1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
67 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
69 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
75 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
86 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
93 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
95 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
101 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
103 pub enum HTLCSource {
104 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
107 session_priv: SecretKey,
108 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
109 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
110 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
115 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
116 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
117 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
118 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
119 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
127 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
135 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
137 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
138 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
139 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
140 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
141 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
142 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
144 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
146 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
147 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
148 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
149 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
150 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
152 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
153 err: msgs::HandleError,
154 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
156 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
158 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
162 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
163 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
165 data: err.to_string()
169 shutdown_finish: None,
173 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
177 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
181 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
182 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
184 data: err.to_string()
188 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
192 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
195 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
197 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
199 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
201 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
202 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
204 data: msg.to_string()
209 shutdown_finish: None,
214 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
215 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
217 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
218 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
220 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
224 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
225 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
226 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
227 /// probably increase this significantly.
228 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
230 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
231 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
233 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
236 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
237 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
238 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
239 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
240 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
241 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
242 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
244 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
248 struct ChannelHolder {
249 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
250 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
251 next_forward: Instant,
252 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
253 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
254 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
255 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
256 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
257 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
258 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
260 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
261 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
262 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
263 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
265 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
266 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
267 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
268 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
269 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
270 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
271 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
274 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
276 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
277 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
278 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
279 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
280 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
281 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
286 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
287 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
289 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
290 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
292 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
293 /// to individual Channels.
295 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
296 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
297 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
298 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
300 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
301 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
302 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
303 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
304 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
305 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
306 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
308 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
309 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
310 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
311 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
313 pub struct ChannelManager {
314 default_configuration: UserConfig,
315 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
316 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
317 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
318 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
319 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
321 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
322 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
323 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
325 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
326 our_network_key: SecretKey,
328 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
329 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
330 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
331 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
332 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
334 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
339 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
340 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
341 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
342 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
343 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
344 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
345 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
347 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
348 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
349 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
350 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
351 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
354 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
356 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
357 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
360 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
362 macro_rules! secp_call {
363 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
366 Err(_) => return Err($err),
373 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
375 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
376 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
381 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
382 pub struct ChannelDetails {
383 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
384 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
385 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
386 /// lifetime of the channel.
387 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
388 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
389 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
390 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
391 /// The node_id of our counterparty
392 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
393 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
394 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
395 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
399 macro_rules! handle_error {
400 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
403 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
404 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
405 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
406 if let Some(update) = update_option {
407 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
408 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
419 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
420 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
423 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
424 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
426 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
427 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
428 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
429 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
430 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
432 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
438 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
439 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
442 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
443 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
445 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
446 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
447 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
448 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
449 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
451 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
457 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
458 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
459 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
461 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
462 if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
463 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
465 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
466 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
468 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
470 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
471 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
472 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
473 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
475 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
476 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
477 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
478 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
479 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
480 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
481 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
482 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
483 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
484 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
486 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
487 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
488 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
494 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
495 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
496 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
498 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
499 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
500 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
501 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
503 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
505 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
506 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
512 impl ChannelManager {
513 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
515 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
516 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
518 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
520 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
521 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
522 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
524 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
525 default_configuration: config.clone(),
526 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
527 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
528 monitor: monitor.clone(),
532 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
533 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
536 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
537 by_id: HashMap::new(),
538 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
539 next_forward: Instant::now(),
540 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
541 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
542 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
544 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
546 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
547 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
553 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
554 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
558 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
560 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
561 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
562 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
563 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
565 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
566 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
568 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
569 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
570 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
571 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
572 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
575 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
576 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
578 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
579 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
580 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
582 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
583 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
585 panic!("RNG is bad???");
588 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
590 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
591 node_id: their_network_key,
597 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
598 /// more information.
599 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
600 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
601 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
602 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
603 res.push(ChannelDetails {
604 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
605 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
606 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
607 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
608 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
614 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
615 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
616 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
617 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
618 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
619 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
620 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
621 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
622 // really wanted anyway.
623 if channel.is_live() {
624 res.push(ChannelDetails {
625 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
626 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
627 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
628 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
629 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
636 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
637 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
638 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
640 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
641 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
642 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
644 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
645 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
646 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
647 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
648 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
649 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
650 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
651 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
654 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
655 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
656 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
658 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
659 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
664 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
665 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
667 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
668 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
673 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
674 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
675 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
684 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
685 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
686 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
687 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
688 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
690 for tx in local_txn {
691 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
695 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
696 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
697 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
698 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
701 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
702 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
703 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
704 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
705 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
712 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
713 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
714 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
715 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
716 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
722 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
723 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
724 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
725 for chan in self.list_channels() {
726 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
731 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
732 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
734 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
735 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
736 let mut res = [0; 32];
737 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
741 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
742 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
743 let mut res = [0; 32];
744 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
750 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
751 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
752 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
753 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
754 let mut res = [0; 32];
755 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
760 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
761 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
762 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
763 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
764 let mut res = [0; 32];
765 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
769 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
771 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
772 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
773 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
775 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
776 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
778 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
779 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
780 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
781 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
782 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
784 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
786 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
787 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
789 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
795 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
796 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
797 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
799 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
800 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
806 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
816 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
817 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
818 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
819 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
820 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
821 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
822 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
823 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
825 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
826 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
827 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
828 // the intended recipient).
829 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
830 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
831 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
833 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
834 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
835 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
836 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
840 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
841 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
842 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
844 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
845 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
846 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
848 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
850 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
854 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
856 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
864 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
865 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
867 for i in 0..dst.len() {
872 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
873 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
874 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
875 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
878 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
879 let end_len = iters * 65;
880 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
881 res.resize(end_len, 0);
883 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
884 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
885 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
886 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
887 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
892 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
893 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
895 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
896 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
897 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
898 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
900 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
901 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
902 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
905 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
908 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
909 hmac.input(&packet_data);
910 hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]);
911 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
916 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
917 hop_data: packet_data,
922 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
923 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
924 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
925 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
927 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
928 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
929 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
930 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
931 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
932 data: packet_crypted,
936 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
937 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
938 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
940 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
943 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
944 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
945 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
946 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
950 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
951 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
954 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
956 failuremsg: failuremsg,
960 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
961 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
962 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
968 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
969 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
970 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
973 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
974 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
977 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
978 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
979 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
980 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
986 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
987 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
988 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
989 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
990 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
991 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
992 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
993 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
996 let shared_secret = {
997 let mut arr = [0; 32];
998 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1001 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1003 let mut channel_state = None;
1004 macro_rules! return_err {
1005 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1007 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1008 if channel_state.is_none() {
1009 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1011 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1012 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1013 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1014 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1015 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1020 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1021 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1022 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1023 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1024 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1025 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1026 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1027 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1030 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1031 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1032 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1033 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1034 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1037 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1038 let next_hop_data = {
1039 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1040 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1041 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1043 let error_code = match err {
1044 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1045 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1047 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1053 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1055 // final_expiry_too_soon
1056 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1057 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1059 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1060 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1061 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1063 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1064 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1065 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1068 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1069 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1070 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1071 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1073 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1075 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1076 short_channel_id: 0,
1077 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1078 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1079 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1082 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1083 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1084 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1086 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1088 let blinding_factor = {
1089 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1090 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1091 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1092 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1093 sha.result(&mut res);
1094 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1096 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1102 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1103 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1106 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1108 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1109 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1110 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1113 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1114 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1115 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1116 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1117 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1118 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1119 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1123 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1124 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1125 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1126 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1127 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1128 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1129 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1131 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1133 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1134 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1136 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1137 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1138 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1139 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1140 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1141 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1142 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1144 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1145 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1147 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1148 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1149 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1151 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1152 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1154 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1155 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1156 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1157 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1159 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1160 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1165 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1166 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1167 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1169 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1170 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1172 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1173 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1175 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1180 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1183 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1184 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1185 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1186 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1187 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1191 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1193 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1194 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1195 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1196 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1197 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1198 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1199 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1200 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1201 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1202 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1205 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1206 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1208 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1214 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1216 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1217 /// fields for more info.
1219 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1220 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1221 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1222 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1223 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1224 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1226 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1228 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1229 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1230 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1231 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1232 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1233 /// relevant updates.
1235 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1236 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1237 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1238 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1239 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1240 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1241 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1242 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1244 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1245 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1246 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1247 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1251 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1253 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1255 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1256 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1257 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1258 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1260 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1262 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1263 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1265 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1266 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1267 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1270 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1271 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1273 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1274 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1276 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1277 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1279 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1280 route: route.clone(),
1281 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1282 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1283 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1285 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1286 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1287 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1288 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1289 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1290 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1291 // something else in case we will resend later!
1292 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1295 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1296 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1297 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1298 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1299 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1300 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1301 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1309 } else { unreachable!(); }
1313 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1314 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1316 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1318 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1319 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1320 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1321 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1325 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1330 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1332 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1333 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1335 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1337 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1338 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1339 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1340 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1342 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1344 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1345 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1347 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1348 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1349 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1350 } else { unreachable!(); })
1356 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1357 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1358 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1361 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1362 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1363 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1364 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1371 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1372 // lock before add_update_monitor
1373 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1377 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1378 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1379 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1382 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1383 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1384 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1392 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1393 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1395 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1397 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1399 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1400 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1402 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1403 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1404 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1405 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1406 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1410 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1412 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1413 /// Will likely generate further events.
1414 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1415 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1417 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1418 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1420 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1421 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1423 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1427 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1428 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1429 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1430 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1432 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1433 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1434 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1435 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1436 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1437 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1439 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1444 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1446 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1447 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1448 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1449 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1450 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1451 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1453 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1455 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1456 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1461 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1463 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1464 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1465 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1466 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1467 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1468 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1469 // this channel currently :/.
1476 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1477 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1480 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1481 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1483 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1487 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1490 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1491 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1492 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1493 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1494 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1495 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1496 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1498 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1503 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1504 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1505 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1506 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1507 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1509 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1511 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1513 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1514 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1515 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1522 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1524 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1525 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1529 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1530 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1531 events.append(&mut new_events);
1534 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1535 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1536 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1538 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1539 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1540 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1541 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1542 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1543 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1549 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1550 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1551 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1552 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1553 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1554 /// still-available channels.
1555 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1557 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1558 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1559 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1560 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1561 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1562 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1563 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1564 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1569 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1570 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1571 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1574 //TODO: Pass this back (see GH #243)
1575 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1576 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1577 rejected_by_dest: false, // We failed it ourselves, can't blame them
1581 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1582 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1583 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1584 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1585 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1586 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1588 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1589 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1590 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1594 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1596 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1597 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1601 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1602 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1603 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1604 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1607 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1608 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1609 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1610 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1611 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1612 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1613 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1615 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1621 //TODO: Do something with e?
1629 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1630 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1631 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1633 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1634 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1635 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1636 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
1637 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
1638 sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]);
1640 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1642 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1643 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1644 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1645 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1646 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1647 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1652 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1654 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1655 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1656 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1657 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1661 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1662 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1663 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1665 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1666 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1668 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1669 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1675 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1676 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1677 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1678 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1679 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1680 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1683 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1684 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1685 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1686 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1687 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1688 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1689 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1690 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1698 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1699 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1700 //TODO: Do something with e?
1708 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1709 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1710 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1713 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1714 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1716 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1717 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1718 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1719 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1720 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1723 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1724 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1725 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1726 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1727 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1728 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1729 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1730 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1732 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1733 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1734 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1735 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1736 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1737 // on-chain confirmations.
1738 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1739 // should be written.
1740 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1741 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1743 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1744 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1745 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1751 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1754 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1755 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1756 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1758 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1760 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1761 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1762 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1763 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1768 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1769 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1770 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1771 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1772 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1777 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1781 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1792 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1793 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1795 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1797 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1798 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1802 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1803 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1804 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1807 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1808 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1809 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1810 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1811 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1812 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1814 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1815 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1816 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1818 entry.insert(channel);
1824 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1825 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1826 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1827 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1828 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1830 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1831 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1832 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1834 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1835 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1837 //TODO: same as above
1838 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1841 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1842 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1843 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1844 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1845 output_script: output_script,
1846 user_channel_id: user_id,
1851 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1852 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1853 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1854 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1855 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1856 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1857 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1858 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1859 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1861 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1863 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1866 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1867 // lock before add_update_monitor
1868 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1871 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1872 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1873 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1874 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1875 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1877 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1878 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1879 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1888 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1889 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1890 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1891 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1892 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1893 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1894 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1895 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1896 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1898 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1899 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1902 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1904 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1907 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1908 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1909 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1910 user_channel_id: user_id,
1915 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1916 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1917 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1918 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1919 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1920 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1921 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1922 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1924 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1925 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1926 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1927 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1928 msg: announcement_sigs,
1933 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1937 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1938 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1939 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1940 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1942 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1944 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1945 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1946 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1948 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1949 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1950 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1951 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1955 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1956 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1957 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1961 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1962 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1963 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1965 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1966 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1968 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1971 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1972 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1974 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1975 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1976 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1977 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1985 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1986 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1987 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1988 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1989 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1990 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1991 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1992 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1993 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1995 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1996 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1997 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1998 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2003 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2004 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2005 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2006 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2007 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2008 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2009 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2011 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2012 } else { (tx, None) }
2014 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2017 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2018 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2020 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2021 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2022 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2023 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2031 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2032 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2033 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2034 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2036 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2037 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2038 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2039 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2041 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2042 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2044 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2045 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2046 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2047 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2048 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2050 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2051 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2052 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2053 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2054 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2055 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2056 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2057 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2058 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2059 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2060 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
2062 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2063 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2064 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2065 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2066 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2067 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2072 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2074 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2079 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2080 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2082 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2083 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2084 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2085 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2086 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2087 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2089 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2091 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2094 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2098 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2099 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2100 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
2101 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2102 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
2103 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
2104 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
2106 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
2107 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
2111 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
2112 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2113 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2116 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2118 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2119 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2120 if res.is_some() { return; }
2122 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2123 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2124 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2126 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2128 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2129 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2130 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2131 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2132 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2134 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2136 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2137 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2138 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2139 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2140 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2141 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2143 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2144 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2145 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2146 // definitely came from the peer in question
2147 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2149 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2151 match error_code & 0xff {
2153 // either from an intermediate or final node
2154 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2155 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2156 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2157 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2158 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2159 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2160 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2161 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2162 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2163 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2164 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2170 if is_from_final_node {
2171 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2172 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2173 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2174 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2175 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2176 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2179 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2180 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2184 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2185 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2186 // does not coform to the spec.
2187 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2188 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2189 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2195 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2199 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2201 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2202 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2203 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2207 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2208 let offset = match error_code {
2209 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2210 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2211 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2212 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2213 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2214 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2216 // node sending unknown code
2217 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2218 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2225 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2226 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2227 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2228 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2229 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2230 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2231 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2232 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2235 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2236 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2237 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2238 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2240 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2241 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2242 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2243 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2244 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2246 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2247 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2248 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2249 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2251 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2252 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2253 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2254 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2256 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2257 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2260 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2261 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2265 res = Some((msg, true));
2271 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2274 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2275 res = Some((None, true));
2279 // node sending unknown code
2280 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2281 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2290 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2291 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2292 } else { ((None, true)) }
2295 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2296 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2297 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2298 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2300 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2301 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2302 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2304 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2306 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2311 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2312 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2313 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2314 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2315 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2316 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2317 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2318 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2320 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2321 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2323 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2326 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2330 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2331 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2332 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2333 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2334 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2335 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2336 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2337 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2339 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2340 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2341 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2342 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
2343 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2345 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2346 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2347 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2349 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2350 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2351 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2352 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2353 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2354 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2355 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2356 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2358 commitment_signed: msg,
2362 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2363 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2364 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2370 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2375 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2376 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2377 let mut forward_event = None;
2378 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2379 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2380 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2381 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2382 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2384 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2385 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2387 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2389 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2390 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2395 match forward_event {
2397 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2398 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2399 time_forwardable: time
2407 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2408 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2409 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2410 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2411 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2412 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2413 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2414 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2415 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2417 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2418 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2419 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2420 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2422 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2423 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2424 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2428 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2429 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2430 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2434 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2436 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2439 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2440 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2442 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2447 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2448 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2449 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2450 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2451 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2452 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2453 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2454 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2456 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2458 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2463 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2464 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2465 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2467 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2468 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2469 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2470 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2472 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2473 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2476 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2477 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2478 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2480 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2481 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2482 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2483 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2484 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2487 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2489 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2490 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2491 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2492 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2493 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2494 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2495 contents: announcement,
2497 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2500 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2505 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2506 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2507 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2509 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2511 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2512 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2514 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2515 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2516 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2517 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2518 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2519 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2520 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2521 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2522 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2524 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2525 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2527 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
2528 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2531 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2532 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2533 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2537 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2538 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2539 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2540 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2545 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2546 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2547 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2548 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2554 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2558 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2563 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2564 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2565 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2571 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2575 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2576 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2577 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2578 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2580 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2581 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2583 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2584 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2585 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2587 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2588 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2589 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2590 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2591 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2593 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2594 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2596 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2597 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2599 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2600 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2601 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2603 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2606 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2607 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2608 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2609 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2610 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2611 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2612 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2613 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2623 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2624 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2626 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2628 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2629 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2630 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2631 node_id: their_node_id,
2635 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2641 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2642 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2643 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2644 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2645 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2647 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2648 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2649 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2650 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2651 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2653 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2654 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2659 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2660 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2661 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2666 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2667 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2668 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2669 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2670 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2672 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2673 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2674 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2675 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2676 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2678 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2679 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2684 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2685 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2686 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2691 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2692 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2693 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2694 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2695 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2696 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2698 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2699 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2700 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2701 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2702 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2703 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2704 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2705 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2706 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2707 msg: funding_locked,
2709 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2710 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2711 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2712 msg: announcement_sigs,
2715 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2716 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2717 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2718 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2719 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2723 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2724 for tx in txn_matched {
2725 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2726 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2727 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2728 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2729 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2731 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2732 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2733 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2734 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2735 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2736 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2745 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2746 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2747 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2749 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2750 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2751 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2752 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2753 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2754 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2755 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2764 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2765 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2767 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2768 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2771 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2772 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2773 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2774 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2776 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2777 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2778 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2779 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2780 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2781 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2782 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2783 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2785 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2786 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2787 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2797 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2798 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2800 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2801 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2805 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2806 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2807 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2808 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2809 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2812 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2813 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2814 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2817 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2818 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2819 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2822 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2823 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2824 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2827 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2828 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2829 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2832 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2833 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2834 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2837 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2838 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2839 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2842 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2843 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2844 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2847 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2848 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2849 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2852 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2853 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2854 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2857 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2858 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2859 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2862 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2863 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2864 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2867 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2868 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2869 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2872 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2873 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2874 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2877 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2878 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2879 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2882 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2883 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2884 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2887 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2888 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2889 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2890 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2892 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2893 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2894 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2895 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2896 if no_connection_possible {
2897 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2898 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2899 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2900 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2901 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2903 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2904 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2905 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2915 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2916 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2917 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2918 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2919 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2920 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2921 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2922 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2924 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2925 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2926 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2935 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2936 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2938 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2939 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2940 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2945 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2946 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2948 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2949 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2950 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2951 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2952 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2953 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2954 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2955 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2956 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2957 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2961 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2962 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2963 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2969 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2972 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2973 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2975 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2976 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2977 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2978 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2982 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2987 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2988 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2990 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2991 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2992 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2994 onion.write(writer)?;
2998 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2999 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3000 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3001 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3002 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3007 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3008 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3009 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3011 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
3012 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3014 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3016 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3017 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3018 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3019 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3020 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3025 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3026 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3028 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3030 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3032 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3034 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3041 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3042 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3043 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3044 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3045 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3046 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3051 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3052 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3054 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3056 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3058 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3060 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3067 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3068 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3069 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3070 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3071 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3072 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3077 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3080 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3083 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3084 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3086 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3088 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3090 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3092 route.write(writer)?;
3093 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3094 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3101 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3102 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3103 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3104 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3105 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3106 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3107 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3108 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3110 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3115 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3116 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3118 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3122 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3124 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3125 data.write(writer)?;
3132 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3133 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3134 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3135 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3136 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3137 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3138 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3140 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3145 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3146 prev_short_channel_id,
3151 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3152 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3153 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3155 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3156 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3158 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3159 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3160 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3162 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3163 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3164 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3165 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3166 unfunded_channels += 1;
3169 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3170 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3171 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3172 channel.write(writer)?;
3176 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3177 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3178 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3179 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3180 for forward in pending_forwards {
3181 forward.write(writer)?;
3185 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3186 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3187 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3188 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3189 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3190 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3198 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3200 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3202 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3203 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3204 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3205 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3206 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3207 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3208 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3209 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3210 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3211 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3212 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3213 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3214 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3215 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3216 /// deserialization.
3217 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3219 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3221 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3222 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3223 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3225 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3226 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3227 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3228 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3229 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3231 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3232 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3233 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3234 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3235 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3236 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3237 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3238 /// deserialization.
3239 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3240 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3241 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3242 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3244 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3245 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3247 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3248 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3249 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3250 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3252 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3254 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3257 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3258 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3259 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3260 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3261 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3262 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3265 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3266 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3267 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3269 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3271 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3272 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3273 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3274 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3275 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3276 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3277 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3278 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3281 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3282 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3283 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3284 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3285 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3286 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3287 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3288 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3289 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3291 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3292 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3294 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3297 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3301 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3302 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3303 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3307 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3308 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3309 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3310 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3311 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3312 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3313 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3314 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3316 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3319 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3320 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3321 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3322 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3323 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3324 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3325 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3326 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3328 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3331 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3333 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3334 monitor: args.monitor,
3335 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3336 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3338 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3339 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3340 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3342 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3345 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3348 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3350 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3352 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3353 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3354 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3355 logger: args.logger,
3356 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3359 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3360 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3361 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3362 //connection or two.
3365 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3371 use chain::chaininterface;
3372 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3373 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3374 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3375 use chain::keysinterface;
3376 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3377 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3378 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3379 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
3380 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3382 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3383 use util::test_utils;
3384 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3385 use util::errors::APIError;
3386 use util::logger::Logger;
3387 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3388 use util::config::UserConfig;
3390 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3391 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3392 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3393 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3394 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3395 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3396 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3397 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3398 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3399 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3403 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3404 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3406 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3407 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3409 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3411 use std::cell::RefCell;
3412 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
3413 use std::default::Default;
3415 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3416 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3417 use std::time::Instant;
3420 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3421 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3422 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3427 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3428 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3431 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3432 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3435 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3436 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3439 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3440 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3443 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3444 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3449 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3451 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3452 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3457 fn onion_vectors() {
3458 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3459 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3461 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3462 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3463 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3464 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3465 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3467 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3468 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3469 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3470 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3471 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3473 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3474 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3475 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3476 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3477 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3479 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3480 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3481 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3482 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3483 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3485 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3486 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3487 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3488 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3489 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3491 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3492 let payloads = vec!(
3493 msgs::OnionHopData {
3495 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3496 short_channel_id: 0,
3498 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3502 msgs::OnionHopData {
3504 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3505 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3506 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3507 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3511 msgs::OnionHopData {
3513 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3514 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3515 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3516 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3520 msgs::OnionHopData {
3522 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3523 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3524 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3525 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3529 msgs::OnionHopData {
3531 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3532 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3533 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3534 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3540 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32]));
3541 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3543 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3547 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3548 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3550 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3551 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3552 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3554 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3555 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3557 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3558 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3560 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3561 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3563 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3564 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3566 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3567 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("9c5add3963fc7f6ed7f148623c84134b5647e1306419dbe2174e523fa9e2fbed3a06a19f899145610741c83ad40b7712aefaddec8c6baf7325d92ea4ca4d1df8bce517f7e54554608bf2bd8071a4f52a7a2f7ffbb1413edad81eeea5785aa9d990f2865dc23b4bc3c301a94eec4eabebca66be5cf638f693ec256aec514620cc28ee4a94bd9565bc4d4962b9d3641d4278fb319ed2b84de5b665f307a2db0f7fbb757366067d88c50f7e829138fde4f78d39b5b5802f1b92a8a820865af5cc79f9f30bc3f461c66af95d13e5e1f0381c184572a91dee1c849048a647a1158cf884064deddbf1b0b88dfe2f791428d0ba0f6fb2f04e14081f69165ae66d9297c118f0907705c9c4954a199bae0bb96fad763d690e7daa6cfda59ba7f2c8d11448b604d12d").unwrap());
3570 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3571 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3572 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3573 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3575 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3576 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3581 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3582 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3583 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3584 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3586 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3587 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3588 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3590 impl Drop for Node {
3591 fn drop(&mut self) {
3592 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3593 // Check that we processed all pending events
3594 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3595 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3596 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3601 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3602 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3605 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3606 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3607 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3608 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3611 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3612 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3614 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3615 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3617 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3618 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3622 }, match events[1] {
3623 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3624 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3625 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3626 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3627 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3628 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3629 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3630 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3632 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3638 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3639 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3641 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3642 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3644 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3645 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3648 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3654 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3655 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3657 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3658 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3660 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3661 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3670 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3671 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3673 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3674 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3681 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3682 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3683 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3684 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3686 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3690 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3691 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3693 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3694 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3695 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3697 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3698 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3700 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3702 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3703 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3704 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3705 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3706 added_monitors.clear();
3708 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3711 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3713 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3714 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3715 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3716 added_monitors.clear();
3719 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3721 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3722 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3723 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3724 added_monitors.clear();
3727 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3728 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3730 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3731 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3732 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3734 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3740 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3741 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3742 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3746 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3747 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3748 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3749 ((match events_6[0] {
3750 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3751 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3752 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3755 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3756 }, match events_6[1] {
3757 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3758 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3765 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3766 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3767 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3771 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3772 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3773 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3774 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3776 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3777 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3778 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3779 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3785 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3786 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3787 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3788 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3789 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3790 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3793 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3796 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3798 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3801 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3802 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3805 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3806 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3808 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3809 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3810 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3812 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3815 macro_rules! check_spends {
3816 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3818 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3819 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3820 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3821 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3826 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3827 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3829 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3830 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3831 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3832 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3833 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3836 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3837 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3839 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3840 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3850 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3851 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3852 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3855 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3856 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3858 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3859 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3860 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3861 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3862 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3868 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3869 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3872 Some(match events_1[1] {
3873 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3874 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3877 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3881 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3882 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3883 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3884 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3885 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3886 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3887 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3889 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3890 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3891 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3892 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3893 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3894 (as_update, bs_update)
3896 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3898 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3899 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3900 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3901 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3903 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3904 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3905 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3906 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3907 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3908 (as_update, bs_update)
3910 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3911 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3913 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3918 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3919 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3922 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3923 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3924 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3925 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3926 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3927 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3930 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3932 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3933 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3937 fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent {
3938 let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3939 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3940 SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap())
3944 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3945 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3947 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3948 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3949 added_monitors.clear();
3954 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3955 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3957 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3958 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3959 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3960 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3961 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3964 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3966 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3967 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3968 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3969 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3970 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3971 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3972 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3973 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3974 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3975 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3977 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3978 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3982 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3984 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3985 if $fail_backwards {
3986 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3987 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3989 (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack)
3992 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3994 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3995 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3996 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3997 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3998 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3999 assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none());
4003 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
4005 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
4006 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
4008 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4009 if $fail_backwards {
4010 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
4011 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
4013 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4015 added_monitors.clear();
4020 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
4022 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
4025 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
4027 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
4028 if $fail_backwards {
4029 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4030 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
4031 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
4032 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4033 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4035 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4041 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
4044 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]);
4045 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
4046 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
4047 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
4048 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
4049 sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]);
4050 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
4055 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4056 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4058 let mut payment_event = {
4059 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4060 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
4062 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4063 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4064 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4066 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
4068 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
4069 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4071 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4072 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
4073 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4075 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4076 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4078 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4082 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4083 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4085 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4086 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4087 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4089 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4090 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4091 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
4093 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4096 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4097 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4098 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
4099 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4100 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4106 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
4109 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4110 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4111 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4113 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4114 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4115 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
4118 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4121 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4122 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4123 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4124 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4125 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4126 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4127 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4128 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4136 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4137 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4139 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4140 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4141 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4142 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4146 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4147 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4149 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4150 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4151 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4152 get_next_msgs!($node)
4154 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4157 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4158 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4163 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4164 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4165 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4166 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4167 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4168 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4169 } else if update_next_msgs {
4170 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4172 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4174 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4175 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4182 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4183 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4184 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4186 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4187 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4194 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4195 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4198 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4200 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4201 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4202 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4203 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4204 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4207 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4210 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4211 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4212 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4213 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4214 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4217 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4219 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4221 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4222 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4226 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4227 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4228 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4231 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4232 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4233 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4235 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4236 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4237 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4239 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4240 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4245 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4246 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4247 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4248 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4249 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4250 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4251 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4252 // second-to-last node!
4253 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4256 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4257 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4258 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4260 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4261 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4262 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4263 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4264 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4265 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4266 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4267 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4272 assert!(events.is_empty());
4274 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4275 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4282 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4284 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4285 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4287 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4288 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4289 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4291 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4296 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4297 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4300 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4301 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4302 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4303 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4305 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4306 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4308 for i in 0..node_count {
4309 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
4310 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4311 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4312 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4313 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4314 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4315 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4316 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4317 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4318 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4319 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4320 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4321 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4322 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4323 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4324 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4332 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4333 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4334 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4335 let channel_id = chan.2;
4338 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4342 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4343 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4344 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4345 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4346 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4347 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4348 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4349 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4350 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4351 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4353 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4355 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4357 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4358 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4361 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4362 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4363 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4364 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4365 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4370 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4372 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4373 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4374 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4377 let payment_event = {
4378 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4379 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4380 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4382 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4383 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4385 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4386 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4387 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4388 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4389 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4392 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4393 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4394 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4395 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4398 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4399 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4400 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4401 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4402 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4403 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4404 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4407 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4408 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4409 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4410 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4411 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4412 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4413 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4416 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4417 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4418 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4421 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4422 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4425 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4428 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4429 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4431 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4432 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4435 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4440 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4441 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4442 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4443 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4444 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4445 let channel_id = chan.2;
4448 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4450 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4451 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4454 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4455 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4456 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4457 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4460 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4463 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4465 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4466 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4467 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4470 let payment_event = {
4471 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4472 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4473 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4475 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4476 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4478 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4479 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4480 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4481 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4482 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4485 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4488 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4492 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4493 let nodes = create_network(2);
4494 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4495 let channel_id = chan.2;
4498 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4499 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4500 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4501 // (3) update_fee ->
4502 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4503 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4504 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4505 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4506 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4507 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4508 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4509 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4510 // revoke_and_ack ->
4511 // B should send no response here
4512 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4513 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4514 // revoke_and_ack ->
4516 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4517 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4518 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4521 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4522 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4523 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4524 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4525 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4527 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4530 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4531 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4532 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4533 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4536 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4538 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4539 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4540 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4542 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4543 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4544 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4545 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4548 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4550 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4552 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4554 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4555 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4556 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4558 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4559 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4560 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4561 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4562 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4563 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4564 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4566 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4567 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4568 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4570 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4572 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4573 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4577 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4578 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4581 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4582 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4585 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4586 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4587 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4590 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4591 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4596 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4597 let nodes = create_network(2);
4598 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4599 let channel_id = chan.2;
4601 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4602 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4605 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4606 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4607 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4608 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4609 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4613 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4615 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4616 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4619 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4620 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4623 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4624 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4625 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4628 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4629 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4634 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4635 let nodes = create_network(2);
4636 let channel_value = 1888;
4637 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4638 let channel_id = chan.2;
4641 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4643 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4645 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4647 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4649 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4650 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4652 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4653 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4655 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4656 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4657 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4658 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4659 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4660 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4663 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4664 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4665 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4668 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4670 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4672 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4673 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4674 //Should produce and error.
4675 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4677 assert!(match err.err {
4678 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4682 //clear the message we could not handle
4683 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4687 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4688 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4689 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4690 let channel_id = chan.2;
4693 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4695 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4696 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4699 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4700 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4701 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4702 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4703 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4705 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4707 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4708 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4709 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4712 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4714 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4716 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4717 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4719 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4720 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4721 added_monitors.clear();
4723 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4724 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4725 // node[1] has nothing to do
4727 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4728 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4731 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4732 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4733 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4735 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4737 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4739 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4740 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4741 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4742 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4743 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4744 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4746 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4747 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4749 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4751 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4753 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4755 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4757 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4758 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4760 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4762 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4764 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4765 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4767 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4770 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4771 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4773 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4774 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4776 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4777 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4780 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4782 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4783 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4784 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4788 fn test_update_fee() {
4789 let nodes = create_network(2);
4790 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4791 let channel_id = chan.2;
4794 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4795 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4796 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4797 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4798 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4799 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4800 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4801 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4802 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4803 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4804 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4805 // revoke_and_ack ->
4807 // Create and deliver (1)...
4808 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4809 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4812 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4813 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4814 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4815 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4816 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4818 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4820 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4822 // Generate (2) and (3):
4823 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4824 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4828 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4829 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4832 // Create and deliver (4)...
4833 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4835 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4836 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4837 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4838 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4839 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4841 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4844 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4845 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4848 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4849 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4851 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4852 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4854 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4855 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4858 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4859 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4862 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4863 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4864 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4865 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4866 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4867 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4868 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4869 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4873 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4875 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4876 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4878 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4880 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4882 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4883 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4884 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4888 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4889 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4890 let nodes = create_network(2);
4891 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4892 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4893 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4894 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4896 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4897 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4898 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4899 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4900 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4902 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4903 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4904 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4905 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4906 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4907 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4909 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4910 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4914 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4915 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4916 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4917 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4918 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4919 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4920 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4922 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4924 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4925 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4926 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4927 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4928 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4930 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4931 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4933 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4934 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4935 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4936 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4937 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4939 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4941 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4942 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4943 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4944 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4945 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4946 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4947 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4949 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4950 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4952 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4953 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4954 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4955 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4956 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4957 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4958 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4960 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4961 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4963 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4964 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4969 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4970 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4971 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4972 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4973 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4974 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4976 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4978 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4979 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4980 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4981 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4982 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4986 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4987 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4988 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4989 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4990 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4992 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4993 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4994 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4996 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4997 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4998 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4999 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5000 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5001 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5003 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5004 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5005 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5006 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5008 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5009 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5011 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5012 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
5014 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5015 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5016 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5017 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5018 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5019 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5021 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5022 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5024 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5025 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5027 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
5028 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5029 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5031 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5034 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5035 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5036 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5037 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5038 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5039 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5040 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5042 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5044 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5045 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5046 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5047 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5048 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5051 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
5052 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
5053 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
5054 let nodes = create_network(3);
5055 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5056 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5058 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
5060 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5061 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5063 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5064 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5066 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5070 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5071 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5073 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5074 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5075 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5076 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5078 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5079 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5080 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5082 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5083 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5084 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5085 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5088 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5089 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5090 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5092 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5094 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5095 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5097 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5099 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5100 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5101 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5102 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5103 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5104 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5105 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5107 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5108 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5110 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5111 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5112 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5113 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5114 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5115 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5116 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5118 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5121 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5122 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5124 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5127 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5129 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5130 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5131 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5134 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5135 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5137 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5138 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5139 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5140 if recv_count == 0 {
5141 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5142 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5144 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5145 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5146 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5148 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5149 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5150 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5152 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5153 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5155 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5156 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5157 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5159 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5160 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5161 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5162 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5163 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5165 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5166 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5167 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5168 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5169 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5170 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5172 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5174 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5175 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5176 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5177 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5178 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5179 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5181 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5182 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5183 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5184 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5185 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5187 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5188 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5190 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5194 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5196 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5197 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5198 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5199 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5200 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5204 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5205 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5206 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5207 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5211 fn fake_network_test() {
5212 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5213 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5214 let nodes = create_network(4);
5216 // Create some initial channels
5217 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5218 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5219 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5221 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5222 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5223 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5224 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5225 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5227 // Send some more payments
5228 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5229 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5230 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5232 // Test failure packets
5233 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5234 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5236 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5237 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5239 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5240 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5241 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5242 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5243 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5244 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5245 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5247 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5248 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5249 hops.push(RouteHop {
5250 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5251 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5253 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5255 hops.push(RouteHop {
5256 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5257 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5259 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5261 hops.push(RouteHop {
5262 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5263 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5265 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5267 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5268 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5269 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5271 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5272 hops.push(RouteHop {
5273 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5274 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5276 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5278 hops.push(RouteHop {
5279 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5280 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5282 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5284 hops.push(RouteHop {
5285 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5286 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5288 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5290 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5291 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5292 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5294 // Claim the rebalances...
5295 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5296 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5298 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5299 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5301 // Send some payments across both channels
5302 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5303 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5304 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5306 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5308 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5310 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5311 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5312 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5314 // Close down the channels...
5315 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5316 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5317 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5318 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5319 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5323 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5324 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5325 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5326 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5328 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5329 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5330 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5331 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5332 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5333 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5335 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5337 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5338 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5340 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5341 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5343 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5344 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5345 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5348 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5349 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5350 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5352 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5353 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5354 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5356 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5357 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5359 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5361 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5362 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5363 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5365 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5366 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5367 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5368 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5369 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5370 res.push(tx.clone());
5375 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5376 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5379 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5381 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5382 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5383 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5384 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5385 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5386 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5388 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5390 res.push(tx.clone());
5394 assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3);
5396 assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]);
5400 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5404 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5405 /// HTLC transaction.
5406 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5407 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5408 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5409 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5410 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5411 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5415 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5418 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5419 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5421 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5422 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5423 let mut found_prev = false;
5425 for tx in prev_txn {
5426 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5427 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5428 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5429 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5435 assert!(found_prev);
5437 let mut res = Vec::new();
5438 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5442 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5443 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5444 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5445 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5446 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5449 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5452 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5453 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5454 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5455 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5458 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5462 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5463 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5467 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5469 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5470 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5472 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5473 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5475 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5476 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5480 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5482 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5483 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5485 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5486 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5487 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5488 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5489 chan.get_value_stat()
5493 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5494 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5495 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5497 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5498 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5500 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5501 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5503 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5504 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5505 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5506 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5507 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5511 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5513 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5514 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5515 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5516 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5521 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5522 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5523 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5524 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5526 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5527 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5528 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5530 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5535 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5536 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5538 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5540 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5542 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5543 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5544 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5546 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5547 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5551 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5552 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5553 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5555 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5556 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5559 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5562 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5563 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5564 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5565 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5566 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5569 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5570 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5571 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5572 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5573 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5577 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5578 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5579 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5580 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5582 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5583 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5587 // adding pending output
5588 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5589 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5591 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5592 let payment_event_1 = {
5593 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5596 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5597 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5598 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5600 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5602 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5603 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5605 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5606 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5607 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5608 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5613 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5614 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5616 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5617 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5618 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5619 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5620 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5622 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5624 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5625 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5626 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5627 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5628 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5629 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5631 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5632 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5633 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5634 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5638 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5640 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5642 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5643 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5644 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5645 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5646 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5647 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5648 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5649 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5651 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5657 // split the rest to test holding cell
5658 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5659 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5661 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5662 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5665 // now see if they go through on both sides
5666 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5667 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5668 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5670 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5671 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5673 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5675 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5676 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5677 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5678 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5682 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5683 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5684 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5686 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5687 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5689 // flush the pending htlc
5690 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5691 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5694 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5696 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5698 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5699 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5700 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5703 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5704 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5707 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5709 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5710 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5711 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5713 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5714 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5716 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5717 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5718 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5719 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5720 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5721 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5723 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5724 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5725 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5726 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5728 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5729 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5731 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5732 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5734 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5735 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5736 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5738 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5741 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5742 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5743 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5748 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5749 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5750 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5752 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5753 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5754 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5755 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5757 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5758 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5762 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5763 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5764 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5768 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5769 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5770 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5771 let nodes = create_network(5);
5773 // Create some initial channels
5774 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5775 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5776 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5777 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5779 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5780 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5781 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5782 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5783 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5785 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5786 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5788 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5789 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5790 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5791 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5793 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5794 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5795 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5797 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5798 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5800 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5801 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5803 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5804 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5805 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5806 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5808 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5809 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5810 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5812 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5813 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5815 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5816 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5818 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5819 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5821 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5822 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5823 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5824 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5832 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5833 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5834 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5836 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5838 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5839 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5841 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5842 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5844 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5846 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5847 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5848 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5850 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5851 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5852 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5855 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5856 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5857 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5858 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5859 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5863 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5864 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5865 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5866 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5867 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5870 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5872 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5873 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5875 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5876 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5877 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5878 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5879 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5882 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5884 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5885 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5887 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5889 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5890 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5891 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5895 fn test_justice_tx() {
5896 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5898 let nodes = create_network(2);
5899 // Create some new channels:
5900 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5902 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5903 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5904 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5905 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5906 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5907 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5908 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5909 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5910 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5911 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5912 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
5913 // Revoke the old state
5914 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5917 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5918 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5920 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5921 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5922 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5923 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5925 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5926 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5928 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5930 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5931 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5932 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5933 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5934 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5936 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5938 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5939 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5941 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5942 // Create some new channels:
5943 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5945 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5946 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5947 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5948 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5949 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5950 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5951 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5952 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5953 // Revoke the old state
5954 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5956 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5957 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5959 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5960 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5961 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5962 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5964 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5965 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5967 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5969 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5970 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5971 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5972 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5973 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5975 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5976 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5977 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5981 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5982 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5983 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5984 let nodes = create_network(2);
5985 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5986 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5987 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5988 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5989 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5990 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5991 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5992 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5994 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5995 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5996 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5997 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5998 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
6000 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6002 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6003 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6005 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
6006 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6007 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6011 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
6012 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
6013 let nodes = create_network(2);
6015 // Create some new channel:
6016 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6018 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6019 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6020 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
6021 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6022 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6024 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6025 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6026 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
6027 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6028 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6029 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6030 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
6031 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
6032 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6034 //Revoke the old state
6035 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6038 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6039 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6040 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6042 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6043 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6045 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6046 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6048 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6051 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6052 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6054 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
6055 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6057 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
6059 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6060 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6061 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6062 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6063 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6064 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6065 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6066 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6068 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
6069 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6070 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
6072 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6073 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
6074 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6075 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
6076 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6077 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
6079 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6080 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6081 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6085 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
6086 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
6087 let nodes = create_network(2);
6089 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6091 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6092 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6093 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6094 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6095 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6096 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6098 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6099 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6101 //Revoke the old state
6102 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6105 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6106 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6107 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6109 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6110 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6112 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6113 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6115 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6118 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6119 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6121 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6122 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6123 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6124 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6125 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6126 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6127 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6129 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6130 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6131 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6133 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6134 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6135 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6136 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6137 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6139 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6140 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6141 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6142 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6143 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6144 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6145 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6146 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6148 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6149 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6151 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6152 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6153 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6154 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6155 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6156 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6158 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6159 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6160 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6164 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
6165 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6166 // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6167 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6168 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
6169 // First, C should claim the HTLC output via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
6170 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
6171 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
6173 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
6174 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
6175 // the HTLC output via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
6176 // PaymentSent event).
6178 let nodes = create_network(3);
6180 // Create some initial channels
6181 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6182 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6184 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
6185 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6186 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6188 let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6189 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6191 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6192 // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
6193 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6194 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
6195 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6196 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6198 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6199 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6200 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6201 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6202 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6204 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6205 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6206 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6208 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6211 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
6212 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6213 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
6214 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6215 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6216 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6217 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6218 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6220 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
6221 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
6222 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6224 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6225 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6226 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6227 added_monitors.clear();
6229 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6231 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6235 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6236 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6237 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6238 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6239 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6240 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6245 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
6246 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transaction, as well as a
6247 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
6248 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6249 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6250 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6251 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6252 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6253 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6254 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6255 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6256 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6257 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6258 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6259 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6260 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6264 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
6265 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
6266 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6267 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6268 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6269 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6270 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6272 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6275 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan)
6276 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6277 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6278 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6279 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6280 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6281 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6282 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6283 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6284 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
6285 // we already checked the same situation with A.
6287 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
6288 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6289 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6290 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6292 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6295 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6296 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6298 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6299 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
6301 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6303 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6304 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6305 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6306 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6307 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6308 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6309 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6310 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6311 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6312 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6313 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6314 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6315 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6319 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
6320 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6321 // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6322 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6323 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
6324 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
6326 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
6328 let nodes = create_network(3);
6330 // Create some intial channels
6331 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6332 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6334 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
6335 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6336 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6338 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6339 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6341 // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6342 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6343 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6344 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown);
6346 let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6347 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6348 added_monitors.clear();
6350 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6351 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6353 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6354 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6355 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6356 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6357 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6358 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6360 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6362 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6363 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6364 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6366 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6369 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
6370 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6371 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6372 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6374 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain
6375 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
6376 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6379 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6380 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6381 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
6382 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
6383 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]);
6384 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6385 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6386 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6387 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6388 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6389 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6390 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone());
6391 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone());
6392 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6393 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6394 timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
6398 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
6399 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6401 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6403 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6404 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6407 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6408 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6409 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6410 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6411 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6412 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6414 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6416 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated
6417 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
6419 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
6420 let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6421 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6423 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6424 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6425 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6427 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6428 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6430 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan
6431 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6432 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6433 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6434 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6435 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6436 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6437 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6438 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6442 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
6443 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
6444 // and fail backward accordingly.
6446 let nodes = create_network(3);
6448 // Create some initial channels
6449 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6450 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6452 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6453 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6454 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6455 // Revoke the old state
6456 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6458 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6460 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6461 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6462 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6464 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6466 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6467 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6470 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6471 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6472 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6473 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6474 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6475 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6477 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6478 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6480 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6481 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6483 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6484 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6486 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6487 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6489 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
6490 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6493 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6497 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool) {
6498 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
6499 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
6500 // commitment transaction anymore.
6501 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
6502 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
6503 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
6504 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
6505 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
6506 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
6508 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
6509 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
6510 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
6511 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
6512 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
6513 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6515 // Create some initial channels
6516 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6517 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6519 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6520 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6521 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6522 // Revoke the old state
6523 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6525 let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6526 let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6527 let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6529 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6531 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6532 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6533 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6534 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6535 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6536 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6537 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6538 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
6539 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
6541 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6543 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6544 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6545 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6546 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6547 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6548 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6549 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6550 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6552 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6553 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6554 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6557 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6559 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6560 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6561 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6562 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6563 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6564 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6565 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6566 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
6567 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
6568 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6570 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6571 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6572 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6575 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
6576 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
6577 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6578 let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6579 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap();
6580 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6581 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6585 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
6586 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, one as we generate a commitment for
6587 // nodes[0] to fail first_payment_hash backwards.
6588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6591 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
6592 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6594 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6595 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6597 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6598 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6600 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6601 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
6603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6606 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6607 // If we delivered the RAA already then we already failed first_payment_hash backwards.
6608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6611 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6612 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
6613 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 0 }] {
6614 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6615 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6619 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6620 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6621 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6622 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6623 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6624 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6626 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6629 // Due to the way backwards-failing occurs we do the updates in two steps.
6630 let updates = match events[1] {
6631 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6632 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6633 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6634 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6635 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6636 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6638 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6639 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6641 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6642 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6644 let bs_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6645 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6647 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6648 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6651 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6652 // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
6653 // that we should update our routing table for.
6654 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6655 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6657 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6658 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6661 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6662 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6664 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6665 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6675 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6676 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
6677 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6678 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6679 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6680 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
6681 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6683 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6684 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6685 for event in events {
6687 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6688 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6692 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6693 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6695 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6696 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6698 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6701 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6702 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6704 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6707 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
6708 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
6709 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
6713 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() {
6714 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false);
6715 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true);
6719 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6720 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6721 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6722 let nodes = create_network(2);
6723 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6725 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6726 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6728 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6729 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6731 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6732 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6734 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6738 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6739 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6741 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6742 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6745 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6746 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6748 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6749 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6755 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6756 // registering new transactions
6757 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6761 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6762 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6763 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6764 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6765 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6767 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6769 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6771 let mut payment_event = {
6772 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6775 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6776 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6777 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6780 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6781 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6783 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6784 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6786 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6790 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6791 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6793 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6794 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6795 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6796 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6799 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6800 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6802 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6804 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6805 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6806 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6808 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6809 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6810 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6812 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6813 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6815 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6819 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6820 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6821 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6822 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6823 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6827 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6828 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6830 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6831 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6832 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6834 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6835 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6837 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6840 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6842 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6843 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6844 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6846 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6847 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6848 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6849 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6850 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6851 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6852 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6854 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6858 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6859 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6860 let nodes = create_network(2);
6861 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6863 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6864 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6865 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6866 mem::drop(channel_state);
6868 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6869 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6870 headers.push(header.clone());
6872 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6873 headers.push(header.clone());
6875 while !headers.is_empty() {
6876 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6879 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6880 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6882 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6883 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6888 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6889 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6890 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6893 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6894 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6896 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6897 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6898 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6899 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6900 res.push(msg.clone());
6902 panic!("Unexpected event")
6910 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6911 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6913 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6915 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6917 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6923 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6924 let mut commitment_update = None;
6925 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6928 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6929 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6930 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6931 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6933 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6934 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6935 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6936 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6941 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6944 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6946 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6947 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6948 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6949 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6951 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6952 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6953 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6954 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6956 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6960 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6965 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6966 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6967 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6968 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6969 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6970 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6971 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6973 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6974 // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6976 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6977 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6980 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6981 // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6983 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6984 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6987 if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 {
6988 // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set
6989 // next_local_commitment_number to 1
6990 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6991 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6993 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6994 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6998 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6999 for msg in reestablish_1 {
7000 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
7001 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
7003 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
7004 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7006 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
7009 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
7010 for msg in reestablish_2 {
7011 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
7012 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
7014 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7015 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7017 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
7020 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
7021 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
7022 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
7024 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
7025 if send_funding_locked.0 {
7026 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7027 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7028 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7029 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7030 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7031 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7032 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7035 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7038 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7039 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7040 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7041 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7043 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7045 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
7046 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7047 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7048 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
7050 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7052 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7053 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7054 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7055 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7056 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7058 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7059 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7061 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7062 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7065 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7066 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7068 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7069 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7070 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
7071 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7072 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7073 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7074 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7077 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7081 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
7082 if send_funding_locked.1 {
7083 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7084 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7085 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7086 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7087 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7088 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7089 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7092 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7095 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7096 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7097 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7098 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7100 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7102 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7103 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7104 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7105 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
7107 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7108 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7109 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7110 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7111 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7113 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7114 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7116 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7117 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7120 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7121 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7123 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7124 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7125 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
7126 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7127 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7128 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7129 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7132 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7138 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
7139 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
7140 let nodes = create_network(3);
7141 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7142 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
7144 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7145 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7146 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7148 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7149 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7150 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
7151 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
7153 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7154 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7155 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7157 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7158 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7159 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7160 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7162 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7163 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7165 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
7166 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
7168 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
7170 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7171 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7173 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
7174 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
7176 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7179 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
7180 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
7181 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
7183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7187 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
7188 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
7191 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
7192 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
7193 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7194 if messages_delivered == 0 {
7195 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7196 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
7198 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7201 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7202 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7204 let payment_event = {
7205 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
7206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7208 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7209 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7210 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7212 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
7214 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7215 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
7217 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7218 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7219 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7221 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7223 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7224 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7225 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7228 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7229 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7230 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7231 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7234 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
7235 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7236 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7244 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7245 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7246 if messages_delivered < 3 {
7247 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
7248 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
7249 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7250 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7251 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7252 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7253 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7254 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7255 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7256 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7257 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7258 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7259 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
7260 // Everything was delivered...
7261 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7264 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7265 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7267 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7268 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7271 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7272 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7273 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7275 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7276 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7278 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7279 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7281 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7282 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7283 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7285 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7288 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
7289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7291 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7292 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7293 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
7294 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
7295 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7296 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7297 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7298 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7299 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7300 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7301 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
7303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7306 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
7307 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
7309 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7310 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7312 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7313 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7315 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7318 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
7319 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
7320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7321 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7323 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7324 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7325 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7328 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7329 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7330 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7331 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7334 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7335 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7336 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7344 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7345 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7346 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7347 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7348 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
7349 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
7350 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7351 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7353 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7354 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7356 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7359 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
7360 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7361 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7362 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7363 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7364 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7365 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7366 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7367 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7368 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7369 // Everything was delivered...
7370 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7373 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7374 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7375 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7377 // Channel should still work fine...
7378 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
7379 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7383 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
7384 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
7385 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
7386 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
7387 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
7391 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
7392 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
7393 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
7394 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
7398 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
7399 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
7400 let nodes = create_network(2);
7401 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7403 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7404 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7406 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7407 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7408 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7410 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7411 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7413 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7416 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7418 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7419 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7421 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7422 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7423 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
7425 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7426 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7428 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7431 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7432 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7437 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7439 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
7440 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
7442 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7443 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7444 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
7448 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
7449 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
7450 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
7451 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7452 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7454 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7456 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7457 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7458 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7460 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
7461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7463 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7464 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7466 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7467 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7470 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7473 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7474 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7476 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7477 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7478 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7479 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7480 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7481 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7482 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7484 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7485 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7486 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7488 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7489 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7491 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7494 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
7495 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7496 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7499 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7502 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7503 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7505 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7506 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7507 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7508 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7509 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7510 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7512 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7513 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7514 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7515 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7517 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7518 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7520 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7521 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7523 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7525 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7526 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7527 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7528 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7529 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7530 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7531 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7532 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7533 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7536 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
7537 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7538 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7539 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7540 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7541 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7542 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7545 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7546 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7547 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7548 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7549 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7550 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7551 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7554 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7555 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7556 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7559 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7560 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7561 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7564 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7565 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7568 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7569 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7571 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7572 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7575 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7576 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7578 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7579 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7581 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
7582 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7584 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7587 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7588 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7591 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7595 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
7596 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
7597 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7598 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7600 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7601 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7603 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7604 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7607 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7608 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
7610 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7614 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
7615 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7618 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7619 // PaymentFailed event
7621 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7624 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
7625 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
7626 // a disconnect in between
7627 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7628 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7630 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7631 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7633 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7634 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7637 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7638 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7639 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7642 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7643 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7644 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7647 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7648 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7651 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7652 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7653 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
7654 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7655 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7656 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7658 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7660 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7661 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7663 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7664 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7665 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7670 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7672 // Now set it to failed again...
7673 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7674 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7675 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7678 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7679 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7680 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7683 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7684 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7685 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7688 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7689 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7690 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7693 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7694 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7696 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7697 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7700 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7701 // PaymentFailed event
7703 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7707 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7708 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7709 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7712 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7713 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7715 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7716 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7717 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7718 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7719 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7720 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7721 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7722 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7723 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7724 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7725 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7726 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7727 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7728 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7729 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7730 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7731 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7732 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7733 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7735 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7737 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7738 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7739 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7741 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7742 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7745 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7746 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7747 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7749 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7750 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7751 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7753 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7754 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7755 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7756 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7757 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7758 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7759 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7760 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7761 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7762 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7764 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7765 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7766 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7767 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7769 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7770 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7775 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7776 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7777 } else { panic!(); }
7780 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7785 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7786 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7787 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7790 // Now fix monitor updating...
7791 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7792 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7795 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7796 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7797 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7799 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7800 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7801 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7802 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7803 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7804 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7806 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7807 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7808 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7809 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7811 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7812 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7814 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7817 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7818 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7819 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7821 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7822 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7823 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7824 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7825 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7826 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7828 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7830 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7831 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7833 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7835 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7836 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7838 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7839 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7840 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7842 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7843 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7844 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7846 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7847 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7848 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7849 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7850 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7851 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7853 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7855 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7856 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7857 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7859 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7860 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7862 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7865 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7866 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7867 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7870 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7874 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7875 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7877 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7878 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7879 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7881 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7882 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7885 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7887 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7888 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7889 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7890 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7891 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7898 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7900 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7901 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7902 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7903 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7906 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7907 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7909 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7910 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7912 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7913 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7916 let as_commitment_update;
7917 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7919 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7920 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7921 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7922 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7923 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7924 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7925 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7926 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7930 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7931 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7932 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7933 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7934 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7935 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7936 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7937 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7941 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7944 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7945 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7947 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7948 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7950 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7951 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7953 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7956 handle_initial_raa!();
7958 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7959 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7961 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7962 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7964 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7965 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7968 handle_initial_raa!();
7970 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7971 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7973 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7974 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7976 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7977 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7979 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7984 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7985 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7987 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7988 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7990 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7991 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7995 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7996 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7997 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8000 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8001 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8002 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
8003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8005 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8006 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8009 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8010 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8013 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8015 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8016 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8018 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
8019 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
8020 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8025 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
8029 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
8030 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
8031 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
8032 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
8033 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
8034 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
8035 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
8039 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
8040 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
8041 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
8042 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
8043 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
8047 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
8048 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
8049 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
8050 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
8051 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
8052 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
8056 fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() {
8057 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed
8058 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8059 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8061 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8062 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8063 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8066 let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8067 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8069 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8070 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
8071 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8072 } else { panic!(); }
8073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8074 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8076 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8077 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8079 let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8080 assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2);
8082 match responses[0] {
8083 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => {
8084 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8085 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
8086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8088 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8090 match responses[1] {
8091 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => {
8092 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8093 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8094 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8095 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8096 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8097 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8099 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8100 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
8101 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8102 } else { panic!(); }
8103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8104 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8106 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8109 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8110 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8113 let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8114 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap();
8115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8117 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8118 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8120 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8121 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8123 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8124 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8126 events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8127 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8129 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => {
8130 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
8131 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8133 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8136 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
8139 fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) {
8140 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
8141 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8142 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8143 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8145 // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
8146 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
8148 // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards
8149 let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8151 // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
8152 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
8153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8155 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8156 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8157 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8158 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8159 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8160 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8161 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8163 let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
8164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8166 // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the
8168 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8169 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8170 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
8171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8173 let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8174 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8175 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8177 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8178 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
8180 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8184 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8185 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8187 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8189 // Now fail monitor updating.
8190 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8191 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() {
8192 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8193 } else { panic!(); }
8194 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8195 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8198 // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable
8201 let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8202 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8203 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
8204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8206 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
8207 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8208 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8209 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
8210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8212 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8213 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8214 match events_2.remove(0) {
8215 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8216 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8217 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8218 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8219 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8220 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8221 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8223 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8224 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8226 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8227 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8228 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } = events[0] {
8229 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
8230 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
8231 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8236 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8237 // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding
8238 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8239 let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8240 nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
8241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8243 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8244 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8245 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) {
8246 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
8247 } else { panic!(); }
8248 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8249 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8250 (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4))
8251 } else { (None, None) };
8253 // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
8254 // update_add update.
8255 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8256 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8259 let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8260 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8261 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3);
8263 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
8266 // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the
8267 // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order.
8268 let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() {
8269 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => {
8270 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8271 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8272 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8273 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8274 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8275 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8276 (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed)
8278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8280 let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8281 match events_3.remove(1) {
8282 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => {
8283 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8289 let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0));
8290 assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8292 // Now deliver the new messages...
8294 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap();
8295 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
8296 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8297 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
8298 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } = events_4[0] {
8299 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
8300 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
8301 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8303 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8304 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8305 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap();
8306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8307 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8308 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap();
8309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8310 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8311 assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8312 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8313 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8314 assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8315 assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8317 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8319 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8320 assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8321 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8322 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8323 assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8324 assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8326 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8328 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8330 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8332 let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8334 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
8335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8336 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8338 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
8339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8340 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8342 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false);
8345 let events_5 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8346 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8348 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8349 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8352 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8353 nodes[2].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8355 let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8356 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
8358 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); },
8359 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8362 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8363 let events_7 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8364 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
8366 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8370 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8371 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8374 send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
8375 assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8376 assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8377 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8378 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8380 let events_8 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8381 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
8383 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8384 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8387 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8388 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8390 let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8391 assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1);
8393 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()),
8394 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8396 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap());
8399 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
8403 fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() {
8404 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false);
8405 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true);
8409 fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() {
8410 // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on
8411 // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell
8413 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8414 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8415 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8417 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8419 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8420 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8422 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
8423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8424 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8425 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8426 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8427 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8428 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8429 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8430 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8432 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8433 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8435 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8436 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8437 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8439 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8440 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8442 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8444 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() {
8445 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8446 } else { panic!(); }
8447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8449 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8450 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8452 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8453 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8455 assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8456 assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8458 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8460 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap();
8461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8462 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8464 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8465 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8468 updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8469 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8470 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8471 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8472 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8473 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8474 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8475 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8477 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8478 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8480 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage),
8481 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8486 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
8487 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
8488 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8489 let nodes = create_network(2);
8491 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8493 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8494 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8495 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8496 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8498 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8500 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8501 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8503 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8504 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8506 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
8508 let mut chan_announcement;
8510 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
8512 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
8513 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
8514 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
8515 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
8516 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
8517 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
8518 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
8519 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
8520 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8525 macro_rules! sign_msg {
8526 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
8527 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
8528 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8529 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8530 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
8531 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
8532 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
8533 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
8534 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
8535 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
8536 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
8537 contents: $unsigned_msg
8542 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8543 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8544 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
8545 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8547 // Configured with Network::Testnet
8548 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8549 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
8550 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8551 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8553 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8554 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
8555 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8556 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8559 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
8560 impl Writer for VecWriter {
8561 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
8562 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
8565 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
8566 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
8571 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8572 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8574 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
8576 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8578 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8579 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8580 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8582 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8583 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8584 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8585 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8587 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8588 let config = UserConfig::new();
8589 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8590 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8591 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8592 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8593 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8594 default_config: config,
8596 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8597 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8598 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8599 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8600 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8601 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8604 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8606 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8607 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8608 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
8609 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
8610 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
8611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8613 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8614 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
8615 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8616 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
8618 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
8619 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8620 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
8621 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8623 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8624 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8625 for node in nodes.iter() {
8626 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
8627 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
8628 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
8631 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8635 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8636 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8637 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8639 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8640 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8642 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8644 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8645 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8646 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8648 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8649 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8650 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8651 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8653 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8654 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8655 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8656 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8657 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8658 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8659 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8661 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8662 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8663 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8664 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8665 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8666 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8669 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8671 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8672 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8675 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8677 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
8678 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8682 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
8683 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
8684 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
8685 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8686 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
8687 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
8689 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
8691 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
8692 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8694 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
8695 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8696 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8697 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8699 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
8701 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
8702 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
8703 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8704 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
8705 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
8708 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8709 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
8710 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
8711 let mut read = &serialized[..];
8712 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8713 assert!(read.is_empty());
8714 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
8717 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8718 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8719 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8720 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8722 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8723 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8724 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8725 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8726 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8727 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
8729 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8731 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
8732 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8733 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8734 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
8735 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
8738 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
8739 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
8740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8742 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8744 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
8745 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8746 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8747 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
8748 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8750 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8751 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8752 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
8753 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
8754 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8755 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
8758 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
8759 ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
8761 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8762 let mut txn = Vec::new();
8763 for event in events {
8765 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
8766 for outp in outputs {
8768 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
8770 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8771 script_sig: Script::new(),
8773 witness: Vec::new(),
8776 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8777 value: output.value,
8779 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8785 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8786 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
8787 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8788 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8789 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8790 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8791 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8792 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8795 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
8797 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8798 script_sig: Script::new(),
8799 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
8800 witness: Vec::new(),
8803 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8804 value: output.value,
8806 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8812 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8813 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8814 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8815 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8816 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8817 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
8818 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
8821 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
8822 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8824 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8825 script_sig: Script::new(),
8827 witness: Vec::new(),
8830 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8831 value: output.value,
8833 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8837 output: vec![outp.clone()],
8840 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
8842 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
8844 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
8847 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
8850 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
8851 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8852 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8853 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
8854 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8855 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8856 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8862 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8871 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
8872 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
8873 let nodes = create_network(2);
8875 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8876 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8877 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8879 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8880 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8882 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8883 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8884 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8885 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8887 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8888 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8889 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8890 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8891 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8895 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
8896 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8897 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8899 let nodes = create_network(2);
8901 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8902 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8903 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8905 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8906 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8908 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8909 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8910 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8911 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8913 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8914 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8915 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8917 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8918 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8920 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8921 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8922 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8923 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8927 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
8928 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8929 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8931 let nodes = create_network(2);
8933 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
8934 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8935 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8936 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8937 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8939 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8940 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8941 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8942 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8944 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8947 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8948 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8949 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8950 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
8951 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8952 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
8953 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8957 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
8958 let nodes = create_network(2);
8960 // Create some initial channels
8961 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8963 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8965 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8966 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
8967 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8969 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
8970 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8971 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8973 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
8974 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8976 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8980 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8981 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8984 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
8985 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
8986 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
8987 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
8988 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8989 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
8991 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
8992 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8993 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8994 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8998 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
8999 let nodes = create_network(2);
9001 // Create some initial channels
9002 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9004 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9005 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9006 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9007 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9009 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9011 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9012 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9013 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9015 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9016 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9018 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9019 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
9020 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
9021 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
9022 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9024 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9025 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9026 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9027 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9031 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9032 let nodes = create_network(2);
9034 // Create some initial channels
9035 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9037 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9038 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9039 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9040 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9042 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9044 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9045 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
9046 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9047 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9049 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9050 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9052 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9053 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9054 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9055 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9056 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9057 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9058 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
9060 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9061 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9062 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9064 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9065 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9068 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9069 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9070 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9071 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9073 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9074 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9075 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
9076 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9077 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9078 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
9082 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
9083 let nodes = create_network(2);
9085 // Create some initial channels
9086 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9088 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9089 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9090 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9091 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9093 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9095 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9096 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
9097 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9098 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9100 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9101 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9103 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9105 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9106 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9107 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9108 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9109 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9111 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9112 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9113 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9115 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9116 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9119 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9120 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9121 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9122 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9124 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9125 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9126 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
9127 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9128 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9129 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
9130 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
9131 check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
9135 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
9136 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
9137 // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
9138 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
9139 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
9141 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
9144 let nodes = create_network(3);
9146 // Create some initial channels
9147 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9148 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9150 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
9151 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9152 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9154 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
9155 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9156 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9157 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9158 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9160 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9161 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9162 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9163 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9164 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9166 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9167 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9168 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9170 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9171 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9174 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
9175 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
9176 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
9177 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
9178 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
9179 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
9180 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
9181 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9182 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9183 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9185 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
9186 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
9188 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9189 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
9190 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
9191 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9192 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9193 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9194 assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9195 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9196 check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9197 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9198 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9199 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9202 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9204 match msg_events[0] {
9205 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9208 match msg_events[1] {
9209 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
9210 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9211 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9212 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9213 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9214 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
9216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9218 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
9219 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9220 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9221 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9222 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
9223 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9224 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9225 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
9226 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9227 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9228 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9229 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9230 match msg_events[0] {
9231 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9237 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
9238 // Topology : A --> B --> C
9239 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
9240 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
9242 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9243 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9245 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
9246 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
9247 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
9249 let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9250 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9251 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9253 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9254 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9255 let htlc_timeout_tx;
9256 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
9257 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9258 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
9259 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
9260 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
9261 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9262 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9263 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9264 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9265 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
9266 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9267 check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
9268 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
9269 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
9272 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9274 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9275 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9278 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
9279 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
9281 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9283 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9284 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9287 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9288 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9290 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9291 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
9292 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9293 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
9294 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9295 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9296 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
9297 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9298 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9299 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
9300 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9301 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9303 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
9304 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9305 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9306 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9307 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
9308 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9309 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9312 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9313 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9315 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9316 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9317 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9319 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
9321 _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
9324 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9326 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
9327 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
9329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9332 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
9333 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9334 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9335 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9336 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9337 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9338 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
9339 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9342 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9343 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
9345 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9347 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
9348 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
9350 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9355 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
9356 let nodes = create_network(2);
9358 // Create some initial channels
9359 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9361 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9362 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9363 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9364 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9366 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
9367 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9369 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9370 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9371 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9373 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9374 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9377 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9378 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9380 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9381 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9382 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9383 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9385 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9386 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9387 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9388 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9389 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
9393 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9394 let nodes = create_network(2);
9396 // Create some initial channels
9397 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9399 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9400 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9401 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9402 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9404 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9405 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9406 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9407 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9409 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9410 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9412 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9413 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9414 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9415 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9417 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9418 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9419 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
9420 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9421 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
9422 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
9423 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9424 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
9425 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
9426 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9427 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
9431 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
9432 let nodes = create_network(2);
9434 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9436 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
9437 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
9439 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9440 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9441 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
9442 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9443 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
9445 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9446 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
9447 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9448 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);