1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
18 use crate::ln::channel;
19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
22 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
25 use crate::util::test_utils;
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
31 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
32 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
34 use crate::prelude::*;
36 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
39 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
40 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
41 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
42 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
43 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
44 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
47 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
49 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
50 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
52 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
53 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
54 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
55 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
56 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
57 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
58 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
60 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
61 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
63 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
64 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
65 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
66 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
68 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
70 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
71 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
72 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
74 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
75 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
76 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
78 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
79 // transaction for nodes[1].
80 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
81 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
82 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
83 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
84 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
86 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
87 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
88 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
89 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
91 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
92 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
93 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
96 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
97 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
98 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
99 if has_anchors_htlc_event {
100 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
103 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
104 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
105 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
106 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
107 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
113 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
114 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
115 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
116 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
118 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
119 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
120 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
121 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
123 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
125 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
127 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
128 // before forwarding.
129 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
130 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
132 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
133 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
135 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
136 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
138 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
139 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
141 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
142 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
143 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
145 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
146 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
147 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
148 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
149 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
151 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
152 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
153 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
154 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
156 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
157 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
160 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
161 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
162 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
163 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
164 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
165 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
166 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
167 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
169 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
170 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
172 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
173 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
175 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
176 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
177 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
178 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
180 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
181 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
183 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
184 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
185 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
186 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
188 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
189 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
190 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
192 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
193 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
194 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
195 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
196 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
198 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
199 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
200 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
201 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
202 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
203 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
204 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
205 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
207 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
208 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
209 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
211 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
212 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
214 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
215 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
217 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
218 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
220 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
221 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
222 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
224 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
225 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
226 amount_satoshis: 1000,
227 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
229 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
231 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
232 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
234 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
235 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
236 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
237 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
239 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
240 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
242 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
243 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
244 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
245 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
247 let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
249 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
253 let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
255 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
259 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
260 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
264 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
265 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
266 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
269 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
274 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
275 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
276 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
277 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
278 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
279 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
280 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
281 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
282 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
285 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
286 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
287 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
288 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
289 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
290 if prev_commitment_tx {
291 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
292 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
293 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
294 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
295 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
298 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
300 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
301 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
303 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
304 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
306 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
308 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
309 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
312 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
313 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
316 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
317 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
322 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
323 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
326 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
327 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
328 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
329 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
331 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
332 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
333 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
334 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
335 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
336 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
337 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
339 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
341 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
342 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
344 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
345 let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
346 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
347 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
350 let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
351 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
352 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
353 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
355 let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
356 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
357 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
360 let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
361 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
362 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
363 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
365 let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
366 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
367 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
371 let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
372 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
373 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
374 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
375 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
378 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
379 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
380 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
381 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
382 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
383 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
384 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
385 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
386 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
387 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
388 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
389 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
390 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
392 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
394 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
396 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
397 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
398 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
399 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
401 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
403 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
405 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
407 if prev_commitment_tx {
408 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
409 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
410 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
411 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
413 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
414 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
415 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
417 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
418 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
422 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
423 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
424 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
425 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
426 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
427 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
428 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
429 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
430 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
431 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
432 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
433 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
434 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
435 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
436 if !prev_commitment_tx {
437 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
439 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
440 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
441 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
442 amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
444 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
446 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
447 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
448 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
449 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
450 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
453 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
454 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
455 match events.pop().unwrap() {
456 Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
457 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
458 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
459 htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
461 panic!("Unexpected event");
463 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
464 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
465 htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
467 panic!("Unexpected event");
469 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
470 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
472 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
476 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
477 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
478 // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
479 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
480 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
481 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
482 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
483 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
484 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
486 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
487 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
489 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
490 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
491 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
493 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
494 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
495 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
497 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
498 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
499 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
500 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
501 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
502 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
503 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
504 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
505 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
506 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
507 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
508 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
509 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
510 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
511 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
512 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
513 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
514 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
516 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
518 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
519 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
521 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
522 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
523 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
525 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
526 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
527 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
528 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
529 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
530 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
531 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
532 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
533 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
535 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
536 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
538 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
539 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
540 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
541 if prev_commitment_tx {
542 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
544 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
546 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
547 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
548 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
549 assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
550 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
552 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
553 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
554 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
555 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
556 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
557 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
558 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
559 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
560 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
561 a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
562 // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
563 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
564 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
566 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
567 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
568 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
569 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
570 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
571 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
572 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
574 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
575 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
577 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
578 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
579 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
580 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
582 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
584 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
585 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
586 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
587 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
588 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
590 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
591 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
592 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
593 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
594 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
595 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
596 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
597 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
599 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
600 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
601 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
602 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
604 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
605 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
606 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
607 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
608 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
610 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
611 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
612 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
613 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
615 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
616 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
618 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
619 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
620 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
621 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
622 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
623 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
624 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
625 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
626 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
628 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
629 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
630 // monitor events or claimable balances.
631 for node in nodes.iter() {
632 connect_blocks(node, 6);
633 connect_blocks(node, 6);
634 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
635 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
640 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
641 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
642 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
643 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
644 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
648 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
649 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
650 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
651 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
652 // delay prior to spendability.
654 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
655 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
656 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
657 // claim by our counterparty).
658 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
659 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
660 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
661 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
663 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
664 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
665 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
666 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
668 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
669 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
670 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
671 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
674 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
675 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
676 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
678 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
679 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
681 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
682 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
683 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
686 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
687 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
688 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
690 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
691 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
692 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
693 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
695 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
697 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
698 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
700 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
701 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
702 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
703 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
704 check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
705 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
707 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
708 // claimable balances.
709 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
710 let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]));
711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
712 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
713 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
715 let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
716 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
717 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
720 let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
721 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
722 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
723 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
726 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
727 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
728 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
729 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
730 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
731 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
733 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
734 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
736 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
737 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
738 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
739 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
740 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
742 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
744 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
745 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
746 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
747 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
748 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
749 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
750 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
751 assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
753 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
754 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
755 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
756 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
757 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
758 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
759 // call, as described, two hunks down.
760 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
761 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
762 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
763 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
764 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
765 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
766 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
767 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
768 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
770 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
771 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
772 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
773 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
774 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
775 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
776 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
777 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
778 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
779 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
780 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
781 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
782 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
784 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
785 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
786 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
787 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
788 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
790 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
791 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
792 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
793 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
794 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
795 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
796 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
798 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
800 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
801 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
802 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
803 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
804 .get_spendable_outputs(&as_txn[0], commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
805 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
806 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
807 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
808 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
810 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
811 let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
813 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&as_txn[0], commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
814 to_self_spendable_output
817 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
818 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
819 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
820 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
821 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
823 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
824 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
825 // monitor events or claimable balances.
826 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
827 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
828 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
829 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
833 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
834 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
836 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
837 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
838 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
839 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
841 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
842 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
844 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
845 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
846 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
847 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
849 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
850 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
852 let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
853 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
854 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
855 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
857 let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
858 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
859 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
860 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
862 let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
863 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
864 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
865 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
867 let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
868 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
869 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
870 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
873 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
874 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
875 // HTLC output is spent.
877 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
878 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
879 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
880 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
881 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
883 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
884 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
885 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
886 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
888 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
889 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
890 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
891 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
892 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
894 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
895 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
896 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
897 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
898 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
899 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
900 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
901 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
903 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
904 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
906 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
907 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
909 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
910 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
912 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
914 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
915 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
917 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
918 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
919 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
920 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
921 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
922 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
923 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
925 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
926 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
927 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
928 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
930 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
931 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
932 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
933 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
934 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
935 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
937 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
938 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
940 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
941 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
942 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
944 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
945 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
946 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
947 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
949 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
950 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
951 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
952 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
953 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
954 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
955 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
956 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
958 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
959 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
961 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
962 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
963 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
965 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
966 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
967 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
968 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
969 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
970 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
971 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
972 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
973 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
974 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
975 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
977 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
979 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
980 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
981 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
982 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
983 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
984 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
985 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
986 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
988 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
990 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
991 // payment failure event.
992 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
993 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
995 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
996 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
997 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
998 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
999 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1000 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1001 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1002 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1004 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1006 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1007 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1008 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1009 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1011 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1012 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1014 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1015 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1016 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1018 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1019 // was already claimed.
1020 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1021 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1022 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1023 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1024 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1026 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1028 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1029 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1030 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1031 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1033 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1035 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1036 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1038 assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1039 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1040 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1042 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1043 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1045 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1046 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1047 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1048 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1049 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1050 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1051 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1054 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1055 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1057 v.push((*t).clone());
1063 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1064 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1065 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1066 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1067 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1068 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1069 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1070 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1071 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1072 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1073 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1075 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1076 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1077 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1078 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1080 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1082 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1083 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1084 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1085 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1086 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1087 // later commitment transaction updates
1089 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1090 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1091 // HTLCs individually.
1093 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1094 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1095 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1097 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1099 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1100 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1102 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1103 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1105 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1106 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1107 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1109 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1111 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1112 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1114 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1115 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1117 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1119 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1120 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1123 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1124 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1125 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1126 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1127 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1128 events.retain(|ev| {
1130 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1131 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1132 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1135 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1136 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1142 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1143 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1145 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1149 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1150 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1154 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1155 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1156 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1157 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1158 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1159 amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1160 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1161 payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1162 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1163 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1164 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1165 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1166 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1167 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1168 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1169 payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1171 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1173 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1174 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1175 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1177 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1178 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1180 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1181 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1182 const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1183 const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1185 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1186 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1187 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1188 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1189 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1190 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1192 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1193 // claim balances separated out.
1194 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1195 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1196 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1197 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1198 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1199 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1200 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1201 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1204 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1205 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1206 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1208 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1209 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1210 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1212 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1214 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1215 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1216 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1217 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1219 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1220 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1221 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1222 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1224 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1225 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1226 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1227 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1230 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1231 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1232 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1234 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1235 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1236 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1237 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1238 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1241 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1242 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1243 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1245 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1246 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1249 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1250 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1252 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1254 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1255 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1257 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1258 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1259 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1260 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1262 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1263 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1264 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1265 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1266 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1267 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1268 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1269 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1270 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1271 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1272 amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1273 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1274 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1275 amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1276 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1277 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1278 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1279 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1281 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1283 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1284 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1286 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1287 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1288 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1289 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1290 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1292 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1293 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1294 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1295 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1296 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1297 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1298 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1299 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1300 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1301 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1302 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1304 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1305 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1306 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1307 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1308 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1309 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1310 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1314 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1315 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1316 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1320 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1321 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1322 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1323 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1325 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1326 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1328 // Create some initial channels
1329 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1330 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1331 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1332 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1334 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1335 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1336 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1337 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1338 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1340 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1341 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1343 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1345 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1346 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1348 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1349 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1350 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1352 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1353 let revoked_htlc_success = {
1354 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1355 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1356 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1357 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1358 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1362 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1363 let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1364 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1365 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1366 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1372 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1373 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1374 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1375 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1377 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1378 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1379 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1381 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1382 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1384 let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1385 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1386 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1388 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1389 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1390 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1391 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1392 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1393 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1394 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1395 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1396 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1397 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1398 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1399 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1400 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1401 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1402 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1404 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1405 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1407 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1408 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1409 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1410 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1411 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1412 // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1414 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1415 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1417 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1418 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1419 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1421 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1422 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1423 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1424 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1425 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1426 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1427 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1428 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1429 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1430 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1431 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1432 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1433 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1434 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1436 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1438 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1439 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1440 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1441 // to_self output to B
1442 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1443 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1444 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1445 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1446 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1447 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1449 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1451 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1452 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1453 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1454 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1455 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1456 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1457 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1459 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1461 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1462 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1463 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1464 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1465 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1466 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1467 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1470 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1472 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1473 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1474 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1475 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1478 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1479 let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1480 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1482 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1483 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1485 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1486 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1487 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1488 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1489 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1490 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1491 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1492 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1493 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1495 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1497 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1498 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1499 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1500 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1501 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1502 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1503 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1505 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1507 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1508 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1509 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1510 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1511 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1512 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1513 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1514 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1516 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1518 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1519 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1520 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1521 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], false);
1523 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1525 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1526 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1527 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1528 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1529 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1530 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1531 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1535 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1536 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1537 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1538 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1539 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1540 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1541 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1542 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1543 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1546 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1548 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1549 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1550 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1551 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1553 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1554 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1555 // revocation-claim transaction.
1557 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1558 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1560 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1562 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1563 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1564 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1565 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1567 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1568 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1570 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1571 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1572 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1574 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1575 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1578 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1581 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1584 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1585 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1586 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1588 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1589 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1591 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1593 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1594 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1595 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1596 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1597 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1598 payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1599 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1600 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1601 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1602 payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1604 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1606 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1607 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1608 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1611 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1612 // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1613 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1614 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1615 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1617 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1619 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1620 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1621 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1622 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1623 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1624 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1625 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1626 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1627 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1628 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1629 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1630 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1632 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1634 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1636 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1637 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1638 let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1639 claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1640 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1641 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1642 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1643 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1644 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1645 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1646 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1648 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1649 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1650 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1651 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1652 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1653 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1654 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1655 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1656 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1657 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1658 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1659 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1660 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1661 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1662 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1664 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1666 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1667 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1669 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1670 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1671 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1672 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1673 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1674 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1675 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1676 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1677 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1678 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1679 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1681 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1683 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1684 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1686 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1687 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1688 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1689 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1690 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1691 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1692 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1693 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1694 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1696 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1698 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1699 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
1701 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1702 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1703 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1704 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1705 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1706 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1708 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1710 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1711 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1713 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1714 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1715 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1717 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1719 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1721 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1722 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1723 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1724 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1726 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1727 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1728 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1729 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1730 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1731 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1732 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1735 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1736 // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1737 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1738 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1740 let new_chain_monitor;
1742 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1743 let node_deserialized;
1745 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1747 // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1748 // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1749 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1750 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1752 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1753 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1754 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1755 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
1756 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1758 let commitment_tx = {
1759 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1760 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1761 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1762 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1766 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
1768 // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
1769 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1770 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
1771 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1772 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1773 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
1777 // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
1778 // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
1779 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1780 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
1781 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0",
1783 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
1786 // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
1787 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1788 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1789 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1792 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1793 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
1794 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
1796 assert!(txn.len() < 6);
1799 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
1800 assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
1801 assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1802 assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
1808 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
1809 do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
1810 do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
1813 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
1814 // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
1815 // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
1816 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1817 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1818 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1820 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1821 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1823 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
1824 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1826 let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1827 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1829 const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
1830 const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
1831 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
1833 let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
1835 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
1836 assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
1837 check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
1838 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
1839 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1840 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
1841 false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1842 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1844 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1846 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1847 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1848 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
1849 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1850 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1853 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1855 // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
1856 // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
1857 // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
1858 let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
1859 let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
1860 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
1861 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1862 let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1863 assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1868 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1869 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1870 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1871 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1872 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1873 check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
1874 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
1875 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
1876 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1877 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1882 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1883 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1884 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1888 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1889 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
1890 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
1891 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1892 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1895 assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
1896 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
1897 assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
1899 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
1903 // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
1904 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
1905 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1907 // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
1908 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1909 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1911 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1912 // transactions pre-anchors.
1913 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1914 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1916 // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
1917 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1918 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1920 // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
1921 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1922 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1923 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1925 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1926 // transactions pre-anchors.
1927 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1928 let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
1930 // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
1931 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
1932 // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
1933 // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
1934 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1935 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1936 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
1937 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1939 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1940 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1944 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
1945 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
1946 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
1950 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
1951 // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
1952 // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
1953 // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
1954 // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
1955 // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
1956 // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
1957 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1958 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1959 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1960 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1961 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1962 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1963 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1964 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1966 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1967 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1969 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
1970 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
1972 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1973 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1975 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1977 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1978 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1980 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1982 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1983 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1984 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1987 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1988 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1989 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
1991 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1992 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1993 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
1996 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1997 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
1998 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
1999 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2000 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2002 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2003 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2004 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2005 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2006 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2009 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2010 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2011 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2012 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2013 let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2014 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2015 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2016 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2017 (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2019 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2022 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2023 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2025 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2027 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2031 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2032 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2034 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2035 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2036 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2037 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2039 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2040 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2041 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2042 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2044 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2045 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2049 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2050 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2051 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2052 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2053 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2054 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2055 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2057 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2059 let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2060 for event in holder_events {
2062 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2063 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2064 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2065 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2066 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2067 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2068 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2074 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2075 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2077 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2079 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2081 let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2082 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2083 for event in holder_events {
2085 Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2086 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2090 // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2091 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2092 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2093 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2094 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2098 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2099 // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2100 // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2101 // revoked commitment.
2102 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2103 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2104 // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2105 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2108 let bob_chain_monitor;
2110 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2111 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2112 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2113 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2114 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2115 let bob_deserialized;
2117 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2119 let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2120 let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2122 // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2123 let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2125 // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2126 let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2127 let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2128 let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2129 let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2131 // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2132 // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2134 let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2135 let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2137 // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2138 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2139 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2140 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2141 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2143 // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2145 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2146 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2148 // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2150 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2151 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2153 for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2154 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2155 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2156 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2157 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2158 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2163 // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2164 // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2165 // the HTLCs still pending.
2166 *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2167 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2168 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2169 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2170 let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2171 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2172 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2173 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2174 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2175 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2176 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2177 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2178 (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2180 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2181 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2182 (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2186 // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2187 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2188 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2189 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2190 let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2191 for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2192 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2193 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2195 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2196 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2197 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2199 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2202 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2204 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2205 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2207 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2208 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2209 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2210 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2211 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2214 for node in &nodes {
2215 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2217 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2218 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2219 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2221 // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2224 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2225 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2227 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2228 (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2230 (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2233 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2234 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2235 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2236 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2237 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2238 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2241 // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2242 // through the success path.
2243 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2244 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2245 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2246 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2247 match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2248 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2249 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2250 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2251 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2252 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2253 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2256 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2259 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2260 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2261 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2262 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2264 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2265 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2266 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2267 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2268 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2271 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2273 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2274 input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2275 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2276 ..Default::default()
2278 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2279 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2280 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2283 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2284 for event in events {
2285 // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2286 // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2287 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2288 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2289 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2290 assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2291 htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2292 htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2294 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2295 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2297 panic!("Unexpected event");
2300 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2301 let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2302 let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2303 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2304 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2305 htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2307 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2308 let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2309 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2310 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2312 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2313 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2314 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2317 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2318 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2322 for node in &nodes {
2323 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2326 // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2327 // the second level instead.
2328 let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2329 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2330 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2332 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2333 tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2334 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2335 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2336 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2337 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2338 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2339 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2342 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2343 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2344 revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2346 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2348 for node in &nodes {
2349 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2353 // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2355 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2356 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2358 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2359 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2361 // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2362 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2363 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2365 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2366 let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2367 assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2368 for event in spendable_output_events {
2369 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2370 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2371 assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2372 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2373 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2376 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2377 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
2379 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2382 panic!("unexpected event");
2386 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2387 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2388 // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2389 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2390 // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2391 // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2392 // balances to claim.
2394 // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2395 // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2396 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2399 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2400 // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2401 // channel upon deserialization.
2402 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2403 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2406 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2407 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2408 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2409 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2410 let node_deserialized;
2411 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2413 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2415 // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2416 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2417 let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2418 let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2419 let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2420 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2421 assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2423 // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2424 // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2425 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2426 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2427 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2428 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2429 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2431 let commitment_tx = {
2432 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2433 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2434 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2435 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2439 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2440 let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2441 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2442 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2443 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2444 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2445 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2446 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2447 commitment_tx_conf_height
2449 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2450 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2451 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2452 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2453 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2454 commitment_tx_conf_height
2456 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2457 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2458 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2460 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2461 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2463 if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2464 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2465 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2466 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2467 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2468 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2469 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2470 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2471 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2474 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2476 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2481 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2482 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2483 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);