1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError, RAACommitmentOrder};
30 use chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
45 use std::collections::HashMap;
46 use std::collections::hash_map;
48 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
66 use ln::router::Route;
67 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
70 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
73 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
75 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
76 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
77 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
87 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
94 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
96 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
97 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
98 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
99 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
102 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
104 pub enum HTLCSource {
105 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
108 session_priv: SecretKey,
109 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
110 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
111 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
116 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
117 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
118 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
119 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
128 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
136 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
138 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
139 err: msgs::HandleError,
140 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
142 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
144 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
148 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
149 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
151 data: err.to_string()
155 needs_channel_force_close: false,
159 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
163 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
164 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
166 data: err.to_string()
170 needs_channel_force_close: true,
174 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
175 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
178 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
179 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
182 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
185 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
187 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
189 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
191 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
192 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
194 data: msg.to_string()
199 needs_channel_force_close: false,
203 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
206 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
208 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
210 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
212 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
213 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
215 data: msg.to_string()
220 needs_channel_force_close: true,
225 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
226 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
228 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
229 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
231 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
235 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
236 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
237 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
238 /// probably increase this significantly.
239 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
241 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
242 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
244 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
247 struct ChannelHolder {
248 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
249 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
250 next_forward: Instant,
251 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
252 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
253 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
254 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
255 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
256 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
257 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
259 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
261 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
262 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
263 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
264 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
265 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
266 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
269 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
271 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
272 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
273 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
274 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
275 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
280 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
281 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
283 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
284 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
286 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
287 /// to individual Channels.
288 pub struct ChannelManager {
289 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
290 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
291 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
292 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
293 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
295 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
296 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
297 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
298 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
300 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
301 our_network_key: SecretKey,
303 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
308 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
309 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
310 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
311 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
312 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
313 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
314 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
316 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
317 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
318 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
319 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
322 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
324 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
325 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
328 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
330 macro_rules! secp_call {
331 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
334 Err(_) => return Err($err),
341 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
343 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
344 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
349 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
350 pub struct ChannelDetails {
351 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
352 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
353 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
354 /// lifetime of the channel.
355 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
356 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
357 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
358 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
359 /// The node_id of our counterparty
360 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
361 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
362 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
363 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
367 impl ChannelManager {
368 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
370 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
371 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
373 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
374 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
376 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
377 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
378 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
380 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
381 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
382 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
383 monitor: monitor.clone(),
387 announce_channels_publicly,
388 fee_proportional_millionths,
389 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
392 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
393 by_id: HashMap::new(),
394 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
395 next_forward: Instant::now(),
396 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
397 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
401 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
405 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
406 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
410 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
412 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
413 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
414 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
415 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
417 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
418 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
420 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
421 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
422 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
424 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
425 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
426 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
427 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
428 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
429 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
430 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
431 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
434 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
435 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
436 ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed)
439 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
440 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
441 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
442 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
443 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
444 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
445 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
447 panic!("RNG is bad???");
450 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
453 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
454 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
455 node_id: their_network_key,
461 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
462 /// more information.
463 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
464 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
465 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
466 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
467 res.push(ChannelDetails {
468 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
469 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
470 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
471 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
472 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
478 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
479 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
480 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
481 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
482 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
483 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
484 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
485 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
486 // really wanted anyway.
487 if channel.is_live() {
488 res.push(ChannelDetails {
489 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
490 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
491 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
492 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
493 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
500 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
501 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
502 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
504 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
505 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
506 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
507 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
508 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
509 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
511 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
512 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
513 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
514 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
516 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
517 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
519 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
522 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
523 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
524 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
526 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
527 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
532 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
533 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
534 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
538 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
547 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
548 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
549 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
550 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
551 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
553 for tx in local_txn {
554 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
556 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
557 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
558 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
559 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
560 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
561 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
562 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
565 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
566 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
567 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
569 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
570 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
571 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
572 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
573 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
580 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
581 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
582 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
583 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
589 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
590 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
591 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
592 for chan in self.list_channels() {
593 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
597 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
599 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
601 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
602 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
603 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
604 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
608 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
609 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
610 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
611 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
612 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
617 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
618 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
619 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
625 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
627 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
628 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
629 let mut res = [0; 32];
630 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
634 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
635 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
636 let mut res = [0; 32];
637 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
643 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
644 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
645 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
646 let mut res = [0; 32];
647 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
652 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
653 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
654 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
655 let mut res = [0; 32];
656 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
660 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
662 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
663 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
664 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
666 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
667 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
669 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
670 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
671 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
672 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
673 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
675 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
677 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
678 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
680 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
686 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
687 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
688 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
690 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
691 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
697 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
707 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
708 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
709 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
710 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
711 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
712 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
713 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
714 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
716 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
717 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
718 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
719 // the intended recipient).
720 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
721 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
722 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
724 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
725 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
726 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
727 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
731 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
732 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
733 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
735 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
736 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
737 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
739 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
741 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
745 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
747 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
755 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
756 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
758 for i in 0..dst.len() {
763 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
764 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
765 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
766 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
769 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
770 let end_len = iters * 65;
771 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
772 res.resize(end_len, 0);
774 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
775 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
776 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
777 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
778 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
783 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
784 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
786 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
787 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
788 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
789 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
791 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
792 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
793 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
796 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
799 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
800 hmac.input(&packet_data);
801 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
802 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
807 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
808 hop_data: packet_data,
813 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
814 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
815 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
816 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
818 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
819 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
820 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
821 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
822 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
823 data: packet_crypted,
827 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
828 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
830 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
833 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
834 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
835 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
836 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
840 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
841 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
844 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
846 failuremsg: failuremsg,
850 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
851 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
852 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
858 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
859 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
860 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
863 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
864 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
867 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
868 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
869 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
870 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
876 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
877 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
878 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
879 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
880 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
881 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
882 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
883 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
886 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
887 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
889 let mut channel_state = None;
890 macro_rules! return_err {
891 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
893 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
894 if channel_state.is_none() {
895 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
897 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
898 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
899 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
900 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
901 })), channel_state.unwrap());
906 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
907 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
908 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
909 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
910 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
911 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
912 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
913 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
916 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
917 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
918 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
919 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
920 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
923 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
924 let next_hop_data = {
925 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
926 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
927 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
929 let error_code = match err {
930 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
931 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
933 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
939 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
941 // final_expiry_too_soon
942 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
943 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
945 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
946 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
947 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
949 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
950 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
951 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
954 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
955 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
956 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
957 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
959 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
961 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
963 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
964 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
965 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
968 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
969 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
970 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
972 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
974 let blinding_factor = {
975 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
976 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
977 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
978 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
979 sha.result(&mut res);
980 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
982 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
988 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
989 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
992 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
994 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
995 hop_data: new_packet_data,
996 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
999 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1000 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1001 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1002 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1003 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
1004 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1005 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1009 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1010 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1011 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1012 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1013 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1014 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1015 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1017 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1019 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1020 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1022 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1023 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1024 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1025 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1026 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1027 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1028 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1030 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1031 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1033 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1034 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1035 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1037 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1038 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1040 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1041 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1042 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1043 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1045 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1046 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1051 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1052 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1053 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1055 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1056 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1058 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1059 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1061 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1066 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1069 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1070 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1071 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1072 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1073 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1077 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1079 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1080 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1081 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1082 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1083 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1084 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1085 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1086 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1087 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1088 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1091 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1092 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1094 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1100 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1102 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1103 /// fields for more info.
1105 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1106 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1107 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1108 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1109 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1110 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1112 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1114 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1115 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1116 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1117 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1118 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1120 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1121 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1122 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1123 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1127 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1128 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1129 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1131 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1133 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1135 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1136 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1137 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1138 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1140 let (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed) = {
1141 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1143 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1144 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1145 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1150 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1151 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1152 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1154 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1155 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1157 if !chan.is_live() {
1158 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1160 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1161 route: route.clone(),
1162 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1163 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1164 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1167 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1168 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1169 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1170 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1172 Some((update_add, commitment_signed))
1178 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1181 Some((update_add, commitment_signed)) => {
1182 (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed)
1184 None => return Ok(()),
1188 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1189 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1190 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1191 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1192 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1193 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1194 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1195 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1203 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1205 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1207 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1208 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1209 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1210 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1213 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1214 pending_events.push($event);
1219 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1220 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1221 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1223 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1224 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1225 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1228 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1229 mem::drop(channel_state);
1230 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1231 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1241 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1242 // lock before add_update_monitor
1243 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1246 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1247 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1251 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1252 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1253 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1254 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1256 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1262 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1263 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1265 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1267 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1269 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1270 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1272 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1273 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1274 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1275 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1276 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1280 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1282 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1283 /// Will likely generate further events.
1284 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1285 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1286 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1288 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1289 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1291 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1295 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1296 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1297 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1298 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1300 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1301 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1302 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1303 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1304 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1305 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1307 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1312 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1314 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1315 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1316 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1317 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1318 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1319 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1321 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1323 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1324 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1329 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1331 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1332 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1333 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1334 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1335 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1336 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1337 // this channel currently :/.
1344 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1345 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1348 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1349 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1351 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1353 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1357 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1358 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1360 new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1361 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1362 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1363 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1364 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1365 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1366 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1368 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1373 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1374 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1375 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1376 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1377 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1379 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1381 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1383 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1384 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1385 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1392 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1394 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1395 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1399 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1400 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1401 events.append(&mut new_events);
1404 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1405 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1406 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1407 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1408 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1409 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1410 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1411 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1417 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1418 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1419 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1420 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1421 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1422 /// still-available channels.
1423 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1425 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1426 mem::drop(channel_state);
1427 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1428 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1429 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1430 if let Some(channel_update) = channel_update {
1431 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1432 update: channel_update,
1435 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1436 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1437 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1440 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1443 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1444 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1445 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1446 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1447 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1449 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1450 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1454 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1455 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1456 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1460 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1461 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1462 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1463 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1466 (chan.get_their_node_id(), Some((msg, commitment_msg)))
1468 Ok(None) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), None),
1470 //TODO: Do something with e?
1477 Some((msg, commitment_msg)) => {
1478 mem::drop(channel_state);
1480 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1481 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1483 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1484 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1485 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1486 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1487 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1489 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1499 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1500 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1501 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1503 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1504 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1505 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1506 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1507 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1508 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1510 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1511 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1512 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1513 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1514 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1515 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1520 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1522 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1523 mem::drop(channel_state);
1524 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1525 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1529 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1530 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1531 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1532 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1533 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1535 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1536 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1542 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1543 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1544 Ok((msgs, Some(chan_monitor))) => {
1545 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1546 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1548 (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs)
1550 Ok((msgs, None)) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs),
1552 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1553 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1554 //TODO: Do something with e?
1560 mem::drop(channel_state);
1561 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs {
1562 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1563 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1565 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1566 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1567 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1568 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1569 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1571 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1579 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1580 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1581 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1584 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1585 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1587 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1588 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1589 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1590 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1591 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1594 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1595 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1596 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1597 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1598 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1599 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1600 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1602 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1603 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1604 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1606 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1607 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1608 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1614 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1617 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1618 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1619 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1621 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1623 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1624 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1625 new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1626 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1631 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1632 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1633 new_events.push(events::Event::SendRevokeAndACK {
1634 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1635 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1640 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1644 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1655 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1656 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1658 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1660 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1661 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1664 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut new_events);
1667 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1668 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1669 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1671 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1672 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1673 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1676 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1678 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1679 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1680 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1681 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1682 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1683 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1684 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1685 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1688 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1689 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1690 ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed)
1693 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1694 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1695 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1696 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1700 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1701 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1702 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1703 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1705 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1706 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1707 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1709 chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1710 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1711 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1713 //TODO: same as above
1714 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1717 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1718 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1719 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1720 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1721 output_script: output_script,
1722 user_channel_id: user_id,
1727 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1728 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1729 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1730 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1731 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1732 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1733 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1734 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1736 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1737 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1738 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1741 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1745 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1748 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1749 // lock before add_update_monitor
1750 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1753 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1754 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1755 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1756 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1765 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1766 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1767 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1768 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1770 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1771 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1772 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1774 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1775 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1778 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1780 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1783 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1784 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1785 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1786 user_channel_id: user_id,
1791 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1792 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1793 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1795 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1796 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1797 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1799 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1800 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1801 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1803 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1807 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1808 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1809 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1810 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1812 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1814 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1815 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1816 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1818 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1819 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1820 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1821 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1823 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1824 } else { (res, None) }
1826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1829 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1830 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1831 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1833 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1834 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1835 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1836 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1844 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1845 let (res, chan_option) = {
1846 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1847 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1848 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1850 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1851 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1852 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1854 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1855 if res.1.is_some() {
1856 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1857 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1858 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1859 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1860 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1861 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1862 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1864 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1865 } else { (res, None) }
1867 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1870 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1871 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1873 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1874 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1875 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1876 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1884 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1885 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1886 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1887 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1889 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1890 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1891 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1892 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1894 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1895 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1897 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1899 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1900 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1901 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1903 if !chan.is_usable() {
1904 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1906 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1908 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1912 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1913 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1914 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1916 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1917 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1918 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1920 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1921 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1923 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1925 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1929 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1930 // indicating that the payment itself failed
1931 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1932 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1933 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1934 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1935 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1937 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1938 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1942 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1943 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1944 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1947 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1949 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1950 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1951 if res.is_some() { return; }
1953 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1954 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1955 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1957 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1959 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1960 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1961 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1962 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1963 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1965 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1967 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1968 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1969 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1970 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1971 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1972 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1974 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1975 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
1976 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
1977 // definitely came from the peer in question
1978 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
1980 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
1982 match error_code & 0xff {
1984 // either from an intermediate or final node
1985 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
1986 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
1987 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
1988 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
1989 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1990 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1991 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
1992 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
1993 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
1994 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
1995 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2001 if is_from_final_node {
2002 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2003 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2004 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2005 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2006 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2007 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2010 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2011 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2015 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2016 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2017 // does not coform to the spec.
2018 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2019 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2020 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2026 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2030 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2032 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2033 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2034 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2038 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2039 let offset = match error_code {
2040 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2041 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2042 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2043 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2044 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2045 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2047 // node sending unknown code
2048 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2049 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2056 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2057 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2058 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2059 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2060 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2061 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2062 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2063 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2066 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2067 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2068 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2069 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2071 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2072 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2073 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2074 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2075 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2077 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2078 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2079 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2080 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2082 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2083 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2084 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2085 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2087 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2088 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2091 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2092 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2096 res = Some((msg, true));
2102 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2105 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2106 res = Some((None, true));
2110 // node sending unknown code
2111 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2112 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2121 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2122 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2123 } else { ((None, true)) }
2126 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2127 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2128 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2130 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2131 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2132 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2134 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2135 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2137 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2142 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2143 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2144 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2146 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2147 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2148 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2150 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2151 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2153 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2154 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2157 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2161 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2162 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = {
2163 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2164 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2166 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2167 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2168 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2170 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2171 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2174 (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed)
2176 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2179 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
2183 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2184 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2185 let mut forward_event = None;
2186 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2187 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2188 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2189 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2190 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2192 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2193 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2194 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2195 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2197 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2198 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2203 match forward_event {
2205 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2206 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2207 time_forwardable: time
2215 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2216 let ((res, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures), short_channel_id) = {
2217 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2218 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2220 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2221 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2222 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2224 let (res, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2225 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2228 ((res, pending_forwards, pending_failures), chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2230 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2233 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2234 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2236 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2241 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2242 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2243 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2245 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2246 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2247 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2249 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2251 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2255 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2256 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
2257 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2258 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2260 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2261 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2263 if !chan.is_usable() {
2264 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2267 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2268 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2269 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2271 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2272 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2273 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2274 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2275 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2277 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2279 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2280 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2281 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2282 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2283 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2284 contents: announcement,
2285 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2287 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2290 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2291 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
2295 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2297 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2298 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2300 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2301 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2303 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2304 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2305 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2306 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2310 Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order))
2312 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2319 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2320 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2321 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2322 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2324 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2325 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2326 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2327 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2329 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2330 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2332 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2333 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2335 if !chan.is_live() {
2336 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2338 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2339 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2342 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2343 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2344 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2345 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2346 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2347 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2348 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2349 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2350 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2361 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2362 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2363 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2364 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2365 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2370 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2371 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2372 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2373 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2375 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2376 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2377 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2378 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2379 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2380 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2381 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2382 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2383 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2384 msg: funding_locked,
2385 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2387 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2388 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2389 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2390 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2393 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2397 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2398 for tx in txn_matched {
2399 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2400 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2401 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2402 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2404 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2405 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2406 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2407 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2408 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2409 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2418 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2419 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2420 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2422 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2423 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2424 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2425 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2426 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2427 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2428 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2437 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2438 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2440 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2441 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2442 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2444 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2447 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2448 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2449 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2450 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2452 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2453 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2454 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2455 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2456 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2457 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2458 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2460 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2461 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2462 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2472 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2473 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2475 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2476 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2477 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2478 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2481 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2485 macro_rules! handle_error {
2486 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2489 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2490 if needs_channel_force_close {
2492 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2493 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2494 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2496 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2499 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2500 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2501 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2502 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2503 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2505 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2517 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2518 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2519 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2520 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2523 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2524 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2527 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2528 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2531 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2532 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2535 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2536 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2539 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2540 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2543 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2544 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2547 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2548 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2551 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2552 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2555 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2556 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2559 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2560 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2563 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2564 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2567 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2568 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2571 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2572 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2575 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2576 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2579 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), HandleError> {
2580 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2583 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2584 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2585 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2586 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2588 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2589 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2590 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2591 if no_connection_possible {
2592 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2593 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2594 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2595 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2597 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2598 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2599 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2609 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2610 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2611 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2612 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2613 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2614 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2615 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2617 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2618 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2619 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2628 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2629 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2631 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2632 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2633 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2634 pending_events.push(event);
2637 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2638 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2639 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2644 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2645 let mut res = Vec::new();
2646 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2647 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2648 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2649 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2650 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2651 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2652 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2656 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2661 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2665 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2666 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2667 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2668 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2669 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2673 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2680 use chain::chaininterface;
2681 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2682 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2683 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason};
2684 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2685 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2687 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2688 use util::test_utils;
2689 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2690 use util::errors::APIError;
2691 use util::logger::Logger;
2692 use util::ser::Writeable;
2694 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2695 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2696 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2697 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2698 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2699 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2700 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2704 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2705 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2707 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2708 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2710 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2712 use std::cell::RefCell;
2713 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2714 use std::default::Default;
2716 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2717 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2718 use std::time::Instant;
2721 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2722 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2723 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2728 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2729 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2732 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2733 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2736 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2737 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2740 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2741 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2744 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2745 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2750 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2752 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2753 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2758 fn onion_vectors() {
2759 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2760 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2762 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2763 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2764 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2765 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2766 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2768 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2769 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2770 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2771 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2772 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2774 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2775 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2776 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2777 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2778 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2780 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2781 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2782 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2783 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2784 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2786 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2787 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2788 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2789 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2790 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2792 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2793 let payloads = vec!(
2794 msgs::OnionHopData {
2796 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2797 short_channel_id: 0,
2799 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2803 msgs::OnionHopData {
2805 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2806 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2807 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2808 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2812 msgs::OnionHopData {
2814 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2815 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2816 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2817 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2821 msgs::OnionHopData {
2823 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2824 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2825 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2826 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2830 msgs::OnionHopData {
2832 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2833 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2834 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2835 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2841 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2842 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2844 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2848 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2849 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2851 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2852 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2853 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2855 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2856 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2858 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2859 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2861 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2862 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2864 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2865 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2867 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2868 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2871 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2872 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2873 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2874 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2876 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2877 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2882 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2883 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2884 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2885 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2887 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2888 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2890 impl Drop for Node {
2891 fn drop(&mut self) {
2892 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2893 // Check that we processed all pending events
2894 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2895 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2900 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2901 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2904 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2905 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2906 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2907 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2910 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2911 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2913 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2914 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2915 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2916 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2917 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2918 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2920 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2923 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2925 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2929 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2930 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2932 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2933 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2934 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2936 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2937 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2939 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2941 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2942 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2943 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2944 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2945 added_monitors.clear();
2947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2950 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2951 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2952 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2953 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2954 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2955 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2956 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2957 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2958 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2959 added_monitors.clear();
2962 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2965 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2967 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2968 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2969 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2970 added_monitors.clear();
2973 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2974 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2976 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2977 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2978 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2980 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2986 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2987 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2988 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2989 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2991 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2992 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2993 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2994 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2996 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3001 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3002 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3003 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3004 (match events_6[0] {
3005 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
3006 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3007 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3008 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
3010 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3014 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3015 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3016 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3020 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3021 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
3022 let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
3023 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3024 bs_announcement_sigs
3027 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3028 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3029 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3030 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3033 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3036 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3037 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3038 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3039 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3040 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3041 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3044 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3047 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3049 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3052 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3053 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3056 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3057 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3059 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3060 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3061 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3063 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3066 macro_rules! check_spends {
3067 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3069 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3070 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3071 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3072 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3077 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3078 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3079 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3082 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3083 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3084 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3085 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
3086 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3087 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
3090 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3093 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
3094 if !close_inbound_first {
3095 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
3097 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3098 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
3099 if close_inbound_first {
3100 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
3101 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3102 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3103 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3105 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3106 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
3107 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3108 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3110 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3111 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3112 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3114 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3115 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
3116 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3117 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3119 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3120 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3122 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3123 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3124 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
3125 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3131 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3132 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3133 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
3134 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3137 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3140 (as_update, bs_update)
3145 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3146 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3149 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3150 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3151 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3152 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3153 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3154 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3157 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
3159 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3160 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3165 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3166 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3168 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3169 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3170 added_monitors.clear();
3175 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3176 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3178 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3179 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3180 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3181 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3182 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3183 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3184 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
3185 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
3186 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3187 if $fail_backwards {
3188 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3190 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3192 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3193 if $fail_backwards {
3194 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3195 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3197 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3199 added_monitors.clear();
3205 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3208 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3209 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3210 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3211 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3212 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3213 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3214 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3219 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3220 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3222 let mut payment_event = {
3223 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3224 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3226 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3227 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3228 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3230 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3232 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3233 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3235 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3236 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3237 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3239 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3240 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3242 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3246 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3247 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3249 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3250 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3251 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3253 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3254 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3255 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3257 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3260 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3261 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3262 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3268 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3271 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3272 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3273 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3275 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3276 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
3277 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3279 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3281 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3283 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3285 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3290 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3291 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3292 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3293 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3294 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3295 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
3298 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3299 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3300 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3302 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3303 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3304 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3305 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3306 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3307 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3308 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3309 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3311 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3314 assert!(events.is_empty());
3316 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3317 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3324 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3325 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3326 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3328 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3329 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3331 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3336 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3337 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3340 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3342 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3343 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3344 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3345 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3346 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3349 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3352 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3353 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3354 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3355 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3356 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3359 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3361 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3363 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3364 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3368 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3369 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3370 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3373 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3374 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
3375 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3377 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3378 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3379 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3381 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3382 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3387 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3388 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3389 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3390 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3391 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3392 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3393 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3394 // second-to-last node!
3395 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3398 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3399 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3400 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3402 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3403 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3404 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3405 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3406 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3407 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3408 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3409 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3411 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3414 assert!(events.is_empty());
3416 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3417 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3424 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3426 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3427 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3429 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
3430 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3431 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3433 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3438 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3439 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3442 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3443 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3444 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3445 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3446 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3448 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3449 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3451 for _ in 0..node_count {
3452 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3453 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3454 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3455 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3457 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3458 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3459 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3461 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3462 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3463 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3464 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3465 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3473 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3474 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3475 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3476 let channel_id = chan.2;
3478 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3480 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3481 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3487 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3491 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
3492 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3493 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3494 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3495 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3496 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
3497 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
3498 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
3499 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
3500 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3502 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3504 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
3506 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3507 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3510 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3511 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3512 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3513 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3514 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3516 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3519 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3521 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3522 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3523 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3526 let payment_event = {
3527 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3528 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3529 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3531 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3532 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3534 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3535 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3536 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3537 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3540 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3541 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3542 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3545 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3546 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3547 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3548 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3549 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3550 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3553 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3554 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3555 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3556 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3557 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3558 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3561 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3562 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3565 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3566 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3569 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3572 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3573 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3575 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3576 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3579 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3584 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3585 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3586 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3587 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3588 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3589 let channel_id = chan.2;
3591 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3593 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3594 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3600 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3602 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3603 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3606 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3607 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3608 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3609 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3612 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3615 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3617 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3618 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3619 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3622 let payment_event = {
3623 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3624 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3625 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3627 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3628 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3630 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3631 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3632 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3633 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3636 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3639 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3643 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3644 let nodes = create_network(2);
3645 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3646 let channel_id = chan.2;
3648 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3650 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3651 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3657 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3658 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3659 // update_fee (never committed) ->
3660 // (3) update_fee ->
3661 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3662 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3663 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3664 // <- (1) RAA delivered
3665 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
3666 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3667 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3668 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3669 // revoke_and_ack ->
3670 // B should send no response here
3671 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
3672 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3673 // revoke_and_ack ->
3675 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3676 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3677 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3680 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3681 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3682 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3683 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3684 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3689 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3690 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3691 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3694 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3696 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3697 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3699 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3700 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3701 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3702 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3705 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3707 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3709 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3711 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3712 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3714 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3715 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3716 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3717 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3718 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3719 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3720 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3722 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3723 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3725 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3727 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3731 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3734 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3737 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3738 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3741 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3746 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3747 let nodes = create_network(2);
3748 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3749 let channel_id = chan.2;
3751 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3753 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3754 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3759 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3760 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3762 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3763 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3764 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3765 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3766 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3770 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3772 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3773 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3777 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3778 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3781 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3782 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3785 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3786 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3791 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3792 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3793 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3794 let channel_id = chan.2;
3796 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3798 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3799 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3805 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3807 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3808 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3810 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3811 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3812 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3813 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3814 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3816 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3818 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3820 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3821 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3824 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3826 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3828 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3829 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3831 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3832 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3833 added_monitors.clear();
3835 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3836 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3837 // node[1] has nothing to do
3839 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3840 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3843 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3844 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3846 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3847 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3849 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3850 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3851 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3852 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3853 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3854 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3856 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3857 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3860 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3861 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3863 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3865 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3867 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3868 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3870 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3872 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3873 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3875 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3878 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3879 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3881 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3882 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3884 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3888 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3890 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3891 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3892 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3896 fn test_update_fee() {
3897 let nodes = create_network(2);
3898 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3899 let channel_id = chan.2;
3901 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3903 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3904 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3910 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3911 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3912 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
3913 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3914 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3915 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3916 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
3917 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3918 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
3919 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3920 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3921 // revoke_and_ack ->
3923 // Create and deliver (1)...
3924 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3925 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3927 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3928 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3929 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3930 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3931 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3933 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3935 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3937 // Generate (2) and (3):
3938 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3939 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3944 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3945 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3948 // Create and deliver (4)...
3949 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3950 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3951 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3952 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3953 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3954 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3956 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3958 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3960 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3962 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3966 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3967 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3968 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3972 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3973 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3976 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3977 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3978 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3982 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3983 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3985 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3986 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3989 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3990 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3991 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3995 fn fake_network_test() {
3996 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3997 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3998 let nodes = create_network(4);
4000 // Create some initial channels
4001 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4002 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4003 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4005 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4006 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4007 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4008 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4009 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4011 // Send some more payments
4012 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4013 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
4014 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
4016 // Test failure packets
4017 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
4018 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
4020 // Add a new channel that skips 3
4021 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4023 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4024 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4025 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4026 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4027 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4028 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4029 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4031 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
4032 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4033 hops.push(RouteHop {
4034 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4035 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4037 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4039 hops.push(RouteHop {
4040 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4041 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4043 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4045 hops.push(RouteHop {
4046 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4047 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4049 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4051 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4052 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4053 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4055 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4056 hops.push(RouteHop {
4057 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4058 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4060 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4062 hops.push(RouteHop {
4063 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4064 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4066 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4068 hops.push(RouteHop {
4069 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4070 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4072 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4074 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4075 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4076 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4078 // Claim the rebalances...
4079 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4080 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4082 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4083 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4085 // Send some payments across both channels
4086 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4087 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4088 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4090 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4092 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4094 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4095 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4096 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4098 // Close down the channels...
4099 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4100 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4101 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4102 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4103 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4107 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4108 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4109 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4110 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4112 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4113 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4114 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4115 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4116 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4117 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4119 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4121 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4122 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4124 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4125 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4127 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4128 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4129 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4132 #[derive(PartialEq)]
4133 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4134 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4136 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4137 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4138 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4140 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4141 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4143 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4145 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4146 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4147 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4149 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4150 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4151 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4152 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4153 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4154 res.push(tx.clone());
4159 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4160 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4163 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4165 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4166 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4167 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4168 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4169 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4170 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4172 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4174 res.push(tx.clone());
4178 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4181 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4185 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4186 /// HTLC transaction.
4187 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4188 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4189 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4190 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4191 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4192 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4196 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4199 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4200 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4202 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4203 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4204 let mut found_prev = false;
4206 for tx in prev_txn {
4207 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4208 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4209 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4210 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4216 assert!(found_prev);
4218 let mut res = Vec::new();
4219 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4223 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4224 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4225 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4226 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4227 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4230 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4233 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4234 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4235 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4236 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4239 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4243 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4244 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4248 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4250 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4251 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4253 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4254 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4256 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4257 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4262 fn channel_reserve_test() {
4264 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4265 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4267 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4268 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4269 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4270 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4271 chan.get_value_stat()
4275 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4276 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4277 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4279 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4280 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4282 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4283 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4285 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4286 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4287 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4288 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4289 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4293 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4295 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4296 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4297 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4298 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4303 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4304 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4305 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4306 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4308 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4309 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4310 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4312 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4317 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4318 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4320 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4322 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4324 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4325 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4326 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4328 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4329 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4333 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4334 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4335 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4337 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4338 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4341 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4344 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4345 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4346 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4347 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4348 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4351 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4352 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4353 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4354 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4355 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4359 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4360 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4361 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4362 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4364 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4365 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4369 // adding pending output
4370 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4371 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4373 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4374 let payment_event_1 = {
4375 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4378 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4379 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4380 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4382 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4384 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4385 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4387 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4388 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4389 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4390 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4395 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4396 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4398 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4399 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4400 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4401 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4402 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4404 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4406 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4407 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4408 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4409 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4410 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4411 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4413 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4414 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4415 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4416 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4419 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4421 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4425 // split the rest to test holding cell
4426 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4427 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4429 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4430 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4433 // now see if they go through on both sides
4434 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4435 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4436 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4438 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4439 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4441 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4443 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4444 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4445 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4446 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4450 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4451 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4452 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4454 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4455 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4457 // flush the pending htlc
4458 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4461 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4463 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4464 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4466 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4469 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4471 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4472 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4473 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4475 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4476 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4478 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4479 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4480 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4481 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4482 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4483 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4485 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4486 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4487 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4488 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4490 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4491 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4493 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4494 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4496 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4497 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4498 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4500 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4503 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4504 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4505 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4507 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4510 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4511 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4512 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4514 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4515 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4516 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4517 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4519 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4520 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4524 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4525 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4526 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4527 let nodes = create_network(5);
4529 // Create some initial channels
4530 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4531 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4532 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4533 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4535 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4536 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4537 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4538 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4539 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4541 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4542 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4544 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4545 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4546 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4547 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4549 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4550 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4551 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4553 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4554 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4556 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4557 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4559 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4560 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4561 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4562 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4564 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4565 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4566 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4568 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4569 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4571 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4572 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4574 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4575 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4577 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4578 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4579 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4580 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4588 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4589 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4590 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4592 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4594 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4595 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4597 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4598 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4600 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4602 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4603 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4604 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4606 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4607 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4608 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4611 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4612 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4613 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4614 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4615 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4619 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4620 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4621 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4622 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4623 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4626 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4628 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4629 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4631 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4632 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4633 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4634 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4635 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4638 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4640 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4641 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4643 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4645 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4646 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4647 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4649 // Create some new channels:
4650 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4652 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4653 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4654 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4655 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4656 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4657 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4658 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4659 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4660 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4661 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4662 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4663 // Revoke the old state
4664 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4667 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4668 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4670 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4671 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4672 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4673 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4675 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4676 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4678 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4680 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4681 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4682 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4683 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4684 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4686 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4687 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4688 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4692 fn revoked_output_claim() {
4693 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4694 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4695 let nodes = create_network(2);
4696 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4697 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4698 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4699 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4700 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4701 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4702 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4703 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4705 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4706 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4707 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4708 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4709 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4711 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4713 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4714 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4716 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4717 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4718 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4722 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4723 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4724 let nodes = create_network(2);
4726 // Create some new channel:
4727 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4729 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4730 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4731 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4732 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4733 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4735 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4736 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4737 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4738 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4739 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4740 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4741 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4742 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4743 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4745 //Revoke the old state
4746 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4749 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4751 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4753 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4754 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4755 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4757 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4758 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4760 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4762 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4763 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4764 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4765 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4766 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4767 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4768 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4769 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4771 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4772 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4773 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4775 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4776 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4777 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4778 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4779 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4780 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4782 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4783 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4784 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4788 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4789 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4790 let nodes = create_network(2);
4792 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4794 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4795 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4796 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4797 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4798 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4799 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4801 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4802 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4804 //Revoke the old state
4805 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4808 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4810 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4812 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4813 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4814 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4816 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4817 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4818 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4819 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4820 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4821 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4822 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4824 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4825 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4826 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4828 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4829 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4830 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4831 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4832 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4834 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4835 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4836 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4837 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4838 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4839 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4840 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4841 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4843 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4844 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4846 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4847 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4848 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4849 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4850 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4851 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4853 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4854 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4855 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4859 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4860 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4861 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4862 let nodes = create_network(2);
4863 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4865 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4866 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4868 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4869 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4871 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4872 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4874 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4878 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4879 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4881 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4882 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4885 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4886 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4888 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4889 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4891 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4895 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4896 // registering new transactions
4897 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4901 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4902 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4903 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4904 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4905 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4907 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4909 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4911 let mut payment_event = {
4912 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4915 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4916 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4917 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4920 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4921 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4923 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4924 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4926 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4927 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4930 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4931 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4933 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4934 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4935 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4936 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4939 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4940 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4943 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4944 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4945 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4947 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4948 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4949 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4951 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4952 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4954 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4958 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4959 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4960 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4961 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4962 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4966 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4967 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4969 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4970 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4971 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4973 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4974 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4976 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4979 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4981 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4982 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4983 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4985 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4986 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4987 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4988 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4989 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4990 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4991 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4993 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4997 fn test_unconf_chan() {
4998 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4999 let nodes = create_network(2);
5000 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5002 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5003 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
5004 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
5005 mem::drop(channel_state);
5007 let mut headers = Vec::new();
5008 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5009 headers.push(header.clone());
5011 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5012 headers.push(header.clone());
5014 while !headers.is_empty() {
5015 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
5018 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5019 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5021 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5022 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5024 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5027 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5028 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
5029 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
5032 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
5033 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
5034 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
5035 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5036 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5038 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
5039 for msg in reestablish_1 {
5040 resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
5042 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5043 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5045 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
5048 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
5049 for msg in reestablish_2 {
5050 resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
5052 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5053 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5055 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5058 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5059 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5060 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5062 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5064 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
5065 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
5066 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5068 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5071 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5072 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5073 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5075 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5077 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5078 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5079 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5080 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5082 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5084 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5085 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5086 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5087 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5088 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5090 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5091 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5093 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5094 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5097 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5098 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5100 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5101 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5102 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5103 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5104 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5107 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5111 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5113 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5114 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5116 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5119 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5120 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5121 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5123 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5125 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5126 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5127 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5128 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5130 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5131 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5132 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5133 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5134 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5136 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5137 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5139 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5140 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5143 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5144 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5146 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5147 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5148 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5149 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5150 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5153 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5159 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5160 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5161 let nodes = create_network(3);
5162 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5163 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5165 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5166 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5167 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5169 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5170 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5171 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5172 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5174 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5175 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5176 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5178 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5179 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5180 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5181 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5183 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5184 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5186 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5187 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5189 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5191 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5192 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5194 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5195 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5197 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5200 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5201 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5202 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5204 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5208 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5209 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5212 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5213 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5214 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5215 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5216 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5217 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5219 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5222 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5223 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5225 let payment_event = {
5226 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5229 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5230 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5231 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5233 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5235 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5236 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5238 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5239 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5242 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5243 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5246 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5247 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5248 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5251 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5252 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5259 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5260 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5261 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5262 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5263 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5264 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5265 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5266 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5267 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5268 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5269 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5270 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5271 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5272 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5273 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5274 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5275 // Everything was delivered...
5276 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5279 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5280 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5282 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5286 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5287 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5288 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5290 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5291 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5293 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5294 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5296 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5297 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5298 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5300 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5303 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5306 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5307 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5308 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
5309 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5310 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5311 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5312 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5313 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5314 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5315 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5316 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5318 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5321 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5322 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5324 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5325 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5327 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5328 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5330 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5333 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5334 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5337 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5338 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5341 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5342 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5343 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5346 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5347 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5355 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5356 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5357 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5358 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5359 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5360 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5361 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5362 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5364 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5365 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5370 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5371 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5372 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5373 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5374 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5375 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5376 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5377 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5378 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5379 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5380 // Everything was delivered...
5381 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5384 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5385 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5386 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5388 // Channel should still work fine...
5389 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5390 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5394 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5395 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5396 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5397 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5401 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5402 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5403 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5404 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5408 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5409 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5410 let nodes = create_network(2);
5411 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5413 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5414 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5416 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5417 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5418 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5420 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5421 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5422 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5424 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5427 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5428 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5429 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5431 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5432 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5433 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5438 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5439 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5440 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5441 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5443 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5444 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5446 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5447 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5448 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5452 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
5453 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
5454 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
5455 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5456 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5458 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5460 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5461 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5462 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5464 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
5465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5467 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5468 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5470 Event::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5471 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5474 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5477 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5478 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5480 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5481 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5482 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5483 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5484 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5485 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5486 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5488 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5489 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5490 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5492 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5493 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5495 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5498 let (_, commitment_update) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
5499 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5502 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5505 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5506 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5508 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5509 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5510 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5511 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5513 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5514 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5516 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5517 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5519 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5520 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5522 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5524 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5525 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5526 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5527 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5528 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5529 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5530 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5531 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5534 let bs_second_commitment_signed = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap().unwrap();
5535 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5536 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5537 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5538 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5539 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5542 let as_commitment_signed = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5543 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5544 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5545 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5546 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5547 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5550 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5551 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
5552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5554 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5555 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5558 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5561 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5562 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5564 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5565 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5568 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5569 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5571 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5572 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5574 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
5575 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5577 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5580 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5583 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5587 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
5588 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
5589 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5590 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5592 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5593 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5595 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5596 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5599 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5600 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5602 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5606 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5607 // PaymentFailed event
5609 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5612 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
5613 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
5614 // a disconnect in between
5615 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5616 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5618 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5619 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5621 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5622 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5625 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5626 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
5627 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5630 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5631 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5632 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5635 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5636 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5639 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5640 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5641 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
5642 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5643 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5644 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5646 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5648 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5649 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5651 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5652 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5653 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5655 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5658 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
5660 // Now set it to failed again...
5661 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5662 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5663 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5666 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5667 assert!(events_4.is_empty());
5668 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5671 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5672 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5673 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5676 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
5677 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5678 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5681 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5682 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5684 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5685 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5688 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5689 // PaymentFailed event
5691 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5695 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
5696 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
5697 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
5700 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
5701 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
5703 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
5704 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
5705 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
5706 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
5707 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
5708 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
5709 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
5710 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
5711 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
5712 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
5713 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
5714 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
5715 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
5716 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
5717 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
5718 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
5719 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
5720 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5721 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5723 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5725 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5726 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5727 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5729 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5730 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5733 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5734 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
5735 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5737 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
5738 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
5739 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5741 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5742 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5743 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
5744 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5745 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5746 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5747 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5748 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5749 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5750 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5752 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5753 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5754 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5755 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5757 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5758 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5760 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5763 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
5764 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
5765 } else { panic!(); }
5768 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
5770 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5773 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5774 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5775 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5778 // Now fix monitor updating...
5779 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5780 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5783 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
5784 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5785 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5787 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5788 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5789 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5790 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5792 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5793 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5795 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5796 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5798 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
5801 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5802 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5803 assert!(events_4.is_empty());
5805 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5806 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5807 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5808 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5810 let mut as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5812 let mut bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5815 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5816 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5818 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5819 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5820 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5822 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
5823 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
5824 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5826 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5827 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5828 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5829 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5830 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
5831 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
5833 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5835 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5836 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5837 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5839 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5840 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5842 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5845 let (as_resp_raa, as_resp_cu) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5846 assert!(as_resp_cu.is_none());
5847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5849 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
5853 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
5854 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5856 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5857 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
5858 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
5860 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
5861 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
5864 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
5866 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5867 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
5868 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
5869 Event::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5870 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5873 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5877 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5879 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5880 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5881 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still
5882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5884 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
5885 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5887 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5888 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5890 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5891 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5894 let as_commitment_update;
5895 let bs_second_commitment_update;
5897 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
5898 as_commitment_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5899 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5900 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5901 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5902 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5903 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5907 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
5908 bs_second_commitment_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5909 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5910 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5911 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5912 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5913 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5917 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
5920 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5921 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5923 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5924 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5926 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5927 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5929 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5932 handle_initial_raa!();
5934 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5935 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5937 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5938 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5940 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5941 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5944 handle_initial_raa!();
5946 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5947 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5949 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5950 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5952 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5953 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5955 assert!(bs_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5960 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5961 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5963 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5964 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5966 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5967 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5971 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5972 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5975 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5976 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5979 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5982 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5985 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5987 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5988 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5990 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5991 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5992 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5997 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6001 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
6002 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
6003 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
6004 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
6005 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
6006 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
6007 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
6011 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
6012 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
6013 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
6014 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
6015 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
6019 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
6020 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
6021 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
6022 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
6023 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
6024 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
6028 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
6029 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
6030 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6031 let nodes = create_network(2);
6033 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
6035 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6036 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6037 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6038 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6040 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6042 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6043 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6045 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6046 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6048 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
6050 let mut chan_announcement;
6052 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
6054 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6055 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
6056 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
6057 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
6058 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
6059 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
6060 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
6061 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
6062 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6067 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6068 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6069 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6070 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6071 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6072 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6073 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6074 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6075 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6076 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6077 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6078 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6079 contents: $unsigned_msg
6084 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6085 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6086 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6087 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6089 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6090 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6091 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6092 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6093 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6095 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6096 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6097 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6098 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());