1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
6 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Encodable, Decodable};
9 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
10 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
13 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
14 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
18 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField};
19 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
20 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
23 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
26 use util::transaction_utils;
27 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
28 use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder};
29 use util::errors::APIError;
30 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
33 use std::default::Default;
35 use std::time::Instant;
39 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
40 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
41 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
42 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
43 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
44 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
45 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
46 pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
49 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
50 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
51 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
52 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
55 enum InboundHTLCState {
56 /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
57 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
58 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
59 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
60 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
61 /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
62 /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
63 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
64 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
65 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
66 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
67 /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
69 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
71 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
72 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
74 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
75 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
76 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
77 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
78 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
79 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
80 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
81 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
84 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
88 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
89 state: InboundHTLCState,
92 enum OutboundHTLCState {
93 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
94 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
95 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
96 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
97 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
98 /// money back (though we won't), and,
99 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
100 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
101 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
102 /// we'll never get out of sync).
103 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
104 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
105 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
107 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
108 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
110 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
111 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
112 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
113 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
114 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
115 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
116 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
117 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
118 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
119 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
120 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
121 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
124 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
128 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 state: OutboundHTLCState,
131 /// If we're in a removed state, set if they failed, otherwise None
132 fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>,
135 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
136 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
141 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
143 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
144 time_created: Instant, //TODO: Some kind of timeout thing-a-majig
147 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
152 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
157 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
158 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
159 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
160 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
161 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
162 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
164 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
165 OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
166 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
167 TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
168 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
169 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
170 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
172 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
173 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
174 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
176 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
177 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
178 TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
179 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
180 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
181 OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
183 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
184 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
186 PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
187 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating the user has told us they
188 /// failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound
189 /// messages until they've managed to do so.
190 MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
191 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
192 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
193 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
194 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
196 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
197 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
198 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
199 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
200 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
201 RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
202 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
203 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
204 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
205 /// us their shutdown.
206 LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
207 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
208 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
209 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
211 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
212 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
214 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
216 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
217 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
218 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
220 pub(super) struct Channel {
221 config: ChannelConfig,
225 channel_id: [u8; 32],
227 channel_outbound: bool,
228 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
229 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
231 local_keys: ChannelKeys,
232 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
234 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
235 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
236 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
238 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
239 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
240 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
241 /// Upon receipt of a channel_reestablish we have to figure out whether to send a
242 /// revoke_and_ack first or a commitment update first. Generally, we prefer to send
243 /// revoke_and_ack first, but if we had a pending commitment update of our own waiting on a
244 /// remote revoke when we received the latest commitment update from the remote we have to make
245 /// sure that commitment update gets resent first.
246 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: bool,
247 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
248 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
249 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
251 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
252 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
253 monitor_pending_order: Option<RAACommitmentOrder>,
254 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
255 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
257 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
258 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
259 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
261 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
262 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
263 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
264 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
265 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
266 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
267 // commitment_signed.
268 pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
269 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
270 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
271 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
272 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
273 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
274 next_local_htlc_id: u64,
275 next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
276 channel_update_count: u32,
279 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
280 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
281 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
282 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
283 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
284 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
287 // Used in ChannelManager's tests to send a revoked transaction
288 pub last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
290 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
292 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64)>, // (feerate, fee)
294 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
295 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
296 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
297 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
298 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
299 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
300 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
301 /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
302 pub(super) last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
303 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
305 their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
307 pub(super) our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
309 our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
311 pub(super) their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
313 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
314 //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
315 /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
316 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
317 //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
318 their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
319 our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
320 their_to_self_delay: u16,
321 //implied by BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: our_to_self_delay: u16,
323 pub their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
325 their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
326 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
329 their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
330 their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
331 their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
332 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
333 their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
334 their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
336 their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
337 their_node_id: PublicKey,
339 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
341 channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
346 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
347 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
348 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
349 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
350 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
351 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
352 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
354 const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
356 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
357 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
358 const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 14;
359 /// Exposing these two constants for use in test in ChannelMonitor
360 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
361 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
362 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
363 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
364 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
366 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
369 pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 138; //Here we have a diff due to HTLC CLTV expiry being < 2^15 in test
371 pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 139;
372 pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
374 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
375 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
376 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
378 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
379 Ignore(&'static str),
383 macro_rules! secp_check {
384 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
387 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
393 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
394 fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
395 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
398 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
400 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
401 fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
402 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
403 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
406 fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
407 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
410 fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
414 fn derive_minimum_depth(_channel_value_satoshis_msat: u64, _value_to_self_msat: u64) -> u32 {
415 // Note that in order to comply with BOLT 7 announcement_signatures requirements this must
417 const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
422 pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
423 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);
425 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
426 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
429 if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
430 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
434 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
435 if Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
436 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
439 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
441 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
442 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
443 &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
444 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
448 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
450 channel_id: keys_provider.get_channel_id(),
451 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
452 channel_outbound: true,
454 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
456 local_keys: chan_keys,
457 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
458 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
459 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
460 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
461 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,
463 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
464 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
465 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
466 pending_update_fee: None,
467 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
468 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
469 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
470 channel_update_count: 1,
472 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
473 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
474 monitor_pending_order: None,
475 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
476 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
478 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
479 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
480 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
481 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
483 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
485 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
487 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
488 short_channel_id: None,
489 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
490 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
492 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
493 their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
494 our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
495 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
496 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
497 their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
498 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
499 their_to_self_delay: 0,
500 their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
501 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
503 their_funding_pubkey: None,
504 their_revocation_basepoint: None,
505 their_payment_basepoint: None,
506 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
507 their_htlc_basepoint: None,
508 their_cur_commitment_point: None,
510 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
511 their_node_id: their_node_id,
513 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
515 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
521 fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
522 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
523 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
525 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
526 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
531 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
532 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
533 pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
534 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
535 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
537 // Check sanity of message fields:
538 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
539 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
541 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
542 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
544 if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
545 return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
547 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
548 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
550 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
551 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
553 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
554 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
556 Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
558 if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
559 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
561 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
562 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
564 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
565 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
568 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
569 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
570 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
572 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
575 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
576 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
578 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
579 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
581 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
582 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
584 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
585 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
587 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
588 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
591 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
593 let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
594 if config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
595 if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
599 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
600 local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
602 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
604 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
605 let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
606 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
607 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
609 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
610 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
612 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
613 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
616 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
617 // for full fee payment
618 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
619 if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
620 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
623 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
624 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
625 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
626 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
629 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
630 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
631 &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
632 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
633 channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
634 channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
636 let mut chan = Channel {
638 config: local_config,
640 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
641 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
642 channel_outbound: false,
645 local_keys: chan_keys,
646 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
647 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
648 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
649 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
650 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,
652 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
653 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
654 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
655 pending_update_fee: None,
656 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
657 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
658 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
659 channel_update_count: 1,
661 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
662 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
663 monitor_pending_order: None,
664 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
665 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
667 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
668 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
669 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
670 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
672 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
674 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
676 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
677 short_channel_id: None,
678 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
679 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
681 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
682 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
683 their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
684 our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
685 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
686 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
687 their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
688 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
689 their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
690 their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
691 minimum_depth: Channel::derive_minimum_depth(msg.funding_satoshis*1000, msg.push_msat),
693 their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
694 their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
695 their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
696 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
697 their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
698 their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
700 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
701 their_node_id: their_node_id,
703 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
705 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
710 let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
711 chan.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
716 // Utilities to derive keys:
718 fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
719 let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, idx);
720 SecretKey::from_slice(&res).unwrap()
723 // Utilities to build transactions:
725 fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
726 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
727 let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
729 if self.channel_outbound {
730 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
731 sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
733 sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
734 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
736 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
738 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
739 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
740 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
741 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
742 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
743 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
746 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
747 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
748 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
749 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
750 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
752 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
753 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
754 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
755 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
756 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
757 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
758 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
759 /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
760 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
761 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
762 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
764 fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) {
765 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
768 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
770 previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
771 script_sig: Script::new(),
772 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
778 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
779 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
781 let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
782 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
783 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
784 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
786 log_trace!(self, "Building commitment transaction number {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
788 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
789 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
790 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
792 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
793 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
794 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
795 transaction_output_index: None
800 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
801 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
802 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
803 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
804 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
805 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
807 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
808 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
809 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
811 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
812 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
815 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
816 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
817 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
818 txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
819 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
820 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
821 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
823 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
824 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
830 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
831 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
832 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
833 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
834 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
835 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
836 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
840 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
841 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
843 log_trace!(self, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
845 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
846 if generated_by_local {
847 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
848 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
857 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
858 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
859 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
860 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
861 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
862 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
863 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
867 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
868 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
870 log_trace!(self, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
872 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
873 if htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
874 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
877 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
878 if !generated_by_local && htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
879 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
888 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
889 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat - remote_htlc_total_msat) as i64 - value_to_self_msat_offset;
891 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
893 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
894 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
895 // TODO: This should happen after fee calculation, but we don't handle that correctly
897 let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
898 self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
900 self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
902 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
903 max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
904 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
905 max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
908 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
909 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
910 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
912 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
915 let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
916 let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
918 if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
920 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
921 if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT },
922 &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
923 value: value_to_a as u64
927 if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
929 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
930 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
932 value: value_to_b as u64
936 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
938 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
939 let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
940 for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
942 if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
943 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
944 htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
947 let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
948 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
952 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
955 }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
959 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
960 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
961 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
965 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
966 (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
970 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
972 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
974 previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
975 script_sig: Script::new(),
976 sequence: 0xffffffff,
982 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
983 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
984 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
986 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
987 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
988 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
990 if value_to_self < 0 {
991 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
992 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
993 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
994 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
995 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
998 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1000 script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1001 value: value_to_remote as u64
1005 if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1006 txouts.push((TxOut {
1007 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1008 value: value_to_self as u64
1012 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
1014 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1015 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1016 outputs.push(out.0);
1024 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1028 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1029 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1030 /// our counterparty!)
1031 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1032 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1033 fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1034 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
1035 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
1036 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
1038 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1042 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1043 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1044 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1045 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1046 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1047 //may see payments to it!
1048 let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
1049 let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
1050 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
1052 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1055 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1056 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1057 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1058 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1059 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
1060 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
1061 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.expect("get_funding_redeemscript only allowed after accept_channel").serialize();
1062 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
1063 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
1064 .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
1066 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
1067 .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
1068 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1071 fn sign_commitment_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature) -> Signature {
1072 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1073 panic!("Tried to sign commitment transaction that had input count != 1!");
1075 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
1076 panic!("Tried to re-sign commitment transaction");
1079 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1081 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1082 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
1084 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1086 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
1087 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
1088 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
1089 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1090 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1092 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1093 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1095 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1096 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1098 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_bytes());
1103 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1104 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1105 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1106 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
1107 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1110 fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), ChannelError> {
1111 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1112 panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
1115 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
1117 let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
1118 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
1119 let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
1120 Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
1123 /// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
1124 /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimage must be set!
1125 fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> {
1126 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1127 panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
1129 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
1130 panic!("Tried to re-sign HTLC transaction");
1133 let (htlc_redeemscript, our_sig, local_tx) = self.create_htlc_tx_signature(tx, htlc, keys)?;
1135 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1137 if local_tx { // b, then a
1138 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1139 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1141 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1142 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1144 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1145 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1148 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1150 tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
1153 tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());
1158 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1159 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
1160 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
1161 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
1162 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1163 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1164 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1166 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1167 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1169 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1171 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1173 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1174 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1175 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1177 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1178 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1179 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1180 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1182 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1183 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1184 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1186 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1188 return Ok((None, None));
1191 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1192 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1199 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1200 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1203 // Now update local state:
1205 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1206 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1207 self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
1209 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1210 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1211 match pending_update {
1212 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1213 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1214 return Ok((None, None));
1217 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1218 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1219 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1220 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1221 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1222 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1228 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1229 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1230 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1232 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1236 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1237 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1239 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1240 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1242 log_trace!(self, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1243 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1246 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1247 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1248 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1249 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1250 }), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
1253 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
1254 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
1255 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
1256 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1257 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1259 (None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
1260 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1264 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1265 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
1266 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
1267 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1268 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1269 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1271 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1273 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1274 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1275 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1277 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1278 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1279 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1281 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1282 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1286 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1287 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1293 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1294 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1297 // Now update local state:
1298 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1299 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1300 match pending_update {
1301 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1302 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1303 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1306 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1307 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1308 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1314 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1315 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1322 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1323 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1326 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1327 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1328 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1333 // Message handlers:
1335 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1336 // Check sanity of message fields:
1337 if !self.channel_outbound {
1338 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
1340 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1341 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
1343 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1344 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1346 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1347 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
1349 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1350 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
1352 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1355 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
1358 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
1359 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
1361 if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
1364 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1365 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
1367 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
1368 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accepted_htlcs > 483"));
1371 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1372 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1373 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
1375 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1376 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
1378 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
1381 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
1384 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1385 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
1387 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1388 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
1390 if msg.minimum_depth > config.channel_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1391 return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
1394 self.channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
1396 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1397 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1398 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1399 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1400 self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
1401 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1402 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1403 self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
1404 self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
1405 self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
1406 self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
1407 self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
1408 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1410 let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
1411 self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
1412 self.channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
1414 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1419 fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Transaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError> {
1420 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1422 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1423 let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1424 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1426 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
1427 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
1429 // ...and we sign it, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish
1430 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, sig);
1432 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1433 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1434 let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1436 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1437 Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), local_keys))
1440 pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
1441 if self.channel_outbound {
1442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
1444 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1445 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1446 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1448 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
1450 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1451 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1452 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1453 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1456 let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
1457 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1458 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
1460 let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
1463 self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
1468 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1470 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
1471 self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx.clone()];
1472 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1473 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1474 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1475 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1476 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1478 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1479 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1480 signature: our_signature
1481 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
1484 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1485 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1486 pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, ChannelError> {
1487 if !self.channel_outbound {
1488 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
1490 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1491 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
1493 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1494 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
1495 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1496 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1499 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1501 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1502 let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1503 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1505 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1506 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
1508 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
1509 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1510 self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
1511 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1512 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1514 Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
1517 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1518 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1519 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1522 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1524 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1525 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1526 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1527 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1528 self.channel_update_count += 1;
1529 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1530 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1531 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1532 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
1533 if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1534 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
1536 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1539 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
1542 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1543 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1547 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1548 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1549 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1550 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1551 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1553 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1556 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1558 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1559 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1560 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1561 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1564 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1565 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1566 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1567 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1568 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1572 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1575 pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1576 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1577 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1579 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1580 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1582 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1583 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
1585 if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
1586 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
1589 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1590 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1591 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
1593 //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
1594 // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1595 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight"));
1598 // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1599 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1600 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1601 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 {
1602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
1604 if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1605 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
1607 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
1611 //TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
1613 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
1614 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
1615 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
1619 // Now update local state:
1620 self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
1621 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1622 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1623 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1624 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1625 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1626 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
1631 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1633 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1634 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1635 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1636 match check_preimage {
1638 Some(payment_hash) =>
1639 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1640 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
1644 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1645 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
1646 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1647 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved;
1648 htlc.fail_reason = fail_reason;
1650 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved =>
1651 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
1653 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1656 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
1659 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1660 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1661 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1663 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1664 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1667 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
1668 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
1671 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1672 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1673 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1675 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1676 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1679 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1683 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1684 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1687 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1688 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1691 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1695 pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
1696 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1697 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1699 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1700 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1702 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1703 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
1706 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1708 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1710 let mut update_fee = false;
1711 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1713 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1718 let mut local_commitment_tx = {
1719 let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
1720 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
1721 (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
1723 let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
1724 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1725 log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1726 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
1728 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
1730 let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1;
1731 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1733 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1734 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee"));
1738 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
1739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote"));
1742 let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1 + 1);
1743 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature);
1744 new_local_commitment_txn.push(local_commitment_tx.0.clone());
1746 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
1747 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in local_commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
1748 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1749 let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
1750 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
1751 log_trace!(self, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
1752 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
1753 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer");
1754 let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
1755 let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, &htlc, &local_keys)?;
1756 new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
1759 self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, &htlc, &local_keys)?.1
1761 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some((msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig)), source));
1763 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
1767 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
1768 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
1770 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1771 let mut need_our_commitment = false;
1772 if !self.channel_outbound {
1773 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
1774 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
1775 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
1776 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
1777 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
1778 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
1779 need_our_commitment = true;
1780 self.pending_update_fee = None;
1785 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
1786 // This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
1787 // monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
1788 self.monitor_pending_order = None;
1791 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
1793 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1794 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
1795 Some(forward_info.clone())
1797 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
1798 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
1799 need_our_commitment = true;
1802 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1803 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
1804 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove;
1805 need_our_commitment = true;
1809 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1810 self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
1811 self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) != 0;
1813 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
1814 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
1815 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
1816 if !self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
1817 self.monitor_pending_order = Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
1819 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
1820 if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1821 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
1822 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
1823 // includes the right HTLCs.
1824 // Note that this generates a monitor update that we ignore! This is OK since we
1825 // won't actually send the commitment_signed that generated the update to the other
1826 // side until the latest monitor has been pulled from us and stored.
1827 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
1828 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1830 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
1831 // re-send the message on restoration)
1832 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"));
1835 let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1836 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
1837 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
1838 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
1839 let (msg, monitor) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1840 (Some(msg), monitor, None)
1841 } else if !need_our_commitment {
1842 (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
1843 } else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), None) };
1845 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1846 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1847 per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
1848 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
1849 }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
1852 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
1853 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
1854 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
1855 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
1856 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
1857 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
1858 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
1859 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1860 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1861 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1863 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1864 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
1865 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
1866 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
1867 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
1868 // to rebalance channels.
1869 if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
1870 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1872 match &htlc_update {
1873 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
1874 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
1875 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
1878 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
1879 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1882 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} resulting in a channel closure during holding_cell freeing", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1889 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
1890 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
1891 Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
1893 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
1895 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
1900 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
1901 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
1902 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
1904 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
1906 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
1913 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1914 if let Some(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) = err {
1915 // If we failed to add the HTLC, but got an Ignore error, we should
1916 // still send the new commitment_signed, so reset the err to None.
1922 //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if it's a fee issue or similar we may want to
1923 //fail it back the route, if it's a temporary issue we can ignore it...
1926 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
1927 // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
1928 // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
1929 // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
1932 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
1933 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
1934 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
1935 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1936 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
1941 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1942 Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1944 update_fulfill_htlcs,
1946 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1947 update_fee: update_fee,
1949 }, monitor_update)))
1958 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
1959 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
1960 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
1961 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
1962 /// revoke_and_ack message.
1963 pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
1964 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1965 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1967 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1968 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1970 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1971 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
1974 if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
1975 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
1976 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
1979 self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
1980 .map_err(|e| ChannelError::Close(e.0))?;
1982 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1983 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
1984 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
1985 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
1986 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
1987 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1988 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1989 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1990 self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = false;
1991 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
1992 // This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
1993 // monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
1994 self.monitor_pending_order = None;
1997 log_trace!(self, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
1998 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
1999 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2000 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2001 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2002 let mut require_commitment = false;
2003 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2006 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2007 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2008 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2009 let logger = LogHolder { logger: &self.logger };
2011 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2012 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2013 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2014 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2015 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2016 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2021 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2022 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke = htlc.state {
2023 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2024 if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2025 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2027 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2028 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2033 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2034 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2035 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2037 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2038 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2042 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2043 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2045 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2046 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2047 require_commitment = true;
2048 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2049 match forward_info {
2050 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2051 require_commitment = true;
2053 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2054 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2055 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2057 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2058 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2059 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2063 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2064 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2065 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2071 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2072 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2073 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2074 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2075 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
2076 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2077 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
2078 require_commitment = true;
2082 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2084 if self.channel_outbound {
2085 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2086 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2089 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2090 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2091 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2092 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2093 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2094 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2095 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2096 require_commitment = true;
2097 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2102 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2103 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2104 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2105 if require_commitment {
2106 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2107 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2108 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2109 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2110 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
2112 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2113 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2114 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, self.channel_monitor.clone()));
2117 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
2118 Some(mut commitment_update) => {
2119 commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2120 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2121 commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2123 commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2124 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2125 commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2127 Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, commitment_update.1))
2130 if require_commitment {
2131 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2132 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2133 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2134 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2136 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2139 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2141 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), self.channel_monitor.clone()))
2148 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2149 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2150 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2151 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2152 if !self.channel_outbound {
2153 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2155 if !self.is_usable() {
2156 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2158 if !self.is_live() {
2159 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2162 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2163 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2167 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2168 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2170 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2171 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2172 feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
2176 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
2177 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2178 Some(update_fee) => {
2179 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2180 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2186 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2187 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2188 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2189 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2190 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2192 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> {
2193 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2195 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2196 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2197 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2198 return outbound_drops;
2200 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2201 // will be retransmitted.
2202 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2204 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2205 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2207 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2208 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2209 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2210 // this HTLC accordingly
2211 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2214 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2215 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2216 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2217 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2220 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2221 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2222 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2223 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2224 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2225 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2230 self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2232 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2233 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
2234 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2235 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2236 // the update upon reconnection.
2237 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2241 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2243 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2244 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2247 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2250 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2251 log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2255 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2256 /// updates are partially paused.
2257 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2258 /// which failed, with the order argument set to the type of call it represented (ie a
2259 /// commitment update or a revoke_and_ack generation). The messages which were generated from
2260 /// that original call must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead have been
2261 /// dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2262 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, order: RAACommitmentOrder, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2263 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2264 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2265 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2266 self.monitor_pending_order = Some(order);
2267 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2268 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2269 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2270 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2271 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2274 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2275 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2276 /// to the remote side.
2277 pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2278 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2279 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2281 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2282 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2283 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2284 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2286 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2287 // Leave monitor_pending_order so we can order our channel_reestablish responses
2288 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2289 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2290 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures);
2293 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2294 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2296 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2297 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
2300 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2301 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2302 (raa, commitment_update, self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap(), forwards, failures)
2305 pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2306 if self.channel_outbound {
2307 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
2309 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2310 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2312 Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2313 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
2314 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2318 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2319 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
2320 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2321 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2322 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2323 per_commitment_secret,
2324 next_per_commitment_point,
2328 fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2329 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2330 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2331 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2332 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2334 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2335 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2336 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2337 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2338 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2339 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2340 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2341 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2342 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2347 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2348 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2350 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2351 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2352 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2353 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2354 reason: err_packet.clone()
2357 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2358 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2359 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2360 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2361 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2362 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2365 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2366 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2367 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2368 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2369 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2376 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2377 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2378 update_fee: None, //TODO: We need to support re-generating any update_fees in the last commitment_signed!
2379 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2383 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2384 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2385 pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
2386 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2387 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2388 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2389 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2390 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
2393 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2394 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2395 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
2398 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2399 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2400 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2402 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2403 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2404 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2405 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2409 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2410 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 == 0 {
2411 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2412 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
2414 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2415 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2418 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2419 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2420 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2421 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2422 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2423 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2424 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2427 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2428 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2429 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2431 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2432 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2433 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2436 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2439 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
2442 // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2443 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2444 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2445 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2446 let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2448 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2449 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2450 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2451 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2452 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2453 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2454 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2458 let order = self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap_or(if self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa {
2459 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
2461 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
2464 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
2465 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2466 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2468 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2471 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 &&
2472 self.monitor_pending_order.is_none() { // monitor_pending_order indicates we're waiting on a response to a unfreeze
2473 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2474 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2475 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2477 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
2478 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
2479 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
2480 Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), order, shutdown_msg)),
2481 Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order, shutdown_msg)),
2484 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order, shutdown_msg));
2486 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
2487 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2488 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2490 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2493 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2494 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2495 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, order, shutdown_msg));
2498 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, order, shutdown_msg));
2500 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
2504 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned> {
2505 if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
2506 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
2507 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2511 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2512 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2513 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2515 let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2516 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
2518 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2519 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2520 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2522 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis));
2523 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2524 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2525 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
2526 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
2530 pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> {
2531 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2532 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2534 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2535 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
2536 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
2537 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
2538 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
2540 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2541 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2542 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
2545 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2547 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2548 // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2549 if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2550 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
2553 //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2554 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2555 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
2558 if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2559 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2560 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
2563 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2566 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2568 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2569 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2571 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2572 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2573 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2574 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
2575 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2576 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2578 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2579 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2585 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
2586 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
2587 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
2589 let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2592 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2593 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2594 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2598 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2599 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2600 Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2603 pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError> {
2604 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
2605 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
2607 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2610 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2611 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
2613 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
2614 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
2617 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2618 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
2619 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
2620 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
2622 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2624 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
2627 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
2628 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
2629 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
2630 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2631 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
2635 if let Some((_, last_fee)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2636 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
2637 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
2638 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2639 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2640 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
2644 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
2645 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
2646 let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2647 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
2648 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2649 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
2650 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
2651 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2652 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2653 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
2659 let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight();
2660 if self.channel_outbound {
2661 let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2662 if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
2663 if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2664 if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
2665 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
2668 propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
2671 let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2672 if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
2673 if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2674 if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
2675 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
2678 propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
2682 let our_sig = self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
2683 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2684 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2686 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2687 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2688 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
2690 }), Some(closing_tx)))
2693 // Public utilities:
2695 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
2699 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2700 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2701 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
2705 /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
2706 pub fn channel_monitor(&self) -> ChannelMonitor {
2707 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2708 panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
2710 self.channel_monitor.clone()
2713 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
2714 /// is_usable() returns true).
2715 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2716 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2717 self.short_channel_id
2720 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2721 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
2722 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2723 self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
2726 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2727 pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2731 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2732 pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2733 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2736 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2737 pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2738 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2741 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2742 self.channel_value_satoshis
2745 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2746 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
2750 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
2754 pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2755 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
2758 pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2759 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
2762 pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2763 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
2766 //TODO: Testing purpose only, should be changed in another way after #81
2768 pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
2773 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
2775 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
2776 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
2777 channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
2778 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2779 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2780 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
2782 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2784 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
2792 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2796 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2797 pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
2798 self.channel_update_count
2801 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2802 self.config.announced_channel
2805 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2806 self.channel_outbound
2809 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2810 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2811 pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
2812 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
2813 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
2815 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
2816 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
2818 if self.channel_outbound {
2819 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
2820 res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
2823 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
2824 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
2829 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2830 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2831 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
2834 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2835 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2836 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2837 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
2838 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
2841 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2842 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2843 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2844 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2845 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
2848 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
2849 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2850 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
2851 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
2854 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
2855 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
2856 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
2859 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
2860 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
2861 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
2862 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
2863 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
2864 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2869 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
2870 /// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
2871 /// the channel_monitor.
2872 /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
2873 /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
2874 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
2875 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
2876 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2877 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
2878 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
2879 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
2880 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
2881 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
2882 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
2883 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2884 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
2886 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
2887 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2888 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2890 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
2891 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
2892 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
2894 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
2895 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
2897 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
2898 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
2901 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
2903 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
2904 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
2905 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
2906 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
2907 if need_commitment_update {
2908 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2909 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2910 return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2911 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2912 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2918 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2919 for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
2920 if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
2921 let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
2922 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
2923 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
2924 if self.channel_outbound {
2925 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
2926 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
2927 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
2928 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
2929 // channel and move on.
2930 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2931 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
2933 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2934 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2935 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
2936 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2937 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
2940 if self.channel_outbound {
2941 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2942 if input.witness.is_empty() {
2943 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
2944 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
2945 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2946 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
2950 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
2951 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
2952 ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
2953 ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
2961 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
2962 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
2963 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
2964 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
2965 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
2966 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
2967 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
2971 if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
2972 self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
2974 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
2975 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
2979 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
2980 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
2982 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
2983 if !self.channel_outbound {
2984 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
2986 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2987 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
2990 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2991 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
2994 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2997 chain_hash: chain_hash,
2998 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
2999 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3000 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3001 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3002 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3003 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3004 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3005 feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
3006 to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
3007 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3008 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
3009 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
3010 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
3011 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
3012 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
3013 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3014 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3015 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Absent
3019 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3020 if self.channel_outbound {
3021 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3023 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3024 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3026 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3027 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3030 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3032 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3033 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3034 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3035 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3036 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3037 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3038 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3039 to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
3040 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3041 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
3042 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
3043 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
3044 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
3045 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
3046 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3047 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Absent
3051 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3052 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
3053 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3055 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3056 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
3057 let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
3059 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3060 Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
3063 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3064 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3065 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3066 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3067 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3068 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3069 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3070 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
3071 if !self.channel_outbound {
3072 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3074 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3075 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3077 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3078 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3079 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3080 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3083 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3084 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
3086 let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
3089 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3090 self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
3095 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3097 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3098 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
3099 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3100 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3101 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3103 Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
3104 temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
3105 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3106 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3107 signature: our_signature
3108 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
3111 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3112 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3113 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3114 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3115 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3117 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3118 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3119 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3120 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3121 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
3123 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3124 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
3126 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3127 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
3130 let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
3131 let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
3133 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3134 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
3135 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3136 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3137 node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
3138 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
3139 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
3140 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
3141 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3144 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
3145 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
3150 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3151 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3152 pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3153 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3154 assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3155 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3156 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3157 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3158 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3159 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3160 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3161 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3162 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3164 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3165 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3166 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3167 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3168 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3169 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3170 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3171 // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3172 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3174 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3175 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
3180 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3182 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3183 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3184 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3185 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3186 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3187 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3188 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3189 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3190 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3191 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
3194 if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3195 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
3197 if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
3198 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
3201 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3202 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3203 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3204 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3205 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3206 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3207 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3208 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
3211 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3212 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3213 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
3215 //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
3216 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3217 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3218 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight"));
3221 // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3222 // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3223 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
3224 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the reserve value"));
3227 //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
3229 // Now update local state:
3230 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3231 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3232 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3233 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3234 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3236 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3237 time_created: Instant::now(),
3242 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3243 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3244 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3245 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3246 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3247 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3252 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3253 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3254 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3255 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3256 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3257 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3258 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3260 self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
3265 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3266 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3267 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3268 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3269 pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
3270 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3271 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3273 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3274 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3276 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3277 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3279 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3280 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3282 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3283 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3284 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3285 have_updates = true;
3287 if have_updates { break; }
3289 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3290 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3291 have_updates = true;
3293 if have_updates { break; }
3296 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3298 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
3300 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3301 fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
3302 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3303 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3305 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3306 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3307 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3309 if let Some(state) = new_state {
3313 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3314 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
3315 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
3319 let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
3320 Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
3321 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3322 let htlcs_no_ref = htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
3323 (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
3325 Err(e) => return Err(e),
3328 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
3329 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3330 Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
3333 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3334 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3335 fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> {
3336 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3338 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3339 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3340 if self.channel_outbound {
3341 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3345 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3346 let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
3347 let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
3348 let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
3349 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
3350 log_trace!(self, "Signing remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", encode::serialize_hex(&remote_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize()), log_bytes!(our_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
3352 let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.1);
3353 for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
3354 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3355 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys, feerate_per_kw);
3356 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
3357 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
3358 let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
3359 htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
3360 log_trace!(self, "Signing remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key).serialize()), log_bytes!(htlc_sigs.last().unwrap().serialize_compact()[..]));
3364 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3365 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3367 htlc_signatures: htlc_sigs,
3368 }, (remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.2)))
3371 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3372 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3373 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3375 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
3376 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3377 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3378 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
3379 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3385 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3386 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3387 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
3388 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3389 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3390 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
3393 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3394 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3395 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
3397 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3398 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
3401 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3402 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3403 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
3406 let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3408 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3409 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3410 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3412 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3414 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3416 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
3417 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
3418 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3419 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3420 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3422 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3423 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3430 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3431 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3432 scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
3433 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3436 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3437 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3438 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3439 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3440 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3441 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
3442 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3444 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3445 // return them to fail the payment.
3446 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3447 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3449 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3450 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
3456 for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3457 //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
3458 //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
3462 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3463 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3464 let mut res = Vec::new();
3465 mem::swap(&mut res, &mut self.last_local_commitment_txn);
3466 (res, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
3470 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3471 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3473 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3474 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3476 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
3478 error_packet.write(writer)?;
3480 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
3482 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
3483 err_code.write(writer)?;
3485 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3487 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3494 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3495 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3496 Ok(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3497 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
3498 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3499 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
3500 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3505 impl Writeable for Channel {
3506 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3507 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
3508 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
3510 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3511 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3513 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
3514 self.config.write(writer)?;
3516 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
3517 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
3518 self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
3519 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3521 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
3522 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3524 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3525 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3526 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
3528 self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa.write(writer)?;
3530 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
3531 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3532 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3533 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
3536 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3537 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3538 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3539 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3540 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3541 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3543 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {}, // Drop
3544 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
3546 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3548 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
3550 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3552 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3555 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
3557 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
3562 macro_rules! write_option {
3565 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3574 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3575 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3576 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3577 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3578 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3579 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3580 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
3581 write_option!(htlc.fail_reason);
3583 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
3585 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3587 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3590 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
3593 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => {
3596 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
3602 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3603 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3605 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, time_created: _ } => {
3607 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3608 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3609 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3610 source.write(writer)?;
3611 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
3612 // time_created is not serialized - we re-init the timeout upon deserialization
3614 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
3616 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3617 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3619 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3621 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3622 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3627 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
3628 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
3629 match self.monitor_pending_order {
3630 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3631 Some(RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
3632 Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst) => 2u8.write(writer)?,
3635 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3636 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
3637 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
3638 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3641 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3642 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
3643 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
3644 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3645 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3648 write_option!(self.pending_update_fee);
3649 write_option!(self.holding_cell_update_fee);
3651 self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3652 (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3653 self.channel_update_count.write(writer)?;
3654 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
3656 (self.last_local_commitment_txn.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3657 for tx in self.last_local_commitment_txn.iter() {
3658 if let Err(e) = tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
3660 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
3661 _ => panic!("last_local_commitment_txn must have been well-formed!"),
3666 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3667 Some((feerate, fee)) => {
3669 feerate.write(writer)?;
3672 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3675 write_option!(self.funding_tx_confirmed_in);
3676 write_option!(self.short_channel_id);
3678 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
3679 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
3681 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3682 self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3683 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
3684 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3685 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3686 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3687 self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
3688 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
3689 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
3691 write_option!(self.their_funding_pubkey);
3692 write_option!(self.their_revocation_basepoint);
3693 write_option!(self.their_payment_basepoint);
3694 write_option!(self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint);
3695 write_option!(self.their_htlc_basepoint);
3696 write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
3698 write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
3699 self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
3701 write_option!(self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3703 self.channel_monitor.write_for_disk(writer)?;
3708 impl<R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for Channel {
3709 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3710 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3711 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3712 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3713 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3716 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3717 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
3719 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3720 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
3721 let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
3722 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3724 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3725 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3727 let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3728 let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3729 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3731 let received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = Readable::read(reader)?;
3733 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3734 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3735 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
3736 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3737 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3738 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3739 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3740 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3741 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3742 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
3743 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
3744 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
3745 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
3746 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3751 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3752 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3753 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
3754 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3755 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3756 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3757 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3758 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3759 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
3760 fail_reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
3761 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3762 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3763 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
3764 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved,
3765 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
3766 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
3767 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3772 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3773 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
3774 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
3775 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3776 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3777 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3778 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3779 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3780 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
3781 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3782 time_created: Instant::now(),
3784 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3785 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
3786 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3788 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
3789 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3790 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3792 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3796 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
3797 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3799 let monitor_pending_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3801 1 => Some(RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst),
3802 2 => Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst),
3803 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3806 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3807 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3808 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
3809 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3812 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3813 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3814 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
3815 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3818 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
3819 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
3821 let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3822 let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3823 let channel_update_count = Readable::read(reader)?;
3824 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
3826 let last_local_commitment_txn_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3827 let mut last_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(last_local_commitment_txn_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2 + 1));
3828 for _ in 0..last_local_commitment_txn_count {
3829 last_local_commitment_txn.push(match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
3831 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3835 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3837 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3838 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3841 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
3842 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3844 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
3845 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
3847 let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3848 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3849 let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3850 let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3851 let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3852 let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3853 let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
3854 let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
3855 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
3857 let their_funding_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3858 let their_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3859 let their_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3860 let their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3861 let their_htlc_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3862 let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3864 let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3865 let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3867 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3868 let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
3869 // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
3870 // doing full block connection operations on the internal CHannelMonitor copies
3871 if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
3872 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3882 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3883 channel_value_satoshis,
3888 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3889 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
3892 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa,
3893 pending_inbound_htlcs,
3894 pending_outbound_htlcs,
3895 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
3897 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
3898 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
3899 monitor_pending_order,
3900 monitor_pending_forwards,
3901 monitor_pending_failures,
3904 holding_cell_update_fee,
3906 next_remote_htlc_id,
3907 channel_update_count,
3910 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3911 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
3912 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3913 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
3915 last_local_commitment_txn,
3917 last_sent_closing_fee,
3919 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
3921 last_block_connected,
3922 funding_tx_confirmations,
3924 their_dust_limit_satoshis,
3925 our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3926 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3927 their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
3928 their_htlc_minimum_msat,
3929 our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3930 their_to_self_delay,
3931 their_max_accepted_htlcs,
3934 their_funding_pubkey,
3935 their_revocation_basepoint,
3936 their_payment_basepoint,
3937 their_delayed_payment_basepoint,
3938 their_htlc_basepoint,
3939 their_cur_commitment_point,
3941 their_prev_commitment_point,
3944 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
3955 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160};
3956 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3957 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
3958 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3959 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3960 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3962 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3963 use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
3964 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
3966 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
3967 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
3968 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3969 use util::config::UserConfig;
3970 use util::test_utils;
3971 use util::logger::Logger;
3972 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
3973 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3974 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3975 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3978 struct TestFeeEstimator {
3981 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
3982 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
3988 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
3989 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
3990 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
3994 chan_keys: ChannelKeys,
3996 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
3997 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
3998 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
3999 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4000 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4001 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4002 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4005 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4006 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4007 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4008 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4011 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
4012 fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4013 fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4017 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4018 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4019 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4020 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4021 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4023 let chan_keys = ChannelKeys {
4024 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4025 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4026 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4027 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4029 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4030 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4031 commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4033 assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
4034 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4035 let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
4037 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4038 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4039 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4040 let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4041 chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
4042 chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4044 let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
4045 chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
4047 chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
4048 assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
4049 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4051 chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
4052 assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
4053 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
4055 chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
4056 assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
4057 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4059 chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
4061 // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
4062 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
4063 // build_commitment_transaction.
4064 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
4065 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4066 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4067 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
4068 let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
4070 let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
4072 macro_rules! test_commitment {
4073 ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
4075 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4076 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
4077 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
4081 let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4082 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
4083 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
4085 chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
4087 assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0)[..],
4088 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4092 macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
4093 ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
4094 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4096 let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
4097 let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4098 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
4099 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
4100 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
4102 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4105 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
4106 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
4107 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
4111 assert!(preimage.is_some());
4114 chan.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys).unwrap();
4115 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
4116 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4121 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
4122 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
4124 test_commitment!("3045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c0",
4125 "3044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c3836939",
4126 "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");
4129 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4130 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4132 amount_msat: 1000000,
4134 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4135 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4137 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
4140 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4141 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4143 amount_msat: 2000000,
4145 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4146 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4148 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
4151 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4152 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4154 amount_msat: 2000000,
4156 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4157 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4158 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4161 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
4164 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4165 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4167 amount_msat: 3000000,
4169 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4170 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4171 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4174 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
4177 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4178 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4180 amount_msat: 4000000,
4182 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4183 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4185 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
4190 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4191 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4192 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
4194 test_commitment!("304402204fd4928835db1ccdfc40f5c78ce9bd65249b16348df81f0c44328dcdefc97d630220194d3869c38bc732dd87d13d2958015e2fc16829e74cd4377f84d215c0b70606",
4195 "30440220275b0c325a5e9355650dc30c0eccfbc7efb23987c24b556b9dfdd40effca18d202206caceb2c067836c51f296740c7ae807ffcbfbf1dd3a0d56b6de9a5b247985f06",
4196 "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");
4198 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4200 test_htlc_output!(0,
4201 "304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a6",
4202 "304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5",
4203 "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");
4205 test_htlc_output!(1,
4206 "3045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b",
4207 "3045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be5",
4208 "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");
4210 test_htlc_output!(2,
4211 "304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f202",
4212 "3045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da",
4213 "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");
4215 test_htlc_output!(3,
4216 "3045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554",
4217 "30440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac08727",
4218 "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");
4220 test_htlc_output!(4,
4221 "304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d",
4222 "30440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e",
4223 "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");
4227 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4228 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4229 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4231 test_commitment!("3045022100a5c01383d3ec646d97e40f44318d49def817fcd61a0ef18008a665b3e151785502203e648efddd5838981ef55ec954be69c4a652d021e6081a100d034de366815e9b",
4232 "304502210094bfd8f5572ac0157ec76a9551b6c5216a4538c07cd13a51af4a54cb26fa14320220768efce8ce6f4a5efac875142ff19237c011343670adf9c7ac69704a120d1163",
4233 "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");
4235 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4237 test_htlc_output!(0,
4238 "30440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab343740",
4239 "304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a",
4240 "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");
4242 test_htlc_output!(1,
4243 "304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b0",
4244 "304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac",
4245 "020000000001018323148ce2419f21ca3d6780053747715832e18ac780931a514b187768882bb60100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b00147304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000");
4247 test_htlc_output!(2,
4248 "304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d833",
4249 "3045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877",
4250 "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");
4252 test_htlc_output!(3,
4253 "30450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d",
4254 "3045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb",
4255 "020000000001018323148ce2419f21ca3d6780053747715832e18ac780931a514b187768882bb6030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d01483045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000");
4257 test_htlc_output!(4,
4258 "3045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f0",
4259 "304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f",
4260 "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");
4264 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4265 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4266 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4268 test_commitment!("3044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b057",
4269 "3045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de",
4270 "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");
4272 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4274 test_htlc_output!(0,
4275 "3044022062ef2e77591409d60d7817d9bb1e71d3c4a2931d1a6c7c8307422c84f001a251022022dad9726b0ae3fe92bda745a06f2c00f92342a186d84518588cf65f4dfaada8",
4276 "3045022100a4c574f00411dd2f978ca5cdc1b848c311cd7849c087ad2f21a5bce5e8cc5ae90220090ae39a9bce2fb8bc879d7e9f9022df249f41e25e51f1a9bf6447a9eeffc098",
4277 "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");
4279 test_htlc_output!(1,
4280 "3045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d4",
4281 "304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0",
4282 "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");
4284 test_htlc_output!(2,
4285 "3045022100aa91932e305292cf9969cc23502bbf6cef83a5df39c95ad04a707c4f4fed5c7702207099fc0f3a9bfe1e7683c0e9aa5e76c5432eb20693bf4cb182f04d383dc9c8c2",
4286 "304402200df76fea718745f3c529bac7fd37923e7309ce38b25c0781e4cf514dd9ef8dc802204172295739dbae9fe0474dcee3608e3433b4b2af3a2e6787108b02f894dcdda3",
4287 "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");
4289 test_htlc_output!(3,
4290 "3044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f",
4291 "304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6",
4292 "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");
4296 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4297 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4298 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4300 test_commitment!("3044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb4",
4301 "304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea",
4302 "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");
4304 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4306 test_htlc_output!(0,
4307 "3045022100d1cf354de41c1369336cf85b225ed033f1f8982a01be503668df756a7e668b66022001254144fb4d0eecc61908fccc3388891ba17c5d7a1a8c62bdd307e5a513f992",
4308 "3044022056eb1af429660e45a1b0b66568cb8c4a3aa7e4c9c292d5d6c47f86ebf2c8838f022065c3ac4ebe980ca7a41148569be4ad8751b0a724a41405697ec55035dae66402",
4309 "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");
4311 test_htlc_output!(1,
4312 "3045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f4",
4313 "3045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f",
4314 "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");
4316 test_htlc_output!(2,
4317 "3045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef18",
4318 "304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f9",
4319 "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");
4321 test_htlc_output!(3,
4322 "30450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c",
4323 "304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5",
4324 "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");
4328 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4329 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4330 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4332 test_commitment!("3045022100f2377f7a67b7fc7f4e2c0c9e3a7de935c32417f5668eda31ea1db401b7dc53030220415fdbc8e91d0f735e70c21952342742e25249b0d062d43efbfc564499f37526",
4333 "30440220443cb07f650aebbba14b8bc8d81e096712590f524c5991ac0ed3bbc8fd3bd0c7022028a635f548e3ca64b19b69b1ea00f05b22752f91daf0b6dab78e62ba52eb7fd0",
4334 "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");
4336 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4338 test_htlc_output!(0,
4339 "3045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f891",
4340 "3045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb8",
4341 "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");
4343 test_htlc_output!(1,
4344 "3044022071e9357619fd8d29a411dc053b326a5224c5d11268070e88ecb981b174747c7a02202b763ae29a9d0732fa8836dd8597439460b50472183f420021b768981b4f7cf6",
4345 "3045022100adb1d679f65f96178b59f23ed37d3b70443118f345224a07ecb043eee2acc157022034d24524fe857144a3bcfff3065a9994d0a6ec5f11c681e49431d573e242612d",
4346 "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");
4348 test_htlc_output!(2,
4349 "3045022100c9458a4d2cbb741705577deb0a890e5cb90ee141be0400d3162e533727c9cb2102206edcf765c5dc5e5f9b976ea8149bf8607b5a0efb30691138e1231302b640d2a4",
4350 "304402200831422aa4e1ee6d55e0b894201770a8f8817a189356f2d70be76633ffa6a6f602200dd1b84a4855dc6727dd46c98daae43dfc70889d1ba7ef0087529a57c06e5e04",
4351 "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");
4355 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4356 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4357 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
4359 test_commitment!("3045022100d33c4e541aa1d255d41ea9a3b443b3b822ad8f7f86862638aac1f69f8f760577022007e2a18e6931ce3d3a804b1c78eda1de17dbe1fb7a95488c9a4ec86203953348",
4360 "304402203b1b010c109c2ecbe7feb2d259b9c4126bd5dc99ee693c422ec0a5781fe161ba0220571fe4e2c649dea9c7aaf7e49b382962f6a3494963c97d80fef9a430ca3f7061",
4361 "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");
4363 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4365 test_htlc_output!(0,
4366 "30450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf44",
4367 "3044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f",
4368 "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");
4370 test_htlc_output!(1,
4371 "30440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d",
4372 "304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c915",
4373 "02000000000101fb824d4e4dafc0f567789dee3a6bce8d411fe80f5563d8cdfdcc7d7e4447d43a010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d0147304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c91501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000");
4375 test_htlc_output!(2,
4376 "3045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a",
4377 "3045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0",
4378 "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");
4382 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4383 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4384 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
4386 test_commitment!("304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb7924298",
4387 "304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a5429",
4388 "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");
4390 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4392 test_htlc_output!(0,
4393 "3045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc",
4394 "3045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc704390",
4395 "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");
4397 test_htlc_output!(1,
4398 "3045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92",
4399 "30440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8",
4400 "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");
4404 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4405 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4406 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
4408 test_commitment!("3045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c1",
4409 "304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b0",
4410 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de8431106f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b001483045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c101475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
4412 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4414 test_htlc_output!(0,
4415 "3045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb",
4416 "304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a",
4417 "02000000000101b8de11eb51c22498fe39722c7227b6e55ff1a94146cf638458cb9bc6a060d3a30000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb0147304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000");
4419 test_htlc_output!(1,
4420 "3045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9",
4421 "30440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c",
4422 "02000000000101b8de11eb51c22498fe39722c7227b6e55ff1a94146cf638458cb9bc6a060d3a30100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9014730440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000");
4426 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4427 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4428 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
4430 test_commitment!("30450221008b7c191dd46893b67b628e618d2dc8e81169d38bade310181ab77d7c94c6675e02203b4dd131fd7c9deb299560983dcdc485545c98f989f7ae8180c28289f9e6bdb0",
4431 "3044022047305531dd44391dce03ae20f8735005c615eb077a974edb0059ea1a311857d602202e0ed6972fbdd1e8cb542b06e0929bc41b2ddf236e04cb75edd56151f4197506",
4432 "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");
4434 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4436 test_htlc_output!(0,
4437 "3044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd",
4438 "3045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724",
4439 "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");
4443 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4444 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4445 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
4447 test_commitment!("304402206d6cb93969d39177a09d5d45b583f34966195b77c7e585cf47ac5cce0c90cefb022031d71ae4e33a4e80df7f981d696fbdee517337806a3c7138b7491e2cbb077a0e",
4448 "304402206a2679efa3c7aaffd2a447fd0df7aba8792858b589750f6a1203f9259173198a022008d52a0e77a99ab533c36206cb15ad7aeb2aa72b93d4b571e728cb5ec2f6fe26",
4449 "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");
4451 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4453 test_htlc_output!(0,
4454 "3045022100fcb38506bfa11c02874092a843d0cc0a8613c23b639832564a5f69020cb0f6ba02206508b9e91eaa001425c190c68ee5f887e1ad5b1b314002e74db9dbd9e42dbecf",
4455 "304502210086e76b460ddd3cea10525fba298405d3fe11383e56966a5091811368362f689a02200f72ee75657915e0ede89c28709acd113ede9e1b7be520e3bc5cda425ecd6e68",
4456 "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");
4460 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4461 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4462 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
4464 test_commitment!("304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f8765552",
4465 "3045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b9",
4466 "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");
4468 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4472 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4473 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4474 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
4476 test_commitment!("3044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd",
4477 "30440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b9",
4478 "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");
4480 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4484 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4485 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4486 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
4488 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4489 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4490 "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");
4492 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4496 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
4497 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4498 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
4500 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4501 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4502 "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");
4504 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4509 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
4510 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
4512 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4513 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
4514 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
4515 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
4517 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
4518 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
4519 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
4521 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
4522 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
4524 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0x555555555555),
4525 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
4527 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
4528 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 1),
4529 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
4533 fn test_key_derivation() {
4534 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
4535 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4537 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4538 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4540 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
4541 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
4543 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4544 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
4546 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4547 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
4549 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4550 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
4552 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4553 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
4555 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4556 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());