1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError, RAACommitmentOrder};
30 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
45 use std::collections::HashMap;
46 use std::collections::hash_map;
48 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
66 use ln::router::Route;
67 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
70 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
73 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
75 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
76 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
77 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
87 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
94 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
96 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
97 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
98 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
99 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
102 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
104 pub enum HTLCSource {
105 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
108 session_priv: SecretKey,
109 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
110 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
111 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
116 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
117 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
118 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
119 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
128 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
136 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
138 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
139 err: msgs::HandleError,
140 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
142 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
144 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
148 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
149 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
151 data: err.to_string()
155 needs_channel_force_close: false,
159 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
163 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
164 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
166 data: err.to_string()
170 needs_channel_force_close: true,
174 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
175 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
178 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
179 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
182 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
185 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
187 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
189 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
191 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
192 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
194 data: msg.to_string()
199 needs_channel_force_close: false,
203 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
206 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
208 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
210 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
212 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
213 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
215 data: msg.to_string()
220 needs_channel_force_close: true,
225 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
226 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
228 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
229 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
231 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
235 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
236 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
237 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
238 /// probably increase this significantly.
239 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
241 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
242 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
244 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
247 struct ChannelHolder {
248 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
249 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
250 next_forward: Instant,
251 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
252 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
253 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
254 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
255 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
256 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
257 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
259 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
261 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
262 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
263 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
264 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
265 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
266 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
269 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
271 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
272 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
273 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
274 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
275 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
280 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
281 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
283 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
284 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
286 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
287 /// to individual Channels.
288 pub struct ChannelManager {
289 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
290 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
291 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
292 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
293 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
295 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
296 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
297 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
298 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
300 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
301 our_network_key: SecretKey,
303 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
305 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
310 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
311 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
312 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
313 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
314 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
315 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
316 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
318 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
319 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
320 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
321 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
324 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
326 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
327 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
330 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
332 macro_rules! secp_call {
333 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
336 Err(_) => return Err($err),
343 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
345 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
346 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
351 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
352 pub struct ChannelDetails {
353 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
354 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
355 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
356 /// lifetime of the channel.
357 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
358 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
359 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
360 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
361 /// The node_id of our counterparty
362 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
363 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
364 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
365 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
369 impl ChannelManager {
370 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
372 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
373 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
375 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
376 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
378 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
379 pub fn new(fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
380 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
382 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
383 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
384 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
385 monitor: monitor.clone(),
389 announce_channels_publicly,
390 fee_proportional_millionths,
391 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
394 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
395 by_id: HashMap::new(),
396 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
397 next_forward: Instant::now(),
398 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
399 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
401 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
403 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
409 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
410 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
414 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
416 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
417 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
418 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
419 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
421 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
422 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
424 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
425 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
426 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
427 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
428 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
429 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
430 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
431 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
432 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
434 panic!("RNG is bad???");
437 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
440 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
441 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
442 node_id: their_network_key,
448 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
449 /// more information.
450 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
451 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
452 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
453 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
454 res.push(ChannelDetails {
455 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
456 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
457 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
458 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
459 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
465 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
466 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
467 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
468 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
469 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
470 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
471 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
472 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
473 // really wanted anyway.
474 if channel.is_live() {
475 res.push(ChannelDetails {
476 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
477 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
478 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
479 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
480 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
487 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
488 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
489 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
491 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
492 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
493 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
494 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
495 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
496 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
497 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
498 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
499 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
500 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
501 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
503 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
504 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
509 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
510 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
511 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
513 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
514 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
519 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
520 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
521 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
525 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
534 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
535 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
536 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
537 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
538 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
540 for tx in local_txn {
541 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
543 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
544 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
545 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
546 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
547 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
548 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
549 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
552 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
553 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
554 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
556 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
557 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
558 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
559 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
560 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
567 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
568 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
569 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
570 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
576 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
577 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
578 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
579 for chan in self.list_channels() {
580 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
584 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
586 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
588 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
589 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
590 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
591 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
595 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
596 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
597 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
598 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
599 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
604 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
605 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
606 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
612 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
614 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
615 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
616 let mut res = [0; 32];
617 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
621 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
622 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
623 let mut res = [0; 32];
624 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
630 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
631 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
632 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
633 let mut res = [0; 32];
634 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
639 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
640 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
641 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
642 let mut res = [0; 32];
643 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
647 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
649 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
650 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
651 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
653 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
654 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
656 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
657 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
658 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
659 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
660 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
662 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
664 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
665 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
667 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
673 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
674 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
675 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
677 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
678 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
684 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
694 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
695 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
696 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
697 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
698 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
699 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
700 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
701 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
703 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
704 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
705 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
706 // the intended recipient).
707 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
708 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
709 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
711 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
712 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
713 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
714 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
718 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
719 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
720 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
722 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
723 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
724 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
726 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
728 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
732 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
734 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
742 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
743 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
745 for i in 0..dst.len() {
750 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
751 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
752 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
753 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
756 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
757 let end_len = iters * 65;
758 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
759 res.resize(end_len, 0);
761 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
762 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
763 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
764 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
765 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
770 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
771 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
773 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
774 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
775 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
776 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
778 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
779 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
780 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
783 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
786 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
787 hmac.input(&packet_data);
788 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
789 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
794 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
795 hop_data: packet_data,
800 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
801 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
802 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
803 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
805 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
806 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
807 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
808 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
809 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
810 data: packet_crypted,
814 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
815 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
817 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
820 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
821 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
822 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
823 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
827 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
828 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
831 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
833 failuremsg: failuremsg,
837 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
838 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
839 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
845 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
846 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
847 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
850 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
851 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
854 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
855 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
856 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
857 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
863 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
864 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
865 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
866 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
867 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
868 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
869 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
870 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
873 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
874 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
876 let mut channel_state = None;
877 macro_rules! return_err {
878 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
880 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
881 if channel_state.is_none() {
882 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
884 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
885 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
886 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
887 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
888 })), channel_state.unwrap());
893 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
894 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
895 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
896 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
897 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
898 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
899 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
900 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
903 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
904 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
905 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
906 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
907 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
910 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
911 let next_hop_data = {
912 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
913 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
914 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
916 let error_code = match err {
917 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
918 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
920 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
926 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
928 // final_expiry_too_soon
929 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
930 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
932 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
933 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
934 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
936 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
937 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
938 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
941 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
942 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
943 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
944 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
946 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
948 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
950 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
951 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
952 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
955 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
956 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
957 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
959 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
961 let blinding_factor = {
962 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
963 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
964 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
965 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
966 sha.result(&mut res);
967 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
969 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
975 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
976 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
979 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
981 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
982 hop_data: new_packet_data,
983 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
986 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
987 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
988 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
989 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
990 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
991 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
992 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
996 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
997 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
998 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
999 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1000 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1001 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1002 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1004 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1006 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1007 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1009 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1010 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1011 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1012 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1013 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1014 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1015 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1017 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1018 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1020 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1021 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1022 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1024 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1025 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1027 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1028 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1029 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1030 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1032 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1033 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1038 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1039 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1040 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1042 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1043 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1045 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1046 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1048 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1053 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1056 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1057 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1058 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1059 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1060 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1064 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1066 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1067 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1068 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1069 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1070 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1071 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1072 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1073 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1074 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1075 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1078 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1079 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1081 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1087 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1089 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1090 /// fields for more info.
1092 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1093 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1094 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1095 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1096 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1097 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1099 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1101 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1102 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1103 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1104 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1105 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1107 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1108 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1109 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1110 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1114 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1115 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1116 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1118 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1120 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1122 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1123 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1124 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1125 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1127 let (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed) = {
1128 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1130 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1131 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1132 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1137 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1138 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1139 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1141 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1142 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1144 if !chan.is_live() {
1145 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1147 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1148 route: route.clone(),
1149 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1150 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1151 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1154 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1155 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1156 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1157 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1159 Some((update_add, commitment_signed))
1165 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1168 Some((update_add, commitment_signed)) => {
1169 (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed)
1171 None => return Ok(()),
1175 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1176 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1177 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1178 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1179 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1180 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1181 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1182 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1190 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1192 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1194 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1195 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1196 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1197 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1200 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1201 pending_events.push($event);
1206 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1207 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1208 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1210 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1211 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1212 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1215 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1216 mem::drop(channel_state);
1217 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1218 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1228 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1229 // lock before add_update_monitor
1230 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1233 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1234 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1238 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1239 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1240 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1241 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1243 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1249 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1250 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1252 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1254 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1256 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1257 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1259 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1260 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1261 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1262 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1263 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1267 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1269 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1270 /// Will likely generate further events.
1271 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1272 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1273 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1275 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1276 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1278 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1282 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1283 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1284 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1285 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1287 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1288 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1289 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1290 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1291 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1292 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1294 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1299 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1301 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1302 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1303 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1304 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1305 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1306 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1308 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1310 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1311 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1316 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1318 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1319 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1320 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1321 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1322 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1323 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1324 // this channel currently :/.
1331 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1332 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1335 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1336 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1338 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1340 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1344 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1345 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1347 new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1348 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1349 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1350 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1351 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1352 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1353 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1355 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1360 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1361 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1362 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1363 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1364 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1366 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1367 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1370 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1371 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1372 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1379 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1381 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1382 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1386 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1387 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1388 events.append(&mut new_events);
1391 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1392 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1393 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1394 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1395 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1396 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1397 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1398 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1404 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1405 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1406 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1407 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1408 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1409 /// still-available channels.
1410 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1412 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1413 mem::drop(channel_state);
1414 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1415 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1416 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1417 if let Some(channel_update) = channel_update {
1418 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1419 update: channel_update,
1422 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1423 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1424 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1427 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1430 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1431 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1432 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1433 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1434 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1436 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1437 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1441 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1442 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1443 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1447 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1448 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1449 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1450 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1453 (chan.get_their_node_id(), Some((msg, commitment_msg)))
1455 Ok(None) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), None),
1457 //TODO: Do something with e?
1464 Some((msg, commitment_msg)) => {
1465 mem::drop(channel_state);
1467 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1468 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1470 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1471 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1472 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1473 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1474 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1476 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1486 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1487 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1488 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1490 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1491 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1492 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1493 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1494 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1495 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1497 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1498 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1499 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1500 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1501 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1502 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1507 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1509 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1510 mem::drop(channel_state);
1511 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1512 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1516 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1517 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1518 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1519 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1520 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1522 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1523 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1529 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1530 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1531 Ok((msgs, Some(chan_monitor))) => {
1532 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1533 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1535 (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs)
1537 Ok((msgs, None)) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs),
1539 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1540 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1541 //TODO: Do something with e?
1547 mem::drop(channel_state);
1548 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs {
1549 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1550 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1552 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1553 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1554 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1555 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1556 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1558 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1566 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1567 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1568 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1571 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1572 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1574 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1575 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1576 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1577 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1578 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1581 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1582 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1583 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1584 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1585 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1586 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1587 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1589 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1590 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1591 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1593 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1594 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1595 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1601 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1604 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1605 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1606 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1608 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1610 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1611 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1612 new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1613 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1618 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1619 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1620 new_events.push(events::Event::SendRevokeAndACK {
1621 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1622 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1627 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1631 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1642 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1643 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1645 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1647 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1648 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1651 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut new_events);
1654 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1655 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1656 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1658 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1659 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1660 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1663 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1664 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1665 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1666 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1670 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1671 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1672 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1673 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1675 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1676 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1677 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1679 chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1680 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1681 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1683 //TODO: same as above
1684 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1687 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1688 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1689 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1690 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1691 output_script: output_script,
1692 user_channel_id: user_id,
1697 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1698 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1699 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1700 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1701 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1702 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1703 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1704 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1706 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1707 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1708 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1711 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1715 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1718 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1719 // lock before add_update_monitor
1720 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1723 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1724 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1725 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1726 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1728 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1735 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1736 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1737 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1738 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1740 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1741 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1742 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1744 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1745 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1748 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1750 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1753 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1754 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1755 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1756 user_channel_id: user_id,
1761 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1762 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1763 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1765 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1766 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1767 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1769 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1770 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1771 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1773 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1777 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1778 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1779 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1780 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1782 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1784 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1785 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1786 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1788 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1789 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1790 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1791 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1793 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1794 } else { (res, None) }
1796 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1799 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1800 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1801 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1803 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1804 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1805 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1806 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1814 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1815 let (res, chan_option) = {
1816 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1817 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1818 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1819 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1820 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1821 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1822 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1824 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1825 if res.1.is_some() {
1826 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1827 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1828 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1829 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1830 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1831 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1832 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1834 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1835 } else { (res, None) }
1837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1840 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1841 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1843 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1844 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1845 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1846 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1854 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1855 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1856 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1857 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1859 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1860 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1861 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1862 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1864 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1865 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1867 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1869 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1870 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1871 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1873 if !chan.is_usable() {
1874 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1876 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1878 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1882 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1883 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1884 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1886 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1887 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1888 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1890 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1891 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1893 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1895 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1899 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1900 // indicating that the payment itself failed
1901 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1902 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1903 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1904 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1905 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1907 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1908 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1912 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1913 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1914 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1917 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1919 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1920 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1921 if res.is_some() { return; }
1923 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1924 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1925 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1927 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1929 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1930 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1931 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1932 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1933 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1935 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1937 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1938 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1939 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1940 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1941 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1942 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1944 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1945 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
1946 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
1947 // definitely came from the peer in question
1948 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
1950 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
1952 match error_code & 0xff {
1954 // either from an intermediate or final node
1955 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
1956 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
1957 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
1958 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
1959 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1960 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1961 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
1962 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
1963 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
1964 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
1965 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
1971 if is_from_final_node {
1972 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
1973 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
1974 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
1975 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
1976 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1977 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
1980 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1981 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
1985 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
1986 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
1987 // does not coform to the spec.
1988 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
1989 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1990 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1996 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2000 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2002 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2003 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2004 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2008 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2009 let offset = match error_code {
2010 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2011 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2012 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2013 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2014 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2015 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2017 // node sending unknown code
2018 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2019 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2026 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2027 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2028 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2029 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2030 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2031 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2032 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2033 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2036 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2037 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2038 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2039 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2041 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2042 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2043 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2044 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2045 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2047 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2048 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2049 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2050 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2052 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2053 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2054 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2055 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2057 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2058 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2061 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2062 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2066 res = Some((msg, true));
2072 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2075 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2076 res = Some((None, true));
2080 // node sending unknown code
2081 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2082 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2091 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2092 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2093 } else { ((None, true)) }
2096 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2097 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2098 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2100 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2101 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2102 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2104 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2105 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2107 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2112 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2113 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2114 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2116 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2117 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2118 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2120 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2121 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2123 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2124 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2127 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2131 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2132 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = {
2133 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2134 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2136 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2137 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2138 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2140 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2141 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2144 (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed)
2146 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2149 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
2153 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2154 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2155 let mut forward_event = None;
2156 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2157 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2158 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2159 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2160 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2162 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2163 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2165 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2167 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2168 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2173 match forward_event {
2175 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2176 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2177 time_forwardable: time
2185 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2186 let ((res, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures), short_channel_id) = {
2187 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2188 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2190 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2191 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2192 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2194 let (res, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2195 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2198 ((res, pending_forwards, pending_failures), chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2200 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2203 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2204 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2206 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2211 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2212 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2213 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2215 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2216 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2217 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2219 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2221 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2225 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2226 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
2227 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2228 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2230 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2231 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2233 if !chan.is_usable() {
2234 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2237 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2238 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2239 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2241 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2242 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2243 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2244 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2245 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2247 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2249 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2250 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2251 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2252 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2253 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2254 contents: announcement,
2255 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2257 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2260 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2261 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
2265 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2267 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2268 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2270 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2271 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2273 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2274 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2275 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2276 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2280 Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order))
2282 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2289 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2290 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2291 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2292 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2294 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2295 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2296 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2297 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2299 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2300 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2302 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2303 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2305 if !chan.is_live() {
2306 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2308 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2309 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2312 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2313 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2314 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2315 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2316 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2317 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2318 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2319 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2320 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2331 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2332 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2333 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2334 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2335 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2340 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2341 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2342 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2343 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2345 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2346 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2347 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2348 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2349 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2350 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2351 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2352 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2353 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2354 msg: funding_locked,
2355 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2357 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2358 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2359 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2360 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2363 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2367 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2368 for tx in txn_matched {
2369 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2370 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2371 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2372 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2374 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2375 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2376 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2377 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2378 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2379 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2388 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2389 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2390 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2392 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2393 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2394 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2395 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2396 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2397 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2398 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2407 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2408 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2410 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2411 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2412 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2414 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2417 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2418 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2419 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2420 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2422 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2423 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2424 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2425 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2426 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2427 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2428 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2430 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2431 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2432 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2442 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2443 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2445 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2446 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2447 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2448 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2451 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2455 macro_rules! handle_error {
2456 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2459 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2460 if needs_channel_force_close {
2462 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2463 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2464 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2466 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2469 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2470 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2471 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2472 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2473 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2475 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2487 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2488 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2489 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2490 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2493 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2494 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2497 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2498 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2501 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2502 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2505 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2506 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2509 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2510 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2513 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2514 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2517 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2518 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2521 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2522 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2525 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2526 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2529 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2530 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2533 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2534 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2537 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2538 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2541 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2542 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2545 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2546 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2549 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), HandleError> {
2550 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2553 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2554 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2555 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2556 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2558 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2559 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2560 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2561 if no_connection_possible {
2562 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2563 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2564 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2565 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2567 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2568 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2569 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2579 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2580 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2581 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2582 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2583 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2584 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2585 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2587 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2588 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2589 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2598 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2599 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2601 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2602 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2603 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2604 pending_events.push(event);
2607 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2608 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2609 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2614 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2615 let mut res = Vec::new();
2616 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2617 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2618 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2619 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2620 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2621 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2622 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2626 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2631 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2635 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2636 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2637 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2638 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2639 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2643 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2650 use chain::chaininterface;
2651 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2652 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2653 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
2654 use chain::keysinterface;
2655 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason};
2656 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2657 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2659 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2660 use util::test_utils;
2661 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2662 use util::errors::APIError;
2663 use util::logger::Logger;
2664 use util::ser::Writeable;
2666 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2667 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2668 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2669 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2670 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2671 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2672 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2676 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2677 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2679 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2680 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2682 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2684 use std::cell::RefCell;
2685 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2686 use std::default::Default;
2688 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2689 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2690 use std::time::Instant;
2693 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2694 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2695 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2700 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2701 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2704 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2705 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2708 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2709 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2712 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2713 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2716 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2717 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2722 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2724 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2725 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2730 fn onion_vectors() {
2731 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2732 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2734 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2735 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2736 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2737 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2738 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2740 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2741 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2742 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2743 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2744 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2746 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2747 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2748 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2749 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2750 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2752 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2753 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2754 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2755 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2756 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2758 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2759 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2760 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2761 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2762 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2764 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2765 let payloads = vec!(
2766 msgs::OnionHopData {
2768 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2769 short_channel_id: 0,
2771 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2775 msgs::OnionHopData {
2777 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2778 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2779 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2780 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2784 msgs::OnionHopData {
2786 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2787 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2788 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2789 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2793 msgs::OnionHopData {
2795 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2796 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2797 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2798 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2802 msgs::OnionHopData {
2804 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2805 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2806 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2807 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2813 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2814 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2816 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2820 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2821 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2823 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2824 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2825 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2827 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2828 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2830 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2831 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("c49a1ce81680f78f5f2000cda36268de34a3f0a0662f55b4e837c83a8773c22aa081bab1616a0011585323930fa5b9fae0c85770a2279ff59ec427ad1bbff9001c0cd1497004bd2a0f68b50704cf6d6a4bf3c8b6a0833399a24b3456961ba00736785112594f65b6b2d44d9f5ea4e49b5e1ec2af978cbe31c67114440ac51a62081df0ed46d4a3df295da0b0fe25c0115019f03f15ec86fabb4c852f83449e812f141a9395b3f70b766ebbd4ec2fae2b6955bd8f32684c15abfe8fd3a6261e52650e8807a92158d9f1463261a925e4bfba44bd20b166d532f0017185c3a6ac7957adefe45559e3072c8dc35abeba835a8cb01a71a15c736911126f27d46a36168ca5ef7dccd4e2886212602b181463e0dd30185c96348f9743a02aca8ec27c0b90dca270").unwrap());
2833 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2834 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2836 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2837 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2839 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2840 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2843 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2844 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2845 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2846 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2848 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2849 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2854 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2855 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2856 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2857 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2859 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2860 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2862 impl Drop for Node {
2863 fn drop(&mut self) {
2864 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2865 // Check that we processed all pending events
2866 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2867 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2872 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2873 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2876 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2877 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2878 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2879 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2882 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2883 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2885 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2886 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2887 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2888 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2889 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2890 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2892 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2895 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2897 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2901 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2902 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2904 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2905 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2906 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2908 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2909 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2911 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2913 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2914 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2915 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2916 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2917 added_monitors.clear();
2919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2922 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2923 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2924 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2925 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2926 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2927 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2928 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2929 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2930 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2931 added_monitors.clear();
2934 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2937 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2939 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2940 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2941 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2942 added_monitors.clear();
2945 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2946 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2948 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2949 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2950 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2952 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2958 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2959 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2960 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2961 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2963 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2964 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2965 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2966 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2973 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2974 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2975 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2976 (match events_6[0] {
2977 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2978 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2979 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2980 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
2982 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2986 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2987 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2988 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
2992 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2993 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
2994 let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
2995 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
2996 bs_announcement_sigs
2999 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3000 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3001 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3002 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3008 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3009 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3010 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3011 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3012 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3013 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3016 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3019 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3021 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3024 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3025 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3028 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3029 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3031 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3032 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3033 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3035 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3038 macro_rules! check_spends {
3039 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3041 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3042 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3043 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3044 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3049 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3050 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3051 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3054 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3055 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3056 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3057 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
3058 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3059 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
3062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3065 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
3066 if !close_inbound_first {
3067 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
3069 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3070 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
3071 if close_inbound_first {
3072 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
3073 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3074 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3075 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3077 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3078 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
3079 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3080 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3082 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3083 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3084 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3086 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3087 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
3088 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3089 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3091 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3092 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3094 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3095 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3096 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
3097 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3100 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3103 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3104 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3105 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
3106 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3109 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3112 (as_update, bs_update)
3117 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3118 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3121 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3122 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3123 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3124 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3125 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3126 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3129 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
3131 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3137 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3138 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3140 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3141 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3142 added_monitors.clear();
3147 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3148 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3150 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3151 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3152 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3153 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3154 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3155 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3156 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
3157 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
3158 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3159 if $fail_backwards {
3160 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3162 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3164 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3165 if $fail_backwards {
3166 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3167 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3169 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3171 added_monitors.clear();
3177 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3180 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3181 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3182 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3183 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3184 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3185 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3186 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3191 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3192 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3194 let mut payment_event = {
3195 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3196 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3198 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3199 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3200 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3202 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3204 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3205 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3207 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3208 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3209 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3211 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3212 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3214 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3218 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3219 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3221 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3222 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3223 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3225 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3226 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3227 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3232 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3233 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3234 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3240 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3243 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3244 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3245 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3247 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3248 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
3249 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3251 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3253 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3255 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3257 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3262 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3263 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3264 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3265 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3266 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3267 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
3270 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3271 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3272 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3274 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3275 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3276 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3277 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3278 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3279 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3280 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3281 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3286 assert!(events.is_empty());
3288 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3289 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3296 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3297 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3298 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3300 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3301 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3308 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3309 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3312 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3314 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3315 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3316 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3317 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3318 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3321 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3324 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3325 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3326 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3327 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3328 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3331 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3333 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3335 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3336 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3340 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3341 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3342 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3345 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3346 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
3347 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3349 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3350 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3351 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3353 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3354 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3359 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3360 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3361 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3362 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3363 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3364 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3365 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3366 // second-to-last node!
3367 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3370 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3371 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3372 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3374 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3375 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3376 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3377 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3378 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3379 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3380 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3381 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3383 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3386 assert!(events.is_empty());
3388 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3389 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3396 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3398 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3399 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3401 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
3402 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3403 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3405 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3410 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3411 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3414 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3415 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3416 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3417 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3418 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3420 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3421 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3423 for _ in 0..node_count {
3424 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3425 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3426 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3427 let mut seed = [0; 32];
3428 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
3429 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3430 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3431 let node = ChannelManager::new(0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone()).unwrap();
3432 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3433 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3434 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3435 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3443 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3444 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3445 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3446 let channel_id = chan.2;
3448 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3450 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3451 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3457 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3461 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
3462 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3463 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3464 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3465 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3466 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
3467 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
3468 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
3469 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
3470 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3472 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3474 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
3476 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3477 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3480 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3481 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3482 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3483 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3484 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3489 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3491 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3492 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3493 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3496 let payment_event = {
3497 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3498 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3499 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3501 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3502 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3504 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3505 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3506 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3507 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3510 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3511 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3512 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3515 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3516 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3517 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3518 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3519 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3520 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3523 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3524 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3525 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3526 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3527 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3528 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3531 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3532 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3535 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3536 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3539 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3542 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3543 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3545 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3546 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3549 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3554 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3555 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3556 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3557 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3558 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3559 let channel_id = chan.2;
3561 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3563 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3564 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3570 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3572 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3573 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3576 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3577 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3578 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3579 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3585 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3587 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3588 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3589 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3592 let payment_event = {
3593 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3594 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3595 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3597 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3598 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3600 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3601 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3602 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3603 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3606 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3609 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3613 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3614 let nodes = create_network(2);
3615 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3616 let channel_id = chan.2;
3618 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3620 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3621 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3627 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3628 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3629 // update_fee (never committed) ->
3630 // (3) update_fee ->
3631 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3632 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3633 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3634 // <- (1) RAA delivered
3635 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
3636 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3637 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3638 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3639 // revoke_and_ack ->
3640 // B should send no response here
3641 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
3642 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3643 // revoke_and_ack ->
3645 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3646 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3647 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3650 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3651 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3652 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3653 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3654 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3656 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3659 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3660 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3661 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3664 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3666 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3667 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3669 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3670 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3671 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3672 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3675 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3677 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3679 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3681 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3682 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3684 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3685 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3686 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3687 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3688 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3689 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3690 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3692 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3693 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3695 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3697 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3701 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3704 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3707 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3708 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3711 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3716 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3717 let nodes = create_network(2);
3718 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3719 let channel_id = chan.2;
3721 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3723 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3724 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3729 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3730 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3732 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3733 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3734 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3735 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3736 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3738 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3740 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3742 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3743 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3747 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3748 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3751 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3752 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3755 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3756 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3761 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3762 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3763 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3764 let channel_id = chan.2;
3766 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3768 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3769 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3775 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3777 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3778 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3780 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3781 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3782 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3783 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3784 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3786 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3788 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3790 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3791 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3794 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3796 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3798 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3799 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3801 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3802 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3803 added_monitors.clear();
3805 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3806 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3807 // node[1] has nothing to do
3809 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3810 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3813 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3814 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3816 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3817 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3819 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3820 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3821 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3822 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3823 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3824 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3826 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3827 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3830 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3831 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3833 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3835 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3837 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3838 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3840 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3842 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3843 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3845 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3848 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3849 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3851 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3852 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3854 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3855 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3858 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3860 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3861 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3862 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3866 fn test_update_fee() {
3867 let nodes = create_network(2);
3868 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3869 let channel_id = chan.2;
3871 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3873 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3874 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3880 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3881 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3882 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
3883 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3884 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3885 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3886 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
3887 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3888 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
3889 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3890 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3891 // revoke_and_ack ->
3893 // Create and deliver (1)...
3894 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3895 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3897 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3898 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3899 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3900 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3901 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3903 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3905 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3907 // Generate (2) and (3):
3908 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3909 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3914 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3915 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3918 // Create and deliver (4)...
3919 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3920 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3921 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3922 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3923 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3924 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3928 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3930 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3932 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3936 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3937 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3938 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3942 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3943 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3946 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3947 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3948 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3952 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3953 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3955 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3956 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3959 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3960 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3961 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3965 fn fake_network_test() {
3966 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3967 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3968 let nodes = create_network(4);
3970 // Create some initial channels
3971 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3972 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3973 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3975 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3976 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3977 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3978 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3979 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3981 // Send some more payments
3982 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3983 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3984 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3986 // Test failure packets
3987 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3988 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3990 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3991 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3993 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3994 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3995 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3996 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3997 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3998 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3999 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4001 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
4002 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4003 hops.push(RouteHop {
4004 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4005 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4007 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4009 hops.push(RouteHop {
4010 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4011 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4013 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4015 hops.push(RouteHop {
4016 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4017 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4019 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4021 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4022 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4023 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4025 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4026 hops.push(RouteHop {
4027 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4028 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4030 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4032 hops.push(RouteHop {
4033 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4034 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4036 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4038 hops.push(RouteHop {
4039 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4040 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4042 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4044 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4045 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4046 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4048 // Claim the rebalances...
4049 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4050 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4052 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4053 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4055 // Send some payments across both channels
4056 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4057 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4058 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4060 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4062 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4064 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4065 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4066 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4068 // Close down the channels...
4069 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4070 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4071 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4072 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4073 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4077 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4078 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4079 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4080 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4082 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4083 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4084 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4085 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4086 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4087 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4089 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4091 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4092 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4094 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4095 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4097 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4098 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4099 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4102 #[derive(PartialEq)]
4103 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4104 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4106 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4107 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4108 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4110 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4111 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4113 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4115 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4116 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4117 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4119 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4120 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4121 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4122 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4123 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4124 res.push(tx.clone());
4129 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4130 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4133 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4135 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4136 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4137 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4138 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4139 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4140 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4142 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4144 res.push(tx.clone());
4148 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4151 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4155 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4156 /// HTLC transaction.
4157 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4158 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4159 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4160 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4161 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4162 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4166 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4169 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4170 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4172 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4173 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4174 let mut found_prev = false;
4176 for tx in prev_txn {
4177 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4178 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4179 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4180 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4186 assert!(found_prev);
4188 let mut res = Vec::new();
4189 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4193 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4194 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4195 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4196 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4197 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4200 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4203 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4204 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4205 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4206 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4213 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4214 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4218 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4220 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4221 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4223 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4224 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4226 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4227 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4232 fn channel_reserve_test() {
4234 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4235 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4237 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4238 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4239 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4240 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4241 chan.get_value_stat()
4245 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4246 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4247 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4249 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4250 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4252 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4253 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4255 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4256 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4257 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4258 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4259 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4263 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4265 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4266 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4267 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4268 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4273 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4274 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4275 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4276 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4278 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4279 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4280 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4282 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4287 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4288 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4290 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4292 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4294 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4295 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4296 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4298 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4299 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4303 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4304 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4305 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4307 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4308 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4311 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4314 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4315 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4316 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4317 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4318 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4321 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4322 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4323 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4324 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4325 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4329 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4330 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4331 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4332 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4334 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4335 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4339 // adding pending output
4340 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4341 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4343 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4344 let payment_event_1 = {
4345 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4348 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4349 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4350 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4352 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4354 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4355 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4357 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4358 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4359 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4360 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4365 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4366 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4368 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4369 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4370 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4371 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4372 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4374 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4376 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4377 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4378 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4379 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4380 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4381 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4383 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4384 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4385 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4386 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4389 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4391 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4395 // split the rest to test holding cell
4396 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4397 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4399 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4400 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4403 // now see if they go through on both sides
4404 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4405 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4406 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4408 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4409 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4411 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4413 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4414 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4415 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4416 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4420 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4421 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4422 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4424 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4425 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4427 // flush the pending htlc
4428 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4431 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4433 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4434 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4436 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4439 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4441 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4442 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4443 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4445 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4446 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4448 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4449 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4450 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4452 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4453 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4455 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4456 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4457 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4458 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4460 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4461 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4463 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4464 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4466 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4467 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4468 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4470 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4473 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4474 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4475 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4477 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4480 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4481 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4482 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4484 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4485 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4486 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4487 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4489 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4490 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4494 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4495 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4496 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4497 let nodes = create_network(5);
4499 // Create some initial channels
4500 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4501 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4502 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4503 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4505 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4506 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4507 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4508 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4509 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4511 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4512 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4514 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4515 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4516 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4517 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4519 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4520 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4521 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4523 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4524 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4526 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4527 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4529 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4530 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4531 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4532 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4534 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4535 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4536 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4538 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4539 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4541 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4542 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4544 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4545 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4547 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4548 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4549 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4550 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4558 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4559 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4560 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4562 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4564 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4565 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4567 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4568 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4570 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4572 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4573 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4574 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4576 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4577 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4578 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4581 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4582 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4583 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4584 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4585 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4589 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4590 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4591 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4592 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4593 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4596 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4598 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4599 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4601 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4602 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4603 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4604 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4605 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4608 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4610 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4611 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4613 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4615 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4616 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4617 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4619 // Create some new channels:
4620 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4622 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4623 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4624 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4625 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4626 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4627 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4628 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4629 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4630 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4631 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4632 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4633 // Revoke the old state
4634 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4637 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4638 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4640 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4641 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4642 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4643 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4645 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4646 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4648 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4650 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4651 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4652 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4653 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4654 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4656 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4657 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4658 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4662 fn revoked_output_claim() {
4663 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4664 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4665 let nodes = create_network(2);
4666 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4667 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4668 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4669 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4670 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4671 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4672 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4673 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4675 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4676 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4677 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4678 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4679 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4681 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4683 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4684 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4686 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4687 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4688 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4692 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4693 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4694 let nodes = create_network(2);
4696 // Create some new channel:
4697 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4699 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4701 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4702 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4703 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4705 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4706 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4707 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4708 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4709 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4710 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4711 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4712 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4713 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4715 //Revoke the old state
4716 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4719 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4721 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4723 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4724 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4725 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4727 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4728 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4730 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4732 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4733 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4734 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4735 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4736 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4737 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4738 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4739 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4741 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4742 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4743 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4745 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4746 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4747 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4748 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4749 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4750 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4752 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4753 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4754 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4758 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4759 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4760 let nodes = create_network(2);
4762 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4764 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4765 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4766 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4767 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4768 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4769 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4771 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4772 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4774 //Revoke the old state
4775 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4778 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4780 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4782 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4783 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4784 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4786 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4787 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4788 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4789 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4790 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4791 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4792 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4794 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4795 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4796 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4798 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4799 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4800 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4801 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4802 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4804 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4805 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4806 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4807 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4808 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4809 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4810 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4811 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4813 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4814 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4816 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4817 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4818 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4819 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4820 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4821 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4823 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4824 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4825 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4829 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4830 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4831 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4832 let nodes = create_network(2);
4833 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4835 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4836 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4838 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4839 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4841 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4842 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4844 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4848 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4849 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4851 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4852 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4855 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4856 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4858 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4859 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4865 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4866 // registering new transactions
4867 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4871 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4872 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4873 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4874 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4875 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4877 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4879 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4881 let mut payment_event = {
4882 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4885 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4886 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4887 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4890 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4891 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4893 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4894 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4896 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4900 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4901 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4903 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4904 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4905 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4906 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4909 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4910 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4913 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4914 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4915 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4917 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4918 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4919 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4921 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4922 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4924 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4928 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4929 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4930 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4931 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4932 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4936 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4937 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4939 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4940 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4941 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4943 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4944 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4946 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4949 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4951 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4952 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4953 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4955 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4956 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4957 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4958 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4959 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4960 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4961 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4963 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4967 fn test_unconf_chan() {
4968 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4969 let nodes = create_network(2);
4970 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4972 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4973 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4974 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4975 mem::drop(channel_state);
4977 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4978 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4979 headers.push(header.clone());
4981 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4982 headers.push(header.clone());
4984 while !headers.is_empty() {
4985 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4988 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4989 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4991 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4992 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4997 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4998 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4999 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
5002 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
5003 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
5004 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
5005 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5006 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5008 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
5009 for msg in reestablish_1 {
5010 resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
5012 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5013 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5015 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
5018 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
5019 for msg in reestablish_2 {
5020 resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
5022 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5023 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5025 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5028 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5029 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5030 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5032 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5034 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
5035 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
5036 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5038 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5041 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5042 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5043 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5045 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5047 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5048 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5049 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5050 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5052 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5054 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5055 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5056 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5057 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5058 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5060 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5061 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5063 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5064 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5067 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5068 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5070 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5071 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5072 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5073 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5074 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5077 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5081 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5083 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5084 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5086 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5089 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5090 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5091 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5093 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5095 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5096 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5097 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5098 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5100 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5101 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5102 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5103 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5104 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5106 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5107 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5109 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5110 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5113 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5114 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5116 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5117 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5118 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5119 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5120 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5123 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5129 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5130 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5131 let nodes = create_network(3);
5132 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5133 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5135 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5136 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5137 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5139 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5140 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5141 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5142 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5144 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5145 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5146 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5148 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5149 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5150 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5151 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5153 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5154 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5156 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5157 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5159 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5161 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5162 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5164 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5165 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5167 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5170 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5171 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5172 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5174 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5178 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5179 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5182 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5183 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5184 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5185 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5186 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5187 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5189 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5192 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5193 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5195 let payment_event = {
5196 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5199 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5200 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5201 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5203 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5205 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5206 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5208 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5209 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5212 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5213 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5216 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5217 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5218 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5221 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5222 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5229 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5230 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5231 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5232 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5233 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5234 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5235 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5236 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5237 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5238 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5239 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5240 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5241 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5242 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5243 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5244 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5245 // Everything was delivered...
5246 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5249 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5250 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5252 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5253 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5256 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5257 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5258 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5260 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5261 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5263 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5264 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5266 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5267 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5268 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5270 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5273 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5276 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5277 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5278 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
5279 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5280 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5281 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5282 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5283 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5284 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5285 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5286 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5291 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5292 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5294 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5295 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5297 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5298 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5300 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5303 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5304 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5307 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5308 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5311 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5312 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5313 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5316 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5317 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5325 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5326 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5327 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5328 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5329 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5330 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5331 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5332 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5334 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5335 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5340 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5341 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5342 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5343 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5344 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5345 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5346 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5347 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5348 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5349 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5350 // Everything was delivered...
5351 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5354 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5355 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5356 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5358 // Channel should still work fine...
5359 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5360 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5364 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5365 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5366 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5367 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5371 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5372 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5373 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5374 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5378 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5379 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5380 let nodes = create_network(2);
5381 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5383 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5384 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5386 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5387 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5388 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5390 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5391 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5392 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5394 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5397 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5398 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5399 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5401 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5402 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5403 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5405 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5408 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5409 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5410 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5411 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5413 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5414 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5416 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5417 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5418 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5422 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
5423 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
5424 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
5425 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5426 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5428 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5430 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5431 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5432 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5434 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
5435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5437 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5438 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5440 Event::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5441 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5444 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5447 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5448 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5450 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5451 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5452 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5453 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5454 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5455 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5456 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5458 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5459 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5460 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5462 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5463 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5465 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5468 let (_, commitment_update) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
5469 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5472 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5475 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5476 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5478 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5479 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5480 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5481 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5483 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5484 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5486 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5487 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5489 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5490 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5492 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5494 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5495 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5496 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5497 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5498 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5499 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5500 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5501 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5504 let bs_second_commitment_signed = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap().unwrap();
5505 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5506 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5507 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5508 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5509 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5512 let as_commitment_signed = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5513 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5514 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5515 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5516 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5517 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5520 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5521 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
5522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5524 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5525 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5528 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5531 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5532 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5534 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5535 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5538 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5539 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5541 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5542 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5544 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
5545 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5547 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5550 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5553 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5557 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
5558 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
5559 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5560 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5562 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5563 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5565 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5566 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5569 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5570 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5572 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5573 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5576 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5577 // PaymentFailed event
5579 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5582 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
5583 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
5584 // a disconnect in between
5585 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5586 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5588 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5589 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5591 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5592 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5595 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5596 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
5597 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5600 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5601 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5602 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5605 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5606 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5609 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5610 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5611 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
5612 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5613 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5614 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5616 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5618 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5619 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5621 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5622 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5623 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5628 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
5630 // Now set it to failed again...
5631 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5632 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5633 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5636 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5637 assert!(events_4.is_empty());
5638 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5641 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5642 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5643 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5646 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
5647 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5648 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5651 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5652 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5654 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5655 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5658 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5659 // PaymentFailed event
5661 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5665 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
5666 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
5667 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
5670 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
5671 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
5673 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
5674 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
5675 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
5676 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
5677 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
5678 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
5679 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
5680 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
5681 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
5682 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
5683 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
5684 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
5685 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
5686 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
5687 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
5688 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
5689 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
5690 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5691 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5693 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5695 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5696 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5697 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5699 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5700 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5703 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5704 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
5705 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5707 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
5708 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
5709 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5711 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5712 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5713 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
5714 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5715 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5716 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5717 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5718 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5719 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5720 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5722 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5723 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5724 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5725 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5727 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5728 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5730 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5733 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
5734 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
5735 } else { panic!(); }
5738 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
5740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5743 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5744 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5745 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5748 // Now fix monitor updating...
5749 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5750 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5753 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
5754 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5755 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5757 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5758 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5759 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5760 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5762 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5763 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5765 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5766 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5768 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
5771 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5772 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5773 assert!(events_4.is_empty());
5775 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5776 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5777 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5778 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5780 let mut as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5782 let mut bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5785 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5786 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5788 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5789 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5790 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5792 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
5793 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
5794 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5796 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5797 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5798 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5799 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5800 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
5801 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
5803 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5805 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5806 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5807 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5809 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5810 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5812 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5815 let (as_resp_raa, as_resp_cu) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5816 assert!(as_resp_cu.is_none());
5817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5819 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
5823 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
5824 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5826 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5827 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
5828 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
5830 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
5831 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
5834 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
5836 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5837 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
5838 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
5839 Event::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5840 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5847 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5849 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5850 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5851 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still
5852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5854 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
5855 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5857 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5858 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5860 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5861 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5864 let as_commitment_update;
5865 let bs_second_commitment_update;
5867 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
5868 as_commitment_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5869 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5870 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5871 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5872 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5873 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5877 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
5878 bs_second_commitment_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5879 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5880 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5881 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5882 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5883 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5887 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
5890 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5891 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5893 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5894 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5896 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5897 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5899 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5902 handle_initial_raa!();
5904 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5905 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5907 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5908 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5910 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5911 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5914 handle_initial_raa!();
5916 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5917 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5919 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5920 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5922 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5923 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5925 assert!(bs_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5930 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5931 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5933 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5934 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5936 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5937 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5941 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5942 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5945 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5946 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5949 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5952 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5955 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5957 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5958 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5960 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5961 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5962 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5967 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5971 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
5972 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
5973 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
5974 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
5975 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
5976 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
5977 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
5981 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
5982 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
5983 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
5984 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
5985 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
5989 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
5990 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
5991 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
5992 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
5993 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
5994 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
5998 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
5999 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
6000 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6001 let nodes = create_network(2);
6003 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
6005 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6006 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6007 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6008 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6010 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6012 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6013 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6015 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6016 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6018 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
6020 let mut chan_announcement;
6022 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
6024 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6025 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
6026 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
6027 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
6028 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
6029 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
6030 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
6031 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
6032 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6037 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6038 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6039 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6040 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6041 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6042 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6043 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6044 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6045 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6046 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6047 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6048 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6049 contents: $unsigned_msg
6054 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6055 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6056 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6057 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6059 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6060 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6061 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6062 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6063 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6065 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6066 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6067 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6068 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());