1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
26 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField};
28 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
31 use util::logger::Logger;
32 use util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
36 use std::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
37 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
39 use std::collections::BTreeMap;
40 use std::collections::btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry;
42 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
44 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
45 /// refuse to relay the message.
46 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
48 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
49 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
50 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
52 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
53 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
54 pub struct NetworkGraph {
55 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
56 channels: BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>,
57 nodes: BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>,
60 /// A simple newtype for RwLockReadGuard<'a, NetworkGraph>.
61 /// This exists only to make accessing a RwLock<NetworkGraph> possible from
62 /// the C bindings, as it can be done directly in Rust code.
63 pub struct LockedNetworkGraph<'a>(pub RwLockReadGuard<'a, NetworkGraph>);
65 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
66 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
67 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
68 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
69 /// serving historical announcements.
70 pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<C: Deref, L: Deref> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
71 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
72 /// Representation of the payment channel network
73 pub network_graph: RwLock<NetworkGraph>,
74 chain_access: Option<C>,
75 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
76 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
80 impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
81 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
82 /// assuming a fresh network graph.
83 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
84 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
85 /// channel owners' keys.
86 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
88 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
89 network_graph: RwLock::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)),
90 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
92 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
97 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
98 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
99 pub fn from_net_graph(chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L, network_graph: NetworkGraph) -> Self {
101 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
102 network_graph: RwLock::new(network_graph),
103 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
105 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
110 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
111 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
112 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
113 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
114 self.chain_access = chain_access;
117 /// Take a read lock on the network_graph and return it in the C-bindings
118 /// newtype helper. This is likely only useful when called via the C
119 /// bindings as you can call `self.network_graph.read().unwrap()` in Rust
121 pub fn read_locked_graph<'a>(&'a self) -> LockedNetworkGraph<'a> {
122 LockedNetworkGraph(self.network_graph.read().unwrap())
125 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
126 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
127 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
128 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
129 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
130 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
138 impl<'a> LockedNetworkGraph<'a> {
139 /// Get a reference to the NetworkGraph which this read-lock contains.
140 pub fn graph(&self) -> &NetworkGraph {
146 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
147 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr ) => {
148 match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
150 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: "Invalid signature from remote node".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
155 impl<C: Deref , L: Deref > RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
156 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
157 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
158 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
159 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
160 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
163 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
164 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
165 log_trace!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
166 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
169 fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, update: &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate) {
171 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
172 let _ = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
174 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
175 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
177 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
178 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
183 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
184 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
185 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
188 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
189 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
190 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
191 let mut iter = network_graph.get_channels().range(starting_point..);
192 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
193 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
194 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
195 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
196 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
197 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
198 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
199 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
201 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
202 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
204 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
206 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
207 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
216 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
217 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
218 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
219 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
220 let mut iter = network_graph.get_nodes().range((*pubkey)..);
224 network_graph.get_nodes().range(..)
226 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
227 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
228 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
229 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
230 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
240 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
241 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
242 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
244 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
245 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
246 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
247 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
248 /// tracking this directly.
249 fn sync_routing_table(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
251 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
252 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
256 // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer
257 if !self.should_request_full_sync(their_node_id) {
261 let first_blocknum = 0;
262 let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff;
263 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks);
264 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
265 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery {
266 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
267 msg: QueryChannelRange {
268 chain_hash: self.network_graph.read().unwrap().genesis_hash,
275 /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately
276 /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler
277 /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi-
278 /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the
279 /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the
280 /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash
281 /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that
282 /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is
284 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
285 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.sync_complete, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),);
287 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len());
288 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
289 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery {
290 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
291 msg: QueryShortChannelIds {
292 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash,
293 short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids,
300 /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming
301 /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received
302 /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the
303 /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried.
304 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
305 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information);
307 // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the
308 // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail
309 // the result and try again with a different peer.
310 if !msg.full_information {
311 return Err(LightningError {
312 err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"),
313 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError
320 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
321 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
322 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
323 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
324 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
325 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
326 /// memory constrained systems.
327 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
328 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
330 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
332 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
334 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
335 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
336 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
338 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
339 if msg.chain_hash != network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
340 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
341 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
342 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
343 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
344 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
345 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
346 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
348 short_channel_ids: vec![],
351 return Err(LightningError {
352 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
353 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
357 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
358 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
359 // exists even if its not yet routable.
360 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
361 for (_, ref chan) in network_graph.get_channels().range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
362 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
363 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
364 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
365 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
368 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
369 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
374 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
375 let batch_count = batches.len();
376 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
377 // Per spec, the initial first_blocknum needs to be <= the query's first_blocknum and subsequent
378 // must be >= the prior reply. We'll simplify this by using zero since its still spec compliant and
379 // sequence completion is now explicitly.
380 let first_blocknum = 0;
382 // Per spec, the final end_blocknum needs to be >= the query's end_blocknum, so we'll use the
383 // query's value. Prior batches must use the number of blocks that fit into the message. We'll
384 // base this off the last SCID in the batch since we've somewhat abusing first_blocknum.
385 let number_of_blocks = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
388 block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) + 1
391 // Only true for the last message in a sequence
392 let sync_complete = batch_index == batch_count - 1;
394 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
395 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
396 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
397 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
401 short_channel_ids: batch,
409 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
412 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
413 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
418 impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L>
420 C::Target: chain::Access,
423 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
424 let mut ret = Vec::new();
425 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
426 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
431 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
432 /// Details about one direction of a channel. Received
433 /// within a channel update.
434 pub struct DirectionalChannelInfo {
435 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
436 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
437 pub last_update: u32,
438 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
440 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
441 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
442 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
443 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
444 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
445 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
446 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
447 pub fees: RoutingFees,
448 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
449 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
450 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
451 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
452 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
455 impl fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo {
456 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
457 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
462 impl_writeable!(DirectionalChannelInfo, 0, {
472 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
473 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
474 /// Received within a channel announcement.
475 pub struct ChannelInfo {
476 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
477 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
478 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
479 pub node_one: PublicKey,
480 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
481 pub one_to_two: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
482 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
483 pub node_two: PublicKey,
484 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
485 pub two_to_one: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
486 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
487 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
488 /// An initial announcement of the channel
489 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
490 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
491 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
492 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
495 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
496 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
497 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
498 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_pubkey!(self.node_one), self.one_to_two, log_pubkey!(self.node_two), self.two_to_one)?;
503 impl_writeable!(ChannelInfo, 0, {
514 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
515 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug)]
516 pub struct RoutingFees {
517 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
519 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
520 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
521 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
524 impl Readable for RoutingFees{
525 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<RoutingFees, DecodeError> {
526 let base_msat: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
527 let proportional_millionths: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
530 proportional_millionths,
535 impl Writeable for RoutingFees {
536 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
537 self.base_msat.write(writer)?;
538 self.proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
543 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
544 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
545 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
546 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
547 pub features: NodeFeatures,
548 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
549 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
550 pub last_update: u32,
551 /// Color assigned to the node
553 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
554 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
555 /// should not be exposed to the user.
557 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
558 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
559 /// An initial announcement of the node
560 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
561 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
562 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
563 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
566 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
567 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
568 self.features.write(writer)?;
569 self.last_update.write(writer)?;
570 self.rgb.write(writer)?;
571 self.alias.write(writer)?;
572 (self.addresses.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
573 for ref addr in &self.addresses {
576 self.announcement_message.write(writer)?;
581 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
582 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, DecodeError> {
583 let features = Readable::read(reader)?;
584 let last_update = Readable::read(reader)?;
585 let rgb = Readable::read(reader)?;
586 let alias = Readable::read(reader)?;
587 let addresses_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
588 let mut addresses = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(addresses_count, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 40) as usize);
589 for _ in 0..addresses_count {
590 match Readable::read(reader) {
591 Ok(Ok(addr)) => { addresses.push(addr); },
592 Ok(Err(_)) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
593 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
597 let announcement_message = Readable::read(reader)?;
598 Ok(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
609 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
610 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
611 pub struct NodeInfo {
612 /// All valid channels a node has announced
613 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
614 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
615 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
616 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
617 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
618 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
619 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
620 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
621 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
624 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
625 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
626 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
627 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
632 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
633 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
634 (self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
635 for ref chan in self.channels.iter() {
638 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees.write(writer)?;
639 self.announcement_info.write(writer)?;
644 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 64*1024;
646 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
647 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NodeInfo, DecodeError> {
648 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
649 let mut channels = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8) as usize);
650 for _ in 0..channels_count {
651 channels.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
653 let lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Readable::read(reader)?;
654 let announcement_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
657 lowest_inbound_channel_fees,
663 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
664 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
666 impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
667 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
668 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
670 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
671 (self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
672 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in self.channels.iter() {
673 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
674 chan_info.write(writer)?;
676 (self.nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
677 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in self.nodes.iter() {
678 node_id.write(writer)?;
679 node_info.write(writer)?;
682 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {});
687 impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
688 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
689 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
691 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
692 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
693 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
694 for _ in 0..channels_count {
695 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
696 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
697 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
699 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
700 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
701 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
702 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
703 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
704 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
706 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {});
716 impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
717 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
718 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
719 for (key, val) in self.channels.iter() {
720 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
722 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
723 for (key, val) in self.nodes.iter() {
724 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_pubkey!(key), val)?;
731 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
733 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
734 pub fn get_channels<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> { &self.channels }
735 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
737 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
738 pub fn get_nodes<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo> { &self.nodes }
740 /// Get network addresses by node id.
741 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
742 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
744 /// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
745 pub fn get_addresses<'a>(&'a self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<&'a Vec<NetAddress>> {
746 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(pubkey) {
747 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
748 return Some(&node_info.addresses)
754 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
755 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
758 channels: BTreeMap::new(),
759 nodes: BTreeMap::new(),
763 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
764 /// given node announcement.
766 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
767 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
768 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
769 pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
770 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
771 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
772 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
775 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
776 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
777 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
779 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
780 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
783 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
784 match self.nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
785 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
787 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
788 if node_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
789 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
794 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
795 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
796 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
797 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
798 features: msg.features.clone(),
799 last_update: msg.timestamp,
802 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
803 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
811 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
813 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
814 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
815 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
817 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
818 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
819 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>
820 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>)
821 -> Result<(), LightningError>
822 where C::Target: chain::Access {
823 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
824 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
825 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
826 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
827 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
828 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
831 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
832 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
833 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
835 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
836 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
837 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>
838 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>)
839 -> Result<(), LightningError>
840 where C::Target: chain::Access {
841 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
844 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>
845 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>)
846 -> Result<(), LightningError>
847 where C::Target: chain::Access {
848 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
849 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
852 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
854 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
857 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
858 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
859 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
860 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
861 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
862 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
863 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
864 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
865 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
866 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
868 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
869 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
872 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
873 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
875 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
876 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
882 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
883 features: msg.features.clone(),
884 node_one: msg.node_id_1.clone(),
886 node_two: msg.node_id_2.clone(),
888 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
889 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
890 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
893 match self.channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
894 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
895 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
896 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
898 if utxo_value.is_some() {
899 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
900 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
901 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
903 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
904 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
906 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
907 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
908 *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
910 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
913 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
914 entry.insert(chan_info);
918 macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
919 ( $node_id: expr ) => {
920 match self.nodes.entry($node_id) {
921 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
922 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
924 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
925 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
926 channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
927 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
928 announcement_info: None,
935 add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_1);
936 add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_2);
941 /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
942 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
943 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
944 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
945 pub fn close_channel_from_update(&mut self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
947 if let Some(chan) = self.channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
948 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
951 if let Some(chan) = self.channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
952 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
953 one_to_two.enabled = false;
955 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
956 two_to_one.enabled = false;
962 fn fail_node(&mut self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
964 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
966 // TODO: downgrade the node
970 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
973 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
974 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
975 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
976 pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
977 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
980 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
981 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
982 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
983 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
984 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
987 fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
989 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
990 let chan_was_enabled;
992 match self.channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
993 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
995 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
996 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
997 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1000 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1001 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1002 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1003 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1004 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1008 macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
1009 ( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
1010 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1011 if existing_chan_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
1012 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1014 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1016 chan_was_enabled = false;
1019 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1020 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1022 let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo {
1023 enabled: chan_enabled,
1024 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1025 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1026 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1027 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
1029 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1030 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1034 $target = Some(updated_channel_dir_info);
1038 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1039 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1040 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1041 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1042 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_two);
1044 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
1046 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1047 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1048 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_one);
1050 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
1056 let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1057 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1058 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1059 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1060 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1061 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1063 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1065 proportional_millionths
1067 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1068 let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1069 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1071 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1072 let chan = self.channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1074 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1075 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1077 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1079 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1080 if chan_info.enabled {
1081 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1082 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1083 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1084 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1089 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1095 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1096 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1097 ($node_id: expr) => {
1098 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1099 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1100 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1102 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1103 entry.remove_entry();
1106 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1111 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1112 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1119 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1120 use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1121 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1122 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate, HTLCFailChannelUpdate,
1123 ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1124 use util::test_utils;
1125 use util::logger::Logger;
1126 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
1127 use util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1128 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1130 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1131 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1132 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1133 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1134 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
1135 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1136 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1140 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1141 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1145 fn create_net_graph_msg_handler() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) {
1146 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1147 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1148 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1149 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_hash, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1150 (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
1154 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1155 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1156 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1158 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1159 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1160 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1161 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1162 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1163 assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1167 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1168 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1170 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1171 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1172 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1173 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1174 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1175 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1176 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1177 let first_announcement_time = 500;
1179 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1180 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1181 timestamp: first_announcement_time,
1185 addresses: Vec::new(),
1186 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1187 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1189 let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1190 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1191 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1192 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1195 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1197 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1201 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1202 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1203 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1204 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1205 short_channel_id: 0,
1208 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1209 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1210 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1213 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1214 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1215 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1216 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1217 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1218 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1219 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1221 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1222 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1227 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1228 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1232 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1233 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
1235 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1236 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1239 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1242 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1243 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1244 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1245 let announcement_with_data = NodeAnnouncement {
1246 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1247 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1249 // Return false because contains excess data.
1250 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1251 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1254 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
1256 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1257 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1258 unsigned_announcement.timestamp -= 10;
1259 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1260 let outdated_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1261 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1262 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1264 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1266 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1271 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1272 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1273 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1275 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1276 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1277 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1278 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1279 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1280 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1282 let good_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1283 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1284 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1285 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1286 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1289 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1290 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1291 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1292 short_channel_id: 0,
1295 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1296 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1297 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1300 let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1301 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1302 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1303 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1304 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1305 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1306 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1309 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1310 let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(), None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1311 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1312 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1317 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1318 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1324 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1325 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1326 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1328 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1331 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1332 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1333 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1334 net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_source.clone().genesis_hash, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1335 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1337 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1338 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1339 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1340 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1341 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1342 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1343 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1346 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1348 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1351 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1352 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1353 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1355 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1356 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1357 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1358 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1359 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1360 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1361 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1363 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1364 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1369 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1370 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1376 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1377 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1378 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1379 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1381 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1384 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1385 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1386 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1387 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1388 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1389 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1390 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1391 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1392 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1393 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1395 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1396 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1400 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1401 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1402 Some(channel_entry) => {
1403 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1409 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1410 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1411 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1412 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1413 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1414 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1415 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1416 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1417 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1418 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1420 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1421 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1425 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
1426 let invalid_sig_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1427 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1428 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1429 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1430 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1431 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1433 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1435 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1438 unsigned_announcement.node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1439 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1440 let channel_to_itself_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1441 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1442 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1443 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1444 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1445 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1447 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1449 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1454 fn handling_channel_update() {
1455 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1456 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1457 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1458 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(), Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1460 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1461 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1462 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1463 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1464 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1465 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1467 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1468 let short_channel_id = 0;
1469 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1470 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1473 // Announce a channel we will update
1474 let good_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1475 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1476 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1477 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1478 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1479 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1480 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1481 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1486 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1487 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1488 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1491 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1492 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1493 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1494 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1495 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1496 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1497 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1499 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1506 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1511 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1512 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1513 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1514 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1515 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1516 excess_data: Vec::new()
1518 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1519 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1520 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1521 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1524 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1525 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1530 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1531 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1533 Some(channel_info) => {
1534 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1535 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1540 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1541 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1542 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1543 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1544 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1545 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1547 // Return false because contains excess data
1548 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1549 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1552 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 10;
1554 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
1555 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1556 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1557 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1558 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1561 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1563 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
1565 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1567 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
1568 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1569 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1570 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1571 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1574 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1576 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
1578 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Absent;
1580 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
1581 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1582 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1583 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1584 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1587 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1589 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
1591 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Absent;
1593 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1594 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
1595 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp -= 10;
1596 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1597 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1598 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1599 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1602 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1604 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1606 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
1608 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1609 let invalid_sig_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1610 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1611 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1614 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
1616 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1622 fn handling_htlc_fail_channel_update() {
1623 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1624 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1625 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1626 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1627 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1628 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1629 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1631 let short_channel_id = 0;
1632 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1635 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
1636 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1637 assert_eq!(network.get_nodes().len(), 0);
1641 // Announce a channel we will update
1642 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1643 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1648 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1649 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1650 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1653 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1654 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1655 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1656 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1657 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1658 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1659 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1661 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1666 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1671 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1672 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1673 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1674 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1675 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1676 excess_data: Vec::new()
1678 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1679 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1680 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1681 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1684 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1685 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1690 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1692 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1693 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1695 Some(channel_info) => {
1696 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.is_some());
1701 let channel_close_msg = HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1706 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&channel_close_msg);
1708 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1710 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1711 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1713 Some(channel_info) => {
1714 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
1719 let channel_close_msg = HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1724 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&channel_close_msg);
1726 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
1728 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1729 assert_eq!(network.get_channels().len(), 0);
1730 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
1731 assert_eq!(network.get_nodes().len(), 0);
1733 // TODO: Test HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
1737 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
1738 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1739 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1740 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1741 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1742 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1743 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1744 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1746 let short_channel_id = 1;
1747 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1749 // Channels were not announced yet.
1750 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
1751 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
1754 // Announce a channel we will update
1755 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1756 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1761 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1762 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1763 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1766 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1767 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1768 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1769 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1770 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1771 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1772 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1774 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1780 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
1781 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1782 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1783 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1784 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1785 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1786 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1793 // Valid channel update
1794 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1799 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1800 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1801 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1802 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1803 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1804 excess_data: Vec::new()
1806 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1807 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1808 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1809 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1811 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1817 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
1818 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1819 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1820 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1821 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1822 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
1823 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1830 // Channel update with excess data.
1831 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1836 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1837 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1838 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1839 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1840 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1841 excess_data: [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec()
1843 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1844 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1845 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1846 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1848 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1854 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
1855 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1856 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1857 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1858 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1859 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1860 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1865 // Further starting point have no channels after it
1866 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
1867 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
1871 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
1872 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1873 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1874 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1875 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1876 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1877 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1878 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1880 let short_channel_id = 1;
1881 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1884 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
1885 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1888 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
1889 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1890 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1895 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1896 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1897 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1900 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1901 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1902 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1903 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1904 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1905 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1906 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1908 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1915 // Nodes were never announced
1916 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
1917 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1920 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1921 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1926 addresses: Vec::new(),
1927 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1928 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1930 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1931 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1932 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1933 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1935 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1940 unsigned_announcement.node_id = node_id_2;
1941 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1942 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1943 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1944 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1947 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1953 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
1954 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
1956 // Skip the first node.
1957 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
1958 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
1961 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
1962 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1963 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1968 addresses: Vec::new(),
1969 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1970 excess_data: [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec(),
1972 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1973 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1974 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1975 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1977 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1978 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1983 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
1984 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1988 fn network_graph_serialization() {
1989 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1991 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1992 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1993 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1994 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1996 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1997 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1998 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1999 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2000 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
2001 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2002 short_channel_id: 0,
2005 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
2006 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
2007 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2010 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2011 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
2012 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
2013 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
2014 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2015 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2016 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
2018 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2019 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2024 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2025 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2026 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2031 addresses: Vec::new(),
2032 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2033 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2035 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2036 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
2037 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
2038 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
2041 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2046 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.write().unwrap();
2047 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2048 assert!(!network.get_nodes().is_empty());
2049 assert!(!network.get_channels().is_empty());
2050 network.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2051 assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == *network);
2055 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2056 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2057 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2058 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2060 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2061 let first_blocknum = 0;
2062 let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff;
2064 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2066 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() };
2067 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2068 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2072 // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information
2074 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2075 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2076 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2077 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2079 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => {
2080 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2081 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2082 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum);
2083 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks);
2085 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2089 // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false.
2090 // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after
2091 // which should_request_full_sync will return false
2093 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2094 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2096 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap();
2097 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2098 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id, &init_msg);
2099 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2101 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2103 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2111 fn handling_reply_channel_range() {
2112 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2113 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2114 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2116 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2118 // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query
2119 // matching the SCIDs in the reply
2121 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
2123 sync_complete: true,
2125 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2126 short_channel_ids: vec![
2127 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2128 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2129 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2130 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2131 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2132 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2135 assert!(result.is_ok());
2137 // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids
2138 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2139 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2141 MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => {
2142 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2143 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2144 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![
2145 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2146 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2147 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2148 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2149 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2150 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2153 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"),
2159 fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() {
2160 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2161 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2162 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2164 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2166 // Test receipt of a successful reply
2168 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2170 full_information: true,
2172 assert!(result.is_ok());
2175 // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information
2176 // for the chain_hash requested in the query.
2178 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2180 full_information: false,
2182 assert!(result.is_err());
2183 assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information");
2188 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2189 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2191 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2192 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2193 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2194 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2195 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2196 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2197 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2198 let bitcoin_key_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey);
2199 let bitcoin_key_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey);
2201 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2202 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2203 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2206 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2207 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2208 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2211 // used for testing resumption on same block
2212 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2215 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2216 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
2217 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2218 short_channel_id: scid,
2223 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2226 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2227 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
2228 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
2229 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
2230 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2231 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2232 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
2234 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2240 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2241 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2242 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2245 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2247 number_of_blocks: 0,
2250 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2251 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2253 number_of_blocks: 0,
2254 sync_complete: true,
2255 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2259 // Error when wrong chain
2260 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2261 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2264 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2266 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2269 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2270 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2272 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2273 sync_complete: true,
2274 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2278 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2279 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2280 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2283 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2284 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2285 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2288 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2289 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2290 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2291 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2292 sync_complete: true,
2293 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2297 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2298 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2299 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2302 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2303 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2304 number_of_blocks: 1,
2309 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2311 number_of_blocks: 0x01000000,
2312 sync_complete: true,
2313 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2318 // No results in valid query range
2319 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2320 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2323 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2324 first_blocknum: 1000,
2325 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2330 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2332 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2333 sync_complete: true,
2334 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2339 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2340 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2341 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2344 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2345 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2346 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2351 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2353 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2354 sync_complete: true,
2355 short_channel_ids: vec![
2356 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2362 // Single block exactly full
2363 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2364 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2367 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2368 first_blocknum: 100000,
2369 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2374 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2376 number_of_blocks: 108000,
2377 sync_complete: true,
2378 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2379 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2385 // Multiple split on new block
2386 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2387 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2390 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2391 first_blocknum: 100000,
2392 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2397 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2399 number_of_blocks: 108000,
2400 sync_complete: false,
2401 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2402 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2406 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2408 number_of_blocks: 108001,
2409 sync_complete: true,
2410 short_channel_ids: vec![
2411 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2417 // Multiple split on same block
2418 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2419 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2422 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2423 first_blocknum: 100002,
2424 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2429 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2431 number_of_blocks: 108002,
2432 sync_complete: false,
2433 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2434 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2438 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2440 number_of_blocks: 108002,
2441 sync_complete: true,
2442 short_channel_ids: vec![
2443 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2450 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2451 net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2452 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2453 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2455 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2457 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2460 assert!(result.is_ok());
2462 assert!(result.is_err());
2465 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2466 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2468 for i in 0..events.len() {
2469 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2471 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2472 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2473 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2474 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2475 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2476 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2477 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2479 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2485 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2486 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2487 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2488 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2490 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2492 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2494 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2496 assert!(result.is_err());