1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
18 use crate::ln::channel;
19 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
20 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
21 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
22 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
23 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
24 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
25 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
26 use crate::util::test_utils;
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
32 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
33 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
35 use crate::prelude::*;
37 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
40 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
41 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
42 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
43 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
44 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
45 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
48 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
50 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
51 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
53 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
54 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
55 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
56 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
57 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
58 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
59 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
61 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
62 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
64 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
65 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
66 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
67 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
69 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
71 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
72 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
73 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
75 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
76 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
77 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
79 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
80 // transaction for nodes[1].
81 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
82 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
83 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
84 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
85 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
87 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
88 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
89 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
90 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
92 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
93 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
94 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
97 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
98 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
99 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
100 if has_anchors_htlc_event {
101 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
104 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
105 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
106 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
107 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
108 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
114 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
115 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
116 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
117 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
119 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
120 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
121 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
122 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
124 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
126 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
128 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
129 // before forwarding.
130 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
131 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
133 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
134 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
136 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
137 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
139 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
140 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
142 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
143 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
144 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
146 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
147 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
148 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
149 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
152 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
153 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
154 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
155 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
157 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
158 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
161 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
162 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
163 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
164 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
165 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
166 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
167 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
168 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
170 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
171 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
173 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
174 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
176 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
177 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
178 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
179 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
181 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
182 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
184 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
185 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
186 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
187 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
188 transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
189 outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
190 outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
191 inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
192 inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
194 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
195 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
196 amount_satoshis: 1_000, transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
197 outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
198 outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
199 inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
200 inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
202 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
204 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
205 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
206 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
207 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
208 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
210 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
211 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
212 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
213 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
214 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
215 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
216 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
217 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
219 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
220 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
221 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
223 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
224 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
226 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
227 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
229 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
230 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
232 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
233 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
234 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
236 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
237 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
238 amount_satoshis: 1000,
239 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
241 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
243 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
244 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
246 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
247 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
248 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
249 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
251 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
252 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
254 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
255 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
256 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
257 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
259 let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
261 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
265 let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
267 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
271 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
272 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
276 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
277 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
278 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
281 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
286 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
287 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
288 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
289 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
290 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
291 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
292 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
293 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
294 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
297 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
298 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
299 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
300 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
301 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
302 if prev_commitment_tx {
303 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
304 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
305 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
306 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
307 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
309 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
310 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
312 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
313 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
315 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
316 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
318 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
320 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
321 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
324 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
325 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
328 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
329 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
334 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
335 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
338 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
339 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
340 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
341 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
343 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
344 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
345 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
346 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
347 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
348 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
349 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
351 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
353 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
354 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
356 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
357 let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
358 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
359 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
361 outbound_payment: true,
363 let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
364 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
365 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
366 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
367 outbound_payment: true,
369 let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
370 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
371 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
374 let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
375 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
376 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
377 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
379 let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
380 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
381 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
385 let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
386 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
387 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
388 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
389 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
392 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
393 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
394 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
395 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
396 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
397 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
398 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
399 transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
400 outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 3000,
401 outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
402 inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
403 inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
404 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
405 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
406 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
407 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
408 transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
409 outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
410 outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
411 inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
412 inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 3000,
413 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
414 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
416 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
418 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
420 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
421 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
422 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
423 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
425 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
427 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
429 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
431 if prev_commitment_tx {
432 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
433 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
434 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
435 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
437 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
438 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
439 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
441 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
442 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
446 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
447 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
448 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
449 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
450 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
451 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
452 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
453 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
454 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
455 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
456 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
457 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
458 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
459 transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
460 outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 3000,
461 outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
462 inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
463 inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
464 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
465 if !prev_commitment_tx {
466 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
468 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
469 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
470 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
471 amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
472 transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
473 outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
474 outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
475 inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 3000,
476 inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
478 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
480 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
481 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
482 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
483 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
484 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
487 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
488 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
489 match events.pop().unwrap() {
490 Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
491 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
492 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
493 htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
495 panic!("Unexpected event");
497 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
498 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
499 htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
501 panic!("Unexpected event");
503 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
504 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
506 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
510 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
511 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
512 // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
513 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
514 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
515 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
516 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
517 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
518 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
520 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
521 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
523 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
524 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
525 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
527 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
528 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
529 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
531 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
532 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
533 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
534 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
535 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
536 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
537 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
538 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
539 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
540 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
541 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
542 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
543 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
544 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
545 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
546 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
547 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
548 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
550 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
552 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
553 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
555 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
556 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
557 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
559 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
560 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
561 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
562 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
563 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
564 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
565 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
566 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
567 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
569 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
570 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
572 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
573 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
574 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
575 if prev_commitment_tx {
576 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
578 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
580 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
581 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
582 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
583 assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
584 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
586 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
587 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
588 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
589 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
590 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
591 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
592 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
593 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
594 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
595 a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
596 // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
597 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
598 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
600 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
601 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
602 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
603 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
604 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
605 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
606 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
608 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
609 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
611 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
612 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
613 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
614 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
616 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
618 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
619 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
620 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
621 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
622 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
624 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
625 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
626 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
627 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
628 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
629 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
630 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
631 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
633 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
634 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
635 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
636 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
638 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
639 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
640 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
641 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
642 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
644 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
645 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
646 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
647 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
649 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
650 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
652 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
653 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
654 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
655 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
656 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
657 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
658 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
659 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
660 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
662 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
663 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
664 // monitor events or claimable balances.
665 for node in nodes.iter() {
666 connect_blocks(node, 6);
667 connect_blocks(node, 6);
668 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
669 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
674 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
675 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
676 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
677 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
678 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
681 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
682 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
683 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
684 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
685 // delay prior to spendability.
687 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
688 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
689 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
690 // claim by our counterparty).
691 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
692 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
693 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
695 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
696 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
698 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
699 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
701 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
703 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
704 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
707 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
708 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
711 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
712 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
717 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
718 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
721 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
722 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
723 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
724 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
726 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
727 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
728 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
729 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
732 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
733 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
734 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
736 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
737 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
739 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
740 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
741 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
744 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
745 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
746 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
748 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
749 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
750 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
751 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
753 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
755 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
756 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
758 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
759 // claimable balances.
760 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
761 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
763 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
764 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
765 let commitment_tx = {
766 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
767 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
768 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
769 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
772 let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
773 if anchors && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
774 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
775 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
776 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
779 let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
780 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
781 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
783 outbound_payment: true,
785 let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
786 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
787 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
788 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
789 outbound_payment: true,
792 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
793 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
794 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
795 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
796 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
797 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
798 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
799 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
801 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
802 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
804 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
805 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
806 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
807 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
808 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
810 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
812 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
813 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
814 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
815 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
816 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
817 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
819 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
821 let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
822 assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
823 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
824 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
826 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
827 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
828 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
829 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
830 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
831 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
832 // call, as described, two hunks down.
833 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
834 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
835 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
836 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
837 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
838 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
839 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
840 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
842 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
843 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
844 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
845 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
846 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
847 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
848 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
849 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
850 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
851 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
852 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
853 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
855 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
856 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
857 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
858 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
859 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
861 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
862 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
863 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
864 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
865 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
866 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
868 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
870 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
871 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
872 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
873 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
874 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
875 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
876 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
877 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
878 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
880 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
881 let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
883 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
884 to_self_spendable_output
887 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
888 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
889 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
890 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
891 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
893 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
894 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
895 // monitor events or claimable balances.
896 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
897 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
898 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
899 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
903 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
904 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
905 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
909 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
910 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
912 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
913 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
914 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
915 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
917 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
918 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
920 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
921 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
922 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
923 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
925 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
926 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
928 let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
929 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
930 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
931 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
932 outbound_payment: true,
934 let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
935 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
936 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
937 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
939 let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
940 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
941 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
942 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
944 let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
945 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
946 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
947 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
948 outbound_payment: true,
951 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
952 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
953 // HTLC output is spent.
954 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
955 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
956 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
957 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - commitment_tx_fee,
958 transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
959 outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
960 outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
961 inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
962 inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
963 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
964 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
966 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
967 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
968 transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
969 outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
970 outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
971 inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
972 inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
973 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
974 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
976 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
977 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
978 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
979 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
980 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
982 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
983 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
984 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
985 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
986 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
987 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
988 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
989 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
991 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
992 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
994 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
995 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
997 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
998 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1000 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
1001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1002 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1003 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1005 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1006 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1007 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
1008 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
1009 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
1010 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1011 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1013 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
1014 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
1015 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
1016 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
1018 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1019 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1020 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1021 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1022 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
1023 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
1025 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1026 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1028 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1029 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1030 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1032 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
1033 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1034 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
1035 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
1037 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
1038 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
1039 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
1040 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
1041 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
1042 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1043 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1044 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1046 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1047 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1049 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1050 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1051 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1053 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1054 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1055 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1056 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1057 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1058 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1059 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1060 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1061 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1062 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1063 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1065 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1067 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1068 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1069 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1070 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1071 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1072 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1073 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1074 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1076 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1078 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1079 // payment failure event.
1080 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1081 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1083 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1084 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1085 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1086 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1087 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1088 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1089 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1090 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1092 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1094 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1095 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1096 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1097 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1099 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1100 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1102 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1103 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1104 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1106 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1107 // was already claimed.
1108 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1109 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1110 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1111 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1112 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1114 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1116 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1117 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1118 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1119 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1121 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1123 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1124 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1126 assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1127 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1128 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1130 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1131 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1133 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1134 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1135 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1136 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1137 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1138 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1139 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1142 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1143 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1145 v.push((*t).clone());
1151 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1152 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1153 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1154 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1155 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1156 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1157 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1158 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1159 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1160 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1162 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1163 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1165 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1166 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1168 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1169 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1170 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1171 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1173 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1175 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1176 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1177 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1178 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1179 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1180 // later commitment transaction updates
1182 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1183 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1184 // HTLCs individually.
1186 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1187 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1188 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1190 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1192 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1193 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1195 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1196 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1198 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1199 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1200 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1202 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1204 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1205 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1207 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1208 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1210 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1212 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1213 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1216 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1217 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1218 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1219 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1220 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1221 events.retain(|ev| {
1223 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1224 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1225 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1228 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1229 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1235 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1236 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1238 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1242 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1243 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1245 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1247 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1248 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1249 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1250 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1251 transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
1252 outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 3000,
1253 outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
1254 inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
1255 inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
1256 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1257 amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1258 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1259 payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1260 outbound_payment: true,
1261 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1262 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1263 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1264 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1265 outbound_payment: true,
1266 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1267 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1268 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1269 payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1270 outbound_payment: true,
1272 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1274 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1275 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1276 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1278 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1279 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1281 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1282 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1283 let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1284 let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1286 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1287 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1288 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1289 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1290 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1291 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1293 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1294 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1295 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1296 let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1297 let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1298 let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1300 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1301 // claim balances separated out.
1302 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1303 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1304 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1305 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1306 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1307 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1308 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1309 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1312 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1313 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1315 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1316 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1317 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1319 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1321 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1322 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1323 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1324 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1326 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1327 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1328 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1329 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1331 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1332 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1333 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1334 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1337 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1338 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1339 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1341 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1342 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1343 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1346 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1347 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1348 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1350 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1351 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1354 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1355 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1357 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1359 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1360 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1362 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1363 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1364 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1365 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1367 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1368 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1369 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1370 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1371 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1372 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1373 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1374 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1375 amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1376 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1377 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1378 amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1379 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1380 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1381 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1382 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1384 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1386 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1387 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1389 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1390 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1391 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1392 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1393 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1395 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1396 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1397 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1398 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1399 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1400 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1401 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1402 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1403 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1404 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1405 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1407 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1408 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1409 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1410 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1411 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1412 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1413 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1417 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1418 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1419 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1420 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1421 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1424 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1425 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1426 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1427 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1428 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1429 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1431 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1432 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1434 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1435 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1437 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1439 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1440 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1443 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1444 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1447 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1448 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1453 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1454 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1457 // Create some initial channels
1458 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1459 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
1460 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1461 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1463 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1464 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1465 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1466 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1467 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1469 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output
1471 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output
1474 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1475 // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1476 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1478 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1480 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1481 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1483 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1484 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1485 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1487 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1489 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1491 let revoked_htlc_success = {
1492 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1493 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1494 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1495 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1496 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1497 if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1498 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1501 let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight() as u64 / 1000;
1503 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1505 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1507 let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1508 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1509 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1510 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1516 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1517 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1518 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1519 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1521 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1522 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1523 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1525 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1526 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1528 let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1529 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1530 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1532 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1533 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1534 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1535 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1536 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1537 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1538 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1539 Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1541 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1542 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1543 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1544 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1545 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1550 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1551 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1552 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1553 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1554 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1555 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1556 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1557 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1558 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1559 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1560 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1561 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1562 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1563 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1564 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1565 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1566 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1568 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1569 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1571 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1572 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1573 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1574 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1575 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1576 // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1577 // spent HTLC output)
1578 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1579 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1581 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1583 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1585 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1586 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1588 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1589 let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1591 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1592 // than with the HTLC itself.
1593 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1594 3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1596 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1597 3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1600 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1601 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1602 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1603 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1604 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1605 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1606 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1607 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1608 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1609 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1610 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1611 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1612 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1614 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1616 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1617 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1618 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1619 // to_self output to B
1620 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1621 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1622 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1623 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1624 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1625 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1627 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1629 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1630 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1631 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1632 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1633 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1634 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1635 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1637 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1639 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1640 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1641 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1642 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1643 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1644 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1645 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1648 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1650 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1651 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1652 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1653 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1656 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1657 let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1658 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1659 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1661 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1662 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1663 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1664 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1666 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1667 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1668 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1669 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1670 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1671 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1672 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1676 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1677 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1678 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1679 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1680 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1681 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1682 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1683 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1684 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1686 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1688 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1689 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1690 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1691 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1692 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1693 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1694 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1696 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1698 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1699 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1700 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1701 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value,
1702 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1703 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1704 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1705 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1707 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1709 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1710 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1711 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1712 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1714 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1716 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1717 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1718 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1719 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1720 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1721 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1722 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1726 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1727 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1728 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1731 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
1732 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1733 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1734 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1735 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1736 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1737 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1738 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1739 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1740 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1741 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1743 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1744 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1747 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1749 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1751 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1752 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1753 output: vec![TxOut {
1754 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1755 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1758 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1760 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1761 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1762 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1763 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1765 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1766 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1767 // revocation-claim transaction.
1769 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1770 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1772 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1774 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1775 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1776 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1777 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1779 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1780 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1782 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1783 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1785 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1788 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1789 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1792 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1795 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1798 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1799 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1800 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1802 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1803 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1805 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1807 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1808 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1809 transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
1810 outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
1811 outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
1812 inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
1813 inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
1814 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1815 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1816 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1817 payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1818 outbound_payment: true,
1819 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1820 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1821 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1822 payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1823 outbound_payment: true,
1825 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1827 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1828 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1829 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1832 let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1833 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1834 let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
1835 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1836 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
1837 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1838 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1839 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1840 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1841 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1842 Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
1844 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1845 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1846 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1847 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1848 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1852 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1854 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1855 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1856 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1857 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1858 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1859 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1860 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1861 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1862 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1863 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1864 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1865 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1866 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1867 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1869 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1871 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1874 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1875 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1876 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1877 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
1878 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
1880 let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
1881 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1882 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1883 check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1886 as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
1888 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
1889 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1891 let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1892 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1893 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1894 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1896 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1897 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1898 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
1899 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1900 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1901 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1903 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1904 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1905 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1906 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
1907 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1908 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
1909 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1912 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1913 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1914 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1915 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1916 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1917 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1918 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1919 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1920 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1921 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1922 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1923 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1924 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1925 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1927 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1929 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1930 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1932 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1933 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1934 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1935 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1936 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1937 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1938 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1939 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1940 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1941 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1943 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1945 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1946 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1948 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1949 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1950 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1951 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1952 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1953 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1954 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1955 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1957 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1959 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1960 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1962 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1963 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1964 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1965 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1966 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1968 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1971 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
1973 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1975 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1978 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1979 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1980 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1981 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1982 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value,
1983 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1985 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1987 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1988 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1989 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1991 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1994 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1996 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1997 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1999 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2000 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2001 for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2002 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
2003 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2004 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2005 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2006 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
2008 check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
2009 } else { panic!(); }
2012 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
2014 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
2016 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
2017 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
2018 // monitor events or claimable balances.
2019 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
2020 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
2021 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2022 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
2026 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
2027 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
2028 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
2031 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
2032 // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
2033 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2034 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2036 let new_chain_monitor;
2038 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2039 let node_deserialized;
2041 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2043 // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
2044 // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
2045 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2046 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
2048 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2049 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2050 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2051 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2052 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2054 let commitment_tx = {
2055 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2056 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2057 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
2058 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2062 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2064 // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
2065 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2066 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2067 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2068 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2069 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
2073 // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
2074 // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
2075 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2076 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
2077 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2079 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2082 // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
2083 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
2084 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2085 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2088 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2089 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2090 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
2092 assert!(txn.len() < 6);
2095 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
2096 assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
2097 assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
2098 assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
2104 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
2105 do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
2106 do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
2109 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
2110 // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
2111 // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
2112 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2113 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2114 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
2116 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2117 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2119 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
2120 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2122 let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2123 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2125 const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
2126 const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
2127 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
2129 let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
2131 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
2132 assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
2133 check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
2134 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
2135 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
2136 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
2137 false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
2138 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2140 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2142 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2143 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2144 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
2145 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2146 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2149 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2151 // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
2152 // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
2153 // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
2154 let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2155 let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2156 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2157 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2158 let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2159 assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2164 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2165 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2166 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2167 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2168 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2169 check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2170 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
2171 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
2172 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2173 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2178 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2179 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2180 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2184 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2185 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2186 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
2187 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2188 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2191 assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2192 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2193 assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2195 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2199 // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2200 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2201 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2203 // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2204 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2205 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2207 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2208 // transactions pre-anchors.
2209 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2210 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2212 // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2213 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2214 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2216 // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2217 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2218 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2219 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2221 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2222 // transactions pre-anchors.
2223 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2224 let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2226 // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2227 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2228 // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2229 // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2230 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2231 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2232 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2233 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2235 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2236 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2240 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2241 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2242 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2246 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2247 // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2248 // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2249 // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2250 // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2251 // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2252 // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2253 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2254 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2255 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2256 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2257 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2258 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2259 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2260 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2262 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2263 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2265 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2266 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2268 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2269 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2271 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2273 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2274 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2276 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2278 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2279 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2280 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2283 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2284 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2285 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2287 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2288 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2289 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2292 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2293 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2294 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2295 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2296 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2298 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2299 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2300 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2301 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2302 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2305 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2306 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2307 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2308 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2309 let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2310 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2311 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2312 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2313 (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2315 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2318 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2319 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2321 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2323 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2327 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2328 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2330 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2331 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2332 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2333 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2335 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2336 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2337 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2338 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2340 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2341 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2345 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2346 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2347 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2348 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2349 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2350 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2351 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2353 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2355 let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2356 for event in holder_events {
2358 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2359 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2360 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2361 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2362 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2363 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2364 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2366 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2370 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2371 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2373 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2375 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2377 let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2378 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2379 for event in holder_events {
2381 Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2382 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2386 // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2387 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2388 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2389 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2390 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2394 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2395 // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2396 // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2397 // revoked commitment.
2398 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2399 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2400 // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2401 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2402 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2404 let bob_chain_monitor;
2406 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2407 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2408 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2409 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2410 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2411 let bob_deserialized;
2413 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2415 let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2416 let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2418 // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2419 let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2421 // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2422 let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2423 let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2424 let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2425 let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2427 // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2428 // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2430 let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2431 let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2433 // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2434 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2435 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2436 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2437 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2439 // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2441 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2442 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2444 // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2446 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2447 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2449 for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2450 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2451 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2452 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2453 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2454 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2459 // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2460 // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2461 // the HTLCs still pending.
2462 *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2463 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2464 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2465 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2466 let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2467 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2468 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2469 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2470 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2471 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2472 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2473 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2474 (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2476 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2477 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2478 (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2482 // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2483 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2484 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2485 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2486 let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2487 for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2488 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2489 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2491 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2492 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2493 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2495 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2498 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2500 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2501 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2503 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2504 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2505 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2506 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2507 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2510 for node in &nodes {
2511 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2513 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2514 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2515 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2517 // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2520 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2521 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2523 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2524 (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2526 (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2529 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2530 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2531 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2532 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2533 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2534 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2537 // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2538 // through the success path.
2539 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2540 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2541 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2542 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2543 match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2544 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2545 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2546 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2547 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2548 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2549 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2552 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2555 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2556 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2557 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2558 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2560 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2561 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2562 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2563 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2564 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2567 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2569 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2570 input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2571 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2572 ..Default::default()
2574 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2575 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2576 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2579 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2580 for event in events {
2581 // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2582 // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2583 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2584 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2585 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2586 assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2587 htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2588 htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2590 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2591 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2593 panic!("Unexpected event");
2596 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2597 let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2598 let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2599 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2600 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2601 htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2603 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2604 let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2605 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2606 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2608 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2609 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2610 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2613 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2614 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2618 for node in &nodes {
2619 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2622 // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2623 // the second level instead.
2624 let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2625 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2626 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2628 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2629 tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2630 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2631 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2632 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2633 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2634 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2635 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2638 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2639 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2640 revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2642 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2644 for node in &nodes {
2645 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2649 // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2651 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2652 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2654 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2655 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2657 // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2658 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2659 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2661 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2662 let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2663 assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2664 for event in spendable_output_events {
2665 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2666 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2667 assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2668 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2669 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2672 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2673 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
2675 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2678 panic!("unexpected event");
2682 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2683 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2684 // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2685 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2686 // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2687 // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2688 // balances to claim.
2690 // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2691 // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2692 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2695 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2696 // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2697 // channel upon deserialization.
2698 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2699 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2702 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2703 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2704 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2705 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2706 let node_deserialized;
2707 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2709 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2711 // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2712 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2713 let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2714 let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2715 let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2716 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2717 assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2719 // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2720 // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2721 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2722 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2723 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2724 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2725 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2727 let commitment_tx = {
2728 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2729 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2730 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2731 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2735 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2736 let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2737 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2738 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2739 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2740 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2741 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2742 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2743 commitment_tx_conf_height
2745 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2746 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2747 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2748 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2749 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2750 commitment_tx_conf_height
2752 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2753 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2754 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2756 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2757 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2759 if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2760 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2761 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2762 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2763 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2764 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2765 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2766 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2767 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2770 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2772 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2777 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2778 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2779 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2782 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2783 fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
2784 // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
2785 // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
2786 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2787 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2788 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2790 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2791 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2793 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2794 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2796 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2798 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2799 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2802 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2803 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2808 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2811 // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
2812 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
2813 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2815 let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2816 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
2818 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
2821 closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2823 // The commitment transaction comes first.
2824 let commitment_tx = {
2825 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2826 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2827 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2831 mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
2832 check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
2833 check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
2834 check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2836 mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
2837 check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
2838 check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
2839 check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2841 // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
2842 // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
2843 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2844 let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2847 // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
2848 if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2849 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
2850 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
2851 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2853 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2855 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2856 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2858 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2859 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2860 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2861 let tx = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == commitment_tx.txid() {
2866 check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
2870 // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
2871 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2872 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2873 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2876 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2877 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2878 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
2879 assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
2883 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2885 fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
2886 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
2887 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
2888 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
2889 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);