1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use crate::prelude::*;
12 use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
13 use crate::ln::msgs::LightningError;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20Poly1305RFC;
26 use crate::util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_twice;
27 use crate::util::ser::VecWriter;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
32 /// Maximum Lightning message data length according to
33 /// [BOLT-8](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/v1.0/08-transport.md#lightning-message-specification)
34 /// and [BOLT-1](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#lightning-message-format):
35 pub const LN_MAX_MSG_LEN: usize = ::core::u16::MAX as usize; // Must be equal to 65535
37 /// The (rough) size buffer to pre-allocate when encoding a message. Messages should reliably be
38 /// smaller than this size by at least 32 bytes or so.
39 pub const MSG_BUF_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 2048;
41 // Sha256("Noise_XK_secp256k1_ChaChaPoly_SHA256")
42 const NOISE_CK: [u8; 32] = [0x26, 0x40, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xeb, 0xcd, 0x9e, 0x88, 0x29, 0x58, 0x95, 0x1c, 0x79, 0x42, 0x50, 0xee, 0xdb, 0x28, 0x00, 0x2c, 0x05, 0xd7, 0xdc, 0x2e, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x95, 0x40, 0x60, 0x42, 0xca, 0xf1];
43 // Sha256(NOISE_CK || "lightning")
44 const NOISE_H: [u8; 32] = [0xd1, 0xfb, 0xf6, 0xde, 0xe4, 0xf6, 0x86, 0xf1, 0x32, 0xfd, 0x70, 0x2c, 0x4a, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0xba, 0x4b, 0xb4, 0x20, 0xd8, 0x9d, 0x2a, 0x04, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x4f, 0x4c, 0x09, 0x2e, 0x37, 0xb6, 0x76];
46 enum NoiseSecretKey<'a, 'b, NS: Deref> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
47 InMemory(&'a SecretKey),
51 pub enum NextNoiseStep {
63 // When done swap noise_state for NoiseState::Finished
66 struct BidirectionalNoiseState {
70 enum DirectionalNoiseState {
75 ie: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in if state >= PostActOne
76 re: Option<SecretKey>, // filled in if state >= PostActTwo
77 temp_k2: Option<[u8; 32]>, // filled in if state >= PostActTwo
83 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState,
84 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState,
96 pub struct PeerChannelEncryptor {
97 their_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in for outbound, or inbound after noise_state is Finished
99 noise_state: NoiseState,
102 impl PeerChannelEncryptor {
103 pub fn new_outbound(their_node_id: PublicKey, ephemeral_key: SecretKey) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
104 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
106 sha.input(&their_node_id.serialize()[..]);
107 let h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
109 PeerChannelEncryptor {
110 their_node_id: Some(their_node_id),
111 noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
112 state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
113 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound {
116 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
124 pub fn new_inbound<NS: Deref>(node_signer: &NS) -> PeerChannelEncryptor where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
125 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
127 let our_node_id = node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
128 sha.input(&our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
129 let h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
131 PeerChannelEncryptor {
133 noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
134 state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
135 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound {
140 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
149 fn encrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], plaintext: &[u8]) {
150 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
151 nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
153 let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
154 let mut tag = [0; 16];
155 chacha.encrypt(plaintext, &mut res[0..plaintext.len()], &mut tag);
156 res[plaintext.len()..].copy_from_slice(&tag);
160 /// Encrypts the message in res[offset..] in-place and pushes a 16-byte tag onto the end of
162 fn encrypt_in_place_with_ad(res: &mut Vec<u8>, offset: usize, n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8]) {
163 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
164 nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
166 let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
167 let mut tag = [0; 16];
168 chacha.encrypt_full_message_in_place(&mut res[offset..], &mut tag);
169 res.extend_from_slice(&tag);
173 fn decrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], cyphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
174 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
175 nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
177 let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
178 if !chacha.decrypt(&cyphertext[0..cyphertext.len() - 16], res, &cyphertext[cyphertext.len() - 16..]) {
179 return Err(LightningError{err: "Bad MAC".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
185 fn hkdf(state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, ss: SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
186 let (t1, t2) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&state.ck, ss.as_ref());
192 fn outbound_noise_act<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, our_key: &SecretKey, their_key: &PublicKey) -> ([u8; 50], [u8; 32]) {
193 let our_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &our_key);
195 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
197 sha.input(&our_pub.serialize()[..]);
198 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
200 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&their_key, &our_key);
201 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(state, ss);
203 let mut res = [0; 50];
204 res[1..34].copy_from_slice(&our_pub.serialize()[..]);
205 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[34..], 0, &temp_k, &state.h, &[0; 0]);
207 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
209 sha.input(&res[34..]);
210 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
216 fn inbound_noise_act<'a, 'b, NS: Deref>(
217 state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, act: &[u8], secret_key: NoiseSecretKey<'a, 'b, NS>
218 ) -> Result<(PublicKey, [u8; 32]), LightningError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
219 assert_eq!(act.len(), 50);
222 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Unknown handshake version number {}", act[0]), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
225 let their_pub = match PublicKey::from_slice(&act[1..34]) {
226 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Invalid public key {}", &act[1..34].to_hex()), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }}),
230 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
232 sha.input(&their_pub.serialize()[..]);
233 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
235 let ss = match secret_key {
236 NoiseSecretKey::InMemory(secret_key) => SharedSecret::new(&their_pub, secret_key),
237 NoiseSecretKey::NodeSigner(node_signer) => node_signer
238 .ecdh(Recipient::Node, &their_pub, None)
239 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
240 err: "Failed to derive shared secret".to_owned(),
241 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }
244 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(state, ss);
246 let mut dec = [0; 0];
247 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut dec, 0, &temp_k, &state.h, &act[34..])?;
249 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
251 sha.input(&act[34..]);
252 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
254 Ok((their_pub, temp_k))
257 pub fn get_act_one<C: secp256k1::Signing>(&mut self, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> [u8; 50] {
258 match self.noise_state {
259 NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
260 match directional_state {
261 &DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound { ref ie } => {
262 if *state != NoiseStep::PreActOne {
263 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
266 let (res, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &ie, &self.their_node_id.unwrap());
267 *state = NoiseStep::PostActOne;
270 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
272 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
276 pub fn process_act_one_with_keys<C: secp256k1::Signing, NS: Deref>(
277 &mut self, act_one: &[u8], node_signer: &NS, our_ephemeral: SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>)
278 -> Result<[u8; 50], LightningError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
279 assert_eq!(act_one.len(), 50);
281 match self.noise_state {
282 NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref mut directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
283 match directional_state {
284 &mut DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound { ref mut ie, ref mut re, ref mut temp_k2 } => {
285 if *state != NoiseStep::PreActOne {
286 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
289 let (their_pub, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_one, NoiseSecretKey::NodeSigner(node_signer))?;
290 ie.get_or_insert(their_pub);
292 re.get_or_insert(our_ephemeral);
295 PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &re.unwrap(), &ie.unwrap());
296 *temp_k2 = Some(temp_k);
297 *state = NoiseStep::PostActTwo;
300 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
302 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
306 pub fn process_act_two<NS: Deref>(
307 &mut self, act_two: &[u8], node_signer: &NS)
308 -> Result<([u8; 66], PublicKey), LightningError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
309 assert_eq!(act_two.len(), 50);
313 let res: [u8; 66] = match self.noise_state {
314 NoiseState::InProgress { ref state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
315 match directional_state {
316 &DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound { ref ie } => {
317 if *state != NoiseStep::PostActOne {
318 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
321 let (re, temp_k2) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_two, NoiseSecretKey::<NS>::InMemory(&ie))?;
323 let mut res = [0; 66];
324 let our_node_id = node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).map_err(|_| LightningError {
325 err: "Failed to encrypt message".to_owned(),
326 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }
329 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[1..50], 1, &temp_k2, &bidirectional_state.h, &our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
331 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
332 sha.input(&bidirectional_state.h);
333 sha.input(&res[1..50]);
334 bidirectional_state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
336 let ss = node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &re, None).map_err(|_| LightningError {
337 err: "Failed to derive shared secret".to_owned(),
338 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }
340 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
342 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[50..], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &[0; 0]);
343 final_hkdf = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
344 ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
347 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
349 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
352 let (sk, rk) = final_hkdf;
353 self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
362 Ok((res, self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone()))
365 pub fn process_act_three(&mut self, act_three: &[u8]) -> Result<PublicKey, LightningError> {
366 assert_eq!(act_three.len(), 66);
370 match self.noise_state {
371 NoiseState::InProgress { ref state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
372 match directional_state {
373 &DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound { ie: _, ref re, ref temp_k2 } => {
374 if *state != NoiseStep::PostActTwo {
375 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
377 if act_three[0] != 0 {
378 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Unknown handshake version number {}", act_three[0]), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
381 let mut their_node_id = [0; 33];
382 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut their_node_id, 1, &temp_k2.unwrap(), &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[1..50])?;
383 self.their_node_id = Some(match PublicKey::from_slice(&their_node_id) {
385 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Bad node_id from peer, {}", &their_node_id.to_hex()), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }}),
388 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
389 sha.input(&bidirectional_state.h);
390 sha.input(&act_three[1..50]);
391 bidirectional_state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
393 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&self.their_node_id.unwrap(), &re.unwrap());
394 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
396 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut [0; 0], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[50..])?;
397 final_hkdf = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
398 ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
400 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
402 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
405 let (rk, sk) = final_hkdf;
406 self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
415 Ok(self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone())
418 /// Encrypts the given pre-serialized message, returning the encrypted version.
419 /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 or Noise handshake has not finished.
420 pub fn encrypt_buffer(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
421 if msg.len() > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN {
422 panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!");
425 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2);
426 res.resize(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2, 0);
428 match self.noise_state {
429 NoiseState::Finished { ref mut sk, ref mut sn, ref mut sck, rk: _, rn: _, rck: _ } => {
431 let (new_sck, new_sk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(sck, sk);
437 Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &(msg.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
440 Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[16+2..], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], msg);
443 _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
449 /// Encrypts the given message, returning the encrypted version.
450 /// panics if the length of `message`, once encoded, is greater than 65535 or if the Noise
451 /// handshake has not finished.
452 pub fn encrypt_message<M: wire::Type>(&mut self, message: &M) -> Vec<u8> {
453 // Allocate a buffer with 2KB, fitting most common messages. Reserve the first 16+2 bytes
454 // for the 2-byte message type prefix and its MAC.
455 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(MSG_BUF_ALLOC_SIZE));
456 res.0.resize(16 + 2, 0);
457 wire::write(message, &mut res).expect("In-memory messages must never fail to serialize");
459 let msg_len = res.0.len() - 16 - 2;
460 if msg_len > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN {
461 panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!");
464 match self.noise_state {
465 NoiseState::Finished { ref mut sk, ref mut sn, ref mut sck, rk: _, rn: _, rck: _ } => {
467 let (new_sck, new_sk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(sck, sk);
473 Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res.0[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &(msg_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
476 Self::encrypt_in_place_with_ad(&mut res.0, 16+2, *sn, sk, &[0; 0]);
479 _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
485 /// Decrypts a message length header from the remote peer.
486 /// panics if noise handshake has not yet finished or msg.len() != 18
487 pub fn decrypt_length_header(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<u16, LightningError> {
488 assert_eq!(msg.len(), 16+2);
490 match self.noise_state {
491 NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref mut rk, ref mut rn, ref mut rck } => {
493 let (new_rck, new_rk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(rck, rk);
499 let mut res = [0; 2];
500 Self::decrypt_with_ad(&mut res, *rn, rk, &[0; 0], msg)?;
502 Ok(u16::from_be_bytes(res))
504 _ => panic!("Tried to decrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
508 /// Decrypts the given message.
509 /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 + 16
510 pub fn decrypt_message(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, LightningError> {
511 if msg.len() > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 16 {
512 panic!("Attempted to decrypt message longer than 65535 + 16 bytes!");
515 match self.noise_state {
516 NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref rk, ref mut rn, rck: _ } => {
517 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(msg.len() - 16);
518 res.resize(msg.len() - 16, 0);
519 Self::decrypt_with_ad(&mut res[..], *rn, rk, &[0; 0], msg)?;
524 _ => panic!("Tried to decrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
528 pub fn get_noise_step(&self) -> NextNoiseStep {
529 match self.noise_state {
530 NoiseState::InProgress {ref state, ..} => {
532 &NoiseStep::PreActOne => NextNoiseStep::ActOne,
533 &NoiseStep::PostActOne => NextNoiseStep::ActTwo,
534 &NoiseStep::PostActTwo => NextNoiseStep::ActThree,
537 NoiseState::Finished {..} => NextNoiseStep::NoiseComplete,
541 pub fn is_ready_for_encryption(&self) -> bool {
542 match self.noise_state {
543 NoiseState::InProgress {..} => { false },
544 NoiseState::Finished {..} => { true }
551 use super::LN_MAX_MSG_LEN;
553 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
554 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
558 use crate::ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor,NoiseState};
559 use crate::util::test_utils::TestNodeSigner;
561 fn get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors() -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
562 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("028d7500dd4c12685d1f568b4c2b5048e8534b873319f3a8daa612b469132ec7f7").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
563 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
565 let mut outbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_outbound(their_node_id, SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
566 assert_eq!(outbound_peer.get_act_one(&secp_ctx)[..], hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap()[..]);
570 fn get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors() -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
571 // transport-responder successful handshake
572 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
573 let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
574 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
575 let node_signer = TestNodeSigner::new(our_node_id);
577 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
579 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
580 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
582 let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
583 // test vector doesn't specify the initiator static key, but it's the same as the one
584 // from transport-initiator successful handshake
585 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).unwrap().serialize()[..], hex::decode("034f355bdcb7cc0af728ef3cceb9615d90684bb5b2ca5f859ab0f0b704075871aa").unwrap()[..]);
587 match inbound_peer.noise_state {
588 NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
589 assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
591 assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
592 assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
594 assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
603 fn noise_initiator_test_vectors() {
604 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
605 let node_signer = TestNodeSigner::new(our_node_id);
608 // transport-initiator successful handshake
609 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
611 let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
612 assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &&node_signer).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
614 match outbound_peer.noise_state {
615 NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
616 assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
618 assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
619 assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
621 assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
627 // transport-initiator act2 short read test
628 // Can't actually test this cause process_act_two requires you pass the right length!
631 // transport-initiator act2 bad version test
632 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
634 let act_two = hex::decode("0102466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
635 assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &&node_signer).is_err());
639 // transport-initiator act2 bad key serialization test
640 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
642 let act_two = hex::decode("0004466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
643 assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &&node_signer).is_err());
647 // transport-initiator act2 bad MAC test
648 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
650 let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730af").unwrap().to_vec();
651 assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &&node_signer).is_err());
656 fn noise_responder_test_vectors() {
657 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
658 let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
659 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
660 let node_signer = TestNodeSigner::new(our_node_id);
663 let _ = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
666 // transport-responder act1 short read test
667 // Can't actually test this cause process_act_one requires you pass the right length!
670 // transport-responder act1 bad version test
671 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
673 let act_one = hex::decode("01036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
674 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
677 // transport-responder act1 bad key serialization test
678 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
680 let act_one =hex::decode("00046360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
681 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
684 // transport-responder act1 bad MAC test
685 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
687 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6b").unwrap().to_vec();
688 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
691 // transport-responder act3 bad version test
692 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
694 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
695 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
697 let act_three = hex::decode("01b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
698 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
701 // transport-responder act3 short read test
702 // Can't actually test this cause process_act_three requires you pass the right length!
705 // transport-responder act3 bad MAC for ciphertext test
706 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
708 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
709 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
711 let act_three = hex::decode("00c9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
712 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
715 // transport-responder act3 bad rs test
716 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
718 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
719 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
721 let act_three = hex::decode("00bfe3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa2235536ad09a8ee351870c2bb7f78b754a26c6cef79a98d25139c856d7efd252c2ae73c").unwrap().to_vec();
722 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
725 // transport-responder act3 bad MAC test
726 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
728 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
729 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
731 let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139bb").unwrap().to_vec();
732 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
738 fn message_encryption_decryption_test_vectors() {
739 // We use the same keys as the initiator and responder test vectors, so we copy those tests
740 // here and use them to encrypt.
741 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
744 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
745 let node_signer = TestNodeSigner::new(our_node_id);
747 let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
748 assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &&node_signer).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
750 match outbound_peer.noise_state {
751 NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
752 assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
754 assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
755 assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
757 assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
763 let mut inbound_peer = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
766 let msg = [0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f];
767 let res = outbound_peer.encrypt_buffer(&msg);
768 assert_eq!(res.len(), 5 + 2*16 + 2);
770 let len_header = res[0..2+16].to_vec();
771 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.decrypt_length_header(&len_header[..]).unwrap() as usize, msg.len());
772 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.decrypt_message(&res[2+16..]).unwrap()[..], msg[..]);
775 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("cf2b30ddf0cf3f80e7c35a6e6730b59fe802473180f396d88a8fb0db8cbcf25d2f214cf9ea1d95").unwrap());
777 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("72887022101f0b6753e0c7de21657d35a4cb2a1f5cde2650528bbc8f837d0f0d7ad833b1a256a1").unwrap());
779 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("178cb9d7387190fa34db9c2d50027d21793c9bc2d40b1e14dcf30ebeeeb220f48364f7a4c68bf8").unwrap());
781 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("1b186c57d44eb6de4c057c49940d79bb838a145cb528d6e8fd26dbe50a60ca2c104b56b60e45bd").unwrap());
782 } else if i == 1000 {
783 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("4a2f3cc3b5e78ddb83dcb426d9863d9d9a723b0337c89dd0b005d89f8d3c05c52b76b29b740f09").unwrap());
784 } else if i == 1001 {
785 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("2ecd8c8a5629d0d02ab457a0fdd0f7b90a192cd46be5ecb6ca570bfc5e268338b1a16cf4ef2d36").unwrap());
791 fn max_msg_len_limit_value() {
792 assert_eq!(LN_MAX_MSG_LEN, 65535);
793 assert_eq!(LN_MAX_MSG_LEN, ::core::u16::MAX as usize);
797 #[should_panic(expected = "Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!")]
798 fn max_message_len_encryption() {
799 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
800 let msg = [4u8; LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 1];
801 outbound_peer.encrypt_buffer(&msg);
805 #[should_panic(expected = "Attempted to decrypt message longer than 65535 + 16 bytes!")]
806 fn max_message_len_decryption() {
807 let mut inbound_peer = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
809 // MSG should not exceed LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 16
810 let msg = [4u8; LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 17];
811 inbound_peer.decrypt_message(&msg).unwrap();