9486 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9488 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9489 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9492 if dust_outbound_balance {
9493 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9494 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9495 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9496 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9497 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9498 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9501 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9502 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9503 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9504 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9505 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9509 if dust_outbound_balance {
9510 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9511 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9512 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9513 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9514 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9517 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9518 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9519 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9520 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9525 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9526 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9527 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9528 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9529 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9531 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9532 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9533 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9535 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9537 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9538 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9539 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9541 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9542 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9543 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9544 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9545 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9547 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9548 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9549 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9550 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9552 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9553 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9555 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9556 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9557 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9559 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9560 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9562 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9564 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9567 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9568 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9569 added_monitors.clear();
9573 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9574 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9575 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9576 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9577 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9578 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9579 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9580 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9581 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9582 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9583 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9584 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9585 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);