1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
12 //! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
13 //! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
14 //! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
15 //! [`ChannelMessageHandler`] yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
18 //! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
19 //! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
20 //! source `node_id` of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
21 //! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
22 //! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
23 //! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
24 //! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
25 //! track the network on the less-secure system.
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
33 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
35 use crate::onion_message;
37 use crate::prelude::*;
40 use crate::io::{self, Read};
41 use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
43 use crate::events::{MessageSendEventsProvider, OnionMessageProvider};
44 use crate::util::logger;
45 use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname};
47 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
51 /// 21 million * 10^8 * 1000
52 pub(crate) const MAX_VALUE_MSAT: u64 = 21_000_000_0000_0000_000;
55 /// A partial signature that also contains the Musig2 nonce its signer used
56 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
57 pub struct PartialSignatureWithNonce(pub musig2::types::PartialSignature, pub musig2::types::PublicNonce);
59 /// An error in decoding a message or struct.
60 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
61 pub enum DecodeError {
62 /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
64 /// Includes unknown realm byte in an onion hop data packet.
66 /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message (e.g., TLV with an even, unknown type)
67 UnknownRequiredFeature,
68 /// Value was invalid.
70 /// For example, a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
71 /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, TLV was
72 /// syntactically incorrect, etc.
74 /// The buffer to be read was too short.
76 /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly.
78 /// Error from [`std::io`].
80 /// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
81 UnsupportedCompression,
84 /// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
86 /// [`init`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-init-message
87 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
89 /// The relevant features which the sender supports.
90 pub features: InitFeatures,
91 /// The receipient's network address.
93 /// This adds the option to report a remote IP address back to a connecting peer using the init
94 /// message. A node can decide to use that information to discover a potential update to its
95 /// public IPv4 address (NAT) and use that for a [`NodeAnnouncement`] update message containing
97 pub remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress>,
100 /// An [`error`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
102 /// [`error`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
103 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
104 pub struct ErrorMessage {
105 /// The channel ID involved in the error.
107 /// All-0s indicates a general error unrelated to a specific channel, after which all channels
108 /// with the sending peer should be closed.
109 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
110 /// A possibly human-readable error description.
112 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g., emitted to logs or printed to
113 /// `stdout`). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
114 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
118 /// A [`warning`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
120 /// [`warning`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
121 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
122 pub struct WarningMessage {
123 /// The channel ID involved in the warning.
125 /// All-0s indicates a warning unrelated to a specific channel.
126 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
127 /// A possibly human-readable warning description.
129 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs or printed to
130 /// stdout). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
131 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
135 /// A [`ping`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
137 /// [`ping`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
138 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
140 /// The desired response length.
142 /// The ping packet size.
144 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
148 /// A [`pong`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
150 /// [`pong`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
151 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
153 /// The pong packet size.
155 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
159 /// An [`open_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
161 /// [`open_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-open_channel-message
162 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
163 pub struct OpenChannel {
164 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
165 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
166 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
167 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
168 /// The channel value
169 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
170 /// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
172 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
173 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
174 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
175 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
176 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
177 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
178 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
179 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
180 /// The feerate per 1000-weight of sender generated transactions, until updated by
182 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
183 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if
184 /// they broadcast a commitment transaction
185 pub to_self_delay: u16,
186 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
187 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
188 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
189 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
190 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
191 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
192 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
193 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
194 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
195 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
196 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender
197 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
198 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
199 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
200 /// The channel flags to be used
201 pub channel_flags: u8,
202 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's `scriptPubkey` for when we collaboratively close
203 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
204 /// The channel type that this channel will represent
206 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of our
207 /// feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
208 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
211 /// An [`accept_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
213 /// [`accept_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-accept_channel-message
214 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
215 pub struct AcceptChannel {
216 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
217 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
218 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
219 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
220 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
221 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
222 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
223 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
224 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
225 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
226 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
227 pub minimum_depth: u32,
228 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
229 pub to_self_delay: u16,
230 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
231 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
232 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
233 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
234 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
235 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
236 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
237 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
238 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
239 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
240 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
241 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
242 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
243 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
244 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
245 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
246 /// The channel type that this channel will represent.
248 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of
249 /// our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
250 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannel::channel_type`].
251 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
254 /// A [`funding_created`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
256 /// [`funding_created`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_created-message
257 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
258 pub struct FundingCreated {
259 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
260 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
261 /// The funding transaction ID
262 pub funding_txid: Txid,
263 /// The specific output index funding this channel
264 pub funding_output_index: u16,
265 /// The signature of the channel initiator (funder) on the initial commitment transaction
266 pub signature: Signature,
269 /// A [`funding_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
271 /// [`funding_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_signed-message
272 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
273 pub struct FundingSigned {
275 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
276 /// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the initial commitment transaction
277 pub signature: Signature,
280 /// A [`channel_ready`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
282 /// [`channel_ready`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-channel_ready-message
283 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
284 pub struct ChannelReady {
286 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
287 /// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
288 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
289 /// If set, provides a `short_channel_id` alias for this channel.
291 /// The sender will accept payments to be forwarded over this SCID and forward them to this
292 /// messages' recipient.
293 pub short_channel_id_alias: Option<u64>,
296 /// A [`shutdown`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
298 /// [`shutdown`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-initiation-shutdown
299 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
300 pub struct Shutdown {
302 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
303 /// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
305 /// Must be in one of these forms: P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, P2TR.
306 pub scriptpubkey: Script,
309 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to place on the closing transaction.
311 /// This is provided in [`ClosingSigned`] by both sides to indicate the fee range they are willing
313 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
314 pub struct ClosingSignedFeeRange {
315 /// The minimum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
317 pub min_fee_satoshis: u64,
318 /// The maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
320 pub max_fee_satoshis: u64,
323 /// A [`closing_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
325 /// [`closing_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-negotiation-closing_signed
326 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
327 pub struct ClosingSigned {
329 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
330 /// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
331 pub fee_satoshis: u64,
332 /// A signature on the closing transaction
333 pub signature: Signature,
334 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to accept, provided only by new
336 pub fee_range: Option<ClosingSignedFeeRange>,
339 /// An [`update_add_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
341 /// [`update_add_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#adding-an-htlc-update_add_htlc
342 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
343 pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
345 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
348 /// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
349 pub amount_msat: u64,
350 /// The payment hash, the pre-image of which controls HTLC redemption
351 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
352 /// The expiry height of the HTLC
353 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
354 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
357 /// An onion message to be sent to or received from a peer.
359 // TODO: update with link to OM when they are merged into the BOLTs
360 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
361 pub struct OnionMessage {
362 /// Used in decrypting the onion packet's payload.
363 pub blinding_point: PublicKey,
364 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet,
367 /// An [`update_fulfill_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
369 /// [`update_fulfill_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
370 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
371 pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
373 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
376 /// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
377 pub payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
380 /// An [`update_fail_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
382 /// [`update_fail_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
383 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
384 pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
386 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
389 pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
392 /// An [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
394 /// [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
395 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
396 pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
398 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
401 pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
403 pub failure_code: u16,
406 /// A [`commitment_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
408 /// [`commitment_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
409 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
410 pub struct CommitmentSigned {
412 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
413 /// A signature on the commitment transaction
414 pub signature: Signature,
415 /// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
416 pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
419 /// A [`revoke_and_ack`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
421 /// [`revoke_and_ack`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#completing-the-transition-to-the-updated-state-revoke_and_ack
422 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
423 pub struct RevokeAndACK {
425 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
426 /// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
427 pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
428 /// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
429 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
432 /// An [`update_fee`] message to be sent to or received from a peer
434 /// [`update_fee`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#updating-fees-update_fee
435 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
436 pub struct UpdateFee {
438 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
439 /// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
440 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
443 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
444 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of the previous commitment transaction.
446 /// This is used to convince the recipient that the channel is at a certain commitment
447 /// number even if they lost that data due to a local failure. Of course, the peer may lie
448 /// and even later commitments may have been revoked.
449 pub struct DataLossProtect {
450 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of a specific commitment transaction
451 /// belonging to the recipient
452 pub your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
453 /// The sender's per-commitment point for their current commitment transaction
454 pub my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
457 /// A [`channel_reestablish`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
459 /// [`channel_reestablish`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#message-retransmission
460 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
461 pub struct ChannelReestablish {
463 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
464 /// The next commitment number for the sender
465 pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
466 /// The next commitment number for the recipient
467 pub next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
468 /// Optionally, a field proving that next_remote_commitment_number-1 has been revoked
469 pub data_loss_protect: OptionalField<DataLossProtect>,
472 /// An [`announcement_signatures`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
474 /// [`announcement_signatures`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-announcement_signatures-message
475 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
476 pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
478 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
479 /// The short channel ID
480 pub short_channel_id: u64,
481 /// A signature by the node key
482 pub node_signature: Signature,
483 /// A signature by the funding key
484 pub bitcoin_signature: Signature,
487 /// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer.
488 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
489 pub enum NetAddress {
490 /// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listening.
492 /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
494 /// The port on which the node is listening
497 /// An IPv6 address/port on which the peer is listening.
499 /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
501 /// The port on which the node is listening
504 /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
506 /// This field is deprecated and the Tor network generally no longer supports V2 Onion
507 /// addresses. Thus, the details are not parsed here.
509 /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
511 /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate the ED25519 pubkey, checksum, and version,
512 /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
514 /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
515 ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
516 /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
518 /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
520 /// The port on which the node is listening
523 /// A hostname/port on which the peer is listening.
525 /// The hostname on which the node is listening.
527 /// The port on which the node is listening.
532 /// Gets the ID of this address type. Addresses in [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages should be sorted
534 pub(crate) fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
536 &NetAddress::IPv4 {..} => { 1 },
537 &NetAddress::IPv6 {..} => { 2 },
538 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 3 },
539 &NetAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
540 &NetAddress::Hostname {..} => { 5 },
544 /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
545 fn len(&self) -> u16 {
547 &NetAddress::IPv4 { .. } => { 6 },
548 &NetAddress::IPv6 { .. } => { 18 },
549 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 12 },
550 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
551 // Consists of 1-byte hostname length, hostname bytes, and 2-byte port.
552 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, .. } => { u16::from(hostname.len()) + 3 },
556 /// The maximum length of any address descriptor, not including the 1-byte type.
557 /// This maximum length is reached by a hostname address descriptor:
558 /// a hostname with a maximum length of 255, its 1-byte length and a 2-byte port.
559 pub(crate) const MAX_LEN: u16 = 258;
562 impl Writeable for NetAddress {
563 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
565 &NetAddress::IPv4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
570 &NetAddress::IPv6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
575 &NetAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => {
577 bytes.write(writer)?;
579 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
581 ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
582 checksum.write(writer)?;
583 version.write(writer)?;
586 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, ref port } => {
588 hostname.write(writer)?;
596 impl Readable for Result<NetAddress, u8> {
597 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<NetAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
598 let byte = <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
601 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv4 {
602 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
603 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
607 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv6 {
608 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
609 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
612 3 => Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV2(Readable::read(reader)?))),
614 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV3 {
615 ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
616 checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
617 version: Readable::read(reader)?,
618 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
622 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::Hostname {
623 hostname: Readable::read(reader)?,
624 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
627 _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
632 impl Readable for NetAddress {
633 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetAddress, DecodeError> {
634 match Readable::read(reader) {
635 Ok(Ok(res)) => Ok(res),
636 Ok(Err(_)) => Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion),
642 /// Represents the set of gossip messages that require a signature from a node's identity key.
643 pub enum UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
644 /// An unsigned channel announcement.
645 ChannelAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedChannelAnnouncement),
646 /// An unsigned channel update.
647 ChannelUpdate(&'a UnsignedChannelUpdate),
648 /// An unsigned node announcement.
649 NodeAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)
652 impl<'a> Writeable for UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
653 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
655 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
656 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
657 UnsignedGossipMessage::NodeAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
662 /// The unsigned part of a [`node_announcement`] message.
664 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
665 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
666 pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
667 /// The advertised features
668 pub features: NodeFeatures,
669 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed
671 /// The `node_id` this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the `node_announcement` back
674 /// An RGB color for UI purposes
676 /// An alias, for UI purposes.
678 /// This should be sanitized before use. There is no guarantee of uniqueness.
680 /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
681 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
682 pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
683 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
685 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
686 /// A [`node_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
688 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
689 pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
690 /// The signature by the node key
691 pub signature: Signature,
692 /// The actual content of the announcement
693 pub contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
696 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_announcement`] message.
698 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
699 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
700 pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
701 /// The advertised channel features
702 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
703 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
704 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
705 /// The short channel ID
706 pub short_channel_id: u64,
707 /// One of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
708 pub node_id_1: NodeId,
709 /// The other of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
710 pub node_id_2: NodeId,
711 /// The funding key for the first node
712 pub bitcoin_key_1: NodeId,
713 /// The funding key for the second node
714 pub bitcoin_key_2: NodeId,
715 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
717 /// A [`channel_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
719 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
720 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
721 pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
722 /// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
723 pub node_signature_1: Signature,
724 /// Authentication of the announcement by the second public node
725 pub node_signature_2: Signature,
726 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the first public node
727 pub bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
728 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the second public node
729 pub bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
730 /// The actual announcement
731 pub contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
734 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message.
736 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
737 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
738 pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
739 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
740 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
741 /// The short channel ID
742 pub short_channel_id: u64,
743 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
747 /// The number of blocks such that if:
748 /// `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
749 /// then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
750 /// the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
751 /// `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
752 /// then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
753 /// forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
754 /// constructing the route.
755 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
756 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
757 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
758 /// The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
760 /// This used to be optional.
761 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
762 /// The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
763 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
764 /// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
765 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
766 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
769 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
770 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
772 /// A [`channel_update`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
774 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
775 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
776 pub struct ChannelUpdate {
777 /// A signature of the channel update
778 pub signature: Signature,
779 /// The actual channel update
780 pub contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
783 /// A [`query_channel_range`] message is used to query a peer for channel
784 /// UTXOs in a range of blocks. The recipient of a query makes a best
785 /// effort to reply to the query using one or more [`ReplyChannelRange`]
788 /// [`query_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
789 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
790 pub struct QueryChannelRange {
791 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
792 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
793 /// The height of the first block for the channel UTXOs being queried
794 pub first_blocknum: u32,
795 /// The number of blocks to include in the query results
796 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
799 /// A [`reply_channel_range`] message is a reply to a [`QueryChannelRange`]
802 /// Multiple `reply_channel_range` messages can be sent in reply
803 /// to a single [`QueryChannelRange`] message. The query recipient makes a
804 /// best effort to respond based on their local network view which may
805 /// not be a perfect view of the network. The `short_channel_id`s in the
806 /// reply are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
807 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
809 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
810 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
811 pub struct ReplyChannelRange {
812 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
813 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
814 /// The height of the first block in the range of the reply
815 pub first_blocknum: u32,
816 /// The number of blocks included in the range of the reply
817 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
818 /// True when this is the final reply for a query
819 pub sync_complete: bool,
820 /// The `short_channel_id`s in the channel range
821 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
824 /// A [`query_short_channel_ids`] message is used to query a peer for
825 /// routing gossip messages related to one or more `short_channel_id`s.
827 /// The query recipient will reply with the latest, if available,
828 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`], [`ChannelUpdate`] and [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages
829 /// it maintains for the requested `short_channel_id`s followed by a
830 /// [`ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd`] message. The `short_channel_id`s sent in
831 /// this query are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
832 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
834 /// [`query_short_channel_ids`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
835 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
836 pub struct QueryShortChannelIds {
837 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
838 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
839 /// The short_channel_ids that are being queried
840 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
843 /// A [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`] message is sent as a reply to a
844 /// message. The query recipient makes a best
845 /// effort to respond based on their local network view which may not be
846 /// a perfect view of the network.
848 /// [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
849 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
850 pub struct ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
851 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain that was queried
852 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
853 /// Indicates if the query recipient maintains up-to-date channel
854 /// information for the `chain_hash`
855 pub full_information: bool,
858 /// A [`gossip_timestamp_filter`] message is used by a node to request
859 /// gossip relay for messages in the requested time range when the
860 /// `gossip_queries` feature has been negotiated.
862 /// [`gossip_timestamp_filter`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-gossip_timestamp_filter-message
863 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
864 pub struct GossipTimestampFilter {
865 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain for channel and node information
866 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
867 /// The starting unix timestamp
868 pub first_timestamp: u32,
869 /// The range of information in seconds
870 pub timestamp_range: u32,
873 /// Encoding type for data compression of collections in gossip queries.
875 /// We do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization [defined in BOLT
876 /// #7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages).
881 /// Used to put an error message in a [`LightningError`].
882 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
883 pub enum ErrorAction {
884 /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
886 /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
887 msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
889 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
890 // New code should *not* use this. New code must use IgnoreAndLog, below!
892 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process.
893 /// If the error is logged, log it at the given level.
894 IgnoreAndLog(logger::Level),
895 /// The peer provided us with a gossip message which we'd already seen. In most cases this
896 /// should be ignored, but it may result in the message being forwarded if it is a duplicate of
897 /// our own channel announcements.
898 IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
899 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
901 /// The message to send.
904 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels.
906 /// The message to send.
908 /// The peer may have done something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process,
909 /// though we should still tell them about it.
910 /// If this event is logged, log it at the given level.
911 log_level: logger::Level,
915 /// An Err type for failure to process messages.
916 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
917 pub struct LightningError {
918 /// A human-readable message describing the error
920 /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
921 pub action: ErrorAction,
924 /// Struct used to return values from [`RevokeAndACK`] messages, containing a bunch of commitment
925 /// transaction updates if they were pending.
926 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
927 pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
928 /// `update_add_htlc` messages which should be sent
929 pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
930 /// `update_fulfill_htlc` messages which should be sent
931 pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
932 /// `update_fail_htlc` messages which should be sent
933 pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
934 /// `update_fail_malformed_htlc` messages which should be sent
935 pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
936 /// An `update_fee` message which should be sent
937 pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
938 /// A `commitment_signed` message which should be sent
939 pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
942 /// Messages could have optional fields to use with extended features
943 /// As we wish to serialize these differently from `Option<T>`s (`Options` get a tag byte, but
944 /// [`OptionalField`] simply gets `Present` if there are enough bytes to read into it), we have a
945 /// separate enum type for them.
947 /// This is not exported to bindings users due to a free generic in `T`
948 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
949 pub enum OptionalField<T> {
950 /// Optional field is included in message
952 /// Optional field is absent in message
956 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
958 /// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different `their_node_ids`, however
959 /// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same `their_node_id`.
960 pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
962 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel` message from the given peer.
963 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannel);
964 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel` message from the given peer.
965 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannel);
966 /// Handle an incoming `funding_created` message from the given peer.
967 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated);
968 /// Handle an incoming `funding_signed` message from the given peer.
969 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned);
970 /// Handle an incoming `channel_ready` message from the given peer.
971 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReady);
974 /// Handle an incoming `shutdown` message from the given peer.
975 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown);
976 /// Handle an incoming `closing_signed` message from the given peer.
977 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned);
980 /// Handle an incoming `update_add_htlc` message from the given peer.
981 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC);
982 /// Handle an incoming `update_fulfill_htlc` message from the given peer.
983 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC);
984 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_htlc` message from the given peer.
985 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC);
986 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_malformed_htlc` message from the given peer.
987 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC);
988 /// Handle an incoming `commitment_signed` message from the given peer.
989 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned);
990 /// Handle an incoming `revoke_and_ack` message from the given peer.
991 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK);
993 /// Handle an incoming `update_fee` message from the given peer.
994 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee);
996 // Channel-to-announce:
997 /// Handle an incoming `announcement_signatures` message from the given peer.
998 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures);
1000 // Connection loss/reestablish:
1001 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost.
1002 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1004 /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating `channel_reestablish` message(s).
1006 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1007 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1008 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1009 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1010 /// Handle an incoming `channel_reestablish` message from the given peer.
1011 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish);
1013 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message from the given peer.
1014 fn handle_channel_update(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelUpdate);
1017 /// Handle an incoming `error` message from the given peer.
1018 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
1020 // Handler information:
1021 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1022 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1023 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1024 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1026 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1027 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1028 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1030 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1031 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1034 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
1036 /// # Implementor DoS Warnings
1038 /// For messages enabled with the `gossip_queries` feature there are potential DoS vectors when
1039 /// handling inbound queries. Implementors using an on-disk network graph should be aware of
1040 /// repeated disk I/O for queries accessing different parts of the network graph.
1041 pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1042 /// Handle an incoming `node_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on,
1043 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1044 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1045 /// Handle a `channel_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on, `false`
1046 /// or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1047 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1048 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
1049 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1050 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1051 /// Gets channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
1052 /// starting at the `short_channel_id` indicated by `starting_point` and including announcements
1053 /// for a single channel.
1054 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)>;
1055 /// Gets a node announcement required to dump our routing table to a remote node, starting at
1056 /// the node *after* the provided pubkey and including up to one announcement immediately
1057 /// higher (as defined by `<PublicKey as Ord>::cmp`) than `starting_point`.
1058 /// If `None` is provided for `starting_point`, we start at the first node.
1059 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement>;
1060 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. This can be used to
1061 /// perform routing table synchronization using a strategy defined by the
1064 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1065 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1066 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1067 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1068 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated to learn about channels
1069 /// for a given range of blocks. We can expect to receive one or more
1070 /// replies to a single query.
1071 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1072 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated asking for routing gossip
1073 /// messages for a list of channels. We should receive this message when
1074 /// a node has completed its best effort to send us the pertaining routing
1075 /// gossip messages.
1076 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1077 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send a list of `short_channel_id`s
1078 /// for the requested range of blocks.
1079 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1080 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send routing gossip messages for a
1081 /// list of `short_channel_id`s.
1082 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1084 // Handler queueing status:
1085 /// Indicates that there are a large number of [`ChannelAnnouncement`] (or other) messages
1086 /// pending some async action. While there is no guarantee of the rate of future messages, the
1087 /// caller should seek to reduce the rate of new gossip messages handled, especially
1088 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`]s.
1089 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool;
1091 // Handler information:
1092 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1093 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1094 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1095 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1096 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1097 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1098 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1100 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1101 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1104 /// A trait to describe an object that can receive onion messages.
1105 pub trait OnionMessageHandler : OnionMessageProvider {
1106 /// Handle an incoming `onion_message` message from the given peer.
1107 fn handle_onion_message(&self, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage);
1108 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. Can be used to track which peers
1109 /// advertise onion message support and are online.
1111 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1112 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1113 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1114 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1115 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. Allows handlers to
1116 /// drop and refuse to forward onion messages to this peer.
1117 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1119 // Handler information:
1120 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1121 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1122 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1123 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1125 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1126 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1127 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1129 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1130 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1133 mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
1134 use crate::prelude::*;
1135 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
1137 // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
1138 // them from untrusted input):
1140 pub(crate) struct FinalOnionHopData {
1141 pub(crate) payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1142 /// The total value, in msat, of the payment as received by the ultimate recipient.
1143 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1144 pub(crate) total_msat: u64,
1147 pub(crate) enum OnionHopDataFormat {
1149 short_channel_id: u64,
1152 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1153 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1157 pub struct OnionHopData {
1158 pub(crate) format: OnionHopDataFormat,
1159 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1160 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1161 pub(crate) amt_to_forward: u64,
1162 pub(crate) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1165 pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
1166 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1167 pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
1168 pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
1172 pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1173 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
1174 pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1177 pub(crate) struct OnionPacket {
1178 pub(crate) version: u8,
1179 /// In order to ensure we always return an error on onion decode in compliance with [BOLT
1180 /// #4](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md), we have to
1181 /// deserialize `OnionPacket`s contained in [`UpdateAddHTLC`] messages even if the ephemeral
1182 /// public key (here) is bogus, so we hold a [`Result`] instead of a [`PublicKey`] as we'd
1184 pub(crate) public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
1185 pub(crate) hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
1186 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1189 impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket {
1190 type Data = onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket;
1191 fn new(pubkey: PublicKey, hop_data: onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket, hmac: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
1194 public_key: Ok(pubkey),
1195 hop_data: hop_data.0,
1201 impl Eq for OnionPacket { }
1202 impl PartialEq for OnionPacket {
1203 fn eq(&self, other: &OnionPacket) -> bool {
1204 for (i, j) in self.hop_data.iter().zip(other.hop_data.iter()) {
1205 if i != j { return false; }
1207 self.version == other.version &&
1208 self.public_key == other.public_key &&
1209 self.hmac == other.hmac
1213 impl fmt::Debug for OnionPacket {
1214 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1215 f.write_fmt(format_args!("OnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))
1219 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1220 pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
1221 // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
1222 // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
1223 pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
1226 impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
1227 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1229 DecodeError::UnknownVersion => f.write_str("Unknown realm byte in Onion packet"),
1230 DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => f.write_str("Unknown required feature preventing decode"),
1231 DecodeError::InvalidValue => f.write_str("Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as"),
1232 DecodeError::ShortRead => f.write_str("Packet extended beyond the provided bytes"),
1233 DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
1234 DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
1235 DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
1240 impl From<io::Error> for DecodeError {
1241 fn from(e: io::Error) -> Self {
1242 if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
1243 DecodeError::ShortRead
1245 DecodeError::Io(e.kind())
1250 impl Writeable for OptionalField<Script> {
1251 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1253 OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1254 // Note that Writeable for script includes the 16-bit length tag for us
1257 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1263 impl Readable for OptionalField<Script> {
1264 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1265 match <u16 as Readable>::read(r) {
1267 let mut buf = vec![0; len as usize];
1268 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1269 Ok(OptionalField::Present(Script::from(buf)))
1271 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(OptionalField::Absent),
1277 impl Writeable for OptionalField<u64> {
1278 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1280 OptionalField::Present(ref value) => {
1283 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1289 impl Readable for OptionalField<u64> {
1290 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1291 let value: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
1292 Ok(OptionalField::Present(value))
1297 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1298 temporary_channel_id,
1299 dust_limit_satoshis,
1300 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1301 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1307 revocation_basepoint,
1309 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1311 first_per_commitment_point,
1312 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1314 (1, channel_type, option),
1317 impl_writeable_msg!(AnnouncementSignatures, {
1324 impl Writeable for ChannelReestablish {
1325 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1326 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1327 self.next_local_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1328 self.next_remote_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1329 match self.data_loss_protect {
1330 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss_protect) => {
1331 (*data_loss_protect).your_last_per_commitment_secret.write(w)?;
1332 (*data_loss_protect).my_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
1334 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1340 impl Readable for ChannelReestablish{
1341 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1343 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1344 next_local_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1345 next_remote_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1346 data_loss_protect: {
1347 match <[u8; 32] as Readable>::read(r) {
1348 Ok(your_last_per_commitment_secret) =>
1349 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
1350 your_last_per_commitment_secret,
1351 my_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
1353 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => OptionalField::Absent,
1354 Err(e) => return Err(e)
1361 impl_writeable_msg!(ClosingSigned,
1362 { channel_id, fee_satoshis, signature },
1363 { (1, fee_range, option) }
1366 impl_writeable!(ClosingSignedFeeRange, {
1371 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
1377 impl_writeable!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
1383 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1384 temporary_channel_id,
1386 funding_output_index,
1390 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
1395 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReady, {
1397 next_per_commitment_point,
1399 (1, short_channel_id_alias, option),
1402 impl Writeable for Init {
1403 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1404 // global_features gets the bottom 13 bits of our features, and local_features gets all of
1405 // our relevant feature bits. This keeps us compatible with old nodes.
1406 self.features.write_up_to_13(w)?;
1407 self.features.write(w)?;
1408 encode_tlv_stream!(w, {
1409 (3, self.remote_network_address, option)
1415 impl Readable for Init {
1416 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1417 let global_features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1418 let features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1419 let mut remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress> = None;
1420 decode_tlv_stream!(r, {
1421 (3, remote_network_address, option)
1424 features: features.or(global_features),
1425 remote_network_address,
1430 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannel, {
1432 temporary_channel_id,
1435 dust_limit_satoshis,
1436 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1437 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1443 revocation_basepoint,
1445 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1447 first_per_commitment_point,
1449 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1451 (1, channel_type, option),
1454 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
1456 per_commitment_secret,
1457 next_per_commitment_point
1460 impl_writeable_msg!(Shutdown, {
1465 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
1471 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, {
1478 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFee, {
1483 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, {
1489 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1490 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1492 impl_writeable!(OnionErrorPacket, {
1496 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1497 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1499 impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
1500 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1501 self.version.write(w)?;
1502 match self.public_key {
1503 Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
1504 Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
1506 w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
1507 self.hmac.write(w)?;
1512 impl Readable for OnionPacket {
1513 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1515 version: Readable::read(r)?,
1517 let mut buf = [0u8;33];
1518 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1519 PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
1521 hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
1522 hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
1527 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateAddHTLC, {
1533 onion_routing_packet
1536 impl Readable for OnionMessage {
1537 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1538 let blinding_point: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
1539 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1540 let mut packet_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(r, len as u64);
1541 let onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet = <onion_message::Packet as LengthReadable>::read(&mut packet_reader)?;
1544 onion_routing_packet,
1549 impl Writeable for OnionMessage {
1550 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1551 self.blinding_point.write(w)?;
1552 let onion_packet_len = self.onion_routing_packet.serialized_length();
1553 (onion_packet_len as u16).write(w)?;
1554 self.onion_routing_packet.write(w)?;
1559 impl Writeable for FinalOnionHopData {
1560 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1561 self.payment_secret.0.write(w)?;
1562 HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.total_msat).write(w)
1566 impl Readable for FinalOnionHopData {
1567 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1568 let secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1569 let amt: HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize<u64> = Readable::read(r)?;
1570 Ok(Self { payment_secret: PaymentSecret(secret), total_msat: amt.0 })
1574 impl Writeable for OnionHopData {
1575 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1577 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => {
1578 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1579 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1580 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1581 (6, short_channel_id, required)
1584 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { ref payment_data, ref keysend_preimage } => {
1585 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1586 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1587 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1588 (8, payment_data, option),
1589 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1597 impl Readable for OnionHopData {
1598 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1599 let mut amt = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u64);
1600 let mut cltv_value = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u32);
1601 let mut short_id: Option<u64> = None;
1602 let mut payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData> = None;
1603 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
1604 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
1606 (4, cltv_value, required),
1607 (6, short_id, option),
1608 (8, payment_data, option),
1609 // See https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
1610 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1613 let format = if let Some(short_channel_id) = short_id {
1614 if payment_data.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1615 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
1619 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1620 if data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1621 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1624 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
1630 if amt.0 > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1631 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1635 amt_to_forward: amt.0,
1636 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.0,
1641 // ReadableArgs because we need onion_utils::decode_next_hop to accommodate payment packets and
1642 // onion message packets.
1643 impl ReadableArgs<()> for OnionHopData {
1644 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, _arg: ()) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1645 <Self as Readable>::read(r)
1649 impl Writeable for Ping {
1650 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1651 self.ponglen.write(w)?;
1652 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1657 impl Readable for Ping {
1658 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1660 ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
1662 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1663 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1670 impl Writeable for Pong {
1671 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1672 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1677 impl Readable for Pong {
1678 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1681 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1682 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1689 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1690 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1691 self.features.write(w)?;
1692 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1693 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1694 self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
1695 self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
1696 self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
1697 self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
1698 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1703 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1704 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1706 features: Readable::read(r)?,
1707 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1708 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1709 node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1710 node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1711 bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1712 bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1713 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1718 impl_writeable!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
1721 bitcoin_signature_1,
1722 bitcoin_signature_2,
1726 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1727 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1728 // `message_flags` used to indicate presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, but was deprecated in the spec.
1729 const MESSAGE_FLAGS: u8 = 1;
1730 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1731 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1732 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1733 let all_flags = self.flags as u16 | ((MESSAGE_FLAGS as u16) << 8);
1734 all_flags.write(w)?;
1735 self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
1736 self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
1737 self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
1738 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
1739 self.htlc_maximum_msat.write(w)?;
1740 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1745 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1746 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1748 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1749 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1750 timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
1752 let flags: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1753 // Note: we ignore the `message_flags` for now, since it was deprecated by the spec.
1756 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
1757 htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1758 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1759 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
1760 htlc_maximum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1761 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1766 impl_writeable!(ChannelUpdate, {
1771 impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
1772 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1773 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1774 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1775 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1780 impl Readable for ErrorMessage {
1781 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1783 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1785 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1786 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1788 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1789 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1791 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1798 impl Writeable for WarningMessage {
1799 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1800 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1801 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1802 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1807 impl Readable for WarningMessage {
1808 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1810 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1812 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1813 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1815 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1816 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1818 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1825 impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1826 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1827 self.features.write(w)?;
1828 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1829 self.node_id.write(w)?;
1830 w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
1831 self.alias.write(w)?;
1833 let mut addr_len = 0;
1834 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1835 addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
1837 (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1838 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1841 w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
1842 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1847 impl Readable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1848 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1849 let features: NodeFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1850 let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1851 let node_id: NodeId = Readable::read(r)?;
1852 let mut rgb = [0; 3];
1853 r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
1854 let alias: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1856 let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1857 let mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress> = Vec::new();
1858 let mut addr_readpos = 0;
1859 let mut excess = false;
1860 let mut excess_byte = 0;
1862 if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
1863 match Readable::read(r) {
1865 if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
1866 return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
1868 addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
1869 addresses.push(addr);
1871 Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
1873 excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
1876 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
1877 Err(e) => return Err(e),
1881 let mut excess_data = vec![];
1882 let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
1883 let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
1884 r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
1886 excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
1891 excess_data.push(excess_byte);
1895 excess_data.extend(read_to_end(r)?.iter());
1896 Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1903 excess_address_data,
1909 impl_writeable!(NodeAnnouncement, {
1914 impl Readable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1915 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1916 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1918 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1919 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
1921 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
1922 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
1923 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
1924 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
1927 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
1928 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
1929 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
1930 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1933 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
1934 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
1935 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
1936 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
1937 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
1938 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
1941 Ok(QueryShortChannelIds {
1948 impl Writeable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1949 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1950 // Calculated from 1-byte encoding_type plus 8-bytes per short_channel_id
1951 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
1953 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1954 encoding_len.write(w)?;
1956 // We only support type=0 uncompressed serialization
1957 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
1959 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
1967 impl_writeable_msg!(ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, {
1972 impl QueryChannelRange {
1973 /// Calculates the overflow safe ending block height for the query.
1975 /// Overflow returns `0xffffffff`, otherwise returns `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`.
1976 pub fn end_blocknum(&self) -> u32 {
1977 match self.first_blocknum.checked_add(self.number_of_blocks) {
1978 Some(block) => block,
1979 None => u32::max_value(),
1984 impl_writeable_msg!(QueryChannelRange, {
1990 impl Readable for ReplyChannelRange {
1991 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1992 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1993 let first_blocknum: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1994 let number_of_blocks: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1995 let sync_complete: bool = Readable::read(r)?;
1997 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1998 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
2000 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
2001 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
2002 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
2003 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2006 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2007 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2008 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2009 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2012 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2013 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2014 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2015 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2016 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2017 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2020 Ok(ReplyChannelRange {
2030 impl Writeable for ReplyChannelRange {
2031 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2032 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2033 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2034 self.first_blocknum.write(w)?;
2035 self.number_of_blocks.write(w)?;
2036 self.sync_complete.write(w)?;
2038 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2039 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2040 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2048 impl_writeable_msg!(GossipTimestampFilter, {
2057 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
2058 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
2059 use crate::ln::msgs;
2060 use crate::ln::msgs::{FinalOnionHopData, OptionalField, OnionErrorPacket, OnionHopDataFormat};
2061 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
2062 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Hostname};
2064 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2065 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
2066 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2067 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
2068 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2069 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
2071 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2072 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2074 use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
2075 use crate::prelude::*;
2076 use core::convert::TryFrom;
2079 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_no_secret() {
2080 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2081 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2082 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2083 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2084 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
2087 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2090 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4]
2095 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_with_secret() {
2097 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2098 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2101 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2102 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2103 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2104 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2105 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Present(msgs::DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32], my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key}),
2108 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2111 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143]
2115 macro_rules! get_keys_from {
2116 ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
2118 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2119 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
2125 macro_rules! get_sig_on {
2126 ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
2128 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
2129 $ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
2135 fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
2136 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2137 let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2138 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2139 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
2140 let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2141 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2142 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2143 node_signature: sig_1,
2144 bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
2147 let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
2148 assert_eq!(encoded_value, hex::decode("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
2151 fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2152 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2153 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2154 let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2155 let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2156 let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2157 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2158 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2159 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2160 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2161 let mut features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2162 if unknown_features_bits {
2163 features = ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF]);
2165 let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2167 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2168 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2169 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2170 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_2),
2171 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_3),
2172 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_4),
2173 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
2175 let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2176 node_signature_1: sig_1,
2177 node_signature_2: sig_2,
2178 bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
2179 bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
2180 contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
2182 let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
2183 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2184 if unknown_features_bits {
2185 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2187 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2189 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2190 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
2192 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
2194 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2198 fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
2199 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false);
2200 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true);
2201 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false);
2202 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true);
2205 fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, hostname: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2206 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2207 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2208 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2209 let features = if unknown_features_bits {
2210 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF])
2212 // Set to some features we may support
2213 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![2 | 1 << 5])
2215 let mut addresses = Vec::new();
2217 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2218 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
2223 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv6 {
2224 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
2229 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV2(
2230 [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]
2234 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV3 {
2235 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
2242 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::Hostname {
2243 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
2247 let mut addr_len = 0;
2248 for addr in &addresses {
2249 addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
2251 let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2253 timestamp: 20190119,
2254 node_id: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2258 excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
2259 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
2261 addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
2262 let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2264 contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
2266 let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
2267 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2268 if unknown_features_bits {
2269 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2271 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000122").unwrap());
2273 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
2274 target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
2276 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
2279 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
2282 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
2285 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
2288 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0504686f73742607").unwrap());
2290 if excess_address_data {
2291 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
2294 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2296 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2300 fn encoding_node_announcement() {
2301 do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
2302 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2303 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2304 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
2305 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
2306 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
2307 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
2308 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
2309 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, false, true, false);
2310 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false, false);
2313 fn do_encoding_channel_update(direction: bool, disable: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2314 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2315 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2316 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2317 let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2318 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2319 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2320 timestamp: 20190119,
2321 flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
2322 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2323 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
2324 htlc_maximum_msat: 131355275467161,
2325 fee_base_msat: 10000,
2326 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2327 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
2329 let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2331 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2333 let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
2334 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2335 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2336 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
2337 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01").unwrap());
2338 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2340 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2344 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2345 *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
2347 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
2348 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000777788889999").unwrap());
2350 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
2352 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2356 fn encoding_channel_update() {
2357 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false);
2358 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true);
2359 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false);
2360 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, true);
2361 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false);
2362 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, true);
2363 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, false);
2364 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true);
2367 fn do_encoding_open_channel(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool) {
2368 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2369 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2370 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2371 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2372 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2373 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2374 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2375 let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
2376 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2377 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2378 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2379 push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2380 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2381 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
2382 channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
2383 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2384 feerate_per_kw: 821716,
2385 to_self_delay: 49340,
2386 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2387 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2388 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2389 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2390 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2391 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2392 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2393 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
2394 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2395 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
2397 let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
2398 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
2399 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2400 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2402 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("20").unwrap());
2404 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2407 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2410 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0100").unwrap());
2412 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2416 fn encoding_open_channel() {
2417 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
2418 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
2419 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
2420 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, true);
2421 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
2422 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, true);
2423 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, false);
2424 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
2427 fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
2428 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2429 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2430 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2431 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2432 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2433 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2434 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2435 let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
2436 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2437 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2438 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2439 channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2440 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2441 minimum_depth: 821716,
2442 to_self_delay: 49340,
2443 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2444 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2445 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2446 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2447 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2448 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2449 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2450 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2453 let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
2454 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2456 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2458 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2462 fn encoding_accept_channel() {
2463 do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
2464 do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
2468 fn encoding_funding_created() {
2469 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2470 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2471 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2472 let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
2473 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2474 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
2475 funding_output_index: 255,
2478 let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
2479 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2480 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2484 fn encoding_funding_signed() {
2485 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2486 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2487 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2488 let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
2489 channel_id: [2; 32],
2492 let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
2493 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2494 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2498 fn encoding_channel_ready() {
2499 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2500 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2501 let channel_ready = msgs::ChannelReady {
2502 channel_id: [2; 32],
2503 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2504 short_channel_id_alias: None,
2506 let encoded_value = channel_ready.encode();
2507 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2508 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2511 fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
2512 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2513 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2514 let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
2515 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
2516 channel_id: [2; 32],
2518 if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
2519 else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2520 else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2521 else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
2523 let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
2524 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
2525 if script_type == 1 {
2526 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2527 } else if script_type == 2 {
2528 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
2529 } else if script_type == 3 {
2530 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
2531 } else if script_type == 4 {
2532 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
2534 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2538 fn encoding_shutdown() {
2539 do_encoding_shutdown(1);
2540 do_encoding_shutdown(2);
2541 do_encoding_shutdown(3);
2542 do_encoding_shutdown(4);
2546 fn encoding_closing_signed() {
2547 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2548 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2549 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2550 let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2551 channel_id: [2; 32],
2552 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2556 let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
2557 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2558 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2559 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), closing_signed);
2561 let closing_signed_with_range = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2562 channel_id: [2; 32],
2563 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2565 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
2566 min_fee_satoshis: 0xdeadbeef,
2567 max_fee_satoshis: 0x1badcafe01234567,
2570 let encoded_value_with_range = closing_signed_with_range.encode();
2571 let target_value_with_range = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a011000000000deadbeef1badcafe01234567").unwrap();
2572 assert_eq!(encoded_value_with_range, target_value_with_range);
2573 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value_with_range)).unwrap(),
2574 closing_signed_with_range);
2578 fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
2579 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2580 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2581 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2583 public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
2584 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
2587 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2588 channel_id: [2; 32],
2589 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2590 amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
2591 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2592 cltv_expiry: 821716,
2593 onion_routing_packet
2595 let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
2596 let target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2597 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2601 fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
2602 let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2603 channel_id: [2; 32],
2604 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2605 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
2607 let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
2608 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2609 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2613 fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
2614 let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
2615 data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
2617 let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2618 channel_id: [2; 32],
2619 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2622 let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
2623 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2624 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2628 fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
2629 let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2630 channel_id: [2; 32],
2631 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2632 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
2635 let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
2636 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
2637 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2640 fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
2641 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2642 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2643 let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2644 let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2645 let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2646 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2647 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2648 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2649 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2650 let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
2651 channel_id: [2; 32],
2653 htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
2655 let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
2656 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2658 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2660 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2662 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2666 fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
2667 do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
2668 do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
2672 fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
2673 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2674 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2675 let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2676 channel_id: [2; 32],
2677 per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
2678 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2680 let encoded_value = raa.encode();
2681 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2682 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2686 fn encoding_update_fee() {
2687 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
2688 channel_id: [2; 32],
2689 feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
2691 let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
2692 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
2693 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2697 fn encoding_init() {
2698 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2699 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]),
2700 remote_network_address: None,
2701 }.encode(), hex::decode("00023fff0003ffffff").unwrap());
2702 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2703 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF]),
2704 remote_network_address: None,
2705 }.encode(), hex::decode("0001ff0001ff").unwrap());
2706 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2707 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2708 remote_network_address: None,
2709 }.encode(), hex::decode("00000000").unwrap());
2711 let init_msg = msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2712 remote_network_address: Some(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2713 addr: [127, 0, 0, 1],
2717 let encoded_value = init_msg.encode();
2718 let target_value = hex::decode("000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
2719 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2720 assert_eq!(msgs::Init::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), init_msg);
2724 fn encoding_error() {
2725 let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
2726 channel_id: [2; 32],
2727 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2729 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2730 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2731 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2735 fn encoding_warning() {
2736 let error = msgs::WarningMessage {
2737 channel_id: [2; 32],
2738 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2740 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2741 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2742 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2746 fn encoding_ping() {
2747 let ping = msgs::Ping {
2751 let encoded_value = ping.encode();
2752 let target_value = hex::decode("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2753 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2757 fn encoding_pong() {
2758 let pong = msgs::Pong {
2761 let encoded_value = pong.encode();
2762 let target_value = hex::decode("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2763 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2767 fn encoding_nonfinal_onion_hop_data() {
2768 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2769 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2770 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2772 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2773 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2775 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2776 let target_value = hex::decode("1a02080badf00d010203040404ffffffff0608deadbeef1bad1dea").unwrap();
2777 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2778 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2779 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = msg.format {
2780 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea);
2781 } else { panic!(); }
2782 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2783 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2787 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data() {
2788 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2789 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2791 keysend_preimage: None,
2793 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2794 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2796 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2797 let target_value = hex::decode("1002080badf00d010203040404ffffffff").unwrap();
2798 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2799 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2800 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data: None, .. } = msg.format { } else { panic!(); }
2801 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2802 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2806 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_secret() {
2807 let expected_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0x42u8; 32]);
2808 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2809 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2810 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2811 payment_secret: expected_payment_secret,
2812 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2814 keysend_preimage: None,
2816 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2817 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2819 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2820 let target_value = hex::decode("3602080badf00d010203040404ffffffff082442424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242421badca1f").unwrap();
2821 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2822 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2823 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2824 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2826 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2828 keysend_preimage: None,
2830 assert_eq!(payment_secret, expected_payment_secret);
2831 } else { panic!(); }
2832 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2833 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2837 fn query_channel_range_end_blocknum() {
2838 let tests: Vec<(u32, u32, u32)> = vec![
2839 (10000, 1500, 11500),
2840 (0, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2841 (1, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2844 for (first_blocknum, number_of_blocks, expected) in tests.into_iter() {
2845 let sut = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2846 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2850 assert_eq!(sut.end_blocknum(), expected);
2855 fn encoding_query_channel_range() {
2856 let mut query_channel_range = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2857 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2858 first_blocknum: 100000,
2859 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2861 let encoded_value = query_channel_range.encode();
2862 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000186a0000005dc").unwrap();
2863 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2865 query_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2866 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.first_blocknum, 100000);
2867 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2871 fn encoding_reply_channel_range() {
2872 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(0);
2873 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(1);
2876 fn do_encoding_reply_channel_range(encoding_type: u8) {
2877 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000b8a06000005dc01").unwrap();
2878 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2879 let mut reply_channel_range = msgs::ReplyChannelRange {
2880 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2881 first_blocknum: 756230,
2882 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2883 sync_complete: true,
2884 short_channel_ids: vec![0x000000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2887 if encoding_type == 0 {
2888 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2889 let encoded_value = reply_channel_range.encode();
2890 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2892 reply_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2893 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2894 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.first_blocknum, 756230);
2895 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2896 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.sync_complete, true);
2897 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2898 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2899 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2901 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2902 let result: Result<msgs::ReplyChannelRange, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2903 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2908 fn encoding_query_short_channel_ids() {
2909 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(0);
2910 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(1);
2913 fn do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(encoding_type: u8) {
2914 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206").unwrap();
2915 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2916 let mut query_short_channel_ids = msgs::QueryShortChannelIds {
2917 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2918 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2921 if encoding_type == 0 {
2922 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2923 let encoded_value = query_short_channel_ids.encode();
2924 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2926 query_short_channel_ids = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2927 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2928 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2929 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2930 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2932 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2933 let result: Result<msgs::QueryShortChannelIds, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2934 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2939 fn encoding_reply_short_channel_ids_end() {
2940 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2941 let mut reply_short_channel_ids_end = msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2942 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2943 full_information: true,
2945 let encoded_value = reply_short_channel_ids_end.encode();
2946 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e220601").unwrap();
2947 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2949 reply_short_channel_ids_end = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2950 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2951 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.full_information, true);
2955 fn encoding_gossip_timestamp_filter(){
2956 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2957 let mut gossip_timestamp_filter = msgs::GossipTimestampFilter {
2958 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2959 first_timestamp: 1590000000,
2960 timestamp_range: 0xffff_ffff,
2962 let encoded_value = gossip_timestamp_filter.encode();
2963 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e22065ec57980ffffffff").unwrap();
2964 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2966 gossip_timestamp_filter = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2967 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2968 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.first_timestamp, 1590000000);
2969 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.timestamp_range, 0xffff_ffff);
2973 fn decode_onion_hop_data_len_as_bigsize() {
2974 // Tests that we can decode an onion payload that is >253 bytes.
2975 // Previously, receiving a payload of this size could've caused us to fail to decode a valid
2976 // payload, because we were decoding the length (a BigSize, big-endian) as a VarInt
2979 // Encode a test onion payload with a big custom TLV such that it's >253 bytes, forcing the
2980 // payload length to be encoded over multiple bytes rather than a single u8.
2981 let big_payload = encode_big_payload().unwrap();
2982 let mut rd = Cursor::new(&big_payload[..]);
2983 <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut rd).unwrap();
2985 // see above test, needs to be a separate method for use of the serialization macros.
2986 fn encode_big_payload() -> Result<Vec<u8>, io::Error> {
2987 use crate::util::ser::HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize;
2988 let payload = msgs::OnionHopData {
2989 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2990 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2992 amt_to_forward: 1000,
2993 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2995 let mut encoded_payload = Vec::new();
2996 let test_bytes = vec![42u8; 1000];
2997 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = payload.format {
2998 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(&mut encoded_payload, {
2999 (1, test_bytes, vec_type),
3000 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.amt_to_forward), required),
3001 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
3002 (6, short_channel_id, required)