1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
35 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
36 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use util::{byte_utils, events, rng};
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
40 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
41 use util::logger::Logger;
42 use util::errors::APIError;
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::Duration;
51 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
64 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
65 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
66 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
67 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
68 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
69 short_channel_id: u64,
70 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
71 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
74 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
75 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
76 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
77 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
80 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
83 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
87 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
88 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
89 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
90 short_channel_id: u64,
92 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
95 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
96 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
97 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
98 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
101 session_priv: SecretKey,
102 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
103 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
104 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
109 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
110 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
111 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
112 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
113 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
121 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
129 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
130 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
131 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
132 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
133 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
134 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
136 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
138 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
139 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
140 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
141 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
142 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
144 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
145 err: msgs::HandleError,
146 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
148 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
150 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
154 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
155 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
157 data: err.to_string()
161 shutdown_finish: None,
165 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
169 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
171 shutdown_finish: None,
175 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
176 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
179 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
183 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
184 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
186 data: err.to_string()
190 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
194 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
197 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
199 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
201 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
203 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
204 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
206 data: msg.to_string()
211 shutdown_finish: None,
216 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
217 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
218 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
219 /// probably increase this significantly.
220 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
222 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
224 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
226 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
230 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
234 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
235 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
236 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
237 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
238 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
239 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
240 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
242 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
246 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
247 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
248 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
249 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
250 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
251 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
252 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
253 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
254 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
255 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
256 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
257 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
258 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
260 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
261 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
262 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
263 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
265 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
266 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
267 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
268 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
269 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
270 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
273 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
275 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
276 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
277 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
278 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
279 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
284 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
285 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
287 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
288 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
290 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
291 /// to individual Channels.
293 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
294 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
295 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
296 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
298 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
299 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
300 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
301 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
302 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
303 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
304 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
306 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
307 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
308 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
309 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
311 pub struct ChannelManager {
312 default_configuration: UserConfig,
313 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
314 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
315 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
316 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
317 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
320 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
322 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
323 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
324 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
327 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
329 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
330 our_network_key: SecretKey,
332 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
333 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
334 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
335 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
336 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
338 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
343 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
344 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
345 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
346 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
347 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
348 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
349 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
351 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
352 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
353 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
354 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
355 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
358 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
360 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
361 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
364 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
366 macro_rules! secp_call {
367 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
370 Err(_) => return Err($err),
375 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
376 pub struct ChannelDetails {
377 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
378 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
379 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
380 /// lifetime of the channel.
381 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
382 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
383 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
384 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
385 /// The node_id of our counterparty
386 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
387 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
388 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
389 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
391 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
392 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
393 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
394 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
395 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
396 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
397 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
398 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
399 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
400 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
401 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
402 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
403 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
407 macro_rules! handle_error {
408 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
411 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
412 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
413 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
414 if let Some(update) = update_option {
415 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
416 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
427 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
428 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
431 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
432 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
434 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
435 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
436 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
437 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
438 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
440 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
446 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
447 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
450 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
451 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
453 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
454 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
455 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
456 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
457 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
459 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
465 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
466 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
467 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
469 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
471 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
472 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
473 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
474 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
475 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
477 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
478 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
479 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
480 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
481 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
482 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
483 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
484 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
485 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
486 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
489 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
490 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
491 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
492 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
494 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
495 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
497 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
498 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
500 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
501 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
502 if !$resend_commitment {
503 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
506 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
508 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
509 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
515 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
516 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
517 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
519 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
520 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
524 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
525 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
526 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
527 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
528 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
531 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
536 impl ChannelManager {
537 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
539 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
540 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
542 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
544 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
545 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
546 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
548 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
549 default_configuration: config.clone(),
550 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
551 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
552 monitor: monitor.clone(),
556 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
557 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
560 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
561 by_id: HashMap::new(),
562 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
563 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
564 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
565 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
567 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
569 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
570 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
576 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
577 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
581 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
583 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
584 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
585 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
586 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
588 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
589 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
591 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
592 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
593 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
594 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
595 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
598 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
599 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
601 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
602 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
603 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
604 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
605 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
606 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
608 panic!("RNG is bad???");
611 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
613 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
614 node_id: their_network_key,
620 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
621 /// more information.
622 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
623 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
624 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
625 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
626 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
627 res.push(ChannelDetails {
628 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
629 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
630 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
631 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
632 inbound_capacity_msat,
633 outbound_capacity_msat,
634 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
635 is_live: channel.is_live(),
641 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
642 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
644 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
645 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
646 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
647 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
648 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
649 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
650 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
651 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
652 // really wanted anyway.
653 if channel.is_live() {
654 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
655 res.push(ChannelDetails {
656 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
657 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
658 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
659 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
660 inbound_capacity_msat,
661 outbound_capacity_msat,
662 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
670 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
671 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
672 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
674 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
675 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
676 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
678 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
679 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
680 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
681 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
683 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
684 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
685 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
688 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
689 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
690 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
692 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
693 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
695 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
698 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
699 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
701 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
702 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
707 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
708 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
709 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
718 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
719 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
720 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
721 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
722 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
724 for tx in local_txn {
725 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
729 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
730 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
731 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
732 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
735 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
736 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
737 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
738 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
739 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
746 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
747 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
748 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
749 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
750 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
756 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
757 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
758 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
759 for chan in self.list_channels() {
760 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
764 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
765 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
766 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
767 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
769 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
770 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
771 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
772 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
773 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
774 failure_code: $err_code,
775 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
780 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
781 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
784 let shared_secret = {
785 let mut arr = [0; 32];
786 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
789 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
791 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
792 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
793 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
794 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
795 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
796 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
797 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
798 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
801 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
802 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
803 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
804 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
805 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
808 let mut channel_state = None;
809 macro_rules! return_err {
810 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
812 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
813 if channel_state.is_none() {
814 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
816 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
817 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
818 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
819 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
820 })), channel_state.unwrap());
825 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
826 let next_hop_data = {
827 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
828 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
829 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
831 let error_code = match err {
832 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
833 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
835 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
841 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
843 // final_expiry_too_soon
844 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
845 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
847 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
848 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
849 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
851 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
852 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
853 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
856 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
857 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
858 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
859 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
861 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
863 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
865 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
866 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
867 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
870 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
871 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
872 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
874 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
876 let blinding_factor = {
877 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
878 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
879 sha.input(&shared_secret);
880 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
883 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
885 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
887 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
890 hop_data: new_packet_data,
891 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
894 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
895 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
896 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
897 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
898 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
899 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
900 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
904 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
905 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
906 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
907 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
908 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
909 None => { // unknown_next_peer
910 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
912 Some(id) => id.clone(),
914 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
915 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
917 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
918 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
919 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
920 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
921 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
922 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
923 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
925 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
926 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
928 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
929 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
930 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
932 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
933 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
935 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
936 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
937 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
938 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
940 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
941 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
946 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
947 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
948 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
949 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
951 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
952 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
954 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
955 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
957 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
959 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
964 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
967 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
968 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
969 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
970 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
971 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
975 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
977 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
978 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
979 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
980 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
981 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
982 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
983 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
984 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
985 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
986 excess_data: Vec::new(),
989 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
990 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
992 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
998 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1000 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1001 /// fields for more info.
1003 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1004 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1005 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1006 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1007 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1008 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1010 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1012 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1013 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1014 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1015 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1016 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1017 /// relevant updates.
1019 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1020 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1021 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1022 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1023 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1024 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1025 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1026 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1028 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1029 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1030 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1031 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1035 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1037 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1039 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1040 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1041 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1042 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1044 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1046 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1047 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1049 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1050 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1051 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1054 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1055 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1057 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1058 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1060 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1061 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1063 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1064 route: route.clone(),
1065 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1066 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1067 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1069 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1070 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1071 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1072 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1073 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1074 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1075 // something else in case we will resend later!
1076 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1079 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1080 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1081 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1082 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1083 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1084 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1085 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1093 } else { unreachable!(); }
1097 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1098 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1100 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1102 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1103 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1104 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1105 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1109 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1114 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1116 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1117 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1119 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1121 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1122 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1123 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1124 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1126 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1128 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1129 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1131 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1132 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1133 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1134 } else { unreachable!(); })
1140 match handle_error!(self, res) {
1141 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1142 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1145 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1146 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1147 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1148 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1155 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1156 // lock before add_update_monitor
1157 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1161 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1162 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1163 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1166 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1167 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1168 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1170 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1176 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1177 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1179 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1181 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1183 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1184 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1186 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1187 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1188 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1189 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1190 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1194 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1196 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1197 /// Will likely generate further events.
1198 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1199 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1201 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1202 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1203 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1205 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1206 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1208 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1209 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1210 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1211 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1213 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1214 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1215 match forward_info {
1216 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1217 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1218 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1219 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1220 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1222 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1224 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1225 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1226 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1227 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1228 // problem, not ours.
1235 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1236 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1237 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1238 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1239 match forward_info {
1240 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1241 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1242 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1243 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1244 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1245 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1247 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1249 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1250 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1252 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1254 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1255 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1260 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1262 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1263 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1264 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1265 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1266 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1267 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1268 // this channel currently :/.
1274 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1275 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1276 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1278 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1279 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1281 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1283 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1284 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1285 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1288 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1290 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1291 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1292 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1293 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1294 // messages when we can.
1295 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1296 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1297 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1304 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1305 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1308 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1309 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1311 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1315 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1316 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1319 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1320 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1321 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1322 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1323 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1324 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1325 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1327 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1335 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1336 match forward_info {
1337 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1338 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1339 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1340 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1341 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1343 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1344 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1345 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1347 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1348 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1349 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1352 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1353 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1361 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1363 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1364 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1368 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1369 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1372 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1374 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1375 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1376 node_id: their_node_id,
1384 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1385 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1386 events.append(&mut new_events);
1389 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1390 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1391 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1392 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1393 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1394 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1395 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1397 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1398 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1399 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1400 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1401 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1402 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1403 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1404 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1410 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1411 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1412 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1413 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1414 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1415 /// still-available channels.
1416 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1417 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1418 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1419 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1422 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1423 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1424 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1425 match &onion_error {
1426 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1428 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1430 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1431 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1432 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1433 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1434 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1435 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1436 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1441 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1442 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1443 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1444 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1446 error_code: onion_error_code
1450 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1454 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1455 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1456 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1457 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1459 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1460 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1461 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1462 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1463 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1464 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1466 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1472 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1473 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1474 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1475 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1476 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1477 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1479 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1480 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1481 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1485 let mut forward_event = None;
1486 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1487 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1489 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1490 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1491 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1493 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1494 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1497 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1498 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1499 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1500 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1501 time_forwardable: time
1508 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1509 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1510 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1512 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1513 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1514 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1516 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1518 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1519 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1520 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1521 // TODO: We should require the user specify the expected amount so that we can claim
1522 // only payments for the correct amount, and reject payments for incorrect amounts
1523 // (which are probably middle nodes probing to break our privacy).
1524 for (_, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1525 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1526 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1531 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1532 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1534 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1535 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1536 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1537 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1541 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1542 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1543 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1545 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1546 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1548 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1549 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1550 // why it's missing.
1555 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1556 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1557 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1558 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1559 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1560 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1561 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1562 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1564 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1568 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1569 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1570 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1571 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1572 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1573 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1574 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1575 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1583 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1584 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1585 //TODO: Do something with e?
1589 } else { unreachable!(); }
1595 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1598 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1600 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1601 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1602 node_id: their_node_id,
1610 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1611 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1612 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1615 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1616 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1618 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1619 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1620 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1621 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1622 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1625 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1626 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1627 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1628 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1629 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1630 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1631 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1632 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1634 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1635 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1636 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1637 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1638 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1639 // on-chain confirmations.
1640 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1641 // should be written.
1642 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1643 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1645 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1646 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1647 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1653 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1656 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1657 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1658 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1660 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1662 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1663 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1664 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1665 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1670 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1671 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1672 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1673 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1674 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1679 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1683 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1694 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1695 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1697 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1699 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1700 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1704 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1705 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1706 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1709 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1710 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1711 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1712 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1713 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1714 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1715 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1716 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1717 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1718 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1720 entry.insert(channel);
1726 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1727 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1728 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1729 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1730 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1731 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1732 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1733 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1734 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1736 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1737 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1739 //TODO: same as above
1740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1743 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1744 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1745 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1746 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1747 output_script: output_script,
1748 user_channel_id: user_id,
1753 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1754 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1755 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1756 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1757 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1758 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1759 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1760 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1761 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1763 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1765 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1768 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1769 // lock before add_update_monitor
1770 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1773 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1774 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1775 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1777 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1780 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1781 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1790 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1791 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1792 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1793 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1794 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1795 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1796 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1797 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1798 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1800 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1801 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1804 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1806 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1809 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1810 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1811 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1812 user_channel_id: user_id,
1817 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1818 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1819 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1820 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1821 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1822 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1823 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1824 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1826 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1827 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1828 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1829 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1830 msg: announcement_sigs,
1835 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1839 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1840 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1841 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1842 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1844 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1845 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1846 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1847 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1848 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1850 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1851 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1852 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1853 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1857 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1858 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1859 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1863 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1864 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1865 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1867 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1868 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1870 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1873 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1874 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1876 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1877 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1878 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1879 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1887 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1888 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1889 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1890 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1891 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1892 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1893 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1894 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1895 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1897 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1898 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1899 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1900 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1905 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1906 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1907 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1908 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1909 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1910 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1911 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1913 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1914 } else { (tx, None) }
1916 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1919 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1920 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1922 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1923 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1924 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1925 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1933 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1934 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1935 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1936 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1938 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1939 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1940 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1941 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1943 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1944 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1946 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1947 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1948 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1949 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1950 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1952 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1953 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1954 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1955 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1956 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1957 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
1958 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1959 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1960 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1961 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1962 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
1963 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
1964 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
1965 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
1967 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
1968 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1969 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
1970 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1974 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1975 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1976 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1977 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1978 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1979 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
1984 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
1986 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1991 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1992 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1994 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1995 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1997 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1998 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1999 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2001 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2003 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2006 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2010 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2011 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2012 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2013 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2015 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2016 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2017 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2019 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2021 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2026 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2027 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2028 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2029 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2030 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2031 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2032 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2033 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2035 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2036 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2038 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2045 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2046 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2047 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2048 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2049 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2050 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2051 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2052 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2054 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2055 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2056 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2057 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2058 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2060 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2061 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2062 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2064 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2065 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2066 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2067 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2068 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2069 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2070 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2071 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2073 commitment_signed: msg,
2077 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2078 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2079 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2085 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2090 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2091 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2092 let mut forward_event = None;
2093 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2094 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2095 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2096 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2098 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2099 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2100 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2101 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2103 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2104 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2109 match forward_event {
2111 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2112 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2113 time_forwardable: time
2121 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2122 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2123 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2124 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2125 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2127 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2128 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2129 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2131 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2132 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2133 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2134 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2135 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2136 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2137 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2139 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2142 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2143 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2144 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2148 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2149 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2150 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2154 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2156 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2159 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2160 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2162 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2167 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2168 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2169 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2170 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2172 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2173 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2174 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2176 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2178 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2183 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2184 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2185 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2187 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2188 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2189 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2190 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2192 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2193 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2196 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2197 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2198 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2200 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2201 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2202 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2203 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2204 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2207 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2209 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2210 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2211 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2212 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2213 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2214 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2215 contents: announcement,
2217 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2220 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2225 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2226 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2227 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2229 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2231 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2232 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2234 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2235 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2236 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2237 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2238 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2239 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2240 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2241 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2242 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2244 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2245 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2247 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2248 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2251 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2252 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2253 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2257 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2258 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2259 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2260 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2265 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2266 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2267 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2268 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2274 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2278 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2283 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2284 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2285 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2295 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2296 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2297 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2298 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2300 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2301 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2303 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2304 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2305 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2307 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2309 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2310 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2311 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2313 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2314 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2316 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2317 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2319 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2320 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2321 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2323 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2326 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2327 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2328 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2329 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2330 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2331 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2332 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2333 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2343 match handle_error!(self, err) {
2344 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2346 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2348 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2349 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2350 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2351 node_id: their_node_id,
2355 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2361 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2362 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2363 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2364 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2365 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2367 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2368 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2369 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2370 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2371 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2373 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2374 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2379 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2380 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2381 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2386 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2387 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2388 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2389 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2390 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2392 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2393 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2394 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2395 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2396 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2398 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2399 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2404 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2405 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2406 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2411 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2412 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2413 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2414 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2415 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2416 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2418 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2419 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2420 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2421 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2422 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2423 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2424 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2425 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2426 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2427 msg: funding_locked,
2429 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2430 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2431 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2432 msg: announcement_sigs,
2435 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2436 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2437 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2438 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2439 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2443 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2444 for tx in txn_matched {
2445 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2446 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2447 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2448 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2449 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2451 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2452 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2453 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2454 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2455 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2456 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2465 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2466 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2467 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2469 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2470 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2471 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2472 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2473 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2474 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2475 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2484 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2485 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2487 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2488 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2491 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2492 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2493 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2494 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2496 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2497 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2498 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2499 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2500 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2501 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2502 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2503 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2505 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2506 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2507 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2517 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2518 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2520 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2521 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2525 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2526 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2527 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2528 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2529 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg))
2532 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2533 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2534 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg))
2537 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2538 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2539 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
2542 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2543 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2544 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2547 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2548 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2549 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
2552 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2553 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2554 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
2557 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2558 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2559 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2562 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2563 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2564 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2567 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2568 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2569 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2572 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2573 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2574 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2577 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2578 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2579 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2582 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2583 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2584 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2587 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2588 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2589 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
2592 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2593 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2594 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
2597 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2598 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2599 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
2602 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2603 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2604 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
2607 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2608 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2609 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2610 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2612 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2613 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2614 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2615 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2616 if no_connection_possible {
2617 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2618 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2619 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2620 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2621 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2623 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2624 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2625 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2635 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2636 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2637 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2638 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2639 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2640 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2641 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2642 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2644 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2645 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2646 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2654 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2656 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2657 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2658 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2659 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2660 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2661 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2662 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2663 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2664 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2665 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2666 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2667 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2668 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2669 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2670 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2674 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2675 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2677 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2678 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2679 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2684 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2685 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2687 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2688 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2689 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2690 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2691 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2692 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2693 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2694 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2695 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2696 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2700 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2701 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2702 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2708 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2711 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2712 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2714 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2715 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2716 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2717 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2721 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2726 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2727 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2729 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2730 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2731 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2732 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2733 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2734 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2735 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2736 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2741 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2742 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2743 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2744 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2745 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2746 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2747 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2748 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2749 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2754 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2755 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2757 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2759 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2761 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2763 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2770 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2771 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2772 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2773 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2774 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2775 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2780 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2781 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2783 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2785 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2787 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2789 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2796 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2797 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2798 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2799 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2800 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2801 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2806 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2809 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2812 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2813 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2815 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2817 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2819 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2821 route.write(writer)?;
2822 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2823 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2830 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2831 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2832 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2833 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2834 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2835 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2836 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2837 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2839 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2844 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2845 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2847 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2851 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2853 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2854 data.write(writer)?;
2861 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2862 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2863 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2864 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2865 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2866 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2867 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2869 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2874 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
2875 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2877 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
2879 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2880 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2881 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2883 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2885 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2886 err_packet.write(writer)?;
2893 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
2894 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
2895 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2896 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
2897 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2898 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2899 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
2901 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
2902 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2903 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2905 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2910 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2911 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2912 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2914 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2915 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2917 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2918 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2919 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2921 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2922 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2923 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2924 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2925 unfunded_channels += 1;
2928 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2929 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2930 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2931 channel.write(writer)?;
2935 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2936 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2937 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2938 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2939 for forward in pending_forwards {
2940 forward.write(writer)?;
2944 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2945 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2946 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2947 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2948 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
2949 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
2950 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
2958 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
2960 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
2962 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
2963 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
2964 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
2965 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
2966 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
2967 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
2968 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
2969 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
2970 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
2971 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
2972 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
2973 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
2974 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
2975 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
2976 /// deserialization.
2977 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
2979 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2981 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
2982 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
2983 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2985 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
2986 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
2987 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
2988 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
2989 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2991 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
2992 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
2993 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
2994 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
2995 /// force-closed during deserialization.
2996 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
2997 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
2998 /// deserialization.
2999 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3000 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3001 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3002 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3004 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3005 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3007 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3008 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3009 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3010 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3012 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3014 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3017 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3018 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3019 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3020 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3021 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3022 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3025 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3026 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3027 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3029 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3031 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3032 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3033 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3034 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3035 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3036 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3037 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3038 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3041 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3042 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3043 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3044 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3045 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3046 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3047 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3048 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3049 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3051 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3052 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3054 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3057 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3061 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3062 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3063 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3067 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3068 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3069 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3070 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3071 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3072 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3073 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3074 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3076 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3079 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3080 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3081 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3082 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3083 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3084 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3085 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3086 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3088 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3091 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3093 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3094 monitor: args.monitor,
3095 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3096 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3098 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3099 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3100 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3102 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3107 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3109 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3111 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3112 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3113 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3114 logger: args.logger,
3115 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3118 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3119 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3120 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3121 //connection or two.
3124 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))