1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelKeys};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError, RAACommitmentOrder};
30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
34 use util::logger::Logger;
35 use util::errors::APIError;
38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::collections::HashMap;
45 use std::collections::hash_map;
47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
67 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
69 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
74 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
86 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
93 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
101 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 pub enum HTLCSource {
104 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
107 session_priv: SecretKey,
108 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
109 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
110 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
115 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
116 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
117 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
118 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
119 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
127 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
135 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
137 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
138 err: msgs::HandleError,
139 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
141 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
143 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
147 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
148 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
150 data: err.to_string()
154 needs_channel_force_close: false,
158 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
162 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
163 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
165 data: err.to_string()
169 needs_channel_force_close: true,
173 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
177 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
178 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
181 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
184 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
186 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
188 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
190 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
191 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
193 data: msg.to_string()
198 needs_channel_force_close: false,
202 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
205 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
207 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
209 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
211 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
212 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
214 data: msg.to_string()
219 needs_channel_force_close: true,
224 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
225 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
227 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
228 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
230 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
234 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
235 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
236 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
237 /// probably increase this significantly.
238 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
240 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
241 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
243 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
246 struct ChannelHolder {
247 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
248 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
249 next_forward: Instant,
250 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
251 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
252 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
253 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
254 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
255 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
256 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
258 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
260 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
261 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
262 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
263 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
264 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
265 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
268 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
270 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
271 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
272 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
273 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
274 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
279 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
280 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
282 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
283 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
285 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
286 /// to individual Channels.
287 pub struct ChannelManager {
288 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
289 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
290 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
291 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
292 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
294 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
295 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
296 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
297 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
299 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
300 our_network_key: SecretKey,
302 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
307 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
308 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
309 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
310 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
311 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
312 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
313 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
315 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
316 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
317 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
318 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
321 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
323 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
324 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
327 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
329 macro_rules! secp_call {
330 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
333 Err(_) => return Err($err),
340 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
342 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
343 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
348 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
349 pub struct ChannelDetails {
350 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
351 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
352 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
353 /// lifetime of the channel.
354 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
355 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
356 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
357 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
358 /// The node_id of our counterparty
359 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
360 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
361 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
362 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
366 impl ChannelManager {
367 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
369 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
370 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
372 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
373 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
375 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
376 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
377 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
379 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
380 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
381 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
382 monitor: monitor.clone(),
386 announce_channels_publicly,
387 fee_proportional_millionths,
388 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
391 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
392 by_id: HashMap::new(),
393 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
394 next_forward: Instant::now(),
395 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
396 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
400 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
404 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
405 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
409 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
411 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
412 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
413 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
414 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
416 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
417 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
419 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
420 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
421 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
423 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
424 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
425 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
426 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
427 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
428 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
429 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
430 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
433 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
434 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
435 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
437 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
441 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
442 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
443 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
444 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
445 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
446 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
447 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
449 panic!("RNG is bad???");
452 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
455 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
456 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
457 node_id: their_network_key,
463 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
464 /// more information.
465 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
466 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
467 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
468 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
469 res.push(ChannelDetails {
470 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
471 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
472 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
473 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
474 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
480 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
481 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
482 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
483 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
484 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
485 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
486 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
487 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
488 // really wanted anyway.
489 if channel.is_live() {
490 res.push(ChannelDetails {
491 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
492 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
493 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
494 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
495 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
502 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
503 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
504 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
506 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
507 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
508 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
509 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
510 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
511 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
512 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
513 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
514 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
515 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
516 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
518 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
519 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
521 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
524 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
525 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
526 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
528 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
529 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
534 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
535 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
536 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
540 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
549 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
550 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
551 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
552 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
553 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
555 for tx in local_txn {
556 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
558 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
559 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
560 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
561 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
562 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
563 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
564 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
567 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
568 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
569 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
571 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
572 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
573 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
574 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
575 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
582 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
583 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
584 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
585 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
591 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
592 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
593 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
594 for chan in self.list_channels() {
595 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
599 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
601 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
603 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
604 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
605 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
606 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
610 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
611 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
612 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
613 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
614 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
619 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
620 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
621 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
627 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
629 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
630 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
631 let mut res = [0; 32];
632 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
636 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
637 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
638 let mut res = [0; 32];
639 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
645 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
646 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
647 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
648 let mut res = [0; 32];
649 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
654 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
655 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
656 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
657 let mut res = [0; 32];
658 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
662 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
664 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
665 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
666 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
668 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
669 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
671 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
672 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
673 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
674 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
675 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
677 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
679 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
680 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
682 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
688 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
689 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
690 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
692 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
693 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
699 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
709 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
710 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
711 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
712 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
713 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
714 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
715 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
716 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
718 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
719 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
720 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
721 // the intended recipient).
722 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
723 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
724 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
726 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
727 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
728 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
729 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
733 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
734 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
735 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
737 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
738 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
739 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
741 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
743 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
747 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
749 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
757 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
758 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
760 for i in 0..dst.len() {
765 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
766 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
767 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
768 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
771 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
772 let end_len = iters * 65;
773 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
774 res.resize(end_len, 0);
776 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
777 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
778 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
779 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
780 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
785 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
786 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
788 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
789 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
790 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
791 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
793 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
794 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
795 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
798 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
801 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
802 hmac.input(&packet_data);
803 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
804 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
809 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
810 hop_data: packet_data,
815 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
816 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
817 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
818 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
820 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
821 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
822 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
823 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
824 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
825 data: packet_crypted,
829 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
830 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
832 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
835 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
836 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
837 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
838 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
842 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
843 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
846 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
848 failuremsg: failuremsg,
852 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
853 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
854 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
860 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
861 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
862 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
865 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
866 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
869 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
870 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
871 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
872 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
878 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
879 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
880 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
881 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
882 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
883 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
884 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
885 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
888 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
889 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
891 let mut channel_state = None;
892 macro_rules! return_err {
893 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
895 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
896 if channel_state.is_none() {
897 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
899 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
900 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
901 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
902 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
903 })), channel_state.unwrap());
908 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
909 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
910 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
911 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
912 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
913 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
914 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
915 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
918 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
919 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
920 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
921 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
922 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
925 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
926 let next_hop_data = {
927 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
928 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
929 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
931 let error_code = match err {
932 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
933 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
935 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
941 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
943 // final_expiry_too_soon
944 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
945 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
947 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
948 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
949 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
951 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
952 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
953 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
956 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
957 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
958 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
959 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
961 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
963 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
965 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
966 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
967 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
970 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
971 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
972 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
974 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
976 let blinding_factor = {
977 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
978 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
979 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
980 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
981 sha.result(&mut res);
982 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
984 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
990 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
991 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
994 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
996 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
997 hop_data: new_packet_data,
998 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1001 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1002 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1003 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1004 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1005 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
1006 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1007 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1011 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1012 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1013 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1014 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1015 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1016 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1017 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1019 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1021 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1022 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1024 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1025 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1026 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1027 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1028 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1029 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1030 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1032 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1033 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1035 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1036 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1037 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1039 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1040 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1042 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1043 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1044 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1045 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1047 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1048 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1053 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1054 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1055 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1057 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1058 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1060 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1061 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1063 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1068 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1071 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1072 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1073 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1074 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1075 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1079 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1081 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1082 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1083 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1084 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1085 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1086 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1087 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1088 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1089 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1090 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1093 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1094 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1096 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1102 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1104 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1105 /// fields for more info.
1107 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1108 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1109 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1110 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1111 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1112 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1114 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1116 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1117 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1118 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1119 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1120 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1122 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1123 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1124 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1125 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1129 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1130 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1131 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1133 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1135 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1137 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1138 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1139 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1140 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1142 let (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed) = {
1143 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1145 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1146 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1147 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1152 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1153 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1154 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1156 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1157 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1159 if !chan.is_live() {
1160 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1162 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1163 route: route.clone(),
1164 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1165 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1166 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1169 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1170 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1171 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1172 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1174 Some((update_add, commitment_signed))
1180 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1183 Some((update_add, commitment_signed)) => {
1184 (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed)
1186 None => return Ok(()),
1190 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1191 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1192 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1193 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1194 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1195 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1196 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1197 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1205 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1207 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1209 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1210 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1211 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1212 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1215 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1216 pending_events.push($event);
1221 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1222 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1223 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1225 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1226 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1227 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1230 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1231 mem::drop(channel_state);
1232 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1233 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1243 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1244 // lock before add_update_monitor
1245 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1248 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1249 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1253 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1254 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1255 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1256 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1258 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1264 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1265 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1267 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1269 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1271 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1272 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1274 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1275 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1276 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1277 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1278 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1282 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1284 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1285 /// Will likely generate further events.
1286 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1287 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1288 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1290 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1291 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1293 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1297 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1298 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1299 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1300 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1302 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1303 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1304 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1305 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1306 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1307 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1309 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1314 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1316 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1317 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1318 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1319 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1320 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1321 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1323 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1325 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1326 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1331 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1333 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1334 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1335 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1336 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1337 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1338 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1339 // this channel currently :/.
1346 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1347 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1350 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1351 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1353 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1355 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1359 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1360 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1362 new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1363 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1364 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1365 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1366 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1367 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1368 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1370 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1375 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1376 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1377 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1378 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1379 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1381 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1382 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1385 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1386 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1387 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1394 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1396 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1397 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1401 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1402 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1403 events.append(&mut new_events);
1406 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1407 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1408 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1409 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1410 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1411 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1412 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1413 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1419 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1420 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1421 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1422 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1423 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1424 /// still-available channels.
1425 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1427 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1428 mem::drop(channel_state);
1429 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1430 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1431 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1432 if let Some(channel_update) = channel_update {
1433 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1434 update: channel_update,
1437 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1438 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1439 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1442 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1445 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1446 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1447 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1448 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1449 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1451 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1452 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1456 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1457 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1458 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1462 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1463 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1464 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1465 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1468 (chan.get_their_node_id(), Some((msg, commitment_msg)))
1470 Ok(None) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), None),
1472 //TODO: Do something with e?
1479 Some((msg, commitment_msg)) => {
1480 mem::drop(channel_state);
1482 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1483 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1485 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1486 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1487 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1488 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1489 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1491 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1501 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1502 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1503 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1505 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1506 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1507 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1508 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1509 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1510 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1512 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1513 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1514 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1515 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1516 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1517 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1522 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1524 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1525 mem::drop(channel_state);
1526 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1527 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1531 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1532 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1533 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1534 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1535 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1537 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1538 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1544 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1545 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1546 Ok((msgs, Some(chan_monitor))) => {
1547 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1548 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1550 (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs)
1552 Ok((msgs, None)) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs),
1554 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1555 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1556 //TODO: Do something with e?
1562 mem::drop(channel_state);
1563 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs {
1564 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1565 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1567 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1568 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1569 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1570 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1571 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1573 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1581 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1582 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1583 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1586 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1587 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1589 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1590 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1591 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1592 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1593 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1596 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1597 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1598 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1599 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1600 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1601 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1602 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1604 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1605 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1606 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1608 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1609 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1610 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1616 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1619 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1620 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1621 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1623 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1625 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1626 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1627 new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1628 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1633 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1634 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1635 new_events.push(events::Event::SendRevokeAndACK {
1636 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1637 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1642 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1646 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1657 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1658 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1660 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1662 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1663 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1666 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut new_events);
1669 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1670 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1671 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1673 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1674 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1675 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1678 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1680 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1681 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1682 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1683 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1684 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1685 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1686 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1687 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1690 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1691 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1692 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1694 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1698 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1699 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1700 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1701 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1705 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1706 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1707 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1708 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1710 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1711 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1712 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1714 chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1715 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1716 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1718 //TODO: same as above
1719 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1722 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1723 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1724 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1725 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1726 output_script: output_script,
1727 user_channel_id: user_id,
1732 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1733 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1734 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1735 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1736 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1737 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1738 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1739 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1741 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1742 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1743 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1746 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1753 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1754 // lock before add_update_monitor
1755 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1758 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1759 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1761 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1763 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1770 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1771 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1772 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1773 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1775 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1776 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1777 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1779 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1780 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1783 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1785 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1788 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1789 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1790 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1791 user_channel_id: user_id,
1796 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1797 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1798 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1800 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1801 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1802 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1804 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1805 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1806 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1808 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1812 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1813 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1814 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1815 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1817 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1819 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1820 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1821 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1823 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1824 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1825 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1826 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1828 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1829 } else { (res, None) }
1831 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1834 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1835 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1836 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1838 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1839 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1840 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1841 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1849 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1850 let (res, chan_option) = {
1851 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1852 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1853 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1854 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1855 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1856 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1857 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1859 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1860 if res.1.is_some() {
1861 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1862 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1863 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1864 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1865 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1866 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1867 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1869 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1870 } else { (res, None) }
1872 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1875 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1876 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1878 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1879 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1880 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1881 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1889 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1890 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1891 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1892 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1894 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1895 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1896 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1897 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1899 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1900 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1902 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1904 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1905 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1906 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1908 if !chan.is_usable() {
1909 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1911 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1913 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1917 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1918 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1919 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1921 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1922 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1923 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1925 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1926 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1928 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1930 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1934 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1935 // indicating that the payment itself failed
1936 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1937 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1938 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1939 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1940 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1942 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1943 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1947 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1948 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1949 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1952 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1954 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1955 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1956 if res.is_some() { return; }
1958 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1959 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1960 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1962 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1964 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1965 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1966 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1967 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1968 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1970 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1972 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1973 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1974 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1975 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1976 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1977 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1979 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1980 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
1981 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
1982 // definitely came from the peer in question
1983 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
1985 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
1987 match error_code & 0xff {
1989 // either from an intermediate or final node
1990 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
1991 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
1992 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
1993 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
1994 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1995 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1996 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
1997 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
1998 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
1999 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2000 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2006 if is_from_final_node {
2007 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2008 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2009 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2010 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2011 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2012 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2015 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2016 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2020 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2021 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2022 // does not coform to the spec.
2023 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2024 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2025 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2031 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2035 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2037 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2038 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2039 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2043 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2044 let offset = match error_code {
2045 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2046 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2047 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2048 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2049 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2050 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2052 // node sending unknown code
2053 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2054 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2061 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2062 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2063 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2064 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2065 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2066 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2067 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2068 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2071 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2072 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2073 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2074 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2076 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2077 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2078 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2079 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2080 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2082 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2083 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2084 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2085 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2087 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2088 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2089 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2090 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2092 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2093 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2096 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2097 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2101 res = Some((msg, true));
2107 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2110 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2111 res = Some((None, true));
2115 // node sending unknown code
2116 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2117 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2126 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2127 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2128 } else { ((None, true)) }
2131 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2132 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2133 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2135 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2136 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2137 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2139 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2140 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2142 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2147 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2148 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2149 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2151 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2152 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2153 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2155 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2156 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2158 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2159 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2162 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2166 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2167 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = {
2168 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2169 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2171 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2172 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2173 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2175 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2176 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2179 (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed)
2181 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2184 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
2188 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2189 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2190 let mut forward_event = None;
2191 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2192 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2193 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2194 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2195 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2197 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2198 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2199 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2200 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2202 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2203 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2208 match forward_event {
2210 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2211 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2212 time_forwardable: time
2220 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2221 let ((res, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures), short_channel_id) = {
2222 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2223 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2225 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2226 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2227 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2229 let (res, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2230 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2233 ((res, pending_forwards, pending_failures), chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2235 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2238 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2239 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2241 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2246 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2247 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2248 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2250 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2251 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2252 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2254 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2256 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2260 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2261 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
2262 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2263 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2265 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2266 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2268 if !chan.is_usable() {
2269 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2272 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2273 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2274 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2276 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2277 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2278 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2279 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2280 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2282 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2284 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2285 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2286 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2287 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2288 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2289 contents: announcement,
2290 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2292 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2295 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2296 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
2300 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2302 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2303 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2305 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2306 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2308 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2309 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2310 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2311 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2315 Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order))
2317 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2324 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2325 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2326 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2327 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2329 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2330 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2331 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2332 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2334 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2335 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2337 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2338 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2340 if !chan.is_live() {
2341 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2343 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2344 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2347 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2348 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2349 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2350 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2351 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2352 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2353 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2354 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2355 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2366 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2367 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2368 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2369 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2370 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2375 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2376 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2377 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2378 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2380 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2381 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2382 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2383 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2384 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2385 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2386 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2387 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2388 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2389 msg: funding_locked,
2390 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2392 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2393 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2394 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2395 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2398 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2402 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2403 for tx in txn_matched {
2404 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2405 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2406 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2407 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2409 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2410 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2411 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2412 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2413 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2414 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2423 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2424 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2425 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2427 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2428 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2429 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2430 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2431 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2432 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2433 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2442 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2443 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2445 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2446 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2447 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2449 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2452 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2453 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2454 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2455 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2457 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2458 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2459 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2460 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2461 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2462 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2463 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2465 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2466 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2467 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2477 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2478 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2480 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2481 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2482 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2483 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2486 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2490 macro_rules! handle_error {
2491 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2494 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2495 if needs_channel_force_close {
2497 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2498 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2499 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2501 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2504 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2505 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2506 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2507 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2508 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2510 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2522 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2523 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2524 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2525 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2528 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2529 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2532 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2533 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2536 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2537 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2540 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2541 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2544 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2545 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2548 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2549 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2552 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2553 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2556 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2557 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2560 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2561 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2564 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2565 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2568 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2569 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2572 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2573 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2576 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2577 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2580 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2581 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2584 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), HandleError> {
2585 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2588 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2589 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2590 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2591 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2593 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2594 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2595 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2596 if no_connection_possible {
2597 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2598 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2599 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2600 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2602 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2603 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2604 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2614 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2615 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2616 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2617 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2618 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2619 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2620 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2622 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2623 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2624 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2633 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2634 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2636 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2637 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2638 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2639 pending_events.push(event);
2642 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2643 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2644 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2649 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2650 let mut res = Vec::new();
2651 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2652 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2653 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2654 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2655 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2656 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2657 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2661 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2666 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2670 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2671 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2672 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2673 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2674 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2678 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2685 use chain::chaininterface;
2686 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2687 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2688 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason};
2689 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2690 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2692 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2693 use util::test_utils;
2694 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2695 use util::errors::APIError;
2696 use util::logger::Logger;
2697 use util::ser::Writeable;
2699 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2700 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2701 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2702 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2703 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2704 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2705 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2709 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2710 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2712 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2713 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2715 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2717 use std::cell::RefCell;
2718 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2719 use std::default::Default;
2721 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2722 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2723 use std::time::Instant;
2726 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2727 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2728 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2733 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2734 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2737 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2738 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2741 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2742 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2745 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2746 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2749 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2750 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2755 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2757 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2758 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2763 fn onion_vectors() {
2764 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2765 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2767 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2768 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2769 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2770 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2771 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2773 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2774 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2775 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2776 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2777 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2779 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2780 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2781 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2782 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2783 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2785 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2786 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2787 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2788 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2789 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2791 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2792 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2793 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2794 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2795 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2797 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2798 let payloads = vec!(
2799 msgs::OnionHopData {
2801 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2802 short_channel_id: 0,
2804 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2808 msgs::OnionHopData {
2810 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2811 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2812 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2813 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2817 msgs::OnionHopData {
2819 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2820 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2821 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2822 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2826 msgs::OnionHopData {
2828 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2829 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2830 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2831 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2835 msgs::OnionHopData {
2837 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2838 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2839 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2840 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2846 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2847 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2849 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2853 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2854 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2856 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2857 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2858 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2860 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2861 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2863 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2864 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2866 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2867 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2869 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2870 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2872 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2873 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2876 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2877 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2878 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2879 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2881 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2882 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2887 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2888 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2889 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2890 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2892 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2893 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2895 impl Drop for Node {
2896 fn drop(&mut self) {
2897 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2898 // Check that we processed all pending events
2899 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2900 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2905 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2906 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2909 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2910 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2911 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2912 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2915 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2916 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2918 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2919 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2920 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2921 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2922 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2923 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2928 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2930 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2934 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2935 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2937 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2938 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2939 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2941 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2942 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2944 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2946 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2947 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2948 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2949 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2950 added_monitors.clear();
2952 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2955 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2956 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2957 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2958 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2959 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2960 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2961 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2962 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2963 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2964 added_monitors.clear();
2967 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2970 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2972 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2973 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2974 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2975 added_monitors.clear();
2978 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2979 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2981 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2982 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2983 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2985 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2991 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2992 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2993 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2994 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2996 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2997 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2998 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2999 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
3001 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3006 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3007 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3008 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3009 (match events_6[0] {
3010 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
3011 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3012 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3013 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
3015 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3019 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3020 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3021 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3025 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3026 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
3027 let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
3028 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3029 bs_announcement_sigs
3032 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3033 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3034 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3035 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3041 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3042 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3043 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3044 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3045 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3046 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3049 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3052 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3054 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3057 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3058 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3061 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3062 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3064 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3065 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3066 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3068 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3071 macro_rules! check_spends {
3072 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3074 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3075 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3076 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3077 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3082 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3083 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3084 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3087 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3088 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3089 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3090 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
3091 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3092 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
3095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3098 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
3099 if !close_inbound_first {
3100 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
3102 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3103 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
3104 if close_inbound_first {
3105 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
3106 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3107 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3108 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3110 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3111 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
3112 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3113 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3115 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3116 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3117 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3119 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3120 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
3121 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3122 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3124 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3125 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3127 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3128 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3129 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
3130 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3133 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3136 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3137 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3138 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
3139 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3142 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3145 (as_update, bs_update)
3150 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3151 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3154 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3155 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3156 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3157 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3158 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3159 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3162 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
3164 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3165 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3170 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3171 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3173 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3174 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3175 added_monitors.clear();
3180 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3181 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3183 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3184 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3185 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3186 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3187 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3188 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3189 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
3190 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
3191 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3192 if $fail_backwards {
3193 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3195 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3197 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3198 if $fail_backwards {
3199 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3200 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3202 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3204 added_monitors.clear();
3210 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3213 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3214 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3215 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3216 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3217 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3218 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3219 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3224 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3225 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3227 let mut payment_event = {
3228 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3229 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3231 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3232 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3233 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3235 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3237 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3238 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3240 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3241 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3242 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3244 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3245 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3247 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3248 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3251 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3252 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3254 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3255 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3256 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3258 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3259 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3260 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3265 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3266 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3267 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3273 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3276 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3277 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3278 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3280 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3281 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
3282 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3284 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3286 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3288 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3290 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3295 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3296 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3297 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3298 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3299 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3300 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
3303 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3304 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3305 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3307 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3308 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3309 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3310 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3311 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3312 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3313 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3314 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3316 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3319 assert!(events.is_empty());
3321 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3322 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3329 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3330 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3331 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3333 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3334 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3336 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3341 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3342 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3345 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3347 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3348 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3349 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3350 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3351 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3354 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3357 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3358 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3359 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3360 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3361 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3364 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3366 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3368 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3369 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3373 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3374 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3375 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3378 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3379 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
3380 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3382 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3383 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3384 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3386 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3387 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3392 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3393 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3394 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3395 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3396 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3397 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3398 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3399 // second-to-last node!
3400 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3403 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3404 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3405 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3407 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3408 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3409 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3410 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3411 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3412 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3413 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3414 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3419 assert!(events.is_empty());
3421 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3422 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3429 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3431 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3432 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3434 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
3435 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3436 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3438 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3443 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3444 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3447 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3448 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3449 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3450 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3451 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3453 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3454 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3456 for _ in 0..node_count {
3457 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3458 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3459 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3460 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3462 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3463 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3464 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3466 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3467 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3468 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3469 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3470 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3478 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3479 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3480 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3481 let channel_id = chan.2;
3483 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3485 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3486 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3492 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3496 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
3497 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3498 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3499 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3500 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3501 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
3502 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
3503 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
3504 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
3505 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3507 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3509 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
3511 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3512 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3515 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3516 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3517 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3518 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3519 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3521 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3524 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3526 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3527 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3528 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3531 let payment_event = {
3532 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3533 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3534 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3536 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3537 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3539 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3540 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3541 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3542 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3545 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3546 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3547 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3550 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3551 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3552 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3553 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3554 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3555 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3558 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3559 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3560 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3561 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3562 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3563 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3566 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3567 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3570 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3571 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3574 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3577 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3578 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3580 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3581 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3584 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3589 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3590 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3591 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3592 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3593 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3594 let channel_id = chan.2;
3596 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3598 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3599 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3605 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3607 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3608 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3611 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3612 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3613 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3614 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3620 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3622 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3623 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3624 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3627 let payment_event = {
3628 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3629 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3630 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3632 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3633 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3635 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3636 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3637 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3638 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3641 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3644 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3648 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3649 let nodes = create_network(2);
3650 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3651 let channel_id = chan.2;
3653 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3655 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3656 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3662 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3663 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3664 // update_fee (never committed) ->
3665 // (3) update_fee ->
3666 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3667 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3668 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3669 // <- (1) RAA delivered
3670 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
3671 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3672 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3673 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3674 // revoke_and_ack ->
3675 // B should send no response here
3676 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
3677 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3678 // revoke_and_ack ->
3680 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3681 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3682 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3685 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3686 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3687 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3688 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3689 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3691 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3694 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3695 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3696 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3699 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3701 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3702 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3704 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3705 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3706 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3707 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3710 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3712 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3714 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3716 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3717 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3719 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3720 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3721 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3722 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3723 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3724 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3725 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3727 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3728 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3730 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3732 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3736 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3739 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3742 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3743 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3746 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3751 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3752 let nodes = create_network(2);
3753 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3754 let channel_id = chan.2;
3756 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3758 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3759 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3764 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3765 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3767 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3768 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3769 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3770 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3771 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3773 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3775 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3777 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3778 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3782 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3783 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3784 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3786 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3787 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3790 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3791 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3796 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3797 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3798 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3799 let channel_id = chan.2;
3801 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3803 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3804 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3810 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3812 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3813 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3815 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3816 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3817 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3818 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3819 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3821 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3823 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3825 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3826 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3829 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3831 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3833 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3834 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3836 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3837 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3838 added_monitors.clear();
3840 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3841 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3842 // node[1] has nothing to do
3844 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3845 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3848 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3849 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3851 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3852 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3854 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3855 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3856 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3857 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3858 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3859 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3861 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3862 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3863 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3865 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3866 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3868 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3870 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3872 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3873 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3875 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3877 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3878 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3880 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3881 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3883 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3884 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3886 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3889 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3890 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3893 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3895 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3896 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3897 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3901 fn test_update_fee() {
3902 let nodes = create_network(2);
3903 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3904 let channel_id = chan.2;
3906 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3908 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3909 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3915 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3916 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3917 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
3918 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3919 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3920 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3921 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
3922 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3923 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
3924 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3925 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3926 // revoke_and_ack ->
3928 // Create and deliver (1)...
3929 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3930 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3932 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3933 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3934 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3935 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3936 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3940 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3942 // Generate (2) and (3):
3943 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3944 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3949 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3950 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3953 // Create and deliver (4)...
3954 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3955 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3956 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3957 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3958 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3959 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3961 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3963 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3965 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3967 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3971 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3972 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3973 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3977 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3978 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3981 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3982 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3983 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3987 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3988 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3990 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3991 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3994 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3995 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3996 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4000 fn fake_network_test() {
4001 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4002 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
4003 let nodes = create_network(4);
4005 // Create some initial channels
4006 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4007 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4008 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4010 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4011 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4012 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4013 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4014 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4016 // Send some more payments
4017 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4018 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
4019 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
4021 // Test failure packets
4022 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
4023 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
4025 // Add a new channel that skips 3
4026 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4028 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4029 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4030 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4031 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4032 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4033 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4034 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4036 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
4037 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4038 hops.push(RouteHop {
4039 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4040 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4042 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4044 hops.push(RouteHop {
4045 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4046 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4048 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4050 hops.push(RouteHop {
4051 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4052 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4054 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4056 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4057 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4058 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4060 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4061 hops.push(RouteHop {
4062 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4063 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4065 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4067 hops.push(RouteHop {
4068 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4069 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4071 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4073 hops.push(RouteHop {
4074 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4075 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4077 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4079 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4080 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4081 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4083 // Claim the rebalances...
4084 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4085 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4087 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4088 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4090 // Send some payments across both channels
4091 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4092 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4093 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4095 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4097 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4099 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4100 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4101 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4103 // Close down the channels...
4104 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4105 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4106 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4107 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4108 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4112 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4113 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4114 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4115 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4117 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4118 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4124 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4126 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4127 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4129 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4130 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4132 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4133 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4134 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4137 #[derive(PartialEq)]
4138 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4139 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4141 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4142 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4143 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4145 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4146 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4148 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4150 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4151 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4152 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4154 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4155 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4156 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4157 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4158 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4159 res.push(tx.clone());
4164 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4165 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4168 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4170 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4171 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4172 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4173 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4174 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4175 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4177 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4179 res.push(tx.clone());
4183 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4186 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4190 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4191 /// HTLC transaction.
4192 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4193 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4194 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4195 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4196 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4197 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4201 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4204 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4205 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4207 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4208 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4209 let mut found_prev = false;
4211 for tx in prev_txn {
4212 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4213 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4214 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4215 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4221 assert!(found_prev);
4223 let mut res = Vec::new();
4224 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4228 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4229 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4230 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4231 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4232 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4238 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4239 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4240 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4241 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4248 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4249 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4253 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4255 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4256 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4258 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4259 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4261 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4262 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4267 fn channel_reserve_test() {
4269 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4270 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4272 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4273 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4274 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4275 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4276 chan.get_value_stat()
4280 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4281 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4282 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4284 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4285 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4287 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4288 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4290 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4291 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4292 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4293 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4294 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4298 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4300 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4301 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4302 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4303 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4308 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4309 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4310 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4311 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4313 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4314 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4315 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4322 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4323 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4325 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4327 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4329 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4330 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4331 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4333 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4334 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4338 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4339 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4340 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4342 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4343 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4346 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4349 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4350 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4351 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4352 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4353 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4356 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4357 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4358 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4359 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4360 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4364 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4365 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4366 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4367 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4369 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4370 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4374 // adding pending output
4375 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4376 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4378 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4379 let payment_event_1 = {
4380 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4383 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4384 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4385 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4387 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4389 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4390 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4392 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4393 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4394 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4395 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4400 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4401 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4403 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4404 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4405 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4406 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4407 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4409 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4411 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4412 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4413 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4414 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4415 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4416 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4418 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4419 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4420 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4421 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4424 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4426 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4430 // split the rest to test holding cell
4431 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4432 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4434 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4435 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4438 // now see if they go through on both sides
4439 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4440 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4441 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4443 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4444 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4446 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4448 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4449 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4450 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4451 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4455 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4456 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4457 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4459 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4460 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4462 // flush the pending htlc
4463 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4466 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4468 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4469 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4471 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4474 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4476 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4477 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4478 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4480 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4481 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4483 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4484 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4485 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4486 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4487 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4488 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4490 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4491 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4492 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4493 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4495 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4496 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4498 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4499 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4501 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4502 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4503 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4505 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4508 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4509 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4510 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4512 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4515 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4516 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4517 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4519 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4520 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4521 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4522 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4524 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4525 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4529 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4530 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4531 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4532 let nodes = create_network(5);
4534 // Create some initial channels
4535 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4536 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4537 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4538 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4540 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4541 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4542 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4543 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4544 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4546 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4547 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4549 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4550 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4551 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4552 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4554 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4555 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4556 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4558 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4559 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4561 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4562 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4564 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4565 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4566 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4567 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4569 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4570 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4571 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4573 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4574 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4576 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4577 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4579 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4580 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4582 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4583 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4584 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4585 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4587 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4593 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4594 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4595 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4597 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4599 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4600 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4602 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4603 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4605 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4607 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4608 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4609 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4611 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4612 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4613 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4616 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4617 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4618 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4619 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4620 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4624 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4625 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4626 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4627 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4628 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4631 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4633 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4634 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4636 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4637 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4638 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4639 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4640 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4643 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4645 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4646 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4648 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4650 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4651 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4652 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4654 // Create some new channels:
4655 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4657 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4658 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4659 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4660 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4661 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4662 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4663 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4664 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4665 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4666 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4667 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4668 // Revoke the old state
4669 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4672 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4673 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4675 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4676 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4677 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4678 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4680 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4681 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4683 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4685 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4686 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4687 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4688 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4689 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4691 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4692 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4693 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4697 fn revoked_output_claim() {
4698 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4699 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4700 let nodes = create_network(2);
4701 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4702 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4703 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4704 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4705 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4706 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4707 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4708 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4710 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4711 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4712 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4713 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4714 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4716 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4718 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4719 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4721 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4722 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4723 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4727 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4728 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4729 let nodes = create_network(2);
4731 // Create some new channel:
4732 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4734 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4735 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4736 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4737 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4738 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4740 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4741 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4742 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4743 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4744 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4745 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4746 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4747 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4748 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4750 //Revoke the old state
4751 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4754 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4756 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4758 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4759 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4760 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4762 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4763 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4765 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4767 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4768 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4769 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4770 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4771 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4772 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4773 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4774 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4776 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4777 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4778 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4780 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4781 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4782 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4783 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4784 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4785 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4787 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4788 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4789 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4793 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4794 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4795 let nodes = create_network(2);
4797 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4799 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4800 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4801 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4802 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4803 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4804 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4806 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4807 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4809 //Revoke the old state
4810 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4813 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4815 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4817 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4818 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4819 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4821 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4822 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4823 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4824 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4825 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4826 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4827 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4829 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4830 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4831 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4833 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4834 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4835 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4836 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4837 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4839 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4840 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4841 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4842 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4843 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4844 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4845 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4846 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4848 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4849 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4851 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4852 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4853 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4854 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4855 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4856 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4858 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4859 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4860 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4864 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4865 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4866 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4867 let nodes = create_network(2);
4868 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4870 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4871 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4873 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4874 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4876 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4877 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4883 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4884 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4886 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4887 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4890 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4891 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4893 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4894 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4900 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4901 // registering new transactions
4902 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4906 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4907 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4908 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4909 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4910 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4912 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4914 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4916 let mut payment_event = {
4917 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4920 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4921 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4922 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4925 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4926 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4928 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4929 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4931 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4935 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4936 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4938 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4939 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4940 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4941 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4944 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4945 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4948 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4949 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4950 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4952 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4953 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4954 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4956 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4957 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4959 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4963 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4964 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4965 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4966 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4967 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4971 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4972 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4974 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4975 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4976 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4978 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4979 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4984 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4986 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4987 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4988 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4990 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4991 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4992 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4993 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4994 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4995 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4996 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4998 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
5002 fn test_unconf_chan() {
5003 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
5004 let nodes = create_network(2);
5005 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5007 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5008 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
5009 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
5010 mem::drop(channel_state);
5012 let mut headers = Vec::new();
5013 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5014 headers.push(header.clone());
5016 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5017 headers.push(header.clone());
5019 while !headers.is_empty() {
5020 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
5023 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5024 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5026 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5027 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5029 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5032 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5033 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
5034 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
5037 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
5038 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
5039 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
5040 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5041 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5043 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
5044 for msg in reestablish_1 {
5045 resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
5047 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5048 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5050 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
5053 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
5054 for msg in reestablish_2 {
5055 resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
5057 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5058 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5060 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5063 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5064 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5065 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5067 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5069 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
5070 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
5071 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5073 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5076 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5077 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5078 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5080 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5082 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5083 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5084 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5085 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5087 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5089 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5090 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5091 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5092 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5093 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5095 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5096 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5098 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5099 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5102 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5103 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5105 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5106 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5107 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5108 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5109 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5112 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5116 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5118 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5119 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5121 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5124 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5125 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5126 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5128 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5130 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5131 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5132 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5133 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5135 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5136 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5137 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5138 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5139 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5141 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5142 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5144 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5145 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5148 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5149 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5151 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5152 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5153 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5154 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5155 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5158 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5164 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5165 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5166 let nodes = create_network(3);
5167 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5168 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5170 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5171 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5172 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5174 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5175 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5176 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5177 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5179 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5180 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5181 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5183 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5184 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5185 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5186 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5188 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5189 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5191 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5192 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5194 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5196 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5197 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5199 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5200 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5202 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5205 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5206 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5207 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5213 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5214 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5217 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5218 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5219 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5220 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5221 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5222 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5227 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5228 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5230 let payment_event = {
5231 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5234 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5235 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5236 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5238 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5240 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5241 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5243 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5244 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5247 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5248 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5251 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5252 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5253 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5256 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5257 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5264 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5265 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5266 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5267 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5268 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5269 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5270 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5271 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5272 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5273 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5274 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5275 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5276 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5277 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5278 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5279 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5280 // Everything was delivered...
5281 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5284 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5285 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5287 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5291 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5292 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5293 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5295 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5296 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5298 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5299 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5301 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5302 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5303 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5305 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5308 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5311 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5312 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5313 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
5314 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5315 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5316 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5317 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5318 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5319 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5320 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5321 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5323 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5326 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5327 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5329 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5330 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5332 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5333 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5338 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5339 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5342 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5343 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5346 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5347 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5348 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5351 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5352 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5360 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5361 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5362 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5363 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5364 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5365 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5366 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5367 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5369 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5370 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5375 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5376 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5377 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5378 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5379 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5380 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5381 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5382 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5383 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5384 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5385 // Everything was delivered...
5386 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5389 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5390 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5391 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5393 // Channel should still work fine...
5394 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5395 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5399 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5400 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5401 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5402 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5406 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5407 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5408 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5409 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5413 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5414 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5415 let nodes = create_network(2);
5416 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5418 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5419 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5421 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5422 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5423 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5425 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5426 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5427 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5429 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5432 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5433 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5434 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5436 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5437 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5438 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5440 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5443 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5444 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5445 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5446 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5448 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5449 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5451 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5452 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5453 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5457 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
5458 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
5459 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
5460 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5461 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5463 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5465 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5466 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5467 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5469 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
5470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5472 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5473 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5475 Event::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5476 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5479 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5482 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5483 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5485 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5486 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5487 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5488 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5489 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5490 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5491 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5493 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5494 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5495 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5497 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5498 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5500 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5503 let (_, commitment_update) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
5504 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5507 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5510 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5511 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5513 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5514 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5515 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5516 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5518 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5519 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5521 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5522 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5524 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5525 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5527 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5529 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5530 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5531 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5532 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5533 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5534 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5535 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5536 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5539 let bs_second_commitment_signed = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap().unwrap();
5540 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5541 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5542 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5543 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5544 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5547 let as_commitment_signed = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5548 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5549 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5550 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5551 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5552 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5555 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5556 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
5557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5559 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5560 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5563 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5566 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5567 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5569 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5570 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5573 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5574 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5576 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5577 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5579 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
5580 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5585 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5588 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5592 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
5593 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
5594 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5595 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5597 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5598 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5600 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5601 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5604 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5605 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5607 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5608 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5611 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5612 // PaymentFailed event
5614 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5617 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
5618 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
5619 // a disconnect in between
5620 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5621 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5623 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5624 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5626 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5627 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5630 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5631 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
5632 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5635 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5636 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5637 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5640 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5641 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5644 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5645 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5646 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
5647 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5648 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5649 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5651 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5653 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5654 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5656 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5657 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5658 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5660 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5663 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
5665 // Now set it to failed again...
5666 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5667 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5668 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5671 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5672 assert!(events_4.is_empty());
5673 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5676 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5677 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5678 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5681 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
5682 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5683 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5686 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5687 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5689 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5693 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5694 // PaymentFailed event
5696 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5700 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
5701 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
5702 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
5705 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
5706 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
5708 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
5709 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
5710 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
5711 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
5712 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
5713 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
5714 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
5715 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
5716 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
5717 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
5718 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
5719 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
5720 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
5721 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
5722 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
5723 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
5724 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
5725 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5726 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5728 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5730 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5731 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5732 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5734 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5735 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5738 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5739 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
5740 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5742 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
5743 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
5744 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5746 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5747 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5748 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
5749 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5750 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5751 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5752 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5753 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5754 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5755 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5757 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5758 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5759 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5760 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5762 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5763 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5765 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5768 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
5769 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
5770 } else { panic!(); }
5773 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
5775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5778 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5779 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5780 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5783 // Now fix monitor updating...
5784 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5785 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5788 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
5789 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5790 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5792 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5793 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5794 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5795 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5797 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5798 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5800 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5801 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5803 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
5806 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5807 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5808 assert!(events_4.is_empty());
5810 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5811 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5812 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5813 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5815 let mut as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5817 let mut bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5820 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5821 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5823 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5824 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5825 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5827 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
5828 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
5829 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5831 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5832 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5833 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5834 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5835 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
5836 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
5838 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5840 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5841 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5842 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5844 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5845 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5847 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5850 let (as_resp_raa, as_resp_cu) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5851 assert!(as_resp_cu.is_none());
5852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5854 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
5858 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
5859 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5861 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5862 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
5863 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
5865 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
5866 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
5869 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
5871 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5872 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
5873 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
5874 Event::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5875 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5882 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5884 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5885 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5886 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still
5887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5889 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
5890 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5892 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5893 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5895 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5896 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5899 let as_commitment_update;
5900 let bs_second_commitment_update;
5902 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
5903 as_commitment_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5904 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5905 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5906 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5907 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5908 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5912 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
5913 bs_second_commitment_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5914 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5915 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5916 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5917 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5918 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5922 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
5925 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5926 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5928 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5929 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5931 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5932 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5934 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5937 handle_initial_raa!();
5939 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5940 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5942 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5943 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5945 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5946 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5949 handle_initial_raa!();
5951 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5952 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5954 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5955 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5957 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5958 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5960 assert!(bs_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5965 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5966 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5968 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5969 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5971 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5972 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5976 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5977 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5980 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5981 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5984 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5987 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5990 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5992 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5993 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5995 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5996 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5997 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5999 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6002 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6006 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
6007 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
6008 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
6009 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
6010 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
6011 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
6012 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
6016 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
6017 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
6018 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
6019 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
6020 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
6024 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
6025 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
6026 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
6027 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
6028 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
6029 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
6033 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
6034 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
6035 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6036 let nodes = create_network(2);
6038 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
6040 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6041 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6042 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6043 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6045 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6047 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6048 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6050 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6051 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6053 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
6055 let mut chan_announcement;
6057 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
6059 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6060 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
6061 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
6062 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
6063 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
6064 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
6065 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
6066 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
6067 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6072 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6073 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6074 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6075 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6076 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6077 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6078 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6079 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6080 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6081 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6082 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6083 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6084 contents: $unsigned_msg
6089 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6090 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6091 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6092 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6094 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6095 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6096 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6097 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6098 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6100 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6101 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6102 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6103 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());