1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
22 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
25 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
29 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
33 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
34 use crate::util::test_utils;
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
38 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
46 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use crate::prelude::*;
56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
57 use core::default::Default;
58 use core::iter::repeat;
59 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
60 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
62 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
63 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
66 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
67 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
68 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
69 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
70 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
71 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
72 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
73 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
74 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
76 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
78 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
79 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
80 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
82 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
83 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
85 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
86 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
88 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
89 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
90 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
91 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
92 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
93 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
94 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
95 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
97 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
98 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
100 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
102 } else { assert!(false); }
105 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
107 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
109 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
111 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
113 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
115 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
117 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
119 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
121 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
123 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
127 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
128 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
130 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
131 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
132 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
133 *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
134 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
135 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
137 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
138 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
139 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
145 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
146 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
147 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
148 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
149 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
150 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
151 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
152 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
153 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
154 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
156 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
157 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
158 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
159 let opt_anchors = false;
160 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
161 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
163 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
164 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
165 if !send_from_initiator {
166 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
167 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
169 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
171 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
172 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
173 if send_from_initiator {
174 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
175 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
177 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
179 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
180 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
181 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
182 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
183 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
184 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
185 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
188 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
189 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
190 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
192 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
193 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
194 if send_from_initiator {
195 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
196 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
197 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
198 // well as an additional HTLC.
199 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
201 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
206 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
207 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
208 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
212 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
213 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
214 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
215 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
216 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
220 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
224 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
225 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
226 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
227 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
228 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
229 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
230 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
231 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
232 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
233 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
235 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
237 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
239 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
241 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
244 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
247 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
248 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
249 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
250 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
251 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
253 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
256 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
258 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
259 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
260 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
263 let payment_event = {
264 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
265 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
266 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
268 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
269 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
271 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
272 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
273 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
274 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
275 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
278 // deliver(1), generate (3):
279 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
280 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
281 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
284 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
285 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
286 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
287 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
288 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
289 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
290 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
293 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
294 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
295 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
296 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
297 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
298 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
299 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
302 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
303 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
304 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
307 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
308 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
311 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
314 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
315 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
317 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
318 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
321 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
326 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
327 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
328 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
329 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
330 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
331 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
332 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
333 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
336 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
338 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
340 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
343 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
346 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
347 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
348 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
349 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
355 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
357 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
358 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
359 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
362 let payment_event = {
363 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
364 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
365 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
367 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
368 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
370 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
371 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
372 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
373 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
374 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
377 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
380 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
384 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
385 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
386 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
387 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
388 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
389 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
392 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
393 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
394 // update_fee (never committed) ->
396 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
397 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
398 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
399 // <- (1) RAA delivered
400 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
401 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
402 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
403 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
405 // B should send no response here
406 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
407 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
410 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
413 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
414 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
415 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
417 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
420 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
421 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
422 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
423 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
424 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
426 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
429 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
430 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
431 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
432 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
435 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
438 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
439 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
441 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
442 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
443 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
445 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
446 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
447 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
448 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
453 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
455 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
457 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
458 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
459 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
461 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
462 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
463 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
464 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
465 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
466 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
467 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
469 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
470 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
471 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
473 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
475 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
476 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
480 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
481 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
484 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
485 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
488 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
489 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
490 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
493 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
494 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
498 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
499 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
500 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
501 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
504 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
505 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
506 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
507 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
509 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
511 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
514 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
515 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
518 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
519 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
520 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
522 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
523 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
524 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
526 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
527 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
529 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
531 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
532 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
534 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
536 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
537 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
539 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
540 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
541 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
542 added_monitors.clear();
544 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
546 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
547 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
549 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
550 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
551 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
552 added_monitors.clear();
555 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
556 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
558 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
559 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
561 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
562 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
563 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
564 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
565 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
569 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
587 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
591 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
595 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
596 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
599 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
602 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
605 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
606 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
607 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
608 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
609 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
613 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
615 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
616 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
619 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
620 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
623 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
624 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
625 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
628 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
629 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
634 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
635 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
636 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
637 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
638 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
639 let channel_value = 5000;
641 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
642 let channel_id = chan.2;
643 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
644 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
645 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
647 let opt_anchors = false;
649 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
650 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
651 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
653 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
654 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
656 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
657 *feerate_lock = feerate;
659 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
661 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
663 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
665 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
667 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
669 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
671 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
672 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
673 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
674 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
675 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
676 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
680 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
681 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
684 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
685 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
688 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
690 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
691 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
692 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
693 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
694 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
695 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
696 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
697 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
698 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
699 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
701 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
702 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
703 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
704 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
705 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
706 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
707 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
708 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
709 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
712 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
713 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
714 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
717 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
718 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
719 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
720 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
721 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
722 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
723 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
725 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
726 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
727 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
728 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
730 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
732 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
735 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
738 htlc_signatures: res.1,
740 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
743 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
745 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
748 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
750 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
751 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
752 //Should produce and error.
753 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
754 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
756 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
757 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
761 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
762 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
763 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
764 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
765 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
766 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
769 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
772 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
775 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
778 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
779 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
780 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
781 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
782 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
786 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
787 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
788 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
791 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
793 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
794 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
796 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
797 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
798 added_monitors.clear();
800 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
801 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
802 // node[1] has nothing to do
804 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
805 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
808 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
809 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
810 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
812 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
814 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
816 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
817 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
818 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
819 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
820 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
821 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
823 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
824 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
826 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
828 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
830 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
832 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
834 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
835 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
837 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
839 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
841 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
843 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
844 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
846 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
847 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
850 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
852 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
853 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
854 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
855 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
856 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
860 fn test_update_fee() {
861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
864 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
865 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
866 let channel_id = chan.2;
869 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
870 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
871 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
872 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
873 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
874 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
875 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
876 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
877 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
878 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
879 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
882 // Create and deliver (1)...
885 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
886 feerate = *feerate_lock;
887 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
889 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
892 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
893 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
894 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
895 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
896 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
898 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
900 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
902 // Generate (2) and (3):
903 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
904 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
908 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
909 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
912 // Create and deliver (4)...
914 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
915 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
917 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
919 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
920 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
921 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
922 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
923 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
928 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
929 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
932 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
933 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
935 // Handle (3), creating (6):
936 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
938 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
939 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
942 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
943 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
946 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
947 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
948 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
949 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
950 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
951 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
952 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
953 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
957 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
959 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
960 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
962 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
964 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
966 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
967 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
968 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
969 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
970 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
974 fn fake_network_test() {
975 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
976 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
977 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
978 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
979 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
980 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
982 // Create some initial channels
983 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
984 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
985 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
987 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
988 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
989 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
990 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
991 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
993 // Send some more payments
994 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
995 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
996 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
998 // Test failure packets
999 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1000 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1002 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1003 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1005 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1011 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1013 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1014 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1015 hops.push(RouteHop {
1016 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1017 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1018 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1019 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1021 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1023 hops.push(RouteHop {
1024 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1025 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1026 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1027 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1029 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1031 hops.push(RouteHop {
1032 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1033 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1034 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1035 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1037 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1039 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1040 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1041 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1043 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1044 hops.push(RouteHop {
1045 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1046 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1047 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1048 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1050 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1052 hops.push(RouteHop {
1053 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1054 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1055 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1056 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1058 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1060 hops.push(RouteHop {
1061 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1062 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1063 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1064 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1066 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1068 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1069 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1070 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1072 // Claim the rebalances...
1073 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1074 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1076 // Close down the channels...
1077 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1078 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1081 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1084 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1086 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1087 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1092 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1093 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1094 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1095 // commitment dance rounds.
1096 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1097 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1098 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1099 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1100 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1101 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1103 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1104 for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1105 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1106 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1107 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1111 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1112 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1113 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1114 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1116 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1117 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1119 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1121 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1122 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1123 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1124 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
1127 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1128 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1130 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1134 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1135 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1136 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1137 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1139 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1140 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1141 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1142 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1143 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1144 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1147 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1148 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1149 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1151 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1153 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1154 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1155 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1158 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1159 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1161 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1163 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1165 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1167 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1168 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1170 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1172 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1174 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1176 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1178 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1180 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1182 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1185 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1187 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1188 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1189 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1191 &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1192 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1194 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1198 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1199 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1202 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1206 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1207 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1208 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1212 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1214 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1218 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1219 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1221 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1223 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1224 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1226 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1227 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1229 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1230 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1231 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1235 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1236 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1237 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1238 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1239 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1240 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1241 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1242 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1244 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1247 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1249 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1251 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1252 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1253 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1255 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1256 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1257 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1260 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1261 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1263 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1264 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1265 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1266 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1267 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1268 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1269 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1272 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1274 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1276 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1277 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1279 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1280 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1282 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1283 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1284 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1285 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1286 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1287 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1289 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1292 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1293 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1295 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1296 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1297 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1299 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1300 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1301 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1302 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1304 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1305 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1308 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1309 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1310 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1311 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1313 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1314 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1315 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1316 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1317 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1318 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1320 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1326 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1327 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1328 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1329 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1330 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1331 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1333 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1334 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1336 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1337 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1338 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1339 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1340 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1342 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1344 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1345 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1346 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1349 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1351 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1352 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 1);
1354 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1358 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1359 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1360 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1361 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1362 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1363 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1365 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1366 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1367 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1368 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1370 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1372 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1373 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1374 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1375 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1378 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1379 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1380 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1381 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1384 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1386 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1387 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1388 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1390 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1392 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1394 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1395 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1396 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1397 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1398 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1399 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1400 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1401 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1402 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1404 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1405 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1406 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1407 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1408 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1410 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1411 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1412 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1413 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1414 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1415 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1416 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1417 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1418 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1421 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1422 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1423 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1425 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1426 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1427 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1429 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1431 amount_msat: 3460001,
1432 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1434 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1437 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1440 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1441 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1442 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1443 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1444 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1448 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1449 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1451 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1452 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1454 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1457 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1460 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1462 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1465 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1466 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1467 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1469 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1470 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1472 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1473 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1475 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1477 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1478 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1479 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1481 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1482 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1483 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1485 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1487 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1488 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1494 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1495 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1496 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1497 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1498 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1500 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1503 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1504 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1505 let opt_anchors = false;
1507 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1508 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1510 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1512 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1514 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1515 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1516 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1519 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1520 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1521 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1522 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1523 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1524 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1528 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1529 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1530 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1531 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1532 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1533 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1534 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1535 let opt_anchors = false;
1537 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1538 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1539 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1540 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1541 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1542 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1543 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1545 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1546 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1547 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1550 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1551 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1552 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1553 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1554 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1555 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1556 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1557 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1558 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1560 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1561 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1562 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1563 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1564 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1567 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1568 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1569 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1570 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1571 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1572 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1574 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1578 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1579 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1580 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1581 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1582 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1586 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1587 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1588 let opt_anchors = false;
1590 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1591 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1592 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1593 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1594 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1595 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1596 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1598 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1599 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1600 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1601 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1602 // commitment transaction fee.
1603 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1605 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1606 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1607 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1610 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1611 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1612 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1613 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1617 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1618 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1619 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1620 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1621 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1622 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1623 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1624 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1625 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1626 let opt_anchors = false;
1628 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1630 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1631 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1632 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1633 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1635 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1636 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1637 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1638 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1639 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1640 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1641 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1643 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1644 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1645 match msg_events[0] {
1646 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1647 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1649 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1654 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1655 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1656 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1657 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1658 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1659 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1660 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1661 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1663 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1664 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1665 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1666 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1671 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1674 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1675 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1677 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1678 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1679 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1680 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1684 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1685 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1686 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1687 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1688 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1689 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1690 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1693 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1694 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1695 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1696 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1698 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1699 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1700 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1701 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1703 // Add a pending HTLC.
1704 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1705 let payment_event_1 = {
1706 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1709 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1710 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1711 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1713 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1715 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1716 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1717 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1718 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1719 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1721 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1722 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1723 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1724 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1725 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1726 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1727 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1728 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1731 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1732 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1733 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1734 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1737 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1738 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1739 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1740 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1741 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1742 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1744 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1748 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1749 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1750 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1751 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1752 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1753 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1754 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1755 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1756 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1757 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1758 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1760 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1761 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1762 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1764 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1765 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1768 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1769 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1773 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1774 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1775 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1776 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1777 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1778 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1779 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1780 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1781 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1782 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1783 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1785 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1786 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1788 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1789 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1791 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1793 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1794 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1795 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1796 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1801 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1802 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1803 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1804 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1806 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1808 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1810 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1811 .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1812 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1813 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1814 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1816 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1817 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1818 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1819 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
1822 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1823 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1825 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1826 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1827 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1828 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1829 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1830 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1831 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1835 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1836 .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1837 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1838 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1839 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1841 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1842 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1843 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1844 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1845 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1848 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1849 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1850 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1851 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1852 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1855 // adding pending output.
1856 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1857 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1858 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1859 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1860 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1861 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1862 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1863 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1864 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1866 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1867 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1868 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1870 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1871 let payment_event_1 = {
1872 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1875 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1876 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1877 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1879 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1881 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1882 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1884 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1885 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1886 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1887 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1890 // split the rest to test holding cell
1891 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1892 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1893 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1894 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1896 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1897 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1900 // now see if they go through on both sides
1901 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1902 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1903 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1905 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1906 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1908 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1910 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1911 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1912 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1913 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1914 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 2);
1917 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1918 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1919 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1921 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1922 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1924 // flush the pending htlc
1925 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1926 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1929 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1930 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1932 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1934 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1935 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1936 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1939 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1940 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1943 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1945 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1946 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1947 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1949 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1950 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1952 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1953 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1954 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1955 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1956 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1957 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1959 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1960 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1961 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1962 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1964 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1965 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1967 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1968 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1970 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1971 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1972 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1973 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1974 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1976 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1977 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1978 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1980 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1983 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1986 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1987 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1988 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1989 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1990 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1992 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1993 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1994 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1996 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1999 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2002 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2003 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2004 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2006 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2007 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2008 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2010 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2011 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2012 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2013 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2014 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2016 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2017 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2021 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2022 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2023 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2024 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2025 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2026 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2027 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2028 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2030 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2031 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2032 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2033 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2034 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2035 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2036 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2037 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2039 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2040 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2041 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2042 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2043 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2044 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2045 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2046 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2047 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2048 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2050 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2051 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2052 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2053 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2054 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2056 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2057 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2059 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2061 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2062 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2063 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2066 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2067 // initial fulfill/CS.
2068 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2069 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2071 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2073 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2074 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2075 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2076 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2078 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2080 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2081 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2083 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2084 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2086 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2087 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2089 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2090 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2092 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2094 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2096 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2098 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2100 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2102 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2104 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2105 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2106 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2107 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2108 // on-chain as necessary).
2109 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2110 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2112 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2113 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2115 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2117 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2119 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2120 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2122 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2123 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2124 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2126 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2127 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2129 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2130 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2131 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2133 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2135 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2136 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2137 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2140 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2141 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2143 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2145 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2147 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2149 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2151 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2154 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2156 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2157 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2159 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2161 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2163 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2166 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2167 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2169 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2170 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2174 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2175 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2176 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2177 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2178 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2179 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2180 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2182 // Create some initial channels
2183 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2184 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2185 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2186 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2188 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2189 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2190 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2191 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2192 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2193 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2195 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2196 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2197 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2198 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2199 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2201 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2202 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2204 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2206 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2207 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2208 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2210 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2212 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2213 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2214 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2215 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2216 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2218 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2219 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2221 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2222 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2223 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2224 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2227 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2228 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2229 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2230 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2232 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2234 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2235 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2236 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2237 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2238 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2240 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2241 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2243 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2244 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2245 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2247 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2248 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2250 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2251 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2252 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2253 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2261 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2262 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2263 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2265 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2266 let node2_commitment_txid;
2268 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2269 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2270 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2271 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2273 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2274 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2275 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2277 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2279 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2280 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2281 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2282 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2283 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2285 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2286 // confusing us in the following tests.
2287 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2289 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2290 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2291 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2294 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2295 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2296 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2298 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2299 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2302 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2305 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2306 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2308 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2312 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2314 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2315 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2316 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2322 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2324 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2325 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2327 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2328 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2329 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2330 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2331 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2334 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2337 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2338 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2340 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2343 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2345 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2346 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2347 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2349 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2350 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2351 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2352 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2354 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2355 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2356 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2357 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2361 fn test_justice_tx() {
2362 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2363 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2364 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2365 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2366 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2367 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2368 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2369 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2370 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2371 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2372 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2373 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2374 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2377 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2378 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2379 // Create some new channels:
2380 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2382 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2383 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2384 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2385 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2386 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2387 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2388 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2389 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2390 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2391 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2392 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2393 // Revoke the old state
2394 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2397 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2399 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2400 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2401 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2403 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2404 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2407 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2408 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2410 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2411 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2412 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2413 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2415 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2416 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2417 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2418 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2420 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2422 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2423 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2425 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2426 // Create some new channels:
2427 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2429 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2433 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2434 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2435 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2436 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2437 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2438 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2439 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2440 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2441 // Revoke the old state
2442 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2444 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2446 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2447 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2448 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2450 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2451 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2454 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2456 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2457 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2458 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2460 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2461 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2462 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2464 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2465 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2466 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2470 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2471 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2472 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2473 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2474 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2475 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2476 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2477 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2478 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2479 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2480 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2481 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2482 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2483 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2484 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2486 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2487 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2489 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2490 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2491 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2493 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2495 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2496 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2497 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2499 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2503 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2504 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2505 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2506 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2507 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2508 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2509 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2511 // Create some new channel:
2512 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2514 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2515 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2516 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2517 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2518 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2520 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2521 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2522 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2523 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2524 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2525 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2526 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2527 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2528 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2530 //Revoke the old state
2531 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2534 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2536 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2537 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2539 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2540 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2541 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2543 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2544 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2546 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2547 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2549 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2550 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2551 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2552 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2553 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2554 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2555 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2556 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2558 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2559 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2560 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2561 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2562 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2564 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2565 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2566 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2570 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2571 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2572 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2573 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2574 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2575 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2576 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2578 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2580 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2581 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2582 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2583 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2584 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2585 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2587 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2588 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2590 //Revoke the old state
2591 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2594 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2596 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2598 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2599 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2600 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2601 match events.last().unwrap() {
2602 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2606 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2607 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2609 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2610 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
2612 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2613 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2614 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2615 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2616 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2617 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2618 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2620 // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
2621 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2622 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2623 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2625 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2626 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2627 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2629 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2630 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2631 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2632 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2633 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2634 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2635 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2636 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2638 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2639 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2640 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2641 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2642 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2643 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2644 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2646 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2647 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2648 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2652 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2653 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2654 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2655 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2656 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2657 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2658 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2659 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2660 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2662 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2663 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2664 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2665 // PaymentSent event).
2667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2670 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2672 // Create some initial channels
2673 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2674 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2676 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2677 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2678 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2679 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2680 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2682 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2683 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2684 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2686 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2687 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2689 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2690 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2691 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2692 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2693 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2694 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2695 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2696 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2697 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2699 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2700 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2701 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2702 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2703 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2705 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2706 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2708 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2709 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2710 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2711 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2712 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2713 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2714 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2715 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2716 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2717 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2718 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2720 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2721 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2722 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
2723 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2725 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2726 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2727 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2728 added_monitors.clear();
2730 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2731 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2732 match forwarded_events[0] {
2733 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2734 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2736 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2737 match forwarded_events[1] {
2738 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2739 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2740 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2741 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2742 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2743 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2747 match forwarded_events[2] {
2748 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2749 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2750 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2751 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2752 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2753 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2757 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2759 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2760 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2761 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2762 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2763 added_monitors.clear();
2765 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2767 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2768 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2770 match nodes_2_event {
2771 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2775 match nodes_0_event {
2776 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2777 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2778 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2779 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2780 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2781 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2786 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2788 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2789 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2792 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2793 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2794 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2795 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2796 // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2797 // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2798 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2799 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2800 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2801 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2803 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2804 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2805 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2806 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2808 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2809 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2810 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2811 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2816 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2817 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2819 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2820 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2821 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2822 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2823 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2824 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2826 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2827 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2828 assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2829 let commitment_spend =
2830 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2833 // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2834 // FullBlockViaListen
2835 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2836 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2837 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2838 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2841 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2842 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2843 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2848 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2849 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2850 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2851 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2852 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1);
2853 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2854 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2855 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2857 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2858 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2859 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2860 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2861 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2863 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2864 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2865 let mut first_claimed = false;
2866 for event in events {
2868 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2869 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2870 assert!(!first_claimed);
2871 first_claimed = true;
2873 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2874 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2877 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2878 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2882 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2885 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2886 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2887 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2888 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2889 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2890 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2892 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2894 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2895 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2896 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2897 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2898 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2899 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2900 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2902 // Create some intial channels
2903 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2904 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2906 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2907 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2908 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2910 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2912 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2913 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2914 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2915 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2917 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2920 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2921 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2923 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2924 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2925 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2926 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2927 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2928 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2930 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2932 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2933 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2935 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2936 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2937 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2939 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2940 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2941 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2942 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2943 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2946 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2947 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2949 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2950 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2952 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2953 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2954 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2955 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2957 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2961 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2963 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2965 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2967 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2969 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2970 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2972 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2973 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2974 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2975 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2976 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2977 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2982 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2983 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2984 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2986 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2987 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2989 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2991 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2992 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
2993 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2994 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2995 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2999 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3000 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3001 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3002 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3006 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3007 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3008 // and fail backward accordingly.
3010 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3011 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3012 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3013 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3015 // Create some initial channels
3016 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3017 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3019 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3020 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3021 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3022 // Revoke the old state
3023 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3025 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3027 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3028 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3029 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3031 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3033 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3035 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3036 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3038 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3039 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3040 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3041 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3042 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3043 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3045 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3046 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3047 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3049 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3053 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3054 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3055 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3056 // commitment transaction anymore.
3057 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3058 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3059 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3060 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3061 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3062 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3064 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3065 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3066 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3067 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3068 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3069 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3070 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3071 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3072 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3074 // Create some initial channels
3075 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3076 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3078 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3079 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3080 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3081 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3082 // Revoke the old state
3083 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3085 let value = if use_dust {
3086 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3087 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3088 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3089 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3092 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3093 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3094 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3096 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3097 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3099 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3100 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3101 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3102 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3103 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3104 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3105 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3106 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3107 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3109 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3110 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3112 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3113 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3114 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3115 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3116 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3117 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3118 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3119 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3121 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3122 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3123 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3126 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3127 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3129 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3130 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3131 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3132 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3133 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3134 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3135 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3136 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3137 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3138 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3140 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3141 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3142 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3145 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3146 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3147 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3148 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3149 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3154 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3155 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3156 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3158 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3159 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3161 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3165 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3166 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3168 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3169 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3172 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3173 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3175 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3177 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3179 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3180 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3182 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3183 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3186 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3187 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3192 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3193 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3195 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3198 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3201 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3202 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3205 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3206 match nodes_2_event {
3207 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3208 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3209 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3210 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3211 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3212 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3214 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3218 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3219 match nodes_2_event {
3220 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3221 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3222 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3224 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3227 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3228 match nodes_0_event {
3229 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3230 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3231 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3232 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3233 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3234 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3236 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3237 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3238 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3240 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3242 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3243 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3245 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3246 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3247 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3248 // that we should update our routing table for.
3249 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3250 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3253 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3256 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3257 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3259 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3262 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3263 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3265 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3268 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3269 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3271 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3274 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3275 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3277 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3280 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3281 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3289 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3291 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3292 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3295 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3296 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3297 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3301 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3302 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3303 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3304 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3305 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3309 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3310 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3311 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3312 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3313 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3317 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3321 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3322 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3324 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3326 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3327 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3330 let payment_event = {
3331 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3332 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3333 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3335 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3336 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3339 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3340 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3342 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3345 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3348 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3350 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3352 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3353 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3354 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3355 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3356 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3357 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3359 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3360 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3366 onion_routing_packet,
3368 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3370 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3371 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3372 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3374 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3375 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3380 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3381 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3383 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3386 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3387 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3389 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3391 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3396 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3397 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3398 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3399 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3400 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3401 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3402 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3403 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3404 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3405 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3409 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3411 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3412 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3413 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3414 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3416 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3418 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3419 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3420 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3422 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3423 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3424 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3426 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3428 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3429 // registering new transactions
3430 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3434 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3435 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3436 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3437 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3438 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3439 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3440 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3441 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3443 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3445 let mut payment_event = {
3446 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3449 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3450 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3451 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3454 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3455 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3457 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3459 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3460 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3461 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3462 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3465 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3466 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3468 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3470 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3471 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3472 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3474 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3475 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3477 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3479 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3480 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3481 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3482 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3483 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3487 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3489 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3490 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3492 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3494 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3496 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3497 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3499 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3500 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3501 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3502 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3503 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3504 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3505 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3507 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3511 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3512 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3513 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3514 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3515 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3517 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3518 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3519 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3520 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3521 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3523 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3525 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3526 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3528 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3529 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3530 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3532 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3533 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3535 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3536 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3540 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3541 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3542 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3543 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3546 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3548 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3549 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3550 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3551 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3552 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3553 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3554 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3556 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3557 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3559 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3561 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3562 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3564 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3565 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3568 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3571 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3572 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3573 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3574 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3576 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3577 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3581 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3582 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3586 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3587 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3588 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3590 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3591 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3592 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3594 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3595 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3596 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3597 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3599 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3600 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3601 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3603 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3604 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3605 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3606 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3608 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3609 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3611 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3612 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3614 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3616 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3617 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3619 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3620 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3621 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3623 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3626 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3627 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3630 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3631 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3632 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3637 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3638 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3640 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3644 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3645 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3648 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3649 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3650 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3651 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3652 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3653 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3655 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3656 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3657 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3658 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3659 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3660 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3661 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3664 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3667 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3669 let payment_event = {
3670 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3673 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3674 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3675 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3677 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3679 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3680 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3682 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3683 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3684 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3686 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3688 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3689 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3690 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3693 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3694 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3695 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3696 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3699 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3700 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3701 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3709 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3710 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3711 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3712 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3713 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3714 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3716 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3717 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3718 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3720 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3721 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3723 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3724 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3725 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3726 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3727 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3728 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3729 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3730 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3731 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3732 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3733 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3734 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3735 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3736 // Everything was delivered...
3737 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3740 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3741 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3742 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3744 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3748 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3749 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3752 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3754 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3755 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3759 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3760 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3761 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3763 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3765 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3766 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3768 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
3769 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3770 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3771 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3772 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3774 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3775 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3776 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3778 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3784 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3786 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3788 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3789 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3790 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3791 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3792 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3793 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3794 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3795 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3796 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3797 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3798 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3803 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3804 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3806 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3807 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3809 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3810 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3811 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3813 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3816 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3817 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3819 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3821 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3822 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3823 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3826 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3827 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3828 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3829 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3832 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3833 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3834 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3842 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3843 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3844 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3845 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3846 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3847 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3849 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3851 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3852 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3853 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3854 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3855 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3856 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3857 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3858 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3859 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3860 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3861 // Everything was delivered...
3862 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3865 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3866 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3868 if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3869 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3870 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3872 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3874 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3875 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3878 // Channel should still work fine...
3879 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3880 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3881 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3885 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3886 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3887 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3888 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3889 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3893 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3894 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3895 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3896 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3897 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3901 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3902 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3903 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3904 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3905 // channel_ready immediately instead.
3906 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3907 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3908 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3909 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3910 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3912 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3914 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3915 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3916 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3917 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3918 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3919 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3921 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3922 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3923 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3927 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3928 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3929 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3930 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3931 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3932 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3933 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3934 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3936 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3938 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3939 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3940 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3943 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3944 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3946 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3950 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3951 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3954 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3955 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3957 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3958 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3959 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3960 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3961 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3962 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3963 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3965 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3966 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3967 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3969 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3970 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3971 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3973 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3976 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3977 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3978 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3984 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3985 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3987 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
3988 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3989 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3990 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
3991 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3992 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3994 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3995 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3996 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3997 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3999 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4000 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4002 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4003 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4005 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4007 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4008 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4009 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4010 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4011 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4012 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4013 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4014 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4015 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4018 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4019 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4020 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4021 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4022 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4023 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4024 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4027 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4028 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4029 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4030 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4031 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4032 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4033 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4036 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4037 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4038 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4041 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4042 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4043 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4046 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4047 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4050 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4052 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4053 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4055 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4056 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4058 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4059 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4060 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4062 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4065 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4068 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4069 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4072 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4073 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4076 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4077 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4078 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4079 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4080 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4081 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4082 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4084 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4086 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4087 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4088 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4089 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4090 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4091 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4092 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4093 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4095 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4096 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4097 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4098 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4099 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4102 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4105 let mut block = Block {
4106 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4109 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4110 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4111 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4112 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4113 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4114 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4115 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4118 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4121 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4122 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4123 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4124 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4125 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4127 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4128 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4129 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4130 let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4131 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4132 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4136 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4137 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4138 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4141 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4142 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4143 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4144 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4145 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4146 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4147 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4148 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4150 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4151 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4152 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4153 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4155 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4156 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4158 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4160 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4163 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4164 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4165 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4166 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4169 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4170 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4171 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4172 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4176 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4177 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4178 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4179 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4182 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4184 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4185 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4186 match fail_commit[0] {
4187 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4188 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4189 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4191 _ => unreachable!(),
4193 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4195 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4200 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4201 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4202 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4205 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4206 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4208 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4209 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4210 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4211 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4212 for event in events.drain(..) {
4214 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4215 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4216 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4217 all_outputs.push(outp);
4220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4223 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4224 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4234 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4235 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4236 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4237 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4238 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4239 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4241 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4242 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4243 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4245 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4246 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4247 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4248 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4249 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4251 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4252 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4254 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4255 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4256 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4257 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4258 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4262 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4263 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4264 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4265 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4266 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4267 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4268 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4270 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4271 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4272 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4274 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4276 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4277 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4278 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4279 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4281 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4282 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4284 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4285 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4287 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4288 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4289 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4293 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4294 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4295 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4300 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4302 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4303 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4304 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4305 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4306 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4308 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4309 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4310 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4312 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4314 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4315 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4316 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4318 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4319 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4320 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4321 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4322 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4326 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4327 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4328 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4329 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4330 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4332 // Create some initial channels
4333 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4335 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4337 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4338 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4339 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4341 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4342 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4343 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4345 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4347 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4349 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4350 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4353 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4354 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4357 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4358 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4359 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4360 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4361 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4363 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4364 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4365 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4367 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4368 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4369 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4373 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4377 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4379 // Create some initial channels
4380 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4382 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4383 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4385 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4387 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4388 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4389 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4391 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4392 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4394 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4396 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4397 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4399 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4401 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4402 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4403 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4404 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4405 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4407 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4408 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4409 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4410 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4412 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4413 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4414 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4415 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4416 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4420 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4421 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4422 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4423 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4424 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4426 // Create some initial channels
4427 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4429 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4430 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4431 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4432 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4434 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4436 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4437 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4439 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4441 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4442 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4443 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4444 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4446 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4447 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4449 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4450 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4451 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4455 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4456 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4457 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4458 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4459 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4460 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4462 // Create some initial channels
4463 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4465 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4466 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4467 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4468 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4470 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4472 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4473 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4474 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4476 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4477 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4479 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4480 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4481 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4482 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4483 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4484 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4486 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4487 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4488 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4489 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4491 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4493 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4494 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4495 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4496 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4497 // transactions next...
4498 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4499 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4501 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4502 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4503 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4504 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4506 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4507 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4510 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4511 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4513 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4514 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4515 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4516 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4517 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4521 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4522 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4523 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4526 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4528 // Create some initial channels
4529 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4531 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4532 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4533 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4534 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4536 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4537 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4539 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4541 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4542 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4543 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4545 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4546 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4548 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4549 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4550 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4551 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4553 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4554 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4555 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4557 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4558 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4559 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4560 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4562 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4564 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4565 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4567 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4568 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4569 // transactions next...
4570 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4571 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4572 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4573 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4575 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4576 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4579 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4580 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4582 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4583 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4585 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4586 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4588 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4589 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4590 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4591 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4592 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4593 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4594 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4595 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4599 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4600 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4601 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4602 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4603 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4605 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4608 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4609 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4610 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4611 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4613 // Create some initial channels
4614 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4615 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4617 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4618 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4619 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4620 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4621 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4623 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4624 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4625 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4627 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4628 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4629 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4630 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4631 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4633 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4634 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4635 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4636 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4637 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4639 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4640 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4642 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4644 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4645 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4646 check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4647 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4648 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4649 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4651 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4652 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4653 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]});
4654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4655 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4656 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4658 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4659 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4662 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4663 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4664 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4665 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4666 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4667 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4672 let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4673 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4674 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4675 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4677 match nodes_2_event {
4678 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4679 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4682 match nodes_0_event {
4683 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4684 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4685 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4686 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4687 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4688 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4693 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4694 match msg_events[0] {
4695 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4696 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4699 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4700 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4701 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4702 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4703 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4704 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4705 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4706 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4707 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4708 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4709 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1); // Success tx
4711 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4716 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4717 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4718 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4719 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4720 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4721 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4722 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4723 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4724 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4725 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4726 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4727 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4728 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4729 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4731 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4732 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4733 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4735 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4736 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4737 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4738 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4739 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4741 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4743 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4744 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4745 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4746 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4747 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4748 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
4749 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4750 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4752 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4753 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4754 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4756 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4757 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4759 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4760 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4762 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4763 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4764 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4765 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4766 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4768 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4769 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4770 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4772 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4773 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4774 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4775 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4776 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4778 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4779 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4780 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4781 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4783 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4784 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4785 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4786 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4789 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4790 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4791 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4792 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4793 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4794 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4795 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4797 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4801 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4802 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4804 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4806 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4807 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4809 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4810 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4813 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4814 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4816 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4817 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4818 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4819 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4820 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4821 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4822 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4823 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4824 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4825 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4827 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4828 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4829 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4830 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4831 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4832 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4833 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4834 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4835 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4838 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4839 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4841 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4843 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4845 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4846 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4847 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4848 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4849 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4850 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4851 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4852 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4853 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4856 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4857 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4859 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4861 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4862 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4863 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4870 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4871 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4872 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4873 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4874 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4876 // Create some initial channels
4877 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4879 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4880 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4881 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4882 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4883 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4885 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4886 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4887 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4890 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4892 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4893 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4895 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4899 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4900 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4903 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4904 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4905 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4906 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4907 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4911 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4912 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4914 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4915 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4916 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4917 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4918 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4919 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4922 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4923 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4924 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4925 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4926 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4927 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4928 // use the same payment hashes.
4929 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4934 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4935 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4937 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4938 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4939 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4940 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4941 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4942 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4943 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4945 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4946 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4947 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4948 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4949 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4951 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4952 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4953 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4954 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4956 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4957 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4959 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4961 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4962 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4964 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4966 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4968 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4970 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4971 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4973 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4975 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4978 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4980 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4981 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4984 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4986 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4987 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4989 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4990 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4991 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4992 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4993 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4995 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4996 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4997 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4998 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4999 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5000 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5003 let failed_destinations = vec![
5004 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5005 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5006 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5007 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5009 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5012 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5013 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5014 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5015 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5016 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5017 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5019 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5020 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5021 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5024 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5025 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5026 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5028 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5031 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5032 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5033 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5034 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5036 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5038 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5039 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5040 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5041 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5042 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5043 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5044 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5045 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5047 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5049 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5050 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5051 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5052 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5053 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5054 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5055 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5056 if deliver_last_raa {
5057 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5059 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5062 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5063 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5064 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5065 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5067 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5068 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5069 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5071 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5072 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5073 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5075 if announce_latest {
5076 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5078 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5080 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5081 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5082 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5083 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5086 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5089 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5090 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5093 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5094 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5095 if deliver_last_raa {
5096 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5098 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5099 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5101 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5102 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5104 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5107 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5111 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5112 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5113 let mut a_done = false;
5114 for msg in cs_msgs {
5116 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5117 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5118 // should be failed-backwards here.
5119 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5120 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5121 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5122 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5124 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5129 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5130 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5131 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5133 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5134 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5137 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5138 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5139 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5140 if announce_latest {
5141 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5142 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5143 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5146 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5148 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5152 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5153 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5154 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5155 let mut as_updates = 0;
5156 for event in as_events.iter() {
5157 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5158 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5159 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5160 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5162 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5164 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5167 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5168 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5170 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5171 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5172 if announce_latest {
5173 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5174 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5176 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5178 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5179 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5180 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5181 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5182 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5183 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5184 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5185 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5186 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5188 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5190 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5193 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5194 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5196 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5197 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5198 if announce_latest {
5199 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5201 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5203 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5204 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5205 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5206 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5207 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5208 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5212 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5213 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5217 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5218 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5222 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5223 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5224 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5225 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5229 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5230 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5231 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5232 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5233 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5235 // Create some initial channels
5236 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5238 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5239 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5240 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5241 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5243 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5244 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5245 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5247 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5248 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5250 let htlc_timeout = {
5251 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5252 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5253 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5254 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5255 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5259 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5260 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5261 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5263 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5264 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5265 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5266 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5267 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5268 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5269 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5270 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5271 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5272 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5273 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5277 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5278 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5279 // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5280 // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5281 // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5283 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5285 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5286 let seed = [42; 32];
5287 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5288 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5289 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5290 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5291 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5292 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5293 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5294 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5295 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5297 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5298 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5300 // Create some initial channels
5301 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5303 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5304 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5305 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5307 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5308 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5309 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5310 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5311 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5313 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5314 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5315 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5316 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5317 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5319 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5320 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5321 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5322 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5323 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5324 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5325 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5326 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5329 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5330 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5331 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5332 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5334 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5336 let htlc_timeout = {
5337 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5338 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5339 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5340 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5341 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5345 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5346 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5347 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5349 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5350 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5351 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5352 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5353 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5354 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5355 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5356 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5357 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5358 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5359 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5360 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5364 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5365 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5366 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5367 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5368 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5370 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5372 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5373 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5375 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5376 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5377 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5379 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5380 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5381 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5383 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5384 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5385 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5387 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5388 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5389 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5392 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5393 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5394 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5395 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5396 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5397 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5399 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5401 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5402 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5403 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5405 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5407 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5408 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5409 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5411 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5413 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5414 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5417 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5418 let mut block = Block {
5419 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5422 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5423 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5424 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5426 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5427 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5429 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5432 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5433 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5434 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5435 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5436 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5437 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5439 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5440 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5443 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5445 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5446 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5447 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5449 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5450 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5452 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5453 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5454 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5456 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5457 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5459 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5462 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5463 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5464 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5465 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5466 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5467 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5469 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5470 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5471 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5472 // actually revoked.
5473 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5474 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5475 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5476 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5479 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5480 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5481 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5483 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5484 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5486 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5488 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5490 if check_revoke_no_close {
5491 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5495 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5496 let mut block = Block {
5497 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5500 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5501 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5502 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5504 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5505 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5506 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5508 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5510 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5514 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5515 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5516 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5517 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5518 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5519 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5520 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5522 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5523 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5524 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5526 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5527 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5528 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5530 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5531 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5535 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5536 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5537 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5538 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5539 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5544 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5545 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5546 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5547 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5548 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5549 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5550 for node in nodes.iter() {
5551 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5554 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5555 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5556 let push_msat=10001;
5557 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5558 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5559 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5560 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5562 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5563 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5564 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5568 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5569 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5570 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5571 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5572 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5574 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5575 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5576 let push_msat=10001;
5577 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5579 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5580 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5581 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5582 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5583 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5585 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5586 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5587 let push_msat=10001;
5588 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5589 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5590 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5592 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5593 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5594 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5596 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5597 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5598 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5600 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5601 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5602 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5604 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5605 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5606 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5607 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5608 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5609 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5613 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5614 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5615 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5616 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5617 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5619 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5620 let push_msat=10001;
5621 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5622 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5623 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5624 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5626 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5627 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5628 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5629 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5632 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5634 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5637 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5638 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5639 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5640 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5642 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5646 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5647 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5649 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5650 // pending_update_fee.
5652 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5653 *feerate_lock += 20;
5655 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5658 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5659 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5660 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5661 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5662 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5667 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5669 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5670 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5671 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5672 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5674 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5675 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5676 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5678 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5679 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5680 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5681 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5683 // Flush the pending fee update.
5684 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5685 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5687 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5690 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5691 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5692 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5693 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5694 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5695 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5696 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5697 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5698 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5700 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5701 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5702 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5704 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5705 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5706 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5707 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5708 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5710 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5713 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5714 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5716 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5720 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5721 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5722 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5724 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5725 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5726 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5727 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5728 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5729 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5731 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5732 // pending_update_fee.
5734 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5735 *feerate_lock += 200;
5737 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5740 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5741 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5742 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5743 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5744 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5749 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5751 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5752 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5753 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5754 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5756 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5758 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5759 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5760 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5762 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5763 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5764 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5765 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5766 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5767 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5768 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5769 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5771 // Flush the pending fee update.
5772 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5773 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5775 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5776 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5779 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5780 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5781 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5782 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5783 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5784 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5785 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5786 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5787 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5789 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5790 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5791 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5793 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5794 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5795 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5796 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5797 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5799 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5802 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5803 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5808 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5809 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5810 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5811 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5812 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5814 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5815 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5816 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5818 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5820 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5821 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5822 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5823 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5825 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5828 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5829 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5830 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5832 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5835 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5837 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5839 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5840 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5841 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5842 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5845 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5846 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5847 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5850 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5851 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5852 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5853 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5854 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5855 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5856 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5857 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5858 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5859 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5860 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5862 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5863 // pending_update_fee.
5865 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5866 *feerate_lock += 20;
5868 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5871 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5872 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5873 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5874 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5875 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5877 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5880 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5882 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5883 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5884 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5885 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5887 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5889 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5890 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5891 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5892 let payment_event = {
5893 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5896 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5897 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5899 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5901 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5903 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5904 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5906 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5907 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5909 // Flush the pending fee update.
5910 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5911 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5913 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5914 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5917 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5918 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5919 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5921 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5922 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5928 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5930 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5932 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5933 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5934 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5935 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5936 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5937 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5940 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5941 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5944 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5945 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5946 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5947 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5948 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5949 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5950 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5951 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5952 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5953 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5955 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5958 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5959 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5960 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5962 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5963 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5965 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5966 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5968 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5969 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5970 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5971 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5974 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5975 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5979 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5980 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5981 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5984 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5985 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5986 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5987 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5988 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5989 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5990 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5992 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5993 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5995 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5996 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5997 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5998 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", 1);
6002 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6003 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6004 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6005 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6006 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6007 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6008 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6010 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6011 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6012 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6013 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6015 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6016 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6020 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6021 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6022 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6023 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6024 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6025 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6026 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6028 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6029 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6031 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6032 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6034 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6035 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6036 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6038 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6042 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6043 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6044 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6045 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6046 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6047 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6048 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6049 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6051 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6052 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6053 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6054 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6055 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6056 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6060 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6061 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6062 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6063 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6064 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6065 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6066 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6067 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6068 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6069 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6070 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6072 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6073 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6074 let payment_event = {
6075 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6078 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6079 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6080 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6081 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6085 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6087 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6089 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6091 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6092 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6094 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6095 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6096 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6098 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6099 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
6103 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6104 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6108 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6109 let channel_value = 100000;
6110 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6111 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6113 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6115 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6116 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6118 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6119 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6120 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6122 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6123 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
6125 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6128 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6130 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6131 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6132 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6133 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6134 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6135 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6136 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6137 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6139 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6140 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6141 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6142 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6145 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6146 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6148 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6149 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6150 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6151 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6152 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6153 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6155 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6159 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6160 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6161 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6162 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6163 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6164 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6165 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6167 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6168 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6169 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6170 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6171 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6172 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6174 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6175 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6176 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6178 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6180 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6181 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6182 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6183 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6184 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6186 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6187 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6188 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6190 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6194 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6195 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6196 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6197 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6198 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6199 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6200 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6201 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6203 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6204 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6205 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6206 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6207 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6208 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6210 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6214 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6215 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6216 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6219 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6220 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6221 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6223 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6224 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6226 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6227 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6228 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6230 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6234 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6235 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6236 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6237 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6238 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6239 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6240 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6242 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6243 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6245 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6246 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6247 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6249 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6250 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6251 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6253 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6257 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6258 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6259 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6260 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6261 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6262 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6264 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6265 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6266 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6268 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6269 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6270 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6272 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6273 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6274 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6276 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6280 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6281 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6282 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6283 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6284 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6285 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6286 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6287 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6289 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6290 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6291 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6293 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6294 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6296 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6297 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6298 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6299 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
6300 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6301 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6302 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
6303 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6304 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6305 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6306 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6307 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6308 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6311 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6312 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6313 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6315 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6317 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6319 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6320 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6321 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6323 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6327 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6328 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6333 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6334 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6335 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6336 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6339 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6340 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6342 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6345 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6348 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6350 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6351 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6352 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6354 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6358 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6359 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6361 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6362 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6363 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6364 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6365 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6367 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6368 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6370 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6371 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6373 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6376 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6379 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6381 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6382 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6383 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6385 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6389 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6390 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6392 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6393 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6395 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6396 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6398 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6399 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6401 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6402 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6403 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6406 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6407 failure_code: 0x8000,
6410 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6412 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6413 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6414 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6416 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6420 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6421 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6423 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6424 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6425 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6426 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6427 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6429 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6431 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6433 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6435 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6436 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6437 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6439 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6440 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6441 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6442 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6443 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6444 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6445 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6447 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6451 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6453 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6455 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6456 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6457 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6459 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6463 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6464 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6466 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6467 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6468 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6469 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6470 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6472 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6474 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6476 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6478 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6479 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6480 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6482 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6483 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6484 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6485 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6486 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6487 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6488 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6490 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6494 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6496 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6498 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6499 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6500 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6502 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6506 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6507 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6509 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6510 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6511 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6512 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6513 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6515 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6516 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6519 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6520 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6522 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6524 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6526 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6528 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6530 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6531 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6532 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6533 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6534 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6535 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6536 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6538 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6541 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6542 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6544 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6545 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6546 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6548 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6552 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6553 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6554 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6556 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6557 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6558 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6559 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6560 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6561 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6563 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6566 let mut payment_event = {
6567 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6569 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6570 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6571 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6573 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6575 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6576 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6577 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6578 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6580 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6581 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6584 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6585 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6587 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6589 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6590 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6591 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6593 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6594 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6595 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6596 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6597 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6598 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6599 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6601 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6605 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6608 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6609 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6610 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6611 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6613 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6615 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6616 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6617 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6618 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6619 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6620 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6629 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6630 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6631 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6633 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6634 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6635 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6637 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6640 let mut payment_event = {
6641 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6643 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6646 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6647 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6648 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6650 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6651 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6654 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6655 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6657 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6659 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6660 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6662 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6663 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6664 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6665 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6667 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6668 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6670 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6673 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6674 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6675 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6676 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6677 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6681 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6682 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6683 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6685 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6688 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6689 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6691 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6692 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6694 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6696 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6697 assert!(is_permanent);
6698 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6700 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6703 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6704 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6709 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6712 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6713 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6714 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6715 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6717 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6718 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6719 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6720 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6721 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6722 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6724 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6725 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6727 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6728 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6729 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6730 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6732 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6733 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6735 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6736 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6738 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6741 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6742 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6743 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6746 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6747 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6749 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6751 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6752 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6754 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6757 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6758 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6760 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6763 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6764 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6765 if announce_latest {
6766 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6768 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6771 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6773 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6775 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6776 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6777 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6778 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6779 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6780 let mut first_failed = false;
6781 for event in events {
6783 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6784 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6785 assert!(!first_failed);
6786 first_failed = true;
6788 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6791 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6792 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6798 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6799 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6800 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6803 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6804 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6805 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6806 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6807 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6808 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6809 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6811 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6812 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6813 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6814 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6815 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6817 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6818 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6820 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6821 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6823 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6824 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6826 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6828 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6829 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6832 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6834 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6835 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6836 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6837 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6838 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6840 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6841 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6843 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6844 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6845 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6846 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6847 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6848 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6849 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6850 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6852 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6853 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6854 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6856 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6857 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6859 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6860 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6861 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6862 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6863 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6864 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6865 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6868 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6870 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 12);
6872 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6873 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6874 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6875 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6876 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6881 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6882 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6883 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6884 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6888 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6889 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6891 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6892 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6893 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6894 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6895 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6896 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6897 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6898 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6899 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6901 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6902 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6903 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6904 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6907 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6908 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6910 } else { assert!(false) }
6912 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6913 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6914 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6915 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6916 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6917 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6918 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6921 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6922 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6924 } else { assert!(false); }
6926 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6927 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6928 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6929 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6930 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6931 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6933 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6935 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6936 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6937 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6941 } else { panic!(); }
6942 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6944 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6945 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6946 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6947 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6948 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6949 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6950 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6953 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6954 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6956 } else { assert!(false); }
6960 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6961 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6962 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6963 // to B, B should refuse payment.
6965 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6966 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6967 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6968 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6970 // Create some initial channels
6971 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6973 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
6974 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6975 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6976 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6977 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6978 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
6979 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6982 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6983 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6984 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6985 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6986 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6988 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6989 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6990 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6991 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6993 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6994 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6995 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6997 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6998 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6999 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7000 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7001 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7002 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7003 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7004 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7005 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7006 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7008 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7012 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7013 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7015 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7016 let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7017 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7018 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7022 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7023 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7024 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7026 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7027 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7028 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7029 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7031 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7032 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7033 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7036 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7037 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7039 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7040 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7041 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7042 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7043 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7044 for e in msg_events {
7046 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7047 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7048 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7049 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7050 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7053 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7057 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
7058 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7059 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7060 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
7061 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7062 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7064 // Reestablish chan_1
7065 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7066 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7067 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7068 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7069 // Reestablish chan_2
7070 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7071 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7072 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7073 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7074 // Reestablish chan_3
7075 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7076 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7077 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7078 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7080 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7081 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7082 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7083 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7084 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7085 for e in msg_events {
7087 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7088 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7089 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7090 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7092 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7093 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7096 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7099 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7100 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7104 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7105 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7106 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7108 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7109 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7110 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7111 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7113 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7115 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7116 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7117 .with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7118 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7119 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7121 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7122 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7123 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7124 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7125 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7126 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7128 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7129 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7130 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7131 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7135 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7136 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7138 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7139 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7140 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7141 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7144 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7148 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7149 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7150 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7151 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7152 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7153 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7154 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7155 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7159 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7160 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7161 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7162 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7164 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7165 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7166 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7167 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7168 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7169 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7170 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7171 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7172 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7173 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7174 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7175 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7176 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7180 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7182 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7183 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7185 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7187 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7188 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7189 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7190 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7191 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7192 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7193 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7194 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7195 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7196 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7197 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7198 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7199 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7203 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7205 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7206 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7210 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7211 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7212 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7214 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7215 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7216 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7217 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7218 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7220 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7221 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7222 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
7223 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7224 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7225 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7226 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7227 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7228 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7229 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7230 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7231 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7233 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7234 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7235 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7237 // Revoke local commitment tx
7238 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7240 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7241 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7242 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7243 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7245 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7246 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7248 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7249 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7251 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7252 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7253 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7255 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7256 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7257 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7258 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7260 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7261 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7262 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7263 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7264 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7265 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
7266 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7267 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7268 match events.last().unwrap() {
7269 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7270 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7276 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7277 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7278 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7280 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7281 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7282 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7283 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7285 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7286 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7287 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7288 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7289 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7290 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7292 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7293 // available, which we check here:
7294 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7295 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7296 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7298 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7299 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7301 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7302 // output, checked above).
7303 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7304 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7305 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7307 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7308 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7309 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7310 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7311 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7315 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7316 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7317 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7318 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7319 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7321 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7322 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7323 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7324 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7326 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7327 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7329 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7330 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7331 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7332 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7333 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7334 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7335 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7336 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7340 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7341 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7342 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7343 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7345 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7346 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7347 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7348 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7349 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7350 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7351 // up bumped justice generation.
7352 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7355 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7360 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7361 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7362 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7365 // Provide preimage for one
7366 // Check aggregation
7368 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7369 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7370 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7371 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7373 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7374 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7375 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7377 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7378 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7379 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7380 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7381 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7383 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7384 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7385 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7386 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7388 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7390 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7394 let feerate_timeout;
7395 let feerate_preimage;
7397 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7398 // 3 transactions including:
7399 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7400 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7401 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7402 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7403 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7404 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7405 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7406 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7408 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7409 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7410 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7411 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7413 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7414 (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7416 (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7419 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7420 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7421 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7423 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7424 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7425 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7426 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7430 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7431 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7433 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7434 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7436 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7437 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7438 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7439 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7440 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7441 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7443 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7444 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7445 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7446 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7447 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7449 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7450 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7451 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7452 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7453 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7458 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7459 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7463 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7464 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7465 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7466 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7467 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7468 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7469 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7470 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7472 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7473 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7474 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7475 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7476 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7478 let per_commitment_secret;
7479 let next_per_commitment_point;
7481 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7482 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7483 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7485 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7487 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7488 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7489 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7491 // Must revoke without gaps
7492 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7493 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7495 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7496 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7497 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7500 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7501 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7502 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7504 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7508 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7509 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7510 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7515 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7517 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7518 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7519 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7520 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7522 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7523 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7524 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7526 // Revoke local commitment tx
7527 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7529 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7530 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7531 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7532 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7534 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7535 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7537 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7539 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7540 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7541 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7542 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7543 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7544 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7548 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7549 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7550 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7552 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7553 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7554 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7559 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7560 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7561 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7562 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7563 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7564 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7565 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7566 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
7568 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7569 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7570 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7572 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7574 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7575 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7576 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7578 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7580 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7581 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7582 // can get our balance.
7584 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7585 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7586 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7587 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7588 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7589 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7590 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7591 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7593 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7597 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7598 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7599 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7600 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7601 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7602 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7603 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7605 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7607 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7608 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7609 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7610 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7611 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7613 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7614 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7616 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7618 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7620 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7621 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7622 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7624 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7625 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7626 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7633 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7637 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7639 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7640 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7641 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7643 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7645 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7646 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7647 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7648 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7652 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7653 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7654 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7655 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7656 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7657 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7658 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7660 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7661 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7662 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7664 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7665 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7666 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7670 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7671 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7672 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7673 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7674 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7675 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7677 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7678 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7679 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7680 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7681 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7682 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7683 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7684 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7685 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7686 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7687 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7688 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7690 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7691 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7692 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7693 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7695 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7696 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7697 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7698 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7699 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7701 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7702 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7704 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7705 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7706 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7707 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7708 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7709 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7711 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7712 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7714 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7715 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7716 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7718 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7722 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7723 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7724 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7725 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7726 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7727 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7728 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7730 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7731 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7733 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7735 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7736 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7737 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7739 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7741 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7742 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7747 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7748 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7750 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7751 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7752 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7754 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7757 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7759 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7760 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7762 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7764 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7765 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7772 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7773 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7774 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7775 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7776 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7777 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7778 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7780 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7781 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7783 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7785 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7786 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7787 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7789 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7791 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7792 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7797 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7798 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7800 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7801 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7802 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7804 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7806 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7810 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7811 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7812 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7813 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7814 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7815 // and the channel should be closed.
7816 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7817 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7818 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7819 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7820 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7821 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7823 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7824 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7825 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7827 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7829 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7830 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7832 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7833 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7835 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7836 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7837 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7838 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7839 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7840 let accept_chan_msg = {
7841 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7842 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7843 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7844 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7846 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7848 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7850 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7851 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7853 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7854 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7856 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7857 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7859 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7860 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7861 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7862 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7863 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7864 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7869 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7873 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7874 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7875 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7876 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7877 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7878 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7879 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7881 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7882 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7884 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7886 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7887 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7888 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7890 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7892 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7893 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7894 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7896 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7897 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7899 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7900 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7903 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7906 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7907 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7908 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7910 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7911 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7912 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7914 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7919 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7920 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7921 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7922 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7923 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7925 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7926 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7928 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7929 assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7931 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7932 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7937 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
7938 // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
7939 // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
7940 // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
7941 // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
7942 // a PaymentClaimable event too early
7944 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
7945 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
7946 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
7947 let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7949 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7950 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7951 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7952 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7954 let total_msat = 100_000;
7955 let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
7956 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
7957 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
7959 let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
7960 path_1[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7961 path_1[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7962 path_1[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
7963 path_1[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7964 path_1[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
7965 route.paths.push(path_1);
7967 let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
7968 path_2[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7969 path_2[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7970 path_2[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
7971 path_2[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7972 path_2[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
7973 route.paths.push(path_2);
7976 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
7977 let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
7978 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
7979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
7981 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7982 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
7985 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
7986 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7987 let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
7989 for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
7990 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
7992 if idx == 0 { // routing node
7993 let session_priv = [3; 32];
7994 let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
7995 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
7996 let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
7997 let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000, &Some(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
7998 // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
7999 // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8000 onion_payloads[1].amt_to_forward = 99_000;
8001 let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
8002 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8005 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8006 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8007 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8008 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8011 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8012 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8013 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8014 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8015 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8017 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8018 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8025 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8026 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8028 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8031 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8033 let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8034 let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8036 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8037 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8038 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8039 let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8044 // Create channels for each amount
8045 let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8046 let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8047 let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8048 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8049 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8050 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8051 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8052 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8053 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8054 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8055 expected_paths.push(path);
8057 let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8059 // Create a route for each amount
8060 let example_amount = 100000;
8061 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8062 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8063 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8064 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8065 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8066 path[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8067 path[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8068 path[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8069 path[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8070 path[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8071 route.paths.push(path);
8074 // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8075 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8076 let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8077 nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8080 let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8081 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8082 let mut amount_received = 0;
8083 for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8084 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8086 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8087 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8088 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8089 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8092 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8096 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8097 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8098 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8102 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8103 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8107 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8109 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8110 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8111 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8112 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8114 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8115 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8116 route.paths.push(path);
8117 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8118 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8119 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8120 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8121 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8122 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8123 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8124 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8128 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8129 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8131 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8132 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8133 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8135 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8138 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8139 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8140 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8142 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8143 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8145 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8147 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8148 // values from previous calls.
8149 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8150 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8151 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8153 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8155 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8156 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8158 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8166 #[allow(deprecated)]
8167 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8168 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8169 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8170 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8171 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8172 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8173 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8175 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8177 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8179 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8180 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8181 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8182 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8183 } else { panic!(); }
8185 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8187 header: BlockHeader {
8189 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8190 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8191 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8195 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8196 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8197 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8198 } else { panic!(); }
8200 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8201 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8202 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8203 block.header.time += 1;
8204 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8205 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8206 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8209 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8210 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8212 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8213 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8214 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8215 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8217 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8218 // values from previous calls.
8219 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8220 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8221 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8223 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8224 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8225 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8226 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8233 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8234 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8235 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8236 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8237 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8238 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8240 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8242 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8243 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8244 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8245 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8247 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8248 // resulting events.
8249 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8250 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8252 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8253 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8254 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8255 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8257 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8258 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8259 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8260 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8263 // We should fail the payment back
8264 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8265 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8266 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8267 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8268 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8270 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8275 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8276 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8277 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8279 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8280 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8281 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8282 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8284 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8285 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8286 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8287 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8289 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8290 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8291 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8292 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8296 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8297 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8298 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8299 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8302 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8303 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8304 // commitment at same time.
8306 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8307 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8308 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8309 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8311 // Create some initial channel
8312 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8313 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8315 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8316 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8318 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8319 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8321 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8322 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8323 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8324 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8327 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8328 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8329 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8330 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8333 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8334 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8337 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8338 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8339 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8340 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8341 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8342 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8344 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8345 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8347 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8349 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8350 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8351 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8353 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8354 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8355 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8356 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8357 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8358 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8359 } else { assert!(false); }
8361 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8363 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8364 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8368 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8369 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8370 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8371 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8372 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8377 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8379 // Create some initial channel
8380 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8381 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8383 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8384 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8386 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8387 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8389 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8390 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8391 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8392 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8393 let watchtower_alice = {
8395 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8396 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8397 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8398 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8401 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8402 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8405 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8406 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8407 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8408 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8409 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8410 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8412 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8414 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8415 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8419 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8420 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8421 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8422 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8423 let watchtower_bob = {
8425 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8426 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8427 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8428 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8431 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8432 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8435 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8436 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8438 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8439 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8441 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8445 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8446 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8447 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8449 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8450 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8451 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8452 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8453 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8454 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8455 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8456 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8457 } else { assert!(false); }
8459 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8462 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8463 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8464 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8466 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8469 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8470 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8471 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8475 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8476 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8477 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8479 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8480 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8481 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8486 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8487 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8488 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8491 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8492 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8494 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8495 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8496 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8497 // before receiving funding_signed.
8498 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8499 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8500 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8501 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8503 // Create an initial channel
8504 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8505 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8506 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8507 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8508 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8510 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8511 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8513 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8516 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8517 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8518 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8519 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8520 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true);
8524 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8525 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8526 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8527 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8528 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8529 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8530 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8532 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8533 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8534 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8535 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8537 // Create some initial channels
8538 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8540 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8541 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8542 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8543 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8544 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8545 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8547 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8548 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8549 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8550 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8551 // this test before #653 fix.
8552 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8553 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8555 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8556 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8558 let htlc_timeout = {
8559 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8560 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8561 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8562 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8563 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8567 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8568 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8569 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8570 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8573 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8574 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8575 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8576 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8578 // Steps of the test:
8579 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8580 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8581 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8582 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8583 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8584 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8585 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8586 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8587 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8588 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8589 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8590 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8592 // Create some initial channels
8593 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8594 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8596 // Steps (1) and (2):
8597 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8598 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8600 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8601 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8602 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8603 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8604 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8605 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8606 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8608 // Steps (3) and (4):
8609 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8610 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8611 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8612 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8615 if !broadcast_alice {
8616 force_closing_node = 1;
8617 counterparty_node = 0;
8619 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8620 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8622 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8623 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8624 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8625 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8626 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8628 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8629 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8630 if broadcast_alice {
8631 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8633 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8638 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8639 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8640 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8642 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8644 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8645 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8646 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8647 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8648 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8649 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8651 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8652 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8653 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8654 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8655 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8656 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8658 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8659 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8661 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8664 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8665 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8666 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8669 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8670 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8671 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8672 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8673 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8678 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8679 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8680 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8683 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8686 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8688 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8691 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8692 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8693 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8694 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8695 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8698 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8700 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8703 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8704 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8705 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8706 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8707 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8708 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8709 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8710 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8711 if broadcast_alice {
8712 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8714 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8716 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8717 if broadcast_alice {
8718 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8719 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8721 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8722 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8727 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8728 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8730 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8731 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8732 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8734 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8735 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8736 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8737 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8738 if broadcast_alice {
8739 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8740 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8741 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8743 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8744 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8745 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8751 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8752 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8753 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8754 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8755 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8759 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8760 // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8761 // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8762 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8763 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8764 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8765 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8767 // Create an first channel channel
8768 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8769 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8771 // Create an second channel
8772 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8773 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8775 // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8776 // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8777 open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8779 // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8780 // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8781 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8783 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8784 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8786 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8787 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8788 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8790 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8794 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8796 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8797 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8799 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8800 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8801 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8809 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8810 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8811 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8813 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8814 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8815 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8816 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8817 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8818 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8819 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8820 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8822 // Create an initial channel
8823 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8824 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8825 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8826 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8828 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8829 // that it is rejected.
8830 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8832 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8833 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8835 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8836 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8837 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8838 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8839 // move forward with it.
8840 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8841 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8847 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8848 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8850 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8853 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8854 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8856 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8857 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8858 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8859 added_monitors.clear();
8861 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8863 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8864 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8866 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8869 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8870 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8871 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8872 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8873 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8875 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8876 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8878 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8879 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8880 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8881 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8882 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8884 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8888 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8889 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8890 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8891 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8892 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8893 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8895 let funding_created = {
8896 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8897 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8898 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8899 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8900 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8901 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8902 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8903 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8904 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8907 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8908 // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8909 // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8912 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8914 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8915 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8917 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8918 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8919 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8920 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8921 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8927 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8928 // everything is functional.
8929 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8931 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8932 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8933 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8934 added_monitors.clear();
8937 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8938 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8939 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8940 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8942 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8943 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8944 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8946 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8950 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8951 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8953 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8954 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8955 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8956 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8957 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8958 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8959 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8961 // Create some initial channels
8962 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8963 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8964 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
8966 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8967 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8968 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8970 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8971 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8972 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8974 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8975 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8977 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8978 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
8979 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8980 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8981 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8982 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8984 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8985 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8986 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8988 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
8989 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8990 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8992 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8993 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8998 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8999 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9001 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9003 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9004 // peer_disconnected.
9005 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9006 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9008 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9009 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9010 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9014 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9015 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9017 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9018 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9019 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9020 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9022 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9023 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9024 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9025 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9026 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9027 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9028 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9030 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9031 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9032 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9034 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9036 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9037 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9038 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9040 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9041 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9042 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9043 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9044 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9047 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9048 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9051 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9054 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9055 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9057 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9058 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9059 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9061 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9062 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9063 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9065 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9066 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9067 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9068 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9069 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9070 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9071 } else { panic!(); }
9072 } else { panic!(); }
9073 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9075 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9076 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9077 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9078 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9079 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9080 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9081 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9085 script_sig: Script::new(),
9086 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9087 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9089 output: vec![TxOut {
9091 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9094 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9095 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9098 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9099 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9100 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9101 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9102 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9103 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9104 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9105 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9106 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9107 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9108 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9109 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9110 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9111 // until we learned about an additional block.
9113 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9114 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9115 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9116 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9117 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9118 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9119 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9122 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9123 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9124 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9125 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9127 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9128 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9129 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9131 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9132 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9134 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9135 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9136 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9138 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9139 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9140 if test_height_before_timelock {
9141 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9142 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9143 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9144 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9146 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9147 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9148 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9149 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9150 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9151 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9153 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9154 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9156 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9157 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9158 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9159 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9160 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9161 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9164 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9165 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9166 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9167 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9168 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9169 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9170 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9171 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9172 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9177 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9178 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9179 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9182 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9183 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9184 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9185 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9186 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9188 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9190 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9191 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
9192 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9194 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9197 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9199 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9200 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9201 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9202 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9203 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9205 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9206 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9209 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9210 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9212 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9213 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9214 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9215 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9216 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9217 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9218 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9219 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9220 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9223 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9224 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9226 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9227 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9228 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9230 let expected_destinations = vec![
9231 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9232 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9234 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9235 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9238 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9239 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9241 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9242 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9243 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9245 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9246 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9247 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9248 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9249 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9250 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9252 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9253 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9254 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9257 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9258 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9259 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9261 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9263 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9268 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9269 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9270 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9271 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9272 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9273 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9277 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9278 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9279 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9280 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9284 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9285 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9286 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9287 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9288 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9289 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9290 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9292 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9293 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9294 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9295 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9297 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9298 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
9299 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9300 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9301 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9302 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9303 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9304 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9307 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9309 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9310 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9312 let session_privs = {
9313 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9314 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9315 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9316 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9317 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9319 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9323 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9325 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9327 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9329 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9333 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9334 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9335 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9337 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9338 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9340 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9343 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9344 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9345 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9347 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9349 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9351 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9352 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9353 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9355 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9356 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9357 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9358 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9362 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9363 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9364 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9366 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9369 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9370 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9371 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9373 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9375 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9378 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9379 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9380 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9382 do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9383 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9384 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9386 Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => { // The payment was abandoned earlier, so the fee paid will be None
9387 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
9389 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9392 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_hash, .. } => {
9393 assert_eq!(payment_hash.unwrap(), our_payment_hash);
9395 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9398 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_hash, .. } => {
9399 assert_eq!(payment_hash.unwrap(), our_payment_hash);
9401 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9406 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9407 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9408 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9409 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9410 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9412 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9413 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9414 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9415 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9416 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9417 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9418 final_value_msat: 10000,
9420 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9421 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9422 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9424 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9425 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9427 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9428 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9429 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9430 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9431 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9432 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9436 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9437 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9438 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9439 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9440 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9442 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9443 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9445 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9446 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9447 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9448 final_value_msat: 10000,
9450 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9451 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9452 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9453 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9454 let route = find_route(
9455 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9456 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9459 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9460 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9462 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9463 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9464 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9465 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9466 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9467 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9471 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9472 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9473 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9474 // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9476 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9477 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9478 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9479 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9481 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9482 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9483 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9484 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9486 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9487 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9488 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9489 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9490 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9491 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9494 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9495 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9496 // amount of time to respond to.
9498 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9499 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9500 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9502 let failed_destinations = vec![
9503 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9504 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9506 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9508 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9510 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9511 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9514 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9515 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9516 let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9517 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9519 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9520 // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9521 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9523 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9526 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9527 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9528 enum ExposureEvent {
9529 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9531 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9533 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9534 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9537 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9538 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9541 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9542 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9543 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9544 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9545 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9546 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9547 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9548 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9550 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9551 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9552 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9553 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9554 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9555 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9557 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9558 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9559 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9560 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9562 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9564 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9565 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9566 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9568 let opt_anchors = false;
9570 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9573 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9574 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9575 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9576 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9579 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9580 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9583 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9586 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9587 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9588 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9590 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9591 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9592 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9593 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9594 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9596 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9597 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9599 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9600 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9602 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9603 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9606 if dust_outbound_balance {
9607 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9608 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9609 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9610 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9611 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9612 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9615 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9616 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9617 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9618 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9619 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9623 if dust_outbound_balance {
9624 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9625 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9626 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9627 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9628 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9631 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9632 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9633 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9634 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9639 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9640 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9641 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9642 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9643 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9645 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9646 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9647 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9649 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9651 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9652 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9653 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9655 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9656 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9657 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9658 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9659 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9661 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9662 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9663 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9664 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9666 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9667 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9669 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9670 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9671 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9673 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9674 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9676 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9678 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9681 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9682 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9683 added_monitors.clear();
9687 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9688 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9689 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9690 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9691 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9692 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9693 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9694 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9695 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9696 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9697 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9698 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9699 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9703 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9704 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9705 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9706 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9707 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9709 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9710 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9711 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9712 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9713 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9715 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9717 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9718 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9719 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9720 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9721 let mut tx = match events[0] {
9722 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9723 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9724 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9725 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9730 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9731 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9732 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9733 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9738 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9739 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9740 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9741 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9745 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9746 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9747 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9748 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9749 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9750 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9751 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9752 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9754 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9756 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9758 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9759 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9762 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9764 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9765 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9767 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9770 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9771 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9773 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9774 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9775 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9777 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9780 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9783 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9784 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9786 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9789 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9790 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9792 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9793 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9794 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9799 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9802 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9803 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9805 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9808 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9809 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9811 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9812 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9813 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9814 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9815 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9818 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9822 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9823 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9824 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9825 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9826 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9827 let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9828 let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9829 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9830 let recv_value = 100_000;
9832 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9834 let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9835 let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9836 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9837 Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9838 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9840 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9841 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9843 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value, final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32).unwrap();
9844 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9846 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9847 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9848 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9849 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9850 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9851 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9854 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9855 None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9857 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9859 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9863 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9864 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9865 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9867 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9872 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9873 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9874 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9875 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9876 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);