1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
18 use crate::ln::channel;
19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
22 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
25 use crate::util::test_utils;
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
31 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
32 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
34 use crate::prelude::*;
36 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
39 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
40 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
41 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
42 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
43 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
44 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
47 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
49 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
50 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
52 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
53 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
54 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
55 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
56 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
57 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
58 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
60 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
61 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
63 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
64 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
65 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
66 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
68 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
70 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
71 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
72 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
74 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
75 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
76 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
78 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
79 // transaction for nodes[1].
80 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
81 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
82 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
83 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
84 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
86 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
87 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
88 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
89 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
91 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
92 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
93 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
96 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
97 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
98 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
99 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
100 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
101 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
102 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
103 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
109 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
110 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
111 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
112 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
114 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
115 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
116 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
117 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
119 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
121 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
123 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
124 // before forwarding.
125 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
126 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
128 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
129 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
131 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
132 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
134 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
135 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
137 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
138 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
139 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
141 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
142 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
143 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
144 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
145 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
147 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
148 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
149 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
152 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
153 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
156 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
157 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
158 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
159 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
160 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
161 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
162 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
163 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
165 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
166 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
168 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
169 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
171 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
172 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
173 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
174 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
176 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
177 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
179 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
180 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
181 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
182 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
184 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
185 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
186 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
188 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
189 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
190 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
191 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
192 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
194 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
195 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
196 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
197 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
198 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
199 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
200 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
201 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
203 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
204 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
205 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
207 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
208 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
210 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
211 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
213 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
214 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
216 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
217 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
218 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
220 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
221 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
222 amount_satoshis: 1000,
223 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
225 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
227 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
228 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
230 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
231 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
232 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
233 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
235 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
236 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
238 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
239 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
240 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
241 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
243 let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
245 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
249 let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
251 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
255 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
256 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
260 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
261 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
262 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
265 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
270 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
271 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
272 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
273 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
274 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
275 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
276 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
277 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
278 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
281 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
282 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
283 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
284 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
285 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
286 if prev_commitment_tx {
287 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
288 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
289 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
290 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
291 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
297 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
298 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
299 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
300 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
302 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
303 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
304 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
305 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
306 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
307 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
308 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
310 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
312 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
313 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
315 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
316 let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
317 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
318 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
321 let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
322 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
323 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
324 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
326 let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
327 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
328 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
331 let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
332 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
333 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
334 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
336 let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
337 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
338 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
342 let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
343 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
344 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
345 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
346 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
349 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
350 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
351 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
352 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
353 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
354 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
355 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
356 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
357 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
358 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
359 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
361 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
363 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
365 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
366 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
367 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
368 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
370 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
372 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
374 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
376 if prev_commitment_tx {
377 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
378 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
379 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
380 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
382 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
383 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
384 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
386 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
387 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
391 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
392 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
393 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
394 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
395 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
396 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
397 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
398 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
399 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
400 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
401 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
402 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
403 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
404 if !prev_commitment_tx {
405 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
407 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
408 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
409 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
410 amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
412 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
414 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
415 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
416 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
417 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
418 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
420 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
421 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
422 // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
423 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
424 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
425 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
426 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
427 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
428 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
430 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
431 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
433 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
434 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
435 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
437 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
438 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
439 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
441 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
442 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
443 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
444 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
445 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
446 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
448 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
449 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
450 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
451 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
452 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
453 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
454 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
455 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
456 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
457 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
458 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
460 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
462 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
463 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
465 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
466 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
467 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
469 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
470 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
471 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
472 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
473 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
474 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
475 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
476 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
477 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
479 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
480 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
482 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
483 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
484 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
485 if prev_commitment_tx {
486 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
488 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
490 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
491 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
492 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
493 assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
494 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
496 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
497 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
498 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
499 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
500 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
501 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
502 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
503 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
504 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
505 a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
506 // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
507 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
508 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
510 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
511 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
512 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
513 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
514 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
515 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
516 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
518 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
519 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
521 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
522 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
523 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
524 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
526 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
528 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
529 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
530 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
531 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
532 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
534 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
535 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
536 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
537 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
538 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
539 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
540 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
541 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
543 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
544 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
545 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
546 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
548 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
549 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
550 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
551 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
552 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
554 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
555 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
556 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
557 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
559 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
560 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
562 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
563 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
564 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
565 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
566 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
567 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
568 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
569 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
570 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
572 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
573 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
574 // monitor events or claimable balances.
575 for node in nodes.iter() {
576 connect_blocks(node, 6);
577 connect_blocks(node, 6);
578 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
579 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
584 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
585 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
586 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
590 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
591 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
592 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
593 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
594 // delay prior to spendability.
596 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
597 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
598 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
599 // claim by our counterparty).
600 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
601 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
602 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
603 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
605 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
606 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
607 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
608 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
610 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
611 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
612 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
613 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
616 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
617 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
618 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
620 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
621 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
623 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
624 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
625 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
628 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
629 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
630 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
632 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
633 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
634 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
635 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
637 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
639 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
640 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
642 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
643 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
644 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
645 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
646 check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
647 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
649 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
650 // claimable balances.
651 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
652 let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]));
653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
654 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
655 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
657 let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
658 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
659 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
662 let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
663 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
664 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
665 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
668 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
669 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
670 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
671 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
672 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
673 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
675 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
676 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
678 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
679 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
680 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
681 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
682 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
684 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
686 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
687 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
688 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
689 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
690 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
691 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
692 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
693 assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
695 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
696 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
697 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
698 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
699 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
700 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
701 // call, as described, two hunks down.
702 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
703 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
704 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
705 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
706 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
707 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
708 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
709 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
710 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
712 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
713 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
714 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
715 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
716 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
717 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
718 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
719 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
720 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
721 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
722 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
723 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
724 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
726 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
727 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
728 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
729 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
730 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
732 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
733 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
734 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
735 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
736 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
737 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
738 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
740 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
742 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
743 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
744 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
745 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
746 .get_spendable_outputs(&as_txn[0], commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
747 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
748 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
749 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
750 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
752 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
753 let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
755 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&as_txn[0], commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
756 to_self_spendable_output
759 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
760 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
761 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
762 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
763 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
765 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
766 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
767 // monitor events or claimable balances.
768 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
769 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
770 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
771 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
775 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
776 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
778 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
779 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
780 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
781 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
783 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
784 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
786 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
787 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
788 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
789 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
791 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
792 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
794 let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
795 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
796 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
797 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
799 let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
800 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
801 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
802 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
804 let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
805 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
806 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
807 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
809 let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
810 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
811 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
812 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
815 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
816 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
817 // HTLC output is spent.
819 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
820 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
821 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
822 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
823 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
825 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
826 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
827 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
828 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
830 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
831 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
832 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
833 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
834 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
836 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
837 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
838 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
839 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
840 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
841 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
842 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
843 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
845 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
846 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
848 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
849 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
851 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
852 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
854 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
856 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
857 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
859 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
860 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
861 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
862 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
863 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
864 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
865 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
867 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
868 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
869 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
870 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
872 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
873 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
874 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
875 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
876 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
877 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
879 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
880 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
882 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
883 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
884 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
886 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
887 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
888 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
889 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
891 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
892 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
893 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
894 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
895 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
896 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
897 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
898 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
900 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
901 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
903 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
904 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
905 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
907 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
908 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
909 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
910 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
911 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
912 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
913 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
914 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
915 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
916 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
917 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
919 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
921 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
922 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
923 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
924 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
925 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
926 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
927 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
928 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
930 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
932 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
933 // payment failure event.
934 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
935 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
937 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
938 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
939 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
940 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
941 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
942 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
943 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
944 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
946 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
948 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
949 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
950 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
951 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
953 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
954 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
956 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
957 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
958 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
960 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
961 // was already claimed.
962 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
963 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
964 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
965 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
966 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
968 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
970 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
971 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
972 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
973 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
975 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
977 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
978 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
980 assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
981 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
982 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
984 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
985 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
987 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
988 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
989 // monitor events or claimable balances.
990 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
991 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
992 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
993 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
996 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
997 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
999 v.push((*t).clone());
1005 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1006 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1007 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1008 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1009 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1010 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1011 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1012 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1013 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1014 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1015 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1017 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1018 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1019 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1020 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1022 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1024 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1025 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1026 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1027 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1028 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1029 // later commitment transaction updates
1031 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1032 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1033 // HTLCs individually.
1035 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1036 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1037 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1039 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1041 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1042 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1044 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1045 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1047 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1048 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1049 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1051 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1053 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1054 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1056 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1057 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1059 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1061 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1062 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1065 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1066 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1067 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1068 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1069 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1070 events.retain(|ev| {
1072 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1073 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1074 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1077 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1078 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1084 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1085 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1087 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1091 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1092 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1094 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1096 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1097 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1098 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1099 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1100 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1101 amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1102 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1103 payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1104 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1105 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1106 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1107 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1108 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1109 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1110 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1111 payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1113 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1115 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1116 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1117 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1119 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1120 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1122 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1123 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1124 const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1125 const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1127 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1128 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1129 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1130 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1131 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1132 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1134 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1135 // claim balances separated out.
1136 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1137 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1138 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1139 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1140 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1141 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1142 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1143 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1146 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1147 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1148 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1150 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1151 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1152 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1154 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1156 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1157 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1158 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1159 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1161 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1162 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1163 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1164 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1166 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1167 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1168 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1169 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1172 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1173 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1174 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1176 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1177 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1178 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1179 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1180 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1183 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1184 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1185 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1187 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1188 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1191 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1192 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1194 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1196 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1197 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1199 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1200 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1201 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1202 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1204 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1205 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1206 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1207 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1208 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1209 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1210 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1211 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1212 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1213 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1214 amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1215 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1216 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1217 amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1218 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1219 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1220 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1221 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1223 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1225 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1226 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1228 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1229 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1230 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1231 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1232 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1234 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1235 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
1236 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1237 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
1238 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1239 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1240 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1241 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1242 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1243 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1244 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1246 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1247 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1248 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1249 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1250 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1251 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1252 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1256 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1257 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1258 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1262 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1263 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1264 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1265 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1266 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1267 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1268 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1270 // Create some initial channels
1271 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1272 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1273 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1274 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1276 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1277 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1278 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1279 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1280 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1282 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1283 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1285 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1287 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1288 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1290 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1291 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1292 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1294 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1295 let revoked_htlc_success = {
1296 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1297 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1298 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1299 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1300 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1304 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1305 let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1306 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1307 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1308 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1314 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1315 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1316 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1317 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1319 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1320 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1321 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1323 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1324 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1326 let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1327 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1328 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1330 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1331 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1332 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1333 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1334 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1335 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1336 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1337 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1338 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1339 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1340 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1341 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1342 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1343 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1344 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1346 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1347 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1349 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1350 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1351 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1352 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1353 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1354 // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1356 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1357 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1359 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1360 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1361 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1363 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1364 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1365 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1366 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1367 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1368 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1369 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1370 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1371 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1372 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1373 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1374 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1375 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1376 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1378 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1380 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1381 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1382 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1383 // to_self output to B
1384 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1385 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1386 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1387 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1388 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1389 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1391 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1393 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1394 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1395 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1396 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1397 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1398 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1399 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1401 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1403 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1404 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1405 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1406 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1407 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1408 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1409 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1412 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1414 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1415 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1416 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1417 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1420 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1421 let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1422 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1424 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1425 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1427 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1428 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1429 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1430 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1431 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1432 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1433 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1434 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1435 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1437 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1439 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1440 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1441 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1442 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1443 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1444 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1445 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1447 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1449 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1450 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1451 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1452 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1453 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1454 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1455 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1456 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1458 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1460 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1461 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1462 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1463 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1465 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1467 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1468 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1469 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1470 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1471 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1472 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1473 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1477 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1478 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1479 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1480 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1481 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1482 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1483 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1484 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1485 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1486 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1487 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1488 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1490 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1491 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1492 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1493 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1495 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1496 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1497 // revocation-claim transaction.
1499 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1500 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1502 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1504 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1505 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1506 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1507 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1509 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1510 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1512 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1513 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1514 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1516 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1517 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1520 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1523 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1526 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1527 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1528 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1530 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1531 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1533 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1535 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1536 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1537 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1538 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1539 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1540 payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1541 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1542 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1543 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1544 payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1546 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1548 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1549 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1550 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1553 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1554 // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1555 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1556 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1557 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1559 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1561 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1562 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1563 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1564 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1565 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1566 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1567 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1568 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1569 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1570 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1571 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1572 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1574 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1576 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1578 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1579 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1580 let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1581 claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1582 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1583 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1584 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1585 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1586 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1587 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1588 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1590 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1591 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1592 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1593 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1594 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1595 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1596 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1597 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1598 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1599 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1600 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1601 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1602 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1603 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1604 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1606 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1608 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1609 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1611 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1612 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1613 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1614 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1615 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1616 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1617 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1618 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1619 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1620 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1621 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1623 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1625 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1626 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1628 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1629 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1630 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1631 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1632 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1633 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1634 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1635 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1636 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1638 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1640 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1641 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1643 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1644 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1645 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1646 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1647 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1648 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1650 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1652 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1653 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1655 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1656 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1657 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1659 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1661 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1663 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1664 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1665 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1666 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1668 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1669 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1670 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1671 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1672 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1673 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1674 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1677 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1678 // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1679 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1680 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1682 let new_chain_monitor;
1684 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1685 let node_deserialized;
1687 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1689 // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1690 // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1691 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1692 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1694 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1695 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1696 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1697 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
1698 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1700 let commitment_tx = {
1701 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1702 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1703 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1704 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1708 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
1710 // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
1711 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1712 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
1713 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1714 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1715 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
1719 // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
1720 // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
1721 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1722 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
1723 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0",
1725 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
1728 // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
1729 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1730 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1731 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1734 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1735 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
1736 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
1738 assert!(txn.len() < 6);
1741 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
1742 assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
1743 assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1744 assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
1750 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
1751 do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
1752 do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
1755 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
1756 // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
1757 // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
1758 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1759 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1760 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1762 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1763 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1765 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
1766 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1768 let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1769 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1771 const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
1772 const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
1773 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
1775 let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
1777 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
1778 assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
1779 check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
1780 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
1781 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1782 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
1783 false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1784 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1786 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1788 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1789 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1790 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
1791 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1792 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1795 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1797 // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
1798 // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
1799 // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
1800 let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
1801 let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
1802 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
1803 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1804 let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1805 assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1810 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1811 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1812 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1813 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1814 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1815 check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
1816 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
1817 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
1818 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1819 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1821 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1824 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1825 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1826 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1830 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1831 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
1832 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
1833 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1834 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1837 assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
1838 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
1839 assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
1841 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
1845 // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
1846 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
1847 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1849 // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
1850 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1851 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1853 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1854 // transactions pre-anchors.
1855 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1856 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1858 // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
1859 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1860 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1862 // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
1863 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1864 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1865 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1867 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1868 // transactions pre-anchors.
1869 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1870 let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
1872 // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
1873 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
1874 // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
1875 // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
1876 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1877 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1878 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
1879 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1881 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1882 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1886 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
1887 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
1888 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
1892 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
1893 // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
1894 // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
1895 // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
1896 // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
1897 // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
1898 // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
1899 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1900 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1901 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1902 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1903 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1904 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1905 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1906 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1908 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1909 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1911 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
1912 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
1914 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1915 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1917 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1919 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1920 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1922 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1924 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1925 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1926 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1929 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1930 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1931 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
1933 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1934 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1935 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
1938 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1939 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
1940 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
1941 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1942 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1944 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1945 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1946 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
1947 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1948 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1951 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1952 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1953 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1954 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1955 let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1956 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1957 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
1958 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
1959 (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
1961 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1964 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
1965 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
1967 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1969 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1973 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1974 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
1976 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1977 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1978 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1979 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
1981 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1982 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1983 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1984 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
1986 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
1987 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
1991 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1992 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
1993 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
1994 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1995 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1996 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
1997 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
1999 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2001 let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2002 for event in holder_events {
2004 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2005 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2006 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2007 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2008 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2009 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2010 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2016 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2017 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2019 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2021 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2023 let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2024 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2025 for event in holder_events {
2027 Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2032 // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2033 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2034 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2035 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2036 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2040 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2041 // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2042 // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2043 // revoked commitment.
2044 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2045 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2046 // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2047 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2048 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2050 let bob_chain_monitor;
2052 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2053 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2054 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2055 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2056 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2057 let bob_deserialized;
2059 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2061 let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2062 let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2064 // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2065 let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2067 // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2068 let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2069 let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2070 let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2071 let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2073 // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2074 // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2076 let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2077 let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2079 // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2080 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2081 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2082 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2083 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2085 // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2087 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2088 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2090 // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2092 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2093 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2095 for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2096 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2097 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2098 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2099 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2100 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2105 // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2106 // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2107 // the HTLCs still pending.
2108 *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2109 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2110 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2111 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2112 let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2113 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2114 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2115 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2116 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2117 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2118 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2119 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2120 (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2122 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2123 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2124 (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2128 // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2129 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2130 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2132 let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2133 for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2134 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2135 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2137 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2138 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2139 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2141 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2144 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2146 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2147 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2149 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2150 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2151 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2152 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2153 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2156 for node in &nodes {
2157 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2159 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2160 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2161 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2163 // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2166 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2167 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2169 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2170 (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2172 (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2175 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2176 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2177 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2178 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2179 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2180 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2183 // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2184 // through the success path.
2185 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2186 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2187 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2188 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2189 match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2190 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2191 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2192 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2193 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2194 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2195 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2198 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2201 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2202 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2203 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2204 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2206 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2207 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2208 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2209 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2210 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2213 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2215 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2216 input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2217 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2218 ..Default::default()
2220 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2221 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2222 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2225 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2226 for event in events {
2227 // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2228 // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2229 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2230 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2231 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2232 assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2233 htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2234 htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2236 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2237 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2239 panic!("Unexpected event");
2242 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2243 let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2244 let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2245 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2246 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2247 htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2249 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2250 let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2251 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2252 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2254 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2255 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2256 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2259 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2260 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2264 for node in &nodes {
2265 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2268 // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2269 // the second level instead.
2270 let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2271 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2272 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2274 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2275 tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2276 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2277 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2278 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2279 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2280 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2281 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2284 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2285 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2286 revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2288 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2290 for node in &nodes {
2291 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2295 // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2297 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2298 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2300 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2301 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2303 // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2304 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2305 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2307 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2308 let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2309 assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2310 for event in spendable_output_events {
2311 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2312 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2313 assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2314 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2315 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2318 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2319 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
2321 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2324 panic!("unexpected event");
2328 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2329 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2330 // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2331 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2332 // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2333 // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2334 // balances to claim.
2336 // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2337 // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2338 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2341 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2342 // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2343 // channel upon deserialization.
2344 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2345 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2348 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2349 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2350 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2351 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2352 let node_deserialized;
2353 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2355 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2357 // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2358 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2359 let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2360 let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2361 let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2362 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2363 assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2365 // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2366 // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2367 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2368 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2369 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2370 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2371 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2373 let commitment_tx = {
2374 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2375 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2376 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2377 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2381 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2382 let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2383 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2384 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2385 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2386 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2387 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2388 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2389 commitment_tx_conf_height
2391 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2392 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2393 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2394 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2395 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2396 commitment_tx_conf_height
2398 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2399 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2400 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2402 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2403 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2405 if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2406 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2407 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2408 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2409 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2410 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2411 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2412 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2413 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2416 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2418 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
2423 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2424 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2425 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);