git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  22 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils;
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  46 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
  47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  48
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  51
  52 use regex;
  53
  54 use crate::io;
  55 use crate::prelude::*;
  56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  57 use core::default::Default;
  58 use core::iter::repeat;
  59 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  60 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  61
  62 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  63 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  64
  65 #[test]
  66 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  67         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  68         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  69         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  70         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  71         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  72         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  73         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  74         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  75
  76         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  77         // funding satoshis
  78         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  79         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  80         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  81
  82         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  83         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  84
  85         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  86         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  87
  88         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  89         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  90         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  91                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  92                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  93                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  94                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  95                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  96                         match action {
  97                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  98                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
  99                                 },
 100                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 101                         }
 102                 } else { assert!(false); }
 103         };
 104
 105         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 106
 107         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 109         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 120
 121         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 122
 123         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 124 }
 125
 126 #[test]
 127 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 128         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 129         // them.
 130         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 131         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 132         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 133         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 134         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 135         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 136
 137         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 138                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 139                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 140                 },
 141                 _ => panic!()
 142         }
 143 }
 144
 145 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 146         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 147         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 148         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 149         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 150         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 151         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 152         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 153         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 154         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 155
 156         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 157         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 158         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 159         let opt_anchors = false;
 160         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 161         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 162
 163         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 164         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 165         if !send_from_initiator {
 166                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 167                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 168         }
 169         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 170
 171         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 172         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 173         if send_from_initiator {
 174                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 175                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 176         }
 177         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 178         {
 179                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 180                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 181                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 182                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 183                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 184                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 185                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 186         }
 187
 188         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 189         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 190         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 191
 192         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 193         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 194         if send_from_initiator {
 195                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 196                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 197                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 198                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 199                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 200         } else {
 201                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 202         }
 203 }
 204
 205 #[test]
 206 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 207         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 208         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 209 }
 210
 211 #[test]
 212 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 213         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 214         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 215         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 216         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 217         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 218
 219         // balancing
 220         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 221
 222         // A                                        B
 223         // update_fee                            ->
 224         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 225         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 226         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 227         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 228         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 229         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 230         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 231         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 232         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 233         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 234         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 235         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 236         //                                       <- RAA
 237         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 238
 239         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 240         {
 241                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 242                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 243         }
 244         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 245         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 246
 247         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 248         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 249         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 250                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 251                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 252                 },
 253                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 254         };
 255
 256         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 257
 258         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 259         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 260         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 262
 263         let payment_event = {
 264                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 265                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 266                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 267         };
 268         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 269         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 270
 271         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 272         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 273         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 274         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 275         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 277
 278         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 279         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 280         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 281         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 283
 284         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 285         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 286         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 287         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 288         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 289         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 290         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 292
 293         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 294         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 295         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 296         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 297         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 298         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 299         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 301
 302         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 303         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 304         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 306
 307         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 308         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 310
 311         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 313
 314         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 315         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 316         match events_2[0] {
 317                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 318                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 319         }
 320
 321         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 323 }
 324
 325 #[test]
 326 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 327         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 328         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 329         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 330         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 332         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 333         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 334
 335         // balancing
 336         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 337
 338         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 339         {
 340                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 341                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 342         }
 343         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 344         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 345
 346         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 347         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 348         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 349                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 350                         update_fee.as_ref()
 351                 },
 352                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 353         };
 354
 355         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 356
 357         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 358         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 359         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 360         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 361
 362         let payment_event = {
 363                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 364                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 365                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 366         };
 367         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 368         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 369
 370         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 371         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 372         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 373         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 374         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 375         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 376
 377         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 378         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 379
 380         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 381 }
 382
 383 #[test]
 384 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 385         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 386         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 387         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 388         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 389         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 390
 391         // A                                        B
 392         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 393         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 394         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 395         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 396         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 397         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 398         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 399         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 400         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 401         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 402         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 403         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 404         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 405         //                                          B should send no response here
 406         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 407         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 408         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 409
 410         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 411         let initial_feerate;
 412         {
 413                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 414                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 415                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 416         }
 417         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 418         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 419
 420         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 421         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 422         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 423                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 424                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 425                 },
 426                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 427         };
 428
 429         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 430         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 431         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 432         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 433         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 434
 435         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 436         // transaction:
 437         {
 438                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 439                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 440         }
 441         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 442         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 443         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 444
 445         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 446         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 447                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 448                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 449         };
 450
 451         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 452
 453         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 454         // Deliver (3)
 455         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 456
 457         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 458         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 459         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 460         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 461         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 462         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 463         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 464         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 465         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 466         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 467         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 468
 469         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 470         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 471         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 472         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 473         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 474
 475         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 476         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 477         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 478
 479         // Delever (4)
 480         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 481         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 483
 484         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 485         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 487
 488         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 489         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 490         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 492
 493         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 494         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 496 }
 497
 498 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 499         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 500         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 501         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 502         // Node objects.
 503
 504         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 505         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 506         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 507         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 508
 509         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 510                 let block = Block {
 511                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 512                         txdata: vec![],
 513                 };
 514                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 515                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 516         }
 517
 518         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 519         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 520         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 521
 522         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 523         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 524         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 525
 526         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 527         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 528
 529         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 530
 531         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 532         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 533         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 534         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 535
 536         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 537         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 538         {
 539                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 540                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 541                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 542                 added_monitors.clear();
 543         }
 544         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 545
 546         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 547         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 548         {
 549                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 550                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 551                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 552                 added_monitors.clear();
 553         }
 554
 555         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 556         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 557
 558         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 559         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 560
 561         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 562         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 563         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 564         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 565         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 566 }
 567
 568 #[test]
 569 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 588 }
 589
 590 #[test]
 591 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 592         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 593         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 594         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 595         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 596         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 597
 598         {
 599                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 600                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 601         }
 602         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 603         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 604
 605         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 606         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 607         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 608                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 609                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 610                 },
 611                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 612         };
 613         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 614
 615         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 616         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 618
 619         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 620         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 621         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 622
 623         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 624         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 625         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 627
 628         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 629         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 631 }
 632
 633 #[test]
 634 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 635         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 636         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 637         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 638         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 639         let channel_value = 5000;
 640         let push_sats = 700;
 641         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 642         let channel_id = chan.2;
 643         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 644         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 645         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 646
 647         let opt_anchors = false;
 648
 649         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 650         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 651         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 652         // remote limit.
 653         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 654         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 655         {
 656                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 657                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 658         }
 659         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 660         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 661         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 662
 663         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 664
 665         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 666
 667         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 668         {
 669                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 670
 671                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 672                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 673                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 674                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 675                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 676                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 677         }
 678
 679         {
 680                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 681                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 682                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 683         }
 684         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 685         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 687
 688         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 689
 690         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 691         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 692         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 693                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 694                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 695                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 696                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 697                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 698                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 699                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 700         };
 701         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 702                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 703                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 704                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 705                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 706                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 707                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 708                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 709                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 710         };
 711
 712         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 713         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 714                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 715
 716         let res = {
 717                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 718                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 719                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 720                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 721                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 722                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 723                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 724                         push_sats,
 725                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 726                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 727                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 728                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 729                         &mut htlcs,
 730                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 731                 );
 732                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 733         };
 734
 735         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 736                 channel_id: chan.2,
 737                 signature: res.0,
 738                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 739                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 740                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 741         };
 742
 743         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 744                 channel_id: chan.2,
 745                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 746         };
 747
 748         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 749
 750         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 751         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 752         //Should produce and error.
 753         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 754         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 755         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 756         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 757         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 758 }
 759
 760 #[test]
 761 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 762         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 763         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 764         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 765         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 766         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 767
 768         // balancing
 769         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 770
 771         {
 772                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 773                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 774         }
 775         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 776         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 777
 778         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 779         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 780         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 781                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 782                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 783                 },
 784                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 785         };
 786         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 787         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 788         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 790
 791         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 792
 793         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 794         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 795         {
 796                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 797                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 798                 added_monitors.clear();
 799         }
 800         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 801         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 802         // node[1] has nothing to do
 803
 804         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 805         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 806         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 807
 808         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 809         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 810         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 811         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 812         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 814         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 815
 816         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 817         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 818         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 819         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 820         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 821         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 822
 823         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 824         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 826         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 827
 828         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 830         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 831
 832         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 833         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 834         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 835         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 836
 837         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 839         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 840
 841         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 842
 843         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 844         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 845         match events[0] {
 846                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 847                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 848         };
 849
 850         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 851
 852         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 853         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 854         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 855         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 856         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 857 }
 858
 859 #[test]
 860 fn test_update_fee() {
 861         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 862         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 863         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 864         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 865         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 866         let channel_id = chan.2;
 867
 868         // A                                        B
 869         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 870         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 871         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 872         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 873         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 874         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 875         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 876         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 877         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 878         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 879         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 880         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 881
 882         // Create and deliver (1)...
 883         let feerate;
 884         {
 885                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 886                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 887                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 888         }
 889         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 891
 892         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 893         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 894         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 895                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 896                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 897                 },
 898                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 899         };
 900         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 901
 902         // Generate (2) and (3):
 903         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 904         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 906
 907         // Deliver (2):
 908         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 909         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 911
 912         // Create and deliver (4)...
 913         {
 914                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 915                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 916         }
 917         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 919         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 920         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 921         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 922                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 923                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 924                 },
 925                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 926         };
 927
 928         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 929         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 930         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 931         // ... creating (5)
 932         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 933         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 934
 935         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 936         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 938         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 939         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 940
 941         // Deliver (5):
 942         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 943         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 944         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 945
 946         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 947         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 948         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 949         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 950         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 951         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 952         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 953         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 955
 956         // Deliver (7)
 957         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 959         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 960         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 961
 962         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 964         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 965
 966         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 967         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 968         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 969         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 970         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 971 }
 972
 973 #[test]
 974 fn fake_network_test() {
 975         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 976         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 977         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 978         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 979         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 980         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 981
 982         // Create some initial channels
 983         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 984         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
 985         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
 986
 987         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 988         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 989         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 990         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 991         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 992
 993         // Send some more payments
 994         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 995         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 996         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 997
 998         // Test failure packets
 999         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1000         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1001
1002         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1003         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1004
1005         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1006         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1007         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1011         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1012
1013         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1014         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1015         hops.push(RouteHop {
1016                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1017                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1018                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1019                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1020                 fee_msat: 0,
1021                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1022         });
1023         hops.push(RouteHop {
1024                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1025                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1026                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1027                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1028                 fee_msat: 0,
1029                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1030         });
1031         hops.push(RouteHop {
1032                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1033                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1034                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1035                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1036                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1037                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1038         });
1039         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1040         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1041         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1042
1043         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1044         hops.push(RouteHop {
1045                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1046                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1047                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1048                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1049                 fee_msat: 0,
1050                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1051         });
1052         hops.push(RouteHop {
1053                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1054                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1055                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1056                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1057                 fee_msat: 0,
1058                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1059         });
1060         hops.push(RouteHop {
1061                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1062                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1063                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1064                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1065                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1066                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1067         });
1068         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1069         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1070         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1071
1072         // Claim the rebalances...
1073         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1074         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1075
1076         // Close down the channels...
1077         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1078         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1081         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1084         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1086         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1087         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1089 }
1090
1091 #[test]
1092 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1093         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1094         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1095         // commitment dance rounds.
1096         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1097         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1098         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1099         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1100         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1101         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1102
1103         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1104         for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1105                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1106                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1107                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1108         }
1109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1110
1111         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1112         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1113         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1114         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1115
1116         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1117         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1118         // another HTLC.
1119         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1120         {
1121                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1122                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1123                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1124                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
1125         }
1126
1127         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1128         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1129         {
1130                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1131                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1132         }
1133
1134         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1135         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1136         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1137         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1138
1139         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1140         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1141         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1142         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1143         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1144         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1146
1147         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1148         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1149         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1150
1151         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1152
1153         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1154         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1155         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1157
1158         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1159         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1161         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1162
1163         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1165         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1166
1167         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1168                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1169         }
1170         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1172         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1173         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1174         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1175
1176         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1177         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1178         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1180         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1181
1182         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1184
1185         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1186
1187         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1188         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1189         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1190                 match event {
1191                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1192                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1193                         },
1194                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1195                 };
1196         }
1197
1198         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1199                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1200         }
1201
1202         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1203 }
1204
1205 #[test]
1206 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1207         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1208         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1212         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1213
1214         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1215         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1216         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1217         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1218         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1219         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1220
1221         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1222
1223         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1224         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1225
1226         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1227         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1228
1229         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1230         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1231         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1232 }
1233
1234 #[test]
1235 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1236         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1237         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1238         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1239         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1240         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1241         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1242         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1243
1244         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1245
1246         // balancing
1247         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1248
1249         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1250
1251         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1252         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1253         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1254
1255         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1256         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1257         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1259
1260         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1261         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1262
1263         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1264         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1265         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1266                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1267                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1268                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1269                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1270                 }
1271         }
1272         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1273
1274         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1275         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1276         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1277         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1278
1279         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1280         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1281
1282         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1283         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1284         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1285         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1286         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1287                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1288         } else {
1289                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1290         };
1291
1292         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1293         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1294
1295         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1296         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1297         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1298
1299         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1300         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1301         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1302         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1303
1304         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1305         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1306         for e in events {
1307                 match e {
1308                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1309                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1310                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1311                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1312                         },
1313                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1314                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1315                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1316                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1317                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1318                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1319                         },
1320                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1321                 }
1322         }
1323 }
1324
1325 #[test]
1326 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1327         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1328         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1329         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1330         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1331         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1332
1333         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1334         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1335
1336         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1337         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1338         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1339         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1340         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1341         match err {
1342                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1343                         match &fails[0] {
1344                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1345                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1346                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1347                         }
1348                 },
1349                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1350         }
1351         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1352         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 1);
1353
1354         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1355 }
1356
1357 #[test]
1358 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1359         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1360         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1361         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1362         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1363         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1364
1365         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1366         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1367         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1368         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1369
1370         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1371
1372         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1373         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1374         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1375         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1376                 channel_id: chan.2,
1377                 htlc_id: 0,
1378                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1379                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1380                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1381                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1382         };
1383
1384         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1385
1386         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1387         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1388         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1389
1390         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1391
1392         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1393
1394         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1395         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1396         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1397                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1398                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1399                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1400                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1401                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1402                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1403
1404                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1405                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1406                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1407                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1408                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1409         };
1410         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1411                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1412                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1413                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1414                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1415                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1416                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1417                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1418                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1419         };
1420
1421         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1422         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1423                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1424
1425         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1426         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1427         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1428
1429         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1430                 offered: false,
1431                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1432                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1433                 payment_hash,
1434                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1435         };
1436
1437         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1438
1439         let res = {
1440                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1441                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1442                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1443                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1444                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1445                         commitment_number,
1446                         95000,
1447                         local_chan_balance,
1448                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1449                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1450                         feerate_per_kw,
1451                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1452                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1453                 );
1454                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1455         };
1456
1457         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1458                 channel_id: chan.2,
1459                 signature: res.0,
1460                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1461                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1462                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1463         };
1464
1465         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1466         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1467         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1468
1469         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1470         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1471                 channel_id: chan.2,
1472                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1473                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1474                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1475                 next_local_nonce: None,
1476         };
1477         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1478
1479         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1480         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1481         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1482         match events[0] {
1483                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1484                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1485                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1486                 },
1487                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1488         };
1489         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1490                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1491
1492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1493 }
1494
1495 #[test]
1496 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1497         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1498         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1499         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1500         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1501         // this situation.
1502         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1503         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1504         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1505         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1506         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1507         let opt_anchors = false;
1508
1509         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1510         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1511
1512         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1513
1514         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1515
1516         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1517         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1518                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1519         }
1520
1521         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1522         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1523         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1524                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1525         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1526         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1527 }
1528
1529 #[test]
1530 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1531         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1532         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1533         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1534         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1535         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1536         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1537         let opt_anchors = false;
1538
1539         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1540         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1541         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1542         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1543         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1544         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1545         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1546
1547         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1548         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1549                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1550         }
1551
1552         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1553         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1554         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1555         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1556         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1557         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1558         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1559         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1560         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1561                 channel_id: chan.2,
1562                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1563                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1564                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1565                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1566                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1567         };
1568
1569         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1570         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1571         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1572         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1573         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1574         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1575         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1576         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1577 }
1578
1579 #[test]
1580 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1581         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1582         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1583         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1584         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1585
1586         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1587         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1588         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1589         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1590         let opt_anchors = false;
1591
1592         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1593         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1594         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1595         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1596         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1597         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1598         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1599
1600         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1601                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1602         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1603         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1604         // commitment transaction fee.
1605         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1606
1607         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1608         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1609                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1610         }
1611
1612         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1613         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1614         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1615                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1616 }
1617
1618 #[test]
1619 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1620         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1621         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1622         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1623         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1624         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1625         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1626         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1627         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1628         let opt_anchors = false;
1629
1630         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1631         // HTLC.
1632         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1633         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1634         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1635                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1636
1637         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1638         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1639         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1640         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1641         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1642         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1643         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1644
1645         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1646         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1647         match msg_events[0] {
1648                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1649                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1650                 },
1651                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1652         }
1653 }
1654
1655 #[test]
1656 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1657         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1658         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1659         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1660         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1661         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1662         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1663         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1664
1665         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1666         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1667         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1671
1672         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1673         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1674         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1675         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1676         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1677         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1678
1679         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1680         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1681         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1682         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1683 }
1684
1685 #[test]
1686 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1687         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1688         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1689         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1690         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1691         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1692         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1693
1694         let feemsat = 239;
1695         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1696         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1697         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1698         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1699
1700         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1701         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1702         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1703         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1704
1705         // Add a pending HTLC.
1706         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1707         let payment_event_1 = {
1708                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1709                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1710
1711                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1712                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1713                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1714         };
1715         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1716
1717         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1718         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1719         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1720         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1721         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1722
1723         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1724         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1725         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1726         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1727         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1728         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1729         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1730         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1731                 channel_id: chan.2,
1732                 htlc_id: 1,
1733                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1734                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1735                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1736                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1737         };
1738
1739         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1740         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1741         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1742         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1743         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1744         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1745         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1746         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1747 }
1748
1749 #[test]
1750 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1751         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1752         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1753         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1754         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1755         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1756         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1757         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1758         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1759         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1760         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1761
1762         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1763         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1764         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1765
1766         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1767         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1768 }
1769
1770 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1771         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1772 }
1773
1774 #[test]
1775 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1776         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1777         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1778         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1779         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1780         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1781         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1782         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1783         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1784         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1785         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1786
1787         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1788         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1789
1790         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1791         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1792
1793         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1794                 ($node: expr) => {{
1795                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1796                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1797                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1798                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1799                         payment_event
1800                 }}
1801         }
1802
1803         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1804         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1805         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1806         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1807
1808         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1809
1810         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1811         {
1812                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1813                         .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1814                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1815                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1816                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1817
1818                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1819                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1820                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1821                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
1822         }
1823
1824         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1825         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1826         loop {
1827                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1828                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1829                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1830                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1831                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1832                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1833                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1834                         break;
1835                 }
1836
1837                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1838                         .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1839                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1840                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1841                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1842
1843                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1844                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1845                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1846                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1847                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1848                 );
1849
1850                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1851                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1852                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1853                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1854                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1855         }
1856
1857         // adding pending output.
1858         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1859         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1860         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1861         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1862         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1863         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1864         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1865         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1866         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1867         // policy.
1868         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1869         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1870         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1871
1872         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1873         let payment_event_1 = {
1874                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1875                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1876
1877                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1878                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1879                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1880         };
1881         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1882
1883         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1884         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1885         {
1886                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1887                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1888                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1889                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1890         }
1891
1892         // split the rest to test holding cell
1893         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1894         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1895         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1896         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1897         {
1898                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1899                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1900         }
1901
1902         // now see if they go through on both sides
1903         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1904         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1905         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1907         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1908         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1909
1910         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1911         {
1912                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1913                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1914                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1915                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1916                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 2);
1917         }
1918
1919         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1920         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1921         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1922         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1923         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1924         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1925
1926         // flush the pending htlc
1927         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1928         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1930
1931         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1932         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1934         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1935
1936         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1937         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1938         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1940
1941         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1942         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1944
1945         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1946
1947         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1948         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1949         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1950
1951         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1952         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1953
1954         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1955         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1956         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1957         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1958         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1959         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1960
1961         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1962         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1963         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1964         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1965
1966         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1967         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1968
1969         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1970         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1971         match events[0] {
1972                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1973                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1974                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1975                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1976                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1977                         match &purpose {
1978                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1979                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1980                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1981                                 },
1982                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1983                         }
1984                 },
1985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1986         }
1987         match events[1] {
1988                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1989                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1990                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1991                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1992                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1993                         match &purpose {
1994                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1995                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1996                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1997                                 },
1998                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1999                         }
2000                 },
2001                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2002         }
2003
2004         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2005         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2006         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2007
2008         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2009         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2010         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2011
2012         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2013         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2014         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2015         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2016         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2017
2018         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2019         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2020 }
2021
2022 #[test]
2023 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2024         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2025         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2026         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2027         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2028         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2029         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2030         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2031         // To test this we:
2032         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2033         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2034         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2035         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2036         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2037         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2038         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2039         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2040         //    claim,
2041         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2042         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2043         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2044         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2045         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2046         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2047         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2048         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2049         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2050         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2051
2052         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2053         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2054         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2055         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2056         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2057
2058         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2059         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2060         let send_1 = {
2061                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2062                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2063                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2064                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2065                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2066         };
2067
2068         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2069         // initial fulfill/CS.
2070         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2071         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2074
2075         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2076         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2077         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2078         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2080         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2081
2082         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2083         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2085         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2086         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2087
2088         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2089         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2090         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2091         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2092         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2093
2094         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2095         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2096         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2097
2098         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2100         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2101
2102         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2104         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2105
2106         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2107         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2108         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2109         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2110         // on-chain as necessary).
2111         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2112         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2114         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2115         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2116
2117         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2118         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2119         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2120
2121         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2122         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2123
2124         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2125         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2126         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2128         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2129         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2130
2131         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2132         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2133         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2134         let send_2 = {
2135                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2136                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2137                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2138                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2139                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2140         };
2141
2142         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2143         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2145         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2146
2147         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2148
2149         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2151         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2152
2153         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2155
2156         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2157         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2158         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2159         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2160
2161         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2163         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2164
2165         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2167
2168         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2169         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2170
2171         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2172         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2173 }
2174
2175 #[test]
2176 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2177         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2178         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2179         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2180         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2181         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2182         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2183
2184         // Create some initial channels
2185         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2186         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2187         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2188         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2189
2190         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2191         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2192         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2193         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2194         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2195         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2196
2197         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2198         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2199         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2200         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2201         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2202
2203         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2204         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2205         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2206         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2207         {
2208                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2209                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2210                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2211                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2212                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2213         }
2214         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2215         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2216         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2217         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2218         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2219
2220         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2221         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2222
2223         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2224         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2225         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2226         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2227         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2228         {
2229                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2230                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2231                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2232                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2233                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2234                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2235         }
2236         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2237         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2238         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2239         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2240         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2241
2242         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2243                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2244                         {
2245                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2246                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2247                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2248
2249                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2250                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2251                                 match events[0] {
2252                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2253                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2254                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2255                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2256                                         },
2257                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2258                                 };
2259                         }
2260                 }
2261         }
2262
2263         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2264         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2265         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2267         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2268         let node2_commitment_txid;
2269         {
2270                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2271                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2272                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2273                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2274
2275                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2276                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2277                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2278                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2279                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2280         }
2281         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2282         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2283         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2284         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2285         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2286
2287         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2288         // confusing us in the following tests.
2289         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2290
2291         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2292         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2293         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2294         // buffer space).
2295
2296         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2297                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2298                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2299                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2300                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2301                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2302                                 msg.clone()
2303                         },
2304                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2305                 };
2306                 match events[1] {
2307                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2308                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2309                         },
2310                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2311                 }
2312                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2313
2314                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2315                 {
2316                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2317                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2318                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2319                                         false
2320                                 } else { true }
2321                         });
2322                 }
2323
2324                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2325
2326                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2327                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2328
2329                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2330                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2331                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2332                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2333                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2334                                 msg.clone()
2335                         },
2336                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2337                 };
2338                 match events[1] {
2339                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2340                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2341                         },
2342                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2343                 }
2344                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2345                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2346
2347                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2348                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2349                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2350         };
2351         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2352         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2353         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2354         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2355
2356         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2357                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2358         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2359         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2360 }
2361
2362 #[test]
2363 fn test_justice_tx() {
2364         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2365         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2366         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2367         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2368         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2369         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2370         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2371         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2372         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2373         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2374         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2375         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2376         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2377         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2378         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2379         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2380         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2381         // Create some new channels:
2382         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2383
2384         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2385         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2386         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2387         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2388         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2389         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2390         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2391         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2392         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2393         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2394         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2395         // Revoke the old state
2396         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2397
2398         {
2399                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2400                 {
2401                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2402                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2403                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2404
2405                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2406                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2407                 }
2408                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2409                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2410                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2411
2412                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2413                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2414                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2415                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2416                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2417                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2418                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2419                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2420                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2421         }
2422         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2423
2424         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2425         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2426
2427         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2428         // Create some new channels:
2429         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2430         {
2431                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2432                 node_txn.clear();
2433         }
2434
2435         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2436         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2437         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2438         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2439         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2440         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2441         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2442         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2443         // Revoke the old state
2444         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2445         {
2446                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2447                 {
2448                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2449                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2450                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2451
2452                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2453                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2454                 }
2455                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2456                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2457
2458                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2459                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2460                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2461                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2462                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2463                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2464                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2465         }
2466         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2467         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2468         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2469 }
2470
2471 #[test]
2472 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2473         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2474         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2475         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2476         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2477         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2478         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2479         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2480         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2481         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2482         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2483         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2484         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2485         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2486         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2487
2488         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2489         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2490         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2491         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2492         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2493         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2494
2495         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2496
2497         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2498         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2499         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2501         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2502 }
2503
2504 #[test]
2505 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2506         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2507         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2508         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2509         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2510         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2511         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2512
2513         // Create some new channel:
2514         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2515
2516         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2517         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2518         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2519         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2520         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2521
2522         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2523         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2524         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2525         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2526         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2527         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2528         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2529         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2530         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2531
2532         //Revoke the old state
2533         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2534
2535         {
2536                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2537                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2538                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2539                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2540                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2541                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2542                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2543                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2544
2545                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2546                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2547
2548                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2549                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2550
2551                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2552                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2553                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2554                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2555                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2556                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2557                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2558                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2559
2560                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2561                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2562                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2563                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2564                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2565         }
2566         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2567         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2568         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2569 }
2570
2571 #[test]
2572 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2573         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2574         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2575         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2576         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2577         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2578         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2579
2580         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2581
2582         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2583         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2584         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2585         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2586         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2587         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2588
2589         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2590         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2591
2592         //Revoke the old state
2593         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2594
2595         {
2596                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2597                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2598                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2599                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2600                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2601                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2602                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2603                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2604                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2605                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2606                 }
2607
2608                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2609                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2610
2611                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2612                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
2613
2614                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2615                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2616                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2617                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2618                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2619                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2620                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2621
2622                 // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
2623                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2624                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2625                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2626
2627                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2628                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2629                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2630
2631                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2632                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2633                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2634                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2635                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2636                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2637                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2638                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2639
2640                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2641                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2642                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2643                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2644                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2645                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2646                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2647         }
2648         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2649         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2650         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2651 }
2652
2653 #[test]
2654 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2655         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2656         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2657         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2658         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2659         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2660         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2661         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2662         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2663         // towards B.
2664         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2665         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2666         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2667         // PaymentSent event).
2668
2669         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2670         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2671         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2672         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2673
2674         // Create some initial channels
2675         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2676         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2677
2678         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2679         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2680         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2681         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2682         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2683
2684         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2685         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2686         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2687
2688         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2689         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2690
2691         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2692         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2693         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2694         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2695         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2696         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2697         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2698         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2699         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2700         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2701         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2702         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2703         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2704         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2705         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2706
2707         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2708         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2709         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2710         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2711         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2712         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2713         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2714         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2715         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2716         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2717         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2718         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2719         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2720         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2721
2722         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2723         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2724         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
2725         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2726         {
2727                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2728                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2729                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2730                 added_monitors.clear();
2731         }
2732         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2733         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2734         match forwarded_events[0] {
2735                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2736                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2737         }
2738         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2739         match forwarded_events[1] {
2740                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2741                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2742                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2743                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2744                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2745                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2746                 },
2747                 _ => panic!()
2748         }
2749         match forwarded_events[2] {
2750                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2751                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2752                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2753                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2754                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2755                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2756                 },
2757                 _ => panic!()
2758         }
2759         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2760         {
2761                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2762                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2763                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2764                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2765                 added_monitors.clear();
2766         }
2767         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2768
2769         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2770         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2771
2772         match nodes_2_event {
2773                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2774                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2775         }
2776
2777         match nodes_0_event {
2778                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2779                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2780                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2781                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2782                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2783                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2784                 },
2785                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2786         };
2787
2788         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2789         match events[0] {
2790                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2791                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2792         }
2793
2794         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2795                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2796                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2797                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2798                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2799                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2800                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2801                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2802                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2803                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2804                         if $htlc_offered {
2805                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2806                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2807                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2808                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2809                         } else {
2810                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2811                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2812                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2813                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2814                         }
2815                         node_txn.clear();
2816                 } }
2817         }
2818         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2819         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2820
2821         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2822         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2823         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2824         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2825         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2826         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2828         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2829         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2830         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2831         let commitment_spend =
2832                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2833                         &node_txn[0]
2834                 } else {
2835                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2836                         // FullBlockViaListen
2837                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2838                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2839                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2840                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2841                                 &node_txn[0]
2842                         } else {
2843                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2844                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2845                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2846                                 &node_txn[2]
2847                         }
2848                 };
2849
2850         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2851         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2852         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2853         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2854         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1);
2855         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2856         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2857         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2858
2859         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2860         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2861         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2862         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2863         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2864         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2865         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2866         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2867         let mut first_claimed = false;
2868         for event in events {
2869                 match event {
2870                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2871                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2872                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2873                                         first_claimed = true;
2874                                 } else {
2875                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2876                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2877                                 }
2878                         },
2879                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2880                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2881                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2882                 }
2883         }
2884         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2885 }
2886
2887 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2888         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2889         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2890         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2891         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2892         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2893         //            \                                  \
2894         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2895
2896         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2897         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2898         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2899         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2900         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2901         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2902         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2903
2904         // Create some intial channels
2905         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2906         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2907
2908         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2909         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2910         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2911
2912         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2913
2914         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2915         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2916         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2917         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2919         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2921
2922         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2923         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2924         match events[0] {
2925                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2926                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2927                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2928                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2929                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2930                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2931                 },
2932                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2933         };
2934         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2935         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2937         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2938         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2939         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2940
2941         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2942         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2943         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2944         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2945         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2946         let timeout_tx;
2947         {
2948                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2949                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2950
2951                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2952                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2953
2954                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2955                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2956                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2957                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2958
2959                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2960                 node_txn.clear();
2961         }
2962
2963         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2964         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2965         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2966
2967         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2968
2969         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2970         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2971         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2972         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2973         match events[0] {
2974                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2975                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2976                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2977                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2978                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2979                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2980                 },
2981                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2982         };
2983
2984         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2985         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2986         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2987
2988         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2989         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2990
2991         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2992         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2993         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2994         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
2995         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2996         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2997         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2998 }
2999
3000 #[test]
3001 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3002         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3003         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3004         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3005 }
3006
3007 #[test]
3008 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3009         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3010         // and fail backward accordingly.
3011
3012         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3013         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3014         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3015         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3016
3017         // Create some initial channels
3018         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3019         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3020
3021         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3022         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3023         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3024         // Revoke the old state
3025         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3026
3027         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3028
3029         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3030         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3031         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3032         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3033         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3034
3035         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3037         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3038         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3039         match events[0] {
3040                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3041                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3042                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3043                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3044                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3045                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3046
3047                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3048                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3049                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3050                 },
3051                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3052         }
3053 }
3054
3055 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3056         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3057         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3058         // commitment transaction anymore.
3059         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3060         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3061         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3062         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3063         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3064         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3065         // transactions:
3066         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3067         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3068         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3069         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3070         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3071         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3072         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3073         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3074         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3075
3076         // Create some initial channels
3077         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3078         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3079
3080         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3081         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3082         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3083         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3084         // Revoke the old state
3085         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3086
3087         let value = if use_dust {
3088                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3089                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3090                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3091                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3092         } else { 3000000 };
3093
3094         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3095         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3096         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3097
3098         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3099         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3101         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3102         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3103         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3104         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3105         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3106         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3107         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3108         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3109         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3110
3111         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3112         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3114         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3115         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3116         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3117         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3118         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3119         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3120         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3121         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3123         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3124         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3125         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3127
3128         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3129         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3130         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3131         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3132         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3133         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3134         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3135         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3136         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3137         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3138         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3139         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3140         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3142         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3143         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3144         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3146
3147         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3148         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3149         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3150         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3151         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3152         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3154
3155         if deliver_bs_raa {
3156                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3157                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3158                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3159                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3160                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3161                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3162                 match events[0] {
3163                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3164                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3165                 };
3166                 match events[1] {
3167                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3168                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3169                 }
3170                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3171                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3172         }
3173
3174         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3175         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3176
3177         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3179         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3180
3181         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3182         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3183         match events[0] {
3184                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3185                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3186         }
3187         match events[1] {
3188                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3189                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3190                 },
3191                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3192         }
3193         match events[2] {
3194                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3195                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3196                 },
3197                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3198         }
3199
3200         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3202
3203         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3204         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3205
3206         if deliver_bs_raa {
3207                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3208                 match nodes_2_event {
3209                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3210                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3211                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3212                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3213                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3214                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3215                         },
3216                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3217                 }
3218         }
3219
3220         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3221         match nodes_2_event {
3222                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3223                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3224                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3225                 },
3226                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3227         }
3228
3229         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3230         match nodes_0_event {
3231                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3232                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3233                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3234                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3235                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3236                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3237
3238                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3239                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3240                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3241
3242                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3243
3244                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3245                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3246                         match events[0] {
3247                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3248                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3249                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3250                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3251                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3252                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3253                                         }
3254                                 },
3255                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3256                         }
3257                         match events[1] {
3258                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3259                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3260                                 },
3261                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3262                         }
3263                         match events[2] {
3264                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3265                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3266                                 },
3267                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3268                         }
3269                         match events[3] {
3270                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3271                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3272                                 },
3273                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3274                         }
3275                         match events[4] {
3276                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3277                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3278                                 },
3279                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3280                         }
3281                         match events[5] {
3282                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3283                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3284                                 },
3285                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3286                         }
3287                 },
3288                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3289         }
3290
3291         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3292         match events[0] {
3293                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3294                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3295         }
3296
3297         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3298         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3299         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3300 }
3301
3302 #[test]
3303 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3304         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3305         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3306         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3307         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3308 }
3309
3310 #[test]
3311 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3312         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3313         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3314         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3315         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3316 }
3317
3318 #[test]
3319 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3320         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3321         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3322         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3323         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3324         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3325
3326         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3327         {
3328                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3329                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3330                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3331
3332                 let payment_event = {
3333                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3334                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3335                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3336                 };
3337                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3338                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3339         }
3340
3341         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3342         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3343         {
3344                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3345                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3346
3347                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3348         }
3349
3350         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3351         {
3352                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3353
3354                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3355                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3356                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3357                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3358                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3359                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3360
3361                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3362                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3363                         channel_id: chan.2,
3364                         htlc_id: 0,
3365                         amount_msat: 0,
3366                         payment_hash,
3367                         cltv_expiry,
3368                         onion_routing_packet,
3369                 };
3370                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3371         }
3372         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3373         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3374         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3375         match events[0] {
3376                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3377                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3378                 },
3379                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3380         }
3381         match events[1] {
3382                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3383                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3384                 },
3385                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3386         }
3387         match events[2] {
3388                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3389                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3390                 },
3391                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3392         }
3393         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3394         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3395 }
3396
3397 #[test]
3398 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3399         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3400         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3401         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3402         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3403         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3404         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3405         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3406                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3407                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3408                 // connect_style.
3409                 return;
3410         }
3411         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3412
3413         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3414         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3415         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3416         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3418         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3419
3420         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3421         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3422         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3423
3424         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3425         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3426         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3428         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3429
3430         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3431         // registering new transactions
3432         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3433 }
3434
3435 #[test]
3436 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3437         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3438         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3439         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3440         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3441         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3442         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3443         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3444
3445         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3446
3447         let mut payment_event = {
3448                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3449                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3450
3451                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3452                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3453                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3454         };
3455
3456         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3457         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3458
3459         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3460
3461         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3462         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3463         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3464         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3465
3466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3467         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3468         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3469         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3470         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3471
3472         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3473         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3474         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3475
3476         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3477         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3479         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3480         let tx = {
3481                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3482                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3483                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3484                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3485                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3486                 node_txn.remove(0)
3487         };
3488
3489         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3490
3491         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3492         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3494         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3495
3496         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3497         {
3498                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3499                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3500         }
3501         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3502         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3503         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3504         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3505         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3506         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3507         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3508
3509         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3510 }
3511
3512 #[test]
3513 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3514         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3515         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3516         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3517         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3518
3519         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3520         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3521         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3522         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3523         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3524
3525         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3526
3527         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3528         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3530         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3531         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3532         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3533
3534         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3535         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3536
3537         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3538         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3539 }
3540
3541 #[test]
3542 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3543         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3544         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3545         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3548         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3549
3550         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3551         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3552         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3553         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3554         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3555         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3556         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3557
3558         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3559         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3560
3561         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3562
3563         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3564         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3565
3566         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3567         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3568         // broadcasted.
3569         {
3570                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3571         }
3572
3573         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3574         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3575         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3576         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3577
3578         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3579         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3580 }
3581
3582 #[test]
3583 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3584         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3585         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3586         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3587         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3588         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3589         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3590         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3591
3592         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3593         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3594         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3595
3596         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3597         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3598         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3599         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3600
3601         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3602         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3603         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3604
3605         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3606         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3607         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3608         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3609
3610         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3611         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3612
3613         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3614         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3615
3616         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3617         {
3618                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3619                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3620                 match events[0] {
3621                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3622                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3623                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3624                         },
3625                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3626                 }
3627                 match events[1] {
3628                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3629                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3630                 }
3631                 match events[2] {
3632                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3633                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3634                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3635                         },
3636                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3637                 }
3638                 match events[3] {
3639                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3640                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3641                         },
3642                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3643                 }
3644         }
3645
3646         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3647         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3648 }
3649
3650 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3651         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3652         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3653         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3654         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3655         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3656
3657         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3658         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3659                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3660                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3661                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3662                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3663                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3664                 chan_id
3665         } else {
3666                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3667         };
3668
3669         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3670
3671         let payment_event = {
3672                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3673                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3674
3675                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3676                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3677                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3678         };
3679         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3680
3681         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3682                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3683         } else {
3684                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3685                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3686                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3687                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3688                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3689
3690                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3691                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3692                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3693                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3694
3695                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3696                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3697                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3698                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3699                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3700
3701                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3702                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3703                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3704                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3705                                         }
3706                                 }
3707                         }
3708                 }
3709         }
3710
3711         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3712         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3713         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3714                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3715                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3716                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3717                         //
3718                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3719                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3720                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3721                         //
3722                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3723                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3724                 }
3725                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3726                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3727                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3728         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3729                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3730                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3731         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3732                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3733                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3734         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3735                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3736                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3737         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3738                 // Everything was delivered...
3739                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3740         }
3741
3742         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3743         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3744                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3745                 match events_1[0] {
3746                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3747                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3748                 };
3749                 match events_1[1] {
3750                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3751                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3752                 };
3753         } else {
3754                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3755                 match events_1[0] {
3756                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3757                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3758                 };
3759         }
3760
3761         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3762         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3763         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3764
3765         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3766
3767         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3768         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3769         match events_2[0] {
3770                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
3771                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3772                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3773                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3774                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3775                         match &purpose {
3776                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3777                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3778                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3779                                 },
3780                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3781                         }
3782                 },
3783                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3784         }
3785
3786         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3787         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3788         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3789
3790         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3791         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3792         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3793                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3794                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3795                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3796                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3797                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3798                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3799                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3800                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3801                 },
3802                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3803         };
3804
3805         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3806                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3807
3808                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3809                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3810                 match events_4[0] {
3811                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3812                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3813                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3814                         },
3815                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3816                 }
3817
3818                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3819                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3820                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3821                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3822
3823                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3824                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3825                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3826                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3827
3828                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3829                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3830                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3831                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3832                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3833
3834                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3835                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3836                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3837                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3838                                         }
3839                                 }
3840                         }
3841                 }
3842         }
3843
3844         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3845         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3846         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3847                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3848                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3849                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3850                 } else {
3851                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3852                 }
3853         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3854                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3855                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3856         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3857                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3858                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3859         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3860                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3861                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3862         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3863                 // Everything was delivered...
3864                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3865         }
3866
3867         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3868                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3869         }
3870         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3871                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3872                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3873         }
3874         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3875
3876         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3877                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3878         }
3879
3880         // Channel should still work fine...
3881         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3882         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3883         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3884 }
3885
3886 #[test]
3887 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3888         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3889         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3890         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3891         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3892 }
3893
3894 #[test]
3895 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3896         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3897         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3898         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3899         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3900 }
3901
3902 #[test]
3903 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3904         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3905         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3906         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3907         // channel_ready immediately instead.
3908         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3909         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3910         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3911         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3912         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3913
3914         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3915
3916         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3917         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3918         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3919         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3920         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3921         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3922
3923         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3924         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3925         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3926 }
3927
3928 #[test]
3929 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3930         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3931         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3932         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3933         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3934         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3935         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3936         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3937
3938         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3939
3940         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3941         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3942         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3944
3945         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3946         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3947         match events_1[0] {
3948                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3949                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3950         }
3951
3952         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3953         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3955
3956         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3957         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3958         match events_2[0] {
3959                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3960                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3961                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3962                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3963                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3964                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3965                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3966
3967                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3968                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3969                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3970                         match events_3[0] {
3971                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3972                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3973                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3974                                 },
3975                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3976                         }
3977
3978                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3979                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3980                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3981                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3982                 },
3983                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3984         }
3985
3986         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3987         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3988
3989         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
3990         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3991         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3992         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
3993         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3994         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3995
3996         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3997         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3998         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3999         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4000
4001         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4002         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4003
4004         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4005         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4006
4007         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4008
4009         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4010         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4011         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4012         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4013         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4014         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4015         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4016         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4017         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4018         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4019
4020         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4021         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4022         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4023         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4024         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4025         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4026         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4027         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4028
4029         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4030         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4031         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4032         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4033         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4034         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4035         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4037
4038         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4039         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4040         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4042
4043         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4044         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4045         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4046         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4047
4048         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4049         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4051
4052         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4053
4054         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4055         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4056         match events_5[0] {
4057                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4058                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4059                         match &purpose {
4060                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4061                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4062                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4063                                 },
4064                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4065                         }
4066                 },
4067                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4068         }
4069
4070         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4071         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4073
4074         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4075         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4076 }
4077
4078 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4079         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4080         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4081         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4082         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4083         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4084         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4085
4086         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4087
4088         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4089                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4090                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4091                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4092                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4093                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4094                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4095                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4096                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4097                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4098                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4099                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4100                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4101                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4102                 our_payment_hash
4103         } else {
4104                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4105         };
4106
4107         let mut block = Block {
4108                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4109                 txdata: vec![],
4110         };
4111         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4112         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4113         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4114         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4115                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4116                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4117                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4118         }
4119
4120         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4121
4122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4123         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4124         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4125         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4126         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4127         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4128
4129         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4130         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4131         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4132         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4133         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4134         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4135 }
4136
4137 #[test]
4138 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4139         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4140         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4141 }
4142
4143 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4144         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4145         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4146         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4147         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4148         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4149         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4150         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4151
4152         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4153         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4154         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4155         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4156
4157         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4158         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4159         {
4160                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4161         }
4162         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4164
4165         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4166         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4167         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4168         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4169         if forwarded_htlc {
4170                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4171                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4172                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4173                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4174                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4175         }
4176         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4177
4178         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4179         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4180         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4181         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4182
4183         if forwarded_htlc {
4184                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4185                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4186                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4187                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4188                 match fail_commit[0] {
4189                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4190                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4191                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4192                         },
4193                         _ => unreachable!(),
4194                 }
4195                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4196         } else {
4197                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4198         }
4199 }
4200
4201 #[test]
4202 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4203         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4204         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4205 }
4206
4207 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4208         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4209                 {
4210                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4211                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4212                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4213                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4214                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4215                                 match event {
4216                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4217                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4218                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4219                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4220                                                 }
4221                                         },
4222                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4223                                 };
4224                         }
4225                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4226                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4227                                         txn.push(tx);
4228                                 }
4229                         }
4230                         txn
4231                 }
4232         }
4233 }
4234
4235 #[test]
4236 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4237         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4238         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4239         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4240         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4241         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4242
4243         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4244         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4245         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4247         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4248         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4249         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4250         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4251         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4252
4253         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4254         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4255
4256         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4257         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4258         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4259         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4260         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4261 }
4262
4263 #[test]
4264 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4265         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4266         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4267         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4268         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4269         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4270         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4271
4272         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4273         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4274         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4275         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4276         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4277
4278         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4279         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4280         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4281         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4282
4283         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4284         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4285         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4286         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4287         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4288
4289         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4290         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4291         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4292 }
4293
4294 #[test]
4295 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4296         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4297         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4298
4299         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4300         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4301         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4302         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4303
4304         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4305         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4306         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4307         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4308         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4309
4310         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4311         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4312         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4313         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4314         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4315
4316         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4317         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4318         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4319
4320         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4321         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4322         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4323         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4324         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4325 }
4326
4327 #[test]
4328 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4329         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4330         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4332         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4333
4334         // Create some initial channels
4335         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4336
4337         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4338
4339         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4340         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4341         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4342
4343         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4344         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4345         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4346         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4347         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4348         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4349         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4350         match events[0] {
4351                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4352                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4353         }
4354         match events[1] {
4355                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4356                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4357         }
4358
4359         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4360         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4361         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4362         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4363         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4364
4365         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4366         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4367         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4368
4369         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4370         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4371         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4372 }
4373
4374 #[test]
4375 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4376         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4377         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4378         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4379         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4380
4381         // Create some initial channels
4382         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4383
4384         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4385         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4386
4387         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4388
4389         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4390         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4391         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4392
4393         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4394         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4395         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4396         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4397         match events[0] {
4398                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4399                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4400         }
4401         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4402
4403         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4404         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4405         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4406         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4407         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4408
4409         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4410         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4411         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4412         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4413
4414         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4415         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4416         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4417         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4418         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4419 }
4420
4421 #[test]
4422 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4423         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4424         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4425         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4426         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4427
4428         // Create some initial channels
4429         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4430
4431         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4432         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4433         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4434         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4435
4436         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4437
4438         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4439         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4440         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4441         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4442
4443         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4444         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4445         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4446         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4447
4448         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4449         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4450
4451         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4452         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4453         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4454 }
4455
4456 #[test]
4457 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4458         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4459         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4460         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4461         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4462         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4463
4464         // Create some initial channels
4465         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4466
4467         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4468         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4469         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4470         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4471
4472         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4473
4474         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4475         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4476         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4477         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4478         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4479         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4480
4481         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4482         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4483         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4484         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4485         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4486         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4487
4488         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4489         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4490         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4491         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4493         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4494
4495         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4496         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4497         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4498         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4499         // transactions next...
4500         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4501         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4502
4503         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4504         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4505         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4506                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4507         } else {
4508                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4509                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4510         }
4511
4512         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4513         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4514
4515         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4516         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4517         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4518         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4519         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4520 }
4521
4522 #[test]
4523 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4524         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4525         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4526         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4527         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4528         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4529
4530         // Create some initial channels
4531         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4532
4533         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4534         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4535         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4536         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4537
4538         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4539         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4540
4541         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4542
4543         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4544         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4545         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4546         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4547         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4548         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4549
4550         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4551         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4552         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4553         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4554
4555         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4556         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4557         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4558
4559         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4560         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4561         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4562         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4563         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4564         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4565
4566         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4567         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4568
4569         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4570         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4571         // transactions next...
4572         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4573         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4574         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4575                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4576         } else {
4577                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4578                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4579         }
4580
4581         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4582         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4583
4584         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4585         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4586
4587         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4588         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4589
4590         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4591         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4592         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4593         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4594         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4595         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4596         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4597         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4598 }
4599
4600 #[test]
4601 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4602         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4603         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4604         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4605         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4606         // channel.
4607         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4608         // gets broadcast.
4609
4610         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4611         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4612         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4613         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4614
4615         // Create some initial channels
4616         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4617         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4618
4619         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4620         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4621         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4622         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4623         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4624
4625         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4626         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4627         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4628
4629         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4630         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4631         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4632         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4633         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4634         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4635         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4636         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4637         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4638         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4639         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4640
4641         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4642         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4643         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4644         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4645
4646         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4647         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4648         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4649         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4650         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4651         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4652
4653         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4654         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4655         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]});
4656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4657         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4658         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4659         match events[0] {
4660                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4661                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4662         }
4663         match events[1] {
4664                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4665                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4666                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4667                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4668                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4669                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4670                 },
4671                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4672         }
4673         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4674         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4675         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4676         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4677         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4678
4679         match nodes_2_event {
4680                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4681                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4682         }
4683
4684         match nodes_0_event {
4685                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4686                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4687                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4688                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4689                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4690                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4691                 },
4692                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4693         };
4694
4695         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4696         match msg_events[0] {
4697                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4698                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4699         }
4700
4701         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4702         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4703         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4704         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4705         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4706         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4707         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4708         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4709         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4710         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4711         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1); // Success tx
4712
4713         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4714         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4715 }
4716
4717 #[test]
4718 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4719         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4720         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4721         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4722         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4723         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4724         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4725         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4726         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4727         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4728         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4729         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4730                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4731         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4732
4733         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4734         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4735         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4736
4737         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4738         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4739         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4740         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4741         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4742
4743         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4744
4745         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4746         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4747         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4748         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4749         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4750                 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
4751         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4752         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4753
4754         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4755         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4756         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4757
4758         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4759         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4760         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4761         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4762         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4763
4764         let htlc_timeout_tx;
4765         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4766                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4767                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4768                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4769
4770                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4771                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4772                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4773
4774                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4775                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4776                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4777                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4778                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4779
4780                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4781                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4782                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4783                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4784                 } else {
4785                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4786                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4787                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4788                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4789                 }
4790
4791                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4792                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4793                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4794                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4795                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4796                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4797                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4798                 } else {
4799                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4800                 }
4801         }
4802
4803         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4804         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4805
4806         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4808         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4809         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4810         match events[0] {
4811                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4812                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4813         }
4814         match events[1] {
4815                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4816                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4817         }
4818         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4819         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4820         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4821         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4822         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4823         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4824         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4825         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4826         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4827         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4828
4829         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4830         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4831         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4832         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4833         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4834         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4835         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4836         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4837         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4839
4840         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4841         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4842         {
4843                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4844         }
4845         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4846
4847         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4848         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4849         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4850         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4851         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4852         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4853         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4854         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4855         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4856         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4857
4858         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4859         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4860
4861         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4862         match events[0] {
4863                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4864                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4865                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4866                 }
4867                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4868         }
4869 }
4870
4871 #[test]
4872 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4873         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4874         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4875         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4876         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4877
4878         // Create some initial channels
4879         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4880
4881         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4882         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4883         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4884         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4885         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4886
4887         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4888         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4889         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4891
4892         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4894         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4895         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4896         match events[0] {
4897                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4898                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4899         }
4900         match events[1] {
4901                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4902                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4903         }
4904         let node_tx = {
4905                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4906                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4907                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4908                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4909                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4910                 node_txn[0].clone()
4911         };
4912
4913         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4914         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4915
4916         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4917         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4918         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4919         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4920         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4921         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4922 }
4923
4924 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4925         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4926         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4927         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4928         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4929         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4930         // use the same payment hashes.
4931         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4932         //
4933         // A \         / E
4934         //    - C - D -
4935         // B /         \ F
4936         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4937         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4938         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4939         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4940         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4941         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4942         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4943         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4944                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4945         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4946
4947         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4948         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4949         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4950         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4951         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4952
4953         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4954         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4955         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4956         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4957
4958         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4959                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4960         // 0th HTLC:
4961         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4962         // 1st HTLC:
4963         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4964         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4965         // 2nd HTLC:
4966         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4967         // 3rd HTLC:
4968         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4969         // 4th HTLC:
4970         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4971         // 5th HTLC:
4972         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4973         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4974         // 6th HTLC:
4975         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4976         // 7th HTLC:
4977         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4978
4979         // 8th HTLC:
4980         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4981         // 9th HTLC:
4982         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4983         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4984
4985         // 10th HTLC:
4986         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4987         // 11th HTLC:
4988         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4989         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4990
4991         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4992         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4993         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4994         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4995         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4996
4997         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4998         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4999         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5000         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5001         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5002         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5004
5005         let failed_destinations = vec![
5006                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5007                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5008                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5009                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5010         ];
5011         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5012         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5013
5014         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5015         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5016         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5017         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5018         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5019         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5020
5021         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5022         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5023         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5025
5026         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5027                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5028                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5029         ];
5030         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5031         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5032
5033         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5034         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5035         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5036         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5037
5038         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5039
5040         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5041         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5042                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5043                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5044                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5045                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5046                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5047                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5048         ];
5049         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5051         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5052         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5053         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5054         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5055         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5056         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5057         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5058         if deliver_last_raa {
5059                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5060         } else {
5061                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5062         }
5063
5064         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5065         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5066         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5067         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5068         //
5069         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5070         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5071         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5072         //
5073         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5074         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5075         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5076
5077         if announce_latest {
5078                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5079         } else {
5080                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5081         }
5082         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5083         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5084                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5085                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5086         } else {
5087                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5088                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5089         };
5090         match close_event {
5091                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5092                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5093         }
5094
5095         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5096         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5097         if deliver_last_raa {
5098                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5099
5100                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5101                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5102         } else {
5103                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5104                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5105                 } else {
5106                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5107                 };
5108
5109                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5110         }
5111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5112
5113         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5114         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5115         let mut a_done = false;
5116         for msg in cs_msgs {
5117                 match msg {
5118                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5119                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5120                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5121                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5122                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5123                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5124                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5125                                         }
5126                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5127                                         assert!(!a_done);
5128                                         a_done = true;
5129                                         &nodes[0]
5130                                 } else {
5131                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5132                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5133                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5134                                         }
5135                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5136                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5137                                         &nodes[1]
5138                                 };
5139                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5140                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5141                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5142                                 if announce_latest {
5143                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5144                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5145                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5146                                         }
5147                                 }
5148                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5149                         },
5150                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5151                 }
5152         }
5153
5154         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5155         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5156         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5157         let mut as_updates = 0;
5158         for event in as_events.iter() {
5159                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5160                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5161                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5162                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5163                         } else {
5164                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5165                         }
5166                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5167                                 as_updates += 1;
5168                         }
5169                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5170                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5171         }
5172         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5173         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5174         if announce_latest {
5175                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5176                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5177         }
5178         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5179
5180         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5181         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5182         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5183         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5184         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5185                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5186                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5187                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5188                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5189                         } else {
5190                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5191                         }
5192                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5193                                 bs_updates += 1;
5194                         }
5195                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5196                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5197         }
5198         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5199         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5200         if announce_latest {
5201                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5202         }
5203         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5204
5205         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5206         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5207         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5208         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5209         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5210         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5211 }
5212
5213 #[test]
5214 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5215         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5216 }
5217
5218 #[test]
5219 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5220         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5221 }
5222
5223 #[test]
5224 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5225         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5226         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5227         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5228 }
5229
5230 #[test]
5231 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5232         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5233         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5234         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5235         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5236
5237         // Create some initial channels
5238         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5239
5240         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5241         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5242         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5243         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5244
5245         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5246         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5247         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5249         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5250         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5251
5252         let htlc_timeout = {
5253                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5254                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5255                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5256                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5257                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5258                 node_txn[0].clone()
5259         };
5260
5261         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5262         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5263         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5264
5265         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5266         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5267         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5268         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5269         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5270         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5271         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5272         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5273         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5274         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5275                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5276 }
5277
5278 #[test]
5279 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5280         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5281         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5282         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5283         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5284
5285         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5286
5287         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5288         let seed = [42; 32];
5289         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5290         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5291         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5292         let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5293         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5294         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5295         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5296         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5297         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5298
5299         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5300         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5301
5302         // Create some initial channels
5303         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5304         // for node 0
5305         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5306         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5307         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5308
5309         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5310         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5311         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5312         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5313         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5314
5315         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5316         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5317         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5318         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5319         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5320
5321         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5322         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5323         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5324         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5325             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5326             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5327             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5328                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5329         }
5330
5331         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5332         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5333         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5334         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5335         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5336         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5337
5338         let htlc_timeout = {
5339                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5340                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5341                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5342                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5343                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5344                 node_txn[0].clone()
5345         };
5346
5347         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5348         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5349         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5350
5351         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5352         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5353         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5354         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5355         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5356         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5357         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5358         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5359         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5360         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5361         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5362                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5363 }
5364
5365 #[test]
5366 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5367         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5368         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5369         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5370         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5371
5372         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5373
5374         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5375         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5376
5377         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5378         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5379         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5380
5381         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5382         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5383         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5384
5385         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5386         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5387         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5388
5389         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5390         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5391         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5392 }
5393
5394 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5395         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5396         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5397         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5398         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5399         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5400
5401         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5402
5403         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5404         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5405         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5407         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5408
5409         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5410         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5411         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5412
5413         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5415         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5416         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5418
5419         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5420         let mut block = Block {
5421                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5422                 txdata: vec![],
5423         };
5424         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5425                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5426                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5427         }
5428         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5429         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5431         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5432 }
5433
5434 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5435         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5436         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5437         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5438         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5439         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5440
5441         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5442         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5443         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5444
5445         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5446
5447         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5448         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5449         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5450
5451         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5452         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5453
5454         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5455                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5456                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5457         }
5458         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5459         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5460         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5461         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5462 }
5463
5464 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5465         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5466         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5467         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5468         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5469         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5470
5471         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5472         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5473         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5474         // actually revoked.
5475         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5476         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5477         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5478         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5480
5481         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5482         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5483         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5485         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5486         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5488         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5489         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5490         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5491
5492         if check_revoke_no_close {
5493                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5494                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5495         }
5496
5497         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5498         let mut block = Block {
5499                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5500                 txdata: vec![],
5501         };
5502         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5503                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5504                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5505         }
5506         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5507                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5508                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5509                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5510                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5511         } else {
5512                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5513         }
5514 }
5515
5516 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5517 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5518 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5519 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5520 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5521 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5522 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5523 // non-dust HTLCs.
5524 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5525 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5526 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5527 #[test]
5528 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5529         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5530         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5531
5532         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5533         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5534 }
5535
5536 #[test]
5537 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5538         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5539         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5540         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5541         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5542 }
5543
5544 #[test]
5545 #[should_panic]
5546 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5547         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5548         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5549         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5550         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5551         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5552         for node in nodes.iter() {
5553                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5554         }
5555
5556         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5557         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5558         let push_msat=10001;
5559         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5560         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5561         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5562         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5563
5564         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5565         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5566         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5567 }
5568
5569 #[test]
5570 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5571         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5572         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5573         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5574         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5575
5576         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5577         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5578         let push_msat=10001;
5579         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5580
5581         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5582         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5583         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5584         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5585         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5586
5587         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5588         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5589         let push_msat=10001;
5590         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5591         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5592         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5593
5594         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5595         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5596         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5597
5598         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5599         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5600         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5601
5602         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5603         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5604         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5605
5606         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5607         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5608         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5609         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5610         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5611         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5612 }
5613
5614 #[test]
5615 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5616         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5617         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5618         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5619         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5620
5621         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5622         let push_msat=10001;
5623         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5624         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5625         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5626         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5627
5628         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5629         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5630         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5631                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5632                         msg.clone()
5633                 },
5634                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5635         };
5636         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5637 }
5638
5639 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5640 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5641 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5642 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5643 #[test]
5644 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5645         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5646         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5647         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5648         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5649         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5650
5651         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5652         // pending_update_fee.
5653         {
5654                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5655                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5656         }
5657         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5659
5660         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5661         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5662         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5663                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5664                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5665                 },
5666                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5667         };
5668
5669         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5670
5671         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5672         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5673         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5674         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5675
5676         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5677         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5678         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5679
5680         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5681         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5682         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5683         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5684
5685         // Flush the pending fee update.
5686         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5687         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5688         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5689         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5690         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5691
5692         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5693         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5694         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5695         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5696         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5697         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5698         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5699                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5700         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5701
5702         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5703         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5704         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5705         match &events[0] {
5706                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5707                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5708                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5709                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5710                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5711                 },
5712                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5713         }
5714         match &events[1] {
5715                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5716                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5717                 },
5718                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5719         }
5720 }
5721
5722 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5723 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5724 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5725 #[test]
5726 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5727         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5728         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5729         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5730         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5731         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5732
5733         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5734         // pending_update_fee.
5735         {
5736                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5737                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5738         }
5739         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5740         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5741
5742         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5743         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5744         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5745                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5746                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5747                 },
5748                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5749         };
5750
5751         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5752
5753         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5754         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5755         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5756         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5757
5758         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5759         let amt_1 = 20000;
5760         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5761         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5762         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5763
5764         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5765         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5766         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5767         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5768         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5769         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5770         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5771         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5772
5773         // Flush the pending fee update.
5774         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5775         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5776         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5777         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5778         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5780
5781         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5782         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5783         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5784         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5785         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5786         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5787         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5788                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5789         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5790
5791         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5792         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5793         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5794         match &events[0] {
5795                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5796                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5797                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5798                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5799                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5800                 },
5801                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5802         }
5803         match &events[1] {
5804                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5805                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5806                 },
5807                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5808         }
5809
5810         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5811         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5812                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5813                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5814                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5815         };
5816         let raa = match send_raa_event {
5817                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5818                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5819         };
5820         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5822         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5823         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5824         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5825         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5826         match events[0] {
5827                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5828                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5829         }
5830         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5831         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5832         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5833         match events[0] {
5834                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5835                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5836         }
5837         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5839         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5840
5841         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5842         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5843         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5844         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5845 }
5846
5847 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5848 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5849 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5850 // once it's freed.
5851 #[test]
5852 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5853         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5854         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5855         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5856         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5857         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5858         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5859         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5860         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5861         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5862         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5863
5864         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5865         // pending_update_fee.
5866         {
5867                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5868                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5869         }
5870         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5871         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5872
5873         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5874         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5875         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5876                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5877                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5878                 },
5879                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5880         };
5881
5882         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5883
5884         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5885         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5886         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5887         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5888
5889         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5890         let feemsat = 239;
5891         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5892         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5893         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5894         let payment_event = {
5895                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5896                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5897
5898                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5899                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5900
5901                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5902         };
5903         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5905         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5906         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5907
5908         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5909         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5910
5911         // Flush the pending fee update.
5912         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5913         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5915         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5916         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5918
5919         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5920         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5921         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5922
5923         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5924                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5925                         msg.clone()
5926                 },
5927                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5928         };
5929
5930         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5932         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5933
5934         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5935         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5936         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5937         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5938                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5939                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5940         }
5941
5942         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5943         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5944         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5945
5946         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5947         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5948         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5949         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5950                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5951                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5952                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5953                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5954                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5955                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5956                 },
5957                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5958         };
5959
5960         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5961         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5962         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5963
5964         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5965         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5966         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5967         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5968         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5970         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5971         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5972         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5973                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5974                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5975         };
5976         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5977         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5978         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5979 }
5980
5981 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5982 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5983 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5984
5985 #[test]
5986 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5987         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5988         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5989         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5990         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5991         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5992         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5993
5994         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5995         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5996
5997         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5998                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5999         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6000         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", 1);
6001 }
6002
6003 #[test]
6004 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6005         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6006         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6007         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6008         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6009         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6010         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6011
6012         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6013         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6014         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6015                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6016
6017         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6018         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6019 }
6020
6021 #[test]
6022 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6023         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6024         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6025         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6026         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6027         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6028         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6029
6030         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6031         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6032         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6033         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6034         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6035
6036         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6037         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6038         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6040         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6041 }
6042
6043 #[test]
6044 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6045         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6046         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6047         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6048         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6049         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6050         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6051         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6052
6053         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6054                 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6055         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6056         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6057         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6058                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6059 }
6060
6061 #[test]
6062 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6063         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6064         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6065         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6066         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6067         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6068         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6069         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6070         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6071         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6072                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6073
6074         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6075                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6076                 let payment_event = {
6077                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6078                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6079
6080                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6081                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6082                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6083                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6084                         } else {
6085                                 assert!(false);
6086                         }
6087                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6088                 };
6089                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6090                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6091                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6092
6093                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6094                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6095         }
6096         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6097         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6098                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6099
6100         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6101         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
6102 }
6103
6104 #[test]
6105 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6106         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6107         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6108         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6109         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6110         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6111         let channel_value = 100000;
6112         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6113         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6114
6115         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6116
6117         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6118         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6119         // limits us to.
6120         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6121         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6122                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6123
6124         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6125         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
6126
6127         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6128 }
6129
6130 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6131 #[test]
6132 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6133         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6134         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6135         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6136         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6137         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6138         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6139         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6140         {
6141                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6142                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6143                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6144                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6145         }
6146
6147         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6148         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6150         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6151         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6152         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6153         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6154         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6155         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6157         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6158 }
6159
6160 #[test]
6161 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6162         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6163         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6164         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6165         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6166         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6167         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6168
6169         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6170         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6171         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6172         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6173         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6174         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6175
6176         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6177         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6178         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6180         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6181
6182         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6183         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6184         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6185         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6186         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6187
6188         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6189         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6190         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6192         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6193 }
6194
6195 #[test]
6196 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6197         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6198         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6199         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6200         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6201         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6202         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6203         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6204
6205         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6206         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6207         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6208         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6209         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6210         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6211
6212         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6213                 channel_id: chan.2,
6214                 htlc_id: 0,
6215                 amount_msat: 1000,
6216                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6217                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6218                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6219         };
6220
6221         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6222                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6223                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6224         }
6225         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6226         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6227
6228         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6229         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6230         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6231         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6232         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6233 }
6234
6235 #[test]
6236 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6237         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6238         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6239         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6240         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6241         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6242         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6243
6244         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6245         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6247         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6248         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6249         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6250
6251         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6252         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6253         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6255         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6256 }
6257
6258 #[test]
6259 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6260         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6261         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6262         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6263         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6264         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6265
6266         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6267         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6268         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6269         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6270         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6271         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6272         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6273
6274         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6275         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6276         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6278         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6279 }
6280
6281 #[test]
6282 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6283         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6284         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6285         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6286         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6287         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6288         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6289         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6290
6291         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6292         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6293         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6295         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6296         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6297
6298         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6299         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6300         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6301         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
6302         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6303         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6304         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
6305         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6306         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6307         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6308         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6309         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6310         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6311
6312         //Resend HTLC
6313         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6314         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6315         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6317         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6318
6319         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6320
6321         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6322         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6323         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6324         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6325         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6326 }
6327
6328 #[test]
6329 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6330         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6331
6332         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6333         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6334         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6335         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6336         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6337         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6338         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6339
6340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6341         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6342         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6343
6344         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6345                 channel_id: chan.2,
6346                 htlc_id: 0,
6347                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6348         };
6349
6350         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6351
6352         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6353         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6354         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6355         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6356         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6357 }
6358
6359 #[test]
6360 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6361         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6362
6363         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6364         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6365         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6366         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6367         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6368
6369         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6370         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6372         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6373         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6374
6375         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6376                 channel_id: chan.2,
6377                 htlc_id: 0,
6378                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6379         };
6380
6381         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6382
6383         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6384         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6385         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6386         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6387         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6388 }
6389
6390 #[test]
6391 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6392         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6393
6394         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6395         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6396         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6397         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6398         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6399
6400         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6401         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6402         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6403         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6404         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6405         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6406                 channel_id: chan.2,
6407                 htlc_id: 0,
6408                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6409                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6410         };
6411
6412         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6413
6414         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6415         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6416         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6418         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6419 }
6420
6421 #[test]
6422 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6423         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6424
6425         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6426         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6427         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6428         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6429         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6430
6431         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6432
6433         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6434         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6435         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6436
6437         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6438         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6439         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6440                 match events[0] {
6441                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6442                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6443                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6444                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6445                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6446                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6447                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6448                         },
6449                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6450                 }
6451         };
6452
6453         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6454
6455         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6456
6457         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6458         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6459         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6460         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6461         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6462 }
6463
6464 #[test]
6465 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6466         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6467
6468         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6469         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6470         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6471         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6472         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6473
6474         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6475
6476         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6477         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6478         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6479
6480         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6481         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6482         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6483                 match events[0] {
6484                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6485                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6486                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6487                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6488                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6489                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6490                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6491                         },
6492                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6493                 }
6494         };
6495
6496         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6497
6498         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6499
6500         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6501         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6502         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6503         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6504         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6505 }
6506
6507 #[test]
6508 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6509         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6510
6511         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6512         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6513         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6514         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6515         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6516
6517         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6518         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6519         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6520
6521         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6522         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6523
6524         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6525         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6526         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6527
6528         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6529
6530         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6531                 match events[0] {
6532                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6533                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6534                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6535                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6536                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6537                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6538                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6539                         },
6540                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6541                 }
6542         };
6543         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6544         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6545
6546         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6547         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6548         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6549         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6550         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6551 }
6552
6553 #[test]
6554 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6555         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6556         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6557
6558         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6559         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6560         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6561         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6562         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6563         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6564
6565         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6566
6567         //First hop
6568         let mut payment_event = {
6569                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6570                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6571                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6572                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6573                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6574         };
6575         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6576         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6577         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6578         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6579         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6580         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6581         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6582         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6583         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6584
6585         //Second Hop
6586         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6587         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6588         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6589         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6590
6591         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6592         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6593         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6594                 match events_3[0] {
6595                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6596                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6597                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6598                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6599                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6600                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6601                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6602                         },
6603                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6604                 }
6605         };
6606
6607         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6608
6609         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6610         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6611         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6612         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6613         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6614
6615         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6616         match events_4[0] {
6617                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6618                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6619                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6620                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6621                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6622                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6623                 },
6624                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6625         };
6626
6627         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6628 }
6629
6630 #[test]
6631 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6632         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6633         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6634         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6635         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6636         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6637         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6638
6639         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6640
6641         // First hop
6642         let mut payment_event = {
6643                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6644                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6645                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6646         };
6647
6648         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6649         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6650         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6652         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6653         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6654
6655         // Second Hop
6656         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6657         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6659         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6660
6661         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6662         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6663         match events_3[0] {
6664                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6665                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6666                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6667                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6668
6669                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6670                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6671                 },
6672                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6673         }
6674
6675         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6676                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6677                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6678         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6679         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6680         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6681
6682         match events_4[0] {
6683                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6684                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6685                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6686                 },
6687                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6688         }
6689
6690         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6691         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6692
6693         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6694         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6695         match events_5[0] {
6696                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6697                 } => {
6698                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6699                         assert!(is_permanent);
6700                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6701                 },
6702                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6703         }
6704         match events_5[1] {
6705                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6706                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6707                 },
6708                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6709         }
6710
6711         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6712 }
6713
6714 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6715         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6716         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6717         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6718
6719         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6720         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6721         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6722         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6723         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6724         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6725
6726         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6727                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6728
6729         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6730         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6731         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6732         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6733
6734         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6735         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6736
6737         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6738         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6739         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6740         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6741         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6742
6743         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6744         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6745         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6747
6748         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6749         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6750
6751         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6752         match events[0] {
6753                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6754                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6755                 },
6756                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6757         }
6758         match events[1] {
6759                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6760                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6761                 },
6762                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6763         }
6764
6765         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6766         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6767         if announce_latest {
6768                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6769         } else {
6770                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6771         }
6772
6773         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6774         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6775         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6776
6777         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6778         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6779         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6780         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6781         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6782         let mut first_failed = false;
6783         for event in events {
6784                 match event {
6785                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6786                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6787                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6788                                         first_failed = true;
6789                                 } else {
6790                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6791                                 }
6792                         },
6793                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6794                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6795                 }
6796         }
6797 }
6798
6799 #[test]
6800 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6801         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6802         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6803 }
6804
6805 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6806         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6807         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6808         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6809         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6810         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6811         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6812
6813         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6814         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6815         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6816         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6817         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6818
6819         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6820                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6821
6822         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6823         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6824
6825         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6826         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6827
6828         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6829         if revoked {
6830                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6831                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6832         }
6833
6834         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6835         if local {
6836                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6837                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6838                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6839                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6840                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6841
6842                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6843                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6844                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6845                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6846                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6847                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6848                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6849                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6850                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6851                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6852                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6853         } else {
6854                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6855                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6856                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6857                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6858                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6859                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6860
6861                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6862                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6863                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6864                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6865                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6866                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6867                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6868
6869                 if !revoked {
6870                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6871                 } else {
6872                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 12);
6873                 }
6874                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6875                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6876                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6877                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6878                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6879         }
6880 }
6881
6882 #[test]
6883 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6884         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6885         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6886         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6887 }
6888
6889 #[test]
6890 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6891         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6892
6893         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6894         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6895         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6896         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6897         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6898         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6899         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6900         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6901         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6902
6903         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6904         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6905                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6906                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6907         {
6908                 match error {
6909                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6910                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6911                 }
6912         } else { assert!(false) }
6913
6914         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6915         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6916         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6917         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6918         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6919                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6920                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6921         {
6922                 match error {
6923                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
6924                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6925                 }
6926         } else { assert!(false); }
6927
6928         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6929         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6930         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6931         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6932         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6933         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6934         let reason_msg;
6935         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6936                 match action {
6937                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6938                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6939                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6940                         },
6941                         _ => { panic!(); }
6942                 }
6943         } else { panic!(); }
6944         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6945
6946         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6947         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6948         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6949         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6950         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6951                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6952                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6953         {
6954                 match error {
6955                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6956                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6957                 }
6958         } else { assert!(false); }
6959 }
6960
6961 #[test]
6962 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6963         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6964         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6965         // to B, B should refuse payment.
6966
6967         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6968         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6969         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6970         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6971
6972         // Create some initial channels
6973         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6974
6975         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
6976         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6977         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6978         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6979         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6980         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
6981         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6983
6984         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6985         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6986         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6987         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6988         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6989
6990         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6991         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6992         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6993         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6994
6995         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6996         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6997         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6998
6999         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7000         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7001         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7002                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7003                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7004                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7005                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7006                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7007                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7008                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7009                 },
7010                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7011         };
7012         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7013
7014         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7015         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7016
7017         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7018         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7019         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7020         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7021 }
7022
7023 #[test]
7024 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7025         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7026         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7027
7028         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7029         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7030         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7031         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7032
7033         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7034         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7035         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7036
7037         // Disconnect peers
7038         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7039         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7040
7041         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7042         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7043         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7044         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7045         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7046         for e in msg_events {
7047                 match e {
7048                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7049                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7050                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7051                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7052                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7053                                 }
7054                         },
7055                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7056                 }
7057         }
7058         // Reconnect peers
7059         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
7060         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7061         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7062         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
7063         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7064         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7065
7066         // Reestablish chan_1
7067         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7068         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7069         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7070         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7071         // Reestablish chan_2
7072         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7073         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7074         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7075         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7076         // Reestablish chan_3
7077         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7078         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7079         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7080         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7081
7082         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7083         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7084         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7085         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7086         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7087         for e in msg_events {
7088                 match e {
7089                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7090                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7091                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7092                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7093                                         // the old one.
7094                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7095                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7096                                 }
7097                         },
7098                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7099                 }
7100         }
7101         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7102         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7103 }
7104
7105 #[test]
7106 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7107         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7108         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7109
7110         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7111         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7112         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7113         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7114
7115         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7116
7117         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7118         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7119                 .with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7120         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7121         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7122
7123         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7124         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7125         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7126         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7127         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7128         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7129
7130         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7131         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7132                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7133                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7134                 }
7135         }
7136
7137         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7138         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7139
7140         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7141         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7142         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7143         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7145
7146         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7147         let penalty_1;
7148         let feerate_1;
7149         {
7150                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7151                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7152                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7153                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7154                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7155                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7156                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7157                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7158                 node_txn.clear();
7159         };
7160
7161         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7162         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7163         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7164         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7165         {
7166                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7167                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7168                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7169                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7170                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7171                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7172                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7173                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7174                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7175                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7176                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7177                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7178                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7179                         node_txn.clear();
7180                 }
7181         }
7182         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7183
7184         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7185         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7186         let penalty_3;
7187         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7188         {
7189                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7190                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7191                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7192                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7193                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7194                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7195                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7196                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7197                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7198                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7199                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7200                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7201                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7202                         node_txn.clear();
7203                 }
7204         }
7205         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7206
7207         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7208         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7209 }
7210
7211 #[test]
7212 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7213         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7214         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7215
7216         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7217         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7218         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7219         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7220         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7221
7222         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7223         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7224         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
7225         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7226         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7227         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7228                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7229         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7230         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7231         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7232                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7233         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7234
7235         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7236         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7237         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7238
7239         // Revoke local commitment tx
7240         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7241
7242         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7243         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7244         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7245         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7247         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7248         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7249
7250         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7251         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7252
7253         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7254         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7255         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7256
7257         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7258         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7259         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7260         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7261
7262         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7263         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7264         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7265         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7266         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7267         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
7268         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7269         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7270         match events.last().unwrap() {
7271                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7272                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7273         }
7274         let first;
7275         let feerate_1;
7276         let penalty_txn;
7277         {
7278                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7279                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7280                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7281
7282                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7283                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7284                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7285                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7286                 // future).
7287                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7288                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7289                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7290                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7291                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7292                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7293
7294                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7295                 // available, which we check here:
7296                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7297                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7298                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7299
7300                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7301                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7302
7303                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7304                 // output, checked above).
7305                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7306                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7307                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7308
7309                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7310                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7311                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7312                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7313                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7314                 node_txn.clear();
7315         }
7316
7317         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7318         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7319         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7320         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7321         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7322
7323         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7324         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7325         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7326         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7327         let node_txn = {
7328                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7329                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7330
7331                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7332                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7333                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7334                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7335                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7336                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7337                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7338                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7339                 node_txn.clear();
7340                 txn
7341         };
7342         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7343         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7344         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7345         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7346         {
7347                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7348                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7349                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7350                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7351                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7352                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7353                 // up bumped justice generation.
7354                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7355                 node_txn.clear();
7356         }
7357         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7358         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7359 }
7360
7361 #[test]
7362 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7363         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7364         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7365
7366         // Create 2 HTLCs
7367         // Provide preimage for one
7368         // Check aggregation
7369
7370         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7371         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7372         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7373         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7374
7375         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7376         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7377         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7378
7379         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7380         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7381         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7382         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7383         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7384
7385         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7386         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7387         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7388         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7390         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7391
7392         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7393         let timeout;
7394         let preimage;
7395         let preimage_bump;
7396         let feerate_timeout;
7397         let feerate_preimage;
7398         {
7399                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7400                 // 3 transactions including:
7401                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7402                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7403                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7404                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7405                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7406                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7407                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7408                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7409
7410                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7411                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7412                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7413                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7414
7415                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7416                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7417                 } else {
7418                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7419                 };
7420
7421                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7422                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7423                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7424
7425                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7426                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7427                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7428                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7429
7430                 node_txn.clear();
7431         };
7432         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7433         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7434
7435         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7436         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7437         {
7438                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7439                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7440                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7441                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7442                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7443                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7444
7445                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7446                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7447                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7448                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7449                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7450
7451                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7452                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7453                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7454                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7455                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7456
7457                 node_txn.clear();
7458         }
7459
7460         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7461         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7462 }
7463
7464 #[test]
7465 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7466         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7467         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7468         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7469         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7470         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7471         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7472         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7473         // implement that).
7474         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7475         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7476         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7477         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7478         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7479
7480         let per_commitment_secret;
7481         let next_per_commitment_point;
7482         {
7483                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7484                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7485                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7486
7487                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7488
7489                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7490                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7491                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7492
7493                 // Must revoke without gaps
7494                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7495                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7496
7497                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7498                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7499                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7500         }
7501
7502         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7503                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7504                         channel_id,
7505                         per_commitment_secret,
7506                         next_per_commitment_point,
7507                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7508                         next_local_nonce: None,
7509                 });
7510         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7511         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7512         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7513 }
7514
7515 #[test]
7516 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7517         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7518         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7519
7520         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7521         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7522         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7523         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7524
7525         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7526         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7527         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7528         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7529
7530         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7531         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7532         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7533
7534         // Revoke local commitment tx
7535         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7536
7537         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7538         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7539         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7540         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7541
7542         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7543         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7544         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7545         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7546         let penalty_txn = {
7547                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7548                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7549                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7550                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7551                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7552                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7553                 node_txn.clear();
7554                 penalty_txn
7555         };
7556         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7557         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7558         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7559         {
7560                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7561                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7562                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7563         }
7564 }
7565
7566 #[test]
7567 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7568         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7569         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7570         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7571         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7572         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7573         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7574         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
7575
7576         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7577         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7578         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7579         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7580         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7581
7582         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7583         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7584         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7585         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7586         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7587
7588         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7589         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7590         // can get our balance.
7591
7592         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7593         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7594         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7595         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7596         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7597         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7598         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7599         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7600
7601         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7602 }
7603
7604 #[test]
7605 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7606         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7607         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7608         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7609         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7610         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7611         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7612
7613         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7614
7615         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7616         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7617         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7618         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7619         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7620
7621         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7622         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7623         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7624         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7625
7626         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7627         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7628         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7629         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7630         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7631         match close_ev[0] {
7632                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7633                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7634                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7635                 },
7636                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7637         }
7638 }
7639
7640 #[test]
7641 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7642         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7643         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7644         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7645         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7646
7647         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7648         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7649         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7650
7651         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7652
7653         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7654         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7655         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7656         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7657 }
7658
7659 #[test]
7660 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7661         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7662         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7663         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7664         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7665         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7666         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7667
7668         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7669         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7670         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7671
7672         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7673         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7674         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7675 }
7676
7677 #[test]
7678 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7679         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7680         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7681         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7682         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7683         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7684
7685         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7686         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7687         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7688         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7689         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7690         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7691         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7692         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7693         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7694         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7695         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7696         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7697
7698         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7699         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7700         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7701         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7702
7703         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7704         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7705         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7706         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7707         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7708
7709         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7710         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7711
7712         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7713         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7714         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7715         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7716         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7717         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7718
7719         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7720         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7721         // `channel_value`.
7722         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7723         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7724         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7725         // `channel_value`.
7726         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7727 }
7728
7729 #[test]
7730 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7731         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7732         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7733         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7734         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7735         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7736         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7737
7738         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7739         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7740
7741         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7742
7743         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7744         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7745         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7746
7747         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7748         match events[0] {
7749                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7750                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7751                 }
7752                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7753         }
7754
7755         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7756         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7757
7758         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7759                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7760                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7761                 }
7762                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7763         }
7764
7765         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7766
7767         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7768         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7769
7770         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7771         match events[0] {
7772                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7773                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7774                 }
7775                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7776         }
7777 }
7778
7779 #[test]
7780 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7781         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7782         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7783         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7784         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7785         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7786         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7787
7788         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7789         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7790
7791         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7792
7793         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7794         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7795         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7796
7797         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7798         match events[0] {
7799                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7800                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7801                 }
7802                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7803         }
7804
7805         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7806         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7807
7808         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7809                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7810                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7811                 }
7812                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7813         }
7814         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7815 }
7816
7817 #[test]
7818 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7819         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7820         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7821         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7822         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7823         // and the channel should be closed.
7824         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7825         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7826         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7827         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7828         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7829         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7830
7831         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7832         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7833         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7834
7835         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7836
7837         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7838         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7839
7840         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7841         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7842
7843         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7844         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7845         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7846         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7847         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7848         let accept_chan_msg = {
7849                 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7850                 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7851                 let channel =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7852                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7853         };
7854         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7855
7856         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7857
7858         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7859         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7860
7861         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7862         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7863
7864         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7865         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7866
7867         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7868         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7869                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7870                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7871                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7872                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7873                 }
7874                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7875         }
7876
7877         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7878 }
7879
7880 #[test]
7881 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7882         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7883         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7884         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7885         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7886         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7887         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7888
7889         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7890         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7891
7892         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7893
7894         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7895         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7896         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7897
7898         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7899         match events[0] {
7900                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7901                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7902                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7903                         match api_res {
7904                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7905                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7906                                 },
7907                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7908                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7909                         }
7910                 }
7911                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7912         }
7913
7914         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7915         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7916         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7917
7918         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7919                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7920                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7921                 }
7922                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7923         }
7924 }
7925
7926 #[test]
7927 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7928         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7929         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7930         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7931         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7932
7933         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7934         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7935         match api_res {
7936                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7937                         assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7938                 },
7939                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7940                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7941         }
7942 }
7943
7944 #[test]
7945 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
7946         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
7947         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
7948         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
7949         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
7950         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
7951         let node_count = 4;
7952         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
7953         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
7954         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
7955         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7956
7957         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7958         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7959         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7960         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7961
7962         let total_msat = 100_000;
7963         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
7964         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
7965         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
7966
7967         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
7968         path_1[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7969         path_1[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7970         path_1[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
7971         path_1[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7972         path_1[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
7973         route.paths.push(path_1);
7974
7975         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
7976         path_2[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7977         path_2[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7978         path_2[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
7979         path_2[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7980         path_2[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
7981         route.paths.push(path_2);
7982
7983         // Send payment
7984         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
7985         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
7986         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
7987         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
7988
7989         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7990         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
7991
7992         // First path
7993         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
7994         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7995         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
7996
7997         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
7998                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
7999
8000                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8001                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8002                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8003                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8004                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8005                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000, &Some(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8006                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8007                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8008                         onion_payloads[1].amt_to_forward = 99_000;
8009                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
8010                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8011                 }
8012
8013                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8014                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8015                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8016                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8017
8018                 if idx == 0 {
8019                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8020                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8021                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8022                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8023                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8024                 } else {
8025                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8026                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8027                 }
8028
8029                 prev_node = node;
8030         }
8031
8032         // Second path
8033         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8034         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8035
8036         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8037 }
8038
8039 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8040
8041         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8042         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8043
8044         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8045         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8046         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8047         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8048
8049         let src_idx = 0;
8050         let dst_idx = 1;
8051
8052         // Create channels for each amount
8053         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8054         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8055         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8056         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8057                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8058                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8059                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8060                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8061                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8062                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8063                 expected_paths.push(path);
8064         }
8065         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8066
8067         // Create a route for each amount
8068         let example_amount = 100000;
8069         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8070         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8071         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8072                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8073                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8074                 path[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8075                 path[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8076                 path[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8077                 path[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8078                 path[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8079                 route.paths.push(path);
8080         }
8081
8082         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8083         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8084         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8085         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8087
8088         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8089         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8090         let mut amount_received = 0;
8091         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8092                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8093
8094                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8095                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8096                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8097                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8098         }
8099
8100         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8101 }
8102
8103 #[test]
8104 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8105         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8106         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8107 }
8108
8109 #[test]
8110 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8111         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8112         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8113         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8114         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8115         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8116
8117         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8118         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8119         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8120         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8121
8122         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8123         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8124         route.paths.push(path);
8125         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8126         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8127         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8128         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8129         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8130         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8131         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8132         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8133 }
8134
8135 #[test]
8136 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8137         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8138         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8139         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8140         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8141         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8142
8143         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8144
8145         {
8146                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8147                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8148                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8149                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8150                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8151                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8152                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8153                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8154         }
8155         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8156         // values from previous calls.
8157         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8158         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8159         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8160         match events[0] {
8161                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8162                         match &purpose {
8163                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8164                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8165                                 },
8166                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8167                         }
8168                 },
8169                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8170         }
8171 }
8172
8173 #[test]
8174 #[allow(deprecated)]
8175 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8176         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8177         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8178         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8179         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8180         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8181         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8182
8183         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8184
8185         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8186
8187         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8188         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8189         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8190                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8191         } else { panic!(); }
8192         let mut block = {
8193                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8194                 Block {
8195                         header: BlockHeader {
8196                                 version: 0x2000000,
8197                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8198                                 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8199                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8200                         txdata: vec![],
8201                 }
8202         };
8203         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8204         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8205                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8206         } else { panic!(); }
8207
8208         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8209         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8210         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8211         block.header.time += 1;
8212         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8213         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8214         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8215
8216         {
8217                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8218                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8219                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8220                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8221                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8222                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8223                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8224         }
8225         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8226         // values from previous calls.
8227         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8228         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8229         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8230         match events[0] {
8231                 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8232                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8233                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8234                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8235                 },
8236                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8237         }
8238 }
8239
8240 #[test]
8241 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8242         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8243         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8244         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8245         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8246         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8247
8248         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8249
8250         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8251         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8252         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8253         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8254
8255         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8256         // resulting events.
8257         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8258                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8259                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8260                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8261                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8262                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8263                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8264
8265                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8266                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8267                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8268                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8269                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8270
8271                         // We should fail the payment back
8272                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8273                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8274                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8275                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8276                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8277                                 },
8278                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8279                         }
8280                 }
8281         }
8282
8283         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8284         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8285         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8286
8287         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8288         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8289         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8290         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8291
8292         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8293         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8294         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8295         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8296
8297         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8298         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8299         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8300         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8301 }
8302
8303 #[test]
8304 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8305         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8306         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8307         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8308         // error.
8309         //
8310         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8311         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8312         // commitment at same time.
8313
8314         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8315         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8316         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8317         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8318
8319         // Create some initial channel
8320         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8321         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8322
8323         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8324         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8325
8326         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8327         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8328
8329         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8330         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8331         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8332         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8333         let watchtower = {
8334                 let new_monitor = {
8335                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8336                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8337                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8338                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8339                         new_monitor
8340                 };
8341                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8342                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8343                 watchtower
8344         };
8345         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8346         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8347         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8348         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8349         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8350         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8351
8352         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8353         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8355         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8356
8357         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8358         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8359         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8360         {
8361                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8362                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8363                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8364                 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8365                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8366                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8367                 } else { assert!(false); }
8368         }
8369         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8371         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8372         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8373 }
8374
8375 #[test]
8376 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8377         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8378         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8379         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8380         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8381
8382         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8383         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8384         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8385         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8386
8387         // Create some initial channel
8388         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8389         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8390
8391         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8392         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8393
8394         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8395         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8396
8397         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8398         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8399         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8400         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8401         let watchtower_alice = {
8402                 let new_monitor = {
8403                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8404                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8405                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8406                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8407                         new_monitor
8408                 };
8409                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8410                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8411                 watchtower
8412         };
8413         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8414         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8415         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8416         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8417         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8418         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8419
8420         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8421         {
8422                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8423                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8424                 txn.clear();
8425         }
8426
8427         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8428         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8429         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8430         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8431         let watchtower_bob = {
8432                 let new_monitor = {
8433                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8434                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8435                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8436                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8437                         new_monitor
8438                 };
8439                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8440                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8441                 watchtower
8442         };
8443         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8444         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8445
8446         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8447         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8448         {
8449                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8450         }
8451         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8452
8453         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8454         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8455         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8456         {
8457                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8458                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8459                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8460                 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8461                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8462                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8463                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8464                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8465                 } else { assert!(false); }
8466         }
8467         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8469
8470         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8471         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8472         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8473
8474         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8475         let bob_state_y;
8476         {
8477                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8478                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8479                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8480                 txn.clear();
8481         };
8482
8483         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8484         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8485         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8486         {
8487                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8488                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8489                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8490         }
8491 }
8492
8493 #[test]
8494 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8495         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8496         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8497         // message).
8498         //
8499         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8500         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8501         //
8502         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8503         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8504         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8505         // before receiving funding_signed.
8506         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8507         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8508         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8509         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8510
8511         // Create an initial channel
8512         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8513         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8514         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8515         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8516         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8517
8518         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8519         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8520
8521         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8523
8524         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8525         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8526         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8527         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8528         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true);
8529 }
8530
8531 #[test]
8532 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8533         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8534         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8535         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8536         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8537         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8538         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8539
8540         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8541         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8542         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8543         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8544
8545         // Create some initial channels
8546         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8547
8548         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8549         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8550         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8551         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8552         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8553         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8554
8555         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8556         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8557         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8558         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8559         // this test before #653 fix.
8560         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8561         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8562         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8563         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8564         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8565
8566         let htlc_timeout = {
8567                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8568                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8569                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8570                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8571                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8572                 node_txn[0].clone()
8573         };
8574
8575         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8576         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8577         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8578         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8579 }
8580
8581 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8582         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8583         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8584         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8585         //
8586         // Steps of the test:
8587         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8588         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8589         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8590         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8591         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8592         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8593         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8594         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8595         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8596         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8597         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8598         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8599
8600         // Create some initial channels
8601         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8602         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8603
8604         // Steps (1) and (2):
8605         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8606         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8607
8608         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8609         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8610         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8611         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8612         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8613         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8614         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8615
8616         // Steps (3) and (4):
8617         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8618         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8619         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8620         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8621
8622         // Bob force-closes
8623         if !broadcast_alice {
8624                 force_closing_node = 1;
8625                 counterparty_node = 0;
8626         }
8627         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8628         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8629         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8630         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8631         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8632                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8633                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8634                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8635                 };
8636                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8637                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8638                 if broadcast_alice {
8639                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8640                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8641                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8642                 }
8643         }
8644
8645         // Step (5):
8646         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8647         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8648         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8649         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8650         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8651
8652         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8653         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8654         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8655         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8656         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8657         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8658
8659         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8660         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8661         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8662         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8663                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8664                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8665                 match events[0] {
8666                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8667                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8668                         },
8669                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8670                 };
8671         }
8672         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8673         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8674         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8675         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8676
8677         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8678         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8679         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8680                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8681                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8682                         (*msg).clone()
8683                 },
8684                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8685         };
8686         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8687                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8688                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8689                         (*updates).clone()
8690                 },
8691                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8692         };
8693
8694         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8695         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8696         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8698
8699         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8700         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8701         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8702                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8703                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8704                         (*msg).clone()
8705                 },
8706                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8707         };
8708         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8709         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8710
8711         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8712         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8713         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8714         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8715         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8716                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8717                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8718                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8719                 if broadcast_alice {
8720                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8721                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8722                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8723                 }
8724                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8725                 if broadcast_alice {
8726                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8727                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8728                 } else {
8729                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8730                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8731                 }
8732         }
8733
8734         // Step (6):
8735         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8736         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8737         {
8738                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8739                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8740                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8741                 };
8742                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8743                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8744                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8745                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8746                 if broadcast_alice {
8747                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8748                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8749                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8750                 } else {
8751                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8752                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8753                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8754                 }
8755         }
8756 }
8757
8758 #[test]
8759 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8760         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8761         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8762         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8763         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8764 }
8765
8766 #[test]
8767 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8768         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8769         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8770         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8771         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8772         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8773         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8774
8775         // Create an first channel channel
8776         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8777         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8778
8779         // Create an second channel
8780         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8781         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8782
8783         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8784         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8785         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8786
8787         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8788         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8789         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8790         {
8791                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8792                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8793                 match &events[0] {
8794                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8795                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8796                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8797                         },
8798                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8799                 }
8800         }
8801
8802         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8803         {
8804                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8805                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8806                 match &events[0] {
8807                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8808                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8809                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8810                         },
8811                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8812                 }
8813         }
8814 }
8815
8816 #[test]
8817 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8818         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8819         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8820         //
8821         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8822         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8823         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8824         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8825         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8826         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8827         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8828         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8829
8830         // Create an initial channel
8831         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8832         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8833         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8834         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8835
8836         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8837         // that it is rejected.
8838         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8839         {
8840                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8841                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8842                 match events[0] {
8843                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8844                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8845                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8846                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8847                                 // move forward with it.
8848                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8849                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8850                         },
8851                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8852                 }
8853         }
8854
8855         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8856         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8857
8858         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8859         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8860
8861         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8862         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8863         {
8864                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8865                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8866                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8867                 added_monitors.clear();
8868         }
8869         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8870
8871         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8872         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8873
8874         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8875         // temporary one).
8876
8877         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8878         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8879         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8880         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8881         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8882         {
8883                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8884                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8885                 match events[0] {
8886                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8887                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8888                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8889                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8890                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8891                         },
8892                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8893                 }
8894         }
8895
8896         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8897         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8898         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8899         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8900         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8901         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8902
8903         let funding_created = {
8904                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8905                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8906                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8907                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8908                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8909                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8910                 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8911                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8912                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8913         };
8914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8915         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8916         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8917         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8919
8920         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8921         {
8922                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8923                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8924                 match events[0] {
8925                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8926                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8927                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8928                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8929                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8930                         },
8931                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8932                 }
8933         }
8934
8935         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8936         // everything is functional.
8937         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8938         {
8939                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8940                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8941                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8942                 added_monitors.clear();
8943         }
8944
8945         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8946         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8947         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8948         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8949
8950         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8951         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8952         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8953
8954         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8955 }
8956
8957 #[test]
8958 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8959         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8960         //
8961         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8962         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8963         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8964         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8965         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8966         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8967         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8968
8969         // Create some initial channels
8970         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8971         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8972         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
8973
8974         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8975         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8976         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8977
8978         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8979         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8980         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8981
8982         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8983         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8985         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8986         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
8987         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8988         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8989         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8990         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8991
8992         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8993         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8994         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8996         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
8997         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8998         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8999         match events[0] {
9000                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9001                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9002                 },
9003                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9004         }
9005         match events[1] {
9006                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9007                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9008                 },
9009                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9010         }
9011         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9012         // peer_disconnected.
9013         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9014         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9015
9016         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9017         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9018         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9019 }
9020
9021 #[test]
9022 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9023         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9024         //
9025         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9026         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9027         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9028         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9029         //
9030         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9031         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9032         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9033         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9034         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9035         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9036         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9037
9038         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9039         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9040         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9041
9042         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9043
9044         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9045         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9046         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9047         // its length.
9048         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9049         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9050         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9051                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9052                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9053         }
9054
9055         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9056         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9057         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9058
9059         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9061
9062         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9063         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9064
9065         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9066         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9067         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9068
9069         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9070         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9071         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9073         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9074         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9075         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9076                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9077                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9078                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9079                 } else { panic!(); }
9080         } else { panic!(); }
9081         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9082
9083         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9084         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9085         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9086         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9087                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9088                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9089                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9090                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9091                                 vout: idx as u32,
9092                         },
9093                         script_sig: Script::new(),
9094                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9095                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9096                 }).collect(),
9097                 output: vec![TxOut {
9098                         value: 1000,
9099                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9100                 }]
9101         };
9102         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9103         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9104 }
9105
9106 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9107         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9108         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9109         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9110         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9111         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9112         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9113         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9114         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9115         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9116         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9117         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9118         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9119         // until we learned about an additional block.
9120         //
9121         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9122         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9123         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9124         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9125         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9126         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9127         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9128
9129         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9130         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9131         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9132         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9133         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9134
9135         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9136         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9137         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9139         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9140         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9141
9142         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9143         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9144                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9145         }
9146         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9147                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9148         if test_height_before_timelock {
9149                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9150                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9151                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9152                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9153         } else {
9154                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9155                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9156                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9157                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9158                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9159                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9160                 // timelock is up).
9161                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9162                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9163
9164                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9165                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9166                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9167                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9168                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9169                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9170                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9171
9172                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9173                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9174                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9175                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9176                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9177                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9178                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9179                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9180                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9181         }
9182 }
9183
9184 #[test]
9185 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9186         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9187         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9188 }
9189
9190 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9191         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9192         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9193         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9194         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9195
9196         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9197
9198         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9199                 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
9200         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9201
9202         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9203
9204         {
9205                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9206                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9207                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9208                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9209                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9210                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9211                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9212         }
9213         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9214         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9215
9216         {
9217                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9218                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9219                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9220                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9221                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9222                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9223                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9224                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9225                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9226                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9227                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9228                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9229         }
9230
9231         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9232         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9233
9234         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9235                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9236                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9237
9238                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9239                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9240                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9241                 ];
9242                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9243                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9244
9245                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9246                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9247                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9248
9249                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9250                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9251                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9252
9253                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9254                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9255                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9256                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9257                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9258                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9259         } else {
9260                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9261                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9262                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9263
9264                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9265                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9266                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9267                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9268
9269                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9270
9271                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9272         }
9273 }
9274
9275 #[test]
9276 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9277         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9278         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9279         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9280         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9281         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9282 }
9283
9284 #[test]
9285 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9286         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9287         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9288         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9289 }
9290
9291 #[test]
9292 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9293         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9294         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9295         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9296         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9297         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9298         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9299
9300         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9301         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9302         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9303         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9304
9305         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9306                 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
9307         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9308         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9309         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9310                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9311                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9312                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9313         });
9314
9315         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9316
9317         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9318         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9319
9320         let session_privs = {
9321                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9322                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9323                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9324                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9325                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9326         };
9327         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9328         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9329
9330         {
9331                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9332                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9333                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9334         }
9335         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9336
9337         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9339
9340         {
9341                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9342                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9343                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9344
9345                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9346                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9347
9348                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9349                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9350
9351                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9352                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9353                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9354
9355                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9356                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9357                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9358
9359                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9360                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9361                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9362         }
9363         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9364         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9365         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9366         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9367
9368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9369
9370         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9371         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9372         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9373
9374         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9375         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9376
9377         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9378         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9379         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9380
9381         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9382
9383         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9384         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9385
9386         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9387         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9388         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9389
9390         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9391         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9392         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9393         match events[0] {
9394                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => { // The payment was abandoned earlier, so the fee paid will be None
9395                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
9396                 },
9397                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9398         }
9399         match events[1] {
9400                 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_hash, .. } => {
9401                         assert_eq!(payment_hash.unwrap(), our_payment_hash);
9402                 },
9403                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9404         }
9405         match events[2] {
9406                 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_hash, .. } => {
9407                         assert_eq!(payment_hash.unwrap(), our_payment_hash);
9408                 },
9409                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9410         }
9411 }
9412
9413 #[test]
9414 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9415         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9416         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9417         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9418         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9419
9420         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9421         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9422         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9423         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9424         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9425                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9426                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9427         };
9428         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9429         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9430         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9431
9432         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9433         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9434         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9435         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9436         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9437         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9438         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9439         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9440         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9441 }
9442
9443 #[test]
9444 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9445         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9446         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9447         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9448         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9449
9450         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9451         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9452
9453         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9454         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9455                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9456                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9457         };
9458         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9459         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9460         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9461         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9462         let route = find_route(
9463                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9464                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9465         ).unwrap();
9466
9467         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9468         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9469         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9470         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9471         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9472         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9473         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9474         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9475         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9476 }
9477
9478 #[test]
9479 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9480         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9481         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9482         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9483         // amount.
9484         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9485         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9486         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9487         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9488
9489         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9490         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9491         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9492         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9493
9494         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9495         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9496         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9497                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9498                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9499                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9500         });
9501
9502         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9503         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9504         // amount of time to respond to.
9505
9506         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9507         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9508         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9509
9510         let failed_destinations = vec![
9511                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9512                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9513         ];
9514         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9515
9516         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9517
9518         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9519         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9521
9522         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9523         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9524         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9525         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9526
9527         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9528         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9529         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9530         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9531         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9532 }
9533
9534 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9535 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9536 enum ExposureEvent {
9537         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9538         AtHTLCForward,
9539         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9540         AtHTLCReception,
9541         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9542         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9543 }
9544
9545 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9546         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9547         // policy.
9548         //
9549         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9550         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9551         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9552         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9553         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9554         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9555         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9556         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9557
9558         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9559         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9560         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9561         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9562         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9563         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9564
9565         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9566         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9567         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9568         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9569         if on_holder_tx {
9570                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9571         }
9572         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9573         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9574         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9575
9576         let opt_anchors = false;
9577
9578         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9579
9580         if on_holder_tx {
9581                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9582                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9583                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9584                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9585         }
9586
9587         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9588         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9589         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9590
9591         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9592         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9593
9594         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9595         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9596         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9597
9598         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9599                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9600                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9601                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9602                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9603         };
9604         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9605         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9606
9607         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9608         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9609
9610         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9611         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9612
9613         if on_holder_tx {
9614                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9615                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9616                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9617                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9618                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9619                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9620                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9621                         }
9622                 } else {
9623                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9624                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9625                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9626                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9627                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9628                         }
9629                 }
9630         } else {
9631                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9632                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9633                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9634                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9635                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9636                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9637                         }
9638                 } else {
9639                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9640                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9641                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9642                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9643                         }
9644                 }
9645         }
9646
9647         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9648         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9649                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9650                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9651                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9652                 if on_holder_tx {
9653                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9654                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9655                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9656                 } else {
9657                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9658                 }
9659         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9660                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9661                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9662                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9663                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9664                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9665                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9666                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9667                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9668                 if on_holder_tx {
9669                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9670                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9671                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9672                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9673                 } else {
9674                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9675                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9676                 }
9677         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9678                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9679                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9680                 {
9681                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9682                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9683                 }
9684                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9685                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9686                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9687         }
9688
9689         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9690         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9691         added_monitors.clear();
9692 }
9693
9694 #[test]
9695 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9696         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9697         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9698         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9699         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9700         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9701         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9702         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9703         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9704         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9705         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9706         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9707         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9708 }
9709
9710 #[test]
9711 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9712         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9713         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9714         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9715         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9716
9717         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9718         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9719         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9720         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9721         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9722
9723         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9724
9725         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9726         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9727         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9728         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9729         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9730                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9731                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9732                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9733                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9734                         }]}
9735                 },
9736                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9737         };
9738         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9739         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9740                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9741                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9742                 },
9743                 _ => panic!()
9744         }
9745
9746         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9747         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9748         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9749         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9750 }
9751
9752 #[test]
9753 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9754         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9755         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9756         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9757         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9758         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9759         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9760         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9761
9762         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9763
9764         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9765         {
9766                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9767                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9768         }
9769
9770         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9771         {
9772                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9773                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9774         }
9775         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9776         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9777
9778         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9779         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9780         match events[0] {
9781                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9782                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9783                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9784                 },
9785                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9786         };
9787
9788         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9789         // it.
9790         {
9791                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9792                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9793         }
9794         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9795         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9796
9797         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9798         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9799         match events[0] {
9800                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9801                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9802                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9803                 },
9804                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9805         };
9806
9807         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9808         // channel.
9809         {
9810                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9811                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9812         }
9813         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9814         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9815
9816         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9817         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9818         match events[0] {
9819                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9820                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9821                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9822                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9823                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9824                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9825                 },
9826                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9827         };
9828 }
9829
9830 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9831         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9832         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9833         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9834         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9835         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9836         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9837                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9838         let recv_value = 100_000;
9839
9840         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9841
9842         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9843         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9844                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9845                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9846                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9847         } else {
9848                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9849                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9850         };
9851         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value, final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32).unwrap();
9852         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9854         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9855         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9856         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9857         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9858         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9859         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9860
9861         if valid_delta {
9862                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9863                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9864
9865                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9866         } else {
9867                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9868
9869                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9870
9871                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9872                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9873                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9874
9875                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9876         }
9877 }
9878
9879 #[test]
9880 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9881         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9882         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9883         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9884         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
9885 }