1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
7 use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256;
9 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
10 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
11 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
14 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
15 use ln::channel::Channel;
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::Route;
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
23 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
24 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
25 use crypto::digest::Digest;
26 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
27 use crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
29 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
30 use std::collections::HashMap;
31 use std::collections::hash_map;
33 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
35 mod channel_held_info {
38 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
39 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
40 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
41 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
42 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
43 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
44 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
45 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
48 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
49 impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
50 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
53 payment_hash: [0; 32],
55 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
57 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
62 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
63 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
65 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
73 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
75 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
76 HTLCFailReason::Reason {
77 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
82 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
83 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
84 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
85 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
87 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
89 source_short_channel_id: u64,
90 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
95 /// Used for channel rebalancing
97 source_short_channel_id: u64,
98 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
103 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
104 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
105 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
106 /// probably increase this significantly.
107 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
109 struct ChannelHolder {
110 by_id: HashMap<Uint256, Channel>,
111 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, Uint256>,
112 next_forward: Instant,
113 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
114 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
115 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
117 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
118 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<Uint256, Channel>,
119 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Uint256>,
120 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
121 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
122 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
123 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
126 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
128 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
129 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
130 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
131 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
132 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
133 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
138 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
139 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
140 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
141 /// to individual Channels.
142 pub struct ChannelManager {
143 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
144 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
145 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
146 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
147 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
149 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
150 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
153 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
154 our_network_key: SecretKey,
156 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
159 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
161 macro_rules! secp_call {
165 //TODO: Make the err a parameter!
166 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", msg: None})
173 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
175 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
176 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
181 pub struct ChannelDetails {
182 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
183 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
184 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
185 /// lifetime of the channel.
186 pub channel_id: Uint256,
187 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
188 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
189 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
190 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
191 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
192 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
196 impl ChannelManager {
197 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
198 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
199 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
200 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
201 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= (1 << 24)!
202 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
203 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
205 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
206 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
207 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
208 monitor: monitor.clone(),
212 announce_channels_publicly,
213 fee_proportional_millionths,
216 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
217 by_id: HashMap::new(),
218 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
219 next_forward: Instant::now(),
220 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
221 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
225 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
227 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
228 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
232 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, HandleError> {
233 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id);
234 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
235 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
236 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
237 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
242 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
243 /// more information.
244 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
245 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
246 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
247 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
248 res.push(ChannelDetails {
249 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
250 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
251 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
252 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
253 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
259 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
260 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
261 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
262 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &Uint256) -> Result<msgs::Shutdown, HandleError> {
264 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
265 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
266 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
267 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
268 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
269 chan_entry.remove_entry();
273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", msg: None})
276 for payment_hash in res.1 {
277 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
278 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
284 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
286 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
287 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
288 let mut res = [0; 32];
289 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
293 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
294 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
295 let mut res = [0; 32];
296 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
302 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
303 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
304 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
305 let mut res = [0; 32];
306 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
311 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
312 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
313 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
314 let mut res = [0; 32];
315 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
319 fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
320 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
321 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
322 let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
323 let mut first_iteration = true;
325 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
326 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
328 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
329 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
330 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
331 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
332 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
335 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
336 first_iteration = false;
338 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
340 secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
341 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
343 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
347 shared_secret: shared_secret,
349 blinding_factor: blinding_factor,
350 ephemeral_pubkey: ephemeral_pubkey,
359 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
360 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
361 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
362 let mut cur_cltv = 0u32;
363 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
364 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
365 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
366 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
368 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
369 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
370 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
371 // the intended recipient).
372 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
373 let cltv = if cur_cltv == 0 { hop.cltv_expiry_delta } else { cur_cltv };
374 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
376 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
377 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
378 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
379 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
383 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
384 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
385 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", msg: None});
387 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
388 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
389 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", msg: None});
391 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
393 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
397 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
399 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
407 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
408 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
410 for i in 0..dst.len() {
415 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
416 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
417 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
418 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
421 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
422 let end_len = iters * 65;
423 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
424 res.resize(end_len, 0);
426 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
427 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
428 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
429 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
430 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
435 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
436 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
438 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
439 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
440 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
441 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
443 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
444 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
445 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
448 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
451 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
452 hmac.input(&packet_data);
453 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
454 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
457 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
459 public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey,
460 hop_data: packet_data,
465 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
466 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
467 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
468 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
470 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
471 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
472 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
473 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
474 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
475 data: packet_crypted,
479 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
480 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
482 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
485 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
486 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
487 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
488 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
492 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
493 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
496 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
498 failuremsg: failuremsg,
502 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
503 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
504 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
510 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
511 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
512 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
515 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
516 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &mut Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
517 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
518 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", msg: None}),
522 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
524 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
525 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
526 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
527 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
528 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
529 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
530 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
531 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
532 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
535 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
536 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
538 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
544 /// Sends a payment along a given route, returning the UpdateAddHTLC message to give to the
545 /// first hop in route. Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see
546 /// documentation for RouteHop fields for more info.
547 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
548 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, HandleError> {
549 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
550 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", msg: None});
552 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
553 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
554 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
555 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", msg: None});
559 let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
560 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
561 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
565 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
567 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?;
568 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route)?;
569 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, associated_data)?;
571 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
572 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
573 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", msg: None}),
574 Some(id) => id.clone()
577 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
578 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
579 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", msg: None});
581 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
584 if channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
587 // TODO: We need to track these better, we're not generating these, so a
588 // third-party might make this happen:
589 panic!("payment_hash was repeated! Don't let this happen");
595 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
596 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
597 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &Uint256, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16)) {
599 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
600 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&temporary_channel_id) {
602 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo.0, funding_txo.1) {
607 //TODO: Push e to pendingevents
614 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
615 let chan_monitor = chan.channel_monitor();
616 match self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
619 //TODO: Push e to pendingevents?
625 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
626 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
627 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
632 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
633 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan);
636 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
637 if !chan.is_usable() { return Ok(None) }
639 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
640 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
641 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
643 Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
644 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
645 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
646 node_signature: our_node_sig,
647 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
651 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forward(&self) {
652 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
653 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
655 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
656 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
658 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
662 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
663 if short_chan_id != 0 {
664 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
665 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
667 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
668 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
669 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
671 // TODO: Send a failure packet back on each pending_forward
675 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
677 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
678 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
679 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
681 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
682 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
687 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
689 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
690 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
691 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
692 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
693 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
694 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
695 // this channel currently :/.
702 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
703 let commitment_msg = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
706 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
710 new_events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs {
711 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
713 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
717 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
718 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
719 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
720 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
727 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
728 match failed_forward.2 {
729 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
730 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode() }),
734 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
736 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
737 events.reserve(new_events.len());
738 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
743 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
744 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
745 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
748 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
749 let mut pending_htlc = {
750 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
751 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
752 None => return false,
757 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. } => {
758 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
764 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
765 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
766 //TODO: DECRYPT route from OutboundRoute
767 mem::drop(channel_state);
768 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
769 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
770 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
774 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
775 let err_packet = match onion_error {
776 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
777 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
778 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
780 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
781 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
785 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
786 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
787 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
791 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
792 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
793 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
795 //TODO: Do something with e?
803 mem::drop(channel_state);
804 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
805 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
808 commitment_msg: msgs.1,
819 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
820 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
821 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
822 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
823 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
824 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
826 pub fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
827 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
828 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
829 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
830 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
832 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
833 let mut pending_htlc = {
834 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
835 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
836 None => return false,
841 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route } => {
842 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
843 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
844 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route });
845 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
846 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
847 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route };
848 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
855 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
856 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
858 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
860 mem::drop(channel_state);
861 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
862 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
867 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
868 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs, monitor) = {
869 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
870 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
874 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
875 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
876 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg, if from_user { Some(chan.channel_monitor()) } else { None }),
878 //TODO: Do something with e?
884 mem::drop(channel_state);
887 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
888 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
891 commitment_msg: msgs.1,
897 //TODO: It may not be possible to handle add_update_monitor fails gracefully, maybe
898 //it should return no Err? Sadly, panic!()s instead doesn't help much :(
900 match self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.as_ref().unwrap().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.unwrap()) {
909 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
910 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
911 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
915 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
916 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
917 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
918 let mut ret = Vec::new();
919 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
924 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
925 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
926 let mut new_funding_locked_messages = Vec::new();
928 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
929 let mut short_to_ids_to_insert = Vec::new();
930 for channel in channel_state.by_id.values_mut() {
931 match channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched) {
932 Some(funding_locked) => {
933 let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
936 //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys)
940 new_funding_locked_messages.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
941 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
943 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
945 short_to_ids_to_insert.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()));
949 //TODO: Check if channel was closed (or disabled) here
951 for to_insert in short_to_ids_to_insert {
952 channel_state.short_to_id.insert(to_insert.0, to_insert.1);
955 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
956 for funding_locked in new_funding_locked_messages.drain(..) {
957 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
961 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
962 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
963 for channel in channel_state.by_id.values_mut() {
964 if channel.block_disconnected(header) {
965 //TODO Close channel here
971 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
972 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
973 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
974 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
975 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", msg: None});
977 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
978 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
979 return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", msg: None});
981 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, self.announce_channels_publicly)?;
982 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
983 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
987 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
988 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
989 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
990 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
992 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
993 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
995 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
996 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
998 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1001 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1002 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1003 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1004 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1005 output_script: output_script,
1006 user_channel_id: user_id,
1011 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1012 //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a
1013 //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also
1014 //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state.
1016 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1017 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1019 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1020 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1022 match chan.funding_created(msg) {
1023 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1031 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1033 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1034 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1035 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1036 // for a bogus channel.
1037 let chan_monitor = chan.0.channel_monitor();
1038 self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor)?;
1039 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1040 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.1.channel_id, chan.0);
1044 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1045 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1046 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1047 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1049 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1050 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1052 chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1053 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1055 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1058 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1059 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1060 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1061 user_channel_id: user_id,
1066 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1067 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1068 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1070 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1071 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1073 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1074 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?);
1076 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1080 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1082 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1084 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1085 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1086 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1087 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1089 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1090 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1091 chan_entry.remove_entry();
1095 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1098 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1099 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1100 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1105 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1107 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1108 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1109 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1110 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1111 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1113 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1114 if res.1.is_some() {
1115 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1116 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1117 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1118 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1119 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1120 chan_entry.remove_entry();
1124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1127 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1128 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1133 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1134 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1135 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1136 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1138 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1139 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1140 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1141 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1143 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
1144 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1146 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
1148 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
1151 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1152 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1153 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1154 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1160 macro_rules! return_err {
1161 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1162 return Err(msgs::HandleError {
1164 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC {
1165 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1166 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1167 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1168 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1175 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1176 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1177 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1178 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1179 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1180 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1181 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1182 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1185 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1186 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1187 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
1188 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1189 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1192 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1193 let next_hop_data = {
1194 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1195 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1196 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
1198 let error_code = match err {
1199 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
1200 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1202 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1208 let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1210 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
1211 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1213 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1214 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1217 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1218 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1219 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1220 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1222 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1224 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1225 short_channel_id: 0,
1226 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1227 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1228 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1231 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1232 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1233 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1235 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
1237 let blinding_factor = {
1238 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1239 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1240 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
1241 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1242 sha.result(&mut res);
1243 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1245 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1247 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1253 match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1255 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1257 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1262 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1264 public_key: new_pubkey,
1265 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1266 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1269 //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
1271 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1272 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1273 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1274 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1275 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1276 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1277 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1281 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1282 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1284 if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1285 let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1287 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1289 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1291 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1292 if !chan.is_live() {
1293 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
1294 return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x4000 | 10, &chan_update.encode()[..]);
1298 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1300 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1301 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1302 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1303 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1304 match &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1305 &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) => {
1306 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1308 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1309 acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
1313 if !acceptable_cycle {
1314 return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1320 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1322 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1323 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1325 if !chan.is_usable() {
1326 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", msg: None});
1328 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1329 pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1330 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1332 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}), //TODO: panic?
1335 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1337 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1338 let route = match outbound_route {
1339 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route } => {
1342 _ => { panic!("WAT") },
1344 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1345 source_short_channel_id,
1346 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1350 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1351 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1352 source_short_channel_id,
1353 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1361 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1362 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1363 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1364 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1365 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1368 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1369 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1371 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1372 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1374 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)?;
1375 chan.channel_monitor()
1377 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1380 self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor)?;
1384 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1385 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1386 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1388 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1389 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1391 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1393 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1397 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1398 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1399 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1401 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1402 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1404 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1406 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1410 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
1411 let (res, monitor) = {
1412 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1413 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1415 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1416 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1418 (chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?, chan.channel_monitor())
1420 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1423 //TODO: Only if we store HTLC sigs
1424 self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor)?;
1429 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
1430 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures), monitor) = {
1431 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1432 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1434 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1435 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1437 (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?, chan.channel_monitor())
1439 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1442 self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor)?;
1443 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1444 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
1447 let mut forward_event = None;
1448 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1449 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1450 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1451 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1452 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1454 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1455 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1457 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1460 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1465 match forward_event {
1467 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1468 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1469 time_forwardable: time
1478 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1479 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1480 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1482 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1483 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1485 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1487 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1491 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1492 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1493 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1494 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1496 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1497 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1499 if !chan.is_usable() {
1500 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", msg: None });
1503 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1504 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1506 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1507 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1508 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
1509 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
1511 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
1513 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1514 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1515 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1516 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1517 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1518 contents: announcement,
1519 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1521 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1524 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1525 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1529 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
1530 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1531 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1532 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1533 if no_connection_possible {
1534 channel_state.by_id.retain(move |_, chan| {
1535 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1536 match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1538 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1542 //TODO: get the latest commitment tx, any HTLC txn built on top of it, etc out
1543 //of the channel and throw those into the announcement blackhole.
1550 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
1551 if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1552 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
1553 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
1563 use chain::chaininterface;
1564 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
1565 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
1567 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
1568 use util::test_utils;
1569 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1571 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
1572 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
1573 use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256;
1574 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
1575 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
1576 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1577 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
1578 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
1580 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1581 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1583 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
1584 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1586 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1588 use std::collections::HashMap;
1589 use std::default::Default;
1590 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
1591 use std::time::Instant;
1593 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
1594 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
1595 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1600 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1601 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1604 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1605 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1608 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1609 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1612 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1613 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1616 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1617 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1622 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1624 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
1625 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
1630 fn onion_vectors() {
1631 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
1632 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1634 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
1635 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
1636 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
1637 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex_bytes("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
1638 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex_bytes("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
1640 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
1641 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
1642 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
1643 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex_bytes("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
1644 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex_bytes("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
1646 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
1647 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
1648 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
1649 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex_bytes("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
1650 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex_bytes("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
1652 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
1653 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
1654 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
1655 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex_bytes("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
1656 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex_bytes("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
1658 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
1659 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
1660 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
1661 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex_bytes("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
1662 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex_bytes("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
1664 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
1665 let payloads = vec!(
1666 msgs::OnionHopData {
1668 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1669 short_channel_id: 0,
1671 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1675 msgs::OnionHopData {
1677 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1678 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
1679 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
1680 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1684 msgs::OnionHopData {
1686 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1687 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
1688 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
1689 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1693 msgs::OnionHopData {
1695 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1696 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
1697 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
1698 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1702 msgs::OnionHopData {
1704 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1705 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
1706 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
1707 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1713 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, hex_bytes("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()).unwrap();
1714 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
1716 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1720 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
1721 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
1723 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1724 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
1725 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1727 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
1728 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1730 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
1731 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1733 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
1734 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1736 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
1737 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1739 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
1740 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1743 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
1744 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
1745 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
1747 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
1748 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
1753 feeest: Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>,
1754 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
1755 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
1756 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
1758 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
1762 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
1763 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Uint256, Transaction) {
1764 let open_chan = node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap();
1765 let accept_chan = node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan).unwrap();
1766 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
1768 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
1772 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1773 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
1775 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
1776 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
1777 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1779 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
1780 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
1782 funding_output = (Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
1784 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output.clone());
1785 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1786 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
1787 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
1788 added_monitors.clear();
1790 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1793 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1794 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
1795 let funding_signed = match events_2[0] {
1796 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
1797 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
1798 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
1799 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1800 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
1801 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
1802 added_monitors.clear();
1805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1808 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
1810 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1811 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
1813 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
1814 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1815 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
1817 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1820 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
1821 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1822 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
1824 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
1825 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
1826 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
1827 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
1829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1834 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
1835 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1836 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
1837 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_5[0] {
1838 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
1839 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
1840 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
1841 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
1842 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
1843 as_announcement_sigs
1845 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1848 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1849 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
1850 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_6[0] {
1851 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
1854 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1857 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
1858 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1859 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
1860 let bs_update = match events_7[0] {
1861 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
1862 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
1865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1872 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
1875 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Uint256, Transaction) {
1876 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
1878 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
1879 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
1880 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
1882 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
1885 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &Uint256, funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) {
1886 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
1887 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
1890 let shutdown_a = node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
1891 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
1892 if !close_inbound_first {
1893 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
1895 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
1896 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
1897 if close_inbound_first {
1898 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
1899 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
1900 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
1901 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
1903 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
1904 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
1905 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
1906 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
1908 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
1909 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
1910 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
1912 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
1913 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
1914 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
1915 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
1917 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
1918 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
1919 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
1920 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
1925 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1926 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
1929 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
1931 Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
1932 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
1934 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
1939 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
1940 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
1941 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
1942 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
1943 let our_payment_hash = {
1944 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1945 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
1946 let mut ret = [0; 32];
1947 sha.result(&mut ret);
1951 let mut payment_event = {
1952 let msgs = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap().unwrap();
1954 node_id: expected_route[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
1956 commitment_msg: msgs.1,
1959 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
1961 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
1962 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
1964 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
1966 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1967 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
1970 let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
1972 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1973 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
1974 added_monitors.clear();
1976 assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
1977 let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
1979 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1980 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
1981 added_monitors.clear();
1983 assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
1984 assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
1986 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1987 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
1988 added_monitors.clear();
1991 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1992 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
1994 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
1995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1998 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
1999 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forward();
2001 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2002 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2003 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2005 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2006 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2007 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2009 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2012 for event in events_2.drain(..) {
2013 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(event);
2015 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2021 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2024 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2025 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2027 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2028 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2029 added_monitors.clear();
2032 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2033 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2034 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
2036 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2037 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2039 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2040 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2041 added_monitors.clear();
2043 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2044 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2045 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2047 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2048 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2049 added_monitors.clear();
2051 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2053 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2054 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2055 added_monitors.clear();
2061 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2062 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2063 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2064 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2065 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2066 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node);
2069 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2070 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2072 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2073 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2074 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2076 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2082 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2083 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
2085 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2086 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2088 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2089 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2095 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2096 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, 142).unwrap();
2097 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2098 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2099 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2102 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2105 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2106 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, 142).unwrap();
2107 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2108 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2109 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2112 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2113 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2114 let our_payment_hash = {
2115 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2116 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2117 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2118 sha.result(&mut ret);
2122 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2123 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2126 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2127 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2128 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2131 fn send_failed_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node]) {
2132 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), 1000000, 142).unwrap();
2133 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2134 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2135 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2137 let our_payment_hash = send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, 1000000).1;
2139 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2141 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2142 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2143 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
2145 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2146 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2148 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2149 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2150 added_monitors.clear();
2152 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2153 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2154 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2156 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2157 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2158 added_monitors.clear();
2160 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2162 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2163 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2164 added_monitors.clear();
2170 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2171 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2172 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2173 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2174 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2175 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node);
2178 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2179 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2181 Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2182 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2183 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2191 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2192 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
2194 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2195 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2197 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2198 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2200 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2204 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2205 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2206 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2207 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2209 for _ in 0..node_count {
2210 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
2211 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
2212 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2213 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2215 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2216 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2217 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2219 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()).unwrap();
2220 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id).unwrap());
2221 nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node_id, node, router });
2228 fn fake_network_test() {
2229 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2230 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2231 let nodes = create_network(4);
2233 // Create some initial channels
2234 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2235 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2236 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2238 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2239 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2240 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2241 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2242 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2244 // Send some more payments
2245 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2246 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2247 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2249 // Test failure packets
2250 send_failed_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..]);
2252 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2253 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2255 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2256 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2257 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2258 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2259 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2260 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2261 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2263 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2264 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2265 hops.push(RouteHop {
2266 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2267 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2269 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2271 hops.push(RouteHop {
2272 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2273 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2275 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2277 hops.push(RouteHop {
2278 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2279 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2281 cltv_expiry_delta: 142,
2283 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2284 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2285 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2287 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2288 hops.push(RouteHop {
2289 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2290 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2292 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2294 hops.push(RouteHop {
2295 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2296 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2298 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2300 hops.push(RouteHop {
2301 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2302 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2304 cltv_expiry_delta: 142,
2306 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2307 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2308 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2310 // Claim the rebalances...
2311 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_2);
2312 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2314 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2315 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2317 // Send some payments across both channels
2318 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2319 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2320 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2322 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
2324 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2326 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2327 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2328 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
2330 // Close down the channels...
2331 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
2332 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
2333 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
2334 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
2335 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
2337 // Check that we processed all pending events
2339 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2340 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);