1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
40 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
41 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
42 use crypto::digest::Digest;
43 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
45 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
66 use ln::router::Route;
67 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
68 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
70 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
73 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
76 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
77 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
87 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
94 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
96 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
97 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
98 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
99 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
102 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
104 pub enum HTLCSource {
105 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
108 session_priv: SecretKey,
109 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
110 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
111 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
116 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
117 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
118 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
119 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
128 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
136 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
138 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
139 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
140 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
141 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
142 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
143 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
145 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
147 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
148 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
149 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
150 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
151 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
153 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
154 err: msgs::HandleError,
155 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
157 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
159 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
163 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
164 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
166 data: err.to_string()
170 shutdown_finish: None,
174 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
175 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
178 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
182 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
183 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
185 data: err.to_string()
189 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
193 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
196 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
198 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
200 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
202 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
203 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
205 data: msg.to_string()
210 shutdown_finish: None,
215 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
216 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
217 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
218 /// probably increase this significantly.
219 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
221 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
222 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
224 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
227 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
228 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
229 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
230 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
231 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
232 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
233 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
235 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
239 struct ChannelHolder {
240 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
241 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
242 next_forward: Instant,
243 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
244 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
245 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
246 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
247 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
248 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
249 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
251 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
252 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
253 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
254 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
256 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
257 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
258 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
259 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
260 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
261 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
262 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
265 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
267 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
268 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
269 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
270 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
271 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
272 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
277 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
278 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
280 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
281 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
283 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
284 /// to individual Channels.
286 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
287 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
288 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
289 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
291 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
292 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
293 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
294 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
295 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
296 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
297 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
299 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
300 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
301 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
302 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
304 pub struct ChannelManager {
305 default_configuration: UserConfig,
306 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
307 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
308 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
309 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
310 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
312 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
313 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
314 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
316 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
317 our_network_key: SecretKey,
319 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
320 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
321 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
322 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
323 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
325 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
330 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
331 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
332 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
333 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
334 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
335 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
336 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
338 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
339 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
340 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
341 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
342 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
345 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
347 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
348 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
351 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
353 macro_rules! secp_call {
354 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
357 Err(_) => return Err($err),
364 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
366 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
367 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
372 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
373 pub struct ChannelDetails {
374 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
375 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
376 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
377 /// lifetime of the channel.
378 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
379 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
380 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
381 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
382 /// The node_id of our counterparty
383 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
384 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
385 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
386 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
390 macro_rules! handle_error {
391 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
394 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
395 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
396 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
397 if let Some(update) = update_option {
398 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
399 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
410 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
411 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
414 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
415 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
417 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
418 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
419 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
420 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
421 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
423 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
429 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
430 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
433 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
434 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
436 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
437 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
438 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
439 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
440 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
442 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
448 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
449 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
450 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
452 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
453 if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
454 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
456 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
457 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
459 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
461 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
462 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
463 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
464 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
466 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
467 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
468 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
469 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
470 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
471 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
472 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
473 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
474 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
475 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
477 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
478 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
479 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
485 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
486 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
487 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
489 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
490 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
491 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
492 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
494 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
496 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
497 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
503 impl ChannelManager {
504 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
506 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
507 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
509 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
511 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
512 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
513 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
515 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
516 default_configuration: config.clone(),
517 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
518 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
519 monitor: monitor.clone(),
523 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
524 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
527 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
528 by_id: HashMap::new(),
529 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
530 next_forward: Instant::now(),
531 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
532 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
533 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
535 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
537 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
538 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
544 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
545 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
549 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
551 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
552 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
553 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
554 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
556 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
557 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
559 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
560 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
561 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
562 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
563 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
566 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
567 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
569 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
570 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
571 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
573 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
574 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
576 panic!("RNG is bad???");
579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
581 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
582 node_id: their_network_key,
588 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
589 /// more information.
590 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
591 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
592 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
593 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
594 res.push(ChannelDetails {
595 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
596 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
597 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
598 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
599 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
605 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
606 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
607 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
608 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
609 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
610 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
611 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
612 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
613 // really wanted anyway.
614 if channel.is_live() {
615 res.push(ChannelDetails {
616 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
617 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
618 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
619 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
620 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
627 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
628 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
629 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
631 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
632 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
633 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
635 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
636 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
637 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
638 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
639 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
640 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
641 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
642 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
645 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
646 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
647 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
649 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
650 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
652 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
655 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
656 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
658 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
659 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
664 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
665 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
666 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
675 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
676 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
677 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
678 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
679 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
681 for tx in local_txn {
682 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
686 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
687 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
688 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
689 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
692 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
693 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
694 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
695 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
696 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
703 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
704 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
705 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
706 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
707 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
713 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
714 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
715 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
716 for chan in self.list_channels() {
717 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
722 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
723 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
725 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
726 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
727 let mut res = [0; 32];
728 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
732 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
733 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
734 let mut res = [0; 32];
735 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
741 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
742 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
743 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
744 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
745 let mut res = [0; 32];
746 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
751 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
752 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
753 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
754 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
755 let mut res = [0; 32];
756 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
760 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
762 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
763 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
764 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
766 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
767 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
769 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
770 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
771 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
772 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
773 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
775 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
777 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
778 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
780 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
786 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
787 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
788 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
790 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
791 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
797 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
807 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
808 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
809 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
810 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
811 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
812 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
813 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
814 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
816 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
817 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
818 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
819 // the intended recipient).
820 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
821 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
822 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
824 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
825 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
826 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
827 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
831 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
832 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
833 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
835 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
836 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
837 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
839 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
841 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
845 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
847 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
855 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
856 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
858 for i in 0..dst.len() {
863 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
864 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
865 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
866 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
869 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
870 let end_len = iters * 65;
871 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
872 res.resize(end_len, 0);
874 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
875 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
876 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
877 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
878 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
883 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
884 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
886 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
887 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
888 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
889 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
891 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
892 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
893 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
896 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
899 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
900 hmac.input(&packet_data);
901 hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]);
902 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
907 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
908 hop_data: packet_data,
913 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
914 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
915 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
916 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
918 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
919 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
920 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
921 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
922 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
923 data: packet_crypted,
927 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
928 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
929 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
931 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
934 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
935 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
936 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
937 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
941 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
942 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
945 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
947 failuremsg: failuremsg,
951 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
952 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
953 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
959 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
960 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
961 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
964 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
965 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
966 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
968 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
969 let mut sha256_of_onion = [0; 32];
970 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
971 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
972 sha.result(&mut sha256_of_onion);
973 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
974 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
975 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
977 failure_code: $err_code,
978 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
983 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
984 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
987 let shared_secret = {
988 let mut arr = [0; 32];
989 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
992 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
994 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
995 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
996 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
997 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
998 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
999 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1000 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1001 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1004 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1005 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1006 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1007 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1008 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1011 let mut channel_state = None;
1012 macro_rules! return_err {
1013 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1015 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1016 if channel_state.is_none() {
1017 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1019 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1020 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1021 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1022 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1023 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1028 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1029 let next_hop_data = {
1030 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1031 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1032 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1034 let error_code = match err {
1035 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1036 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1038 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1044 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1046 // final_expiry_too_soon
1047 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1048 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1050 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1051 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1052 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1054 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1055 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1056 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1059 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1060 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1061 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1062 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1064 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1066 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1067 short_channel_id: 0,
1068 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1069 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1070 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1073 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1074 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1075 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1077 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1079 let blinding_factor = {
1080 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1081 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1082 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1083 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1084 sha.result(&mut res);
1085 SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res).expect("SHA-256 is broken?")
1088 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1090 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1092 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1095 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1096 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1099 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1100 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1101 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1102 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1103 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1104 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1105 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1109 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1110 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1111 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1112 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1113 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1114 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1115 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1117 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1119 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1120 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1122 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1123 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1124 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1125 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1126 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1127 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1128 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1130 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1131 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1133 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1134 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1135 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1137 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1138 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1140 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1141 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1142 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1143 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1145 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1146 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1151 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1152 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1153 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1154 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1156 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1157 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1159 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1160 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1162 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1164 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1169 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1172 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1173 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1174 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1175 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1176 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1180 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1182 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1183 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1184 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1185 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1186 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1187 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1188 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1189 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1190 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1191 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1194 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1195 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1197 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1203 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1205 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1206 /// fields for more info.
1208 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1209 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1210 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1211 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1212 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1213 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1215 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1217 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1218 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1219 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1220 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1221 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1222 /// relevant updates.
1224 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1225 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1226 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1227 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1228 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1229 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1230 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1231 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1233 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1234 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1235 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1236 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1240 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1242 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1244 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1245 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1246 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1247 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1249 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1251 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1252 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1254 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1255 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1256 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1259 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1260 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1262 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1263 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1265 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1266 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1268 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1269 route: route.clone(),
1270 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1271 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1272 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1274 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1275 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1276 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1277 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1278 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1279 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1280 // something else in case we will resend later!
1281 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1284 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1285 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1286 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1287 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1288 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1289 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1290 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1298 } else { unreachable!(); }
1302 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1303 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1305 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1307 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1308 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1309 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1310 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1314 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1319 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1321 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1322 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1324 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1326 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1327 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1328 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1329 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1331 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1333 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1334 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1336 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1337 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1338 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1339 } else { unreachable!(); })
1345 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1346 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1347 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1350 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1351 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1352 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1353 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1360 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1361 // lock before add_update_monitor
1362 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1366 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1367 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1368 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1371 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1372 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1373 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1381 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1382 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1384 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1386 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1388 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1389 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1391 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1392 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1393 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1394 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1395 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1399 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1401 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1402 /// Will likely generate further events.
1403 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1404 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1406 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1407 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1409 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1410 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1412 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1416 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1417 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1418 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1419 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1421 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1422 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1423 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1424 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1425 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1426 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1428 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1433 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1435 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1436 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1437 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1438 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1439 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1440 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1442 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1444 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1445 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1450 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1452 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1453 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1454 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1455 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1456 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1457 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1458 // this channel currently :/.
1465 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1466 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1469 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1470 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1472 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1476 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1479 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1480 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1481 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1482 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1483 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1484 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1485 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1487 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1492 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1493 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1494 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1495 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1496 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1498 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1500 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1502 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1503 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1504 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1511 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1513 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1514 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1518 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1519 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1520 events.append(&mut new_events);
1523 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1524 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
1525 /// expected_value is the value you expected the payment to be for (not the amount it actually
1526 /// was for from the PaymentReceived event).
1527 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, expected_value: u64) -> bool {
1528 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1530 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1531 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1532 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1533 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1534 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1535 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1536 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1537 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(expected_value).to_vec() });
1543 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1544 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1545 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1546 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1547 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1548 /// still-available channels.
1549 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1551 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1552 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1553 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1554 match &onion_error {
1555 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1557 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1559 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1560 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1561 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1562 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1563 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1564 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1565 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1570 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1571 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1572 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1573 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1575 error_code: onion_error_code
1579 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1583 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1584 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1585 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1586 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1588 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1589 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1590 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1591 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1592 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1593 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1595 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1601 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1602 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1603 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1604 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1605 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1606 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1608 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1609 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1610 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1614 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1616 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1617 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1621 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1622 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1623 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1624 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1627 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1628 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1629 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1630 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1631 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1632 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1633 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1635 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1641 //TODO: Do something with e?
1649 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1650 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1651 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1653 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1654 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1655 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1656 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
1657 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
1658 sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]);
1660 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1662 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1663 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1664 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1665 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1666 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1667 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1672 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1674 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1675 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1676 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1677 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1681 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1682 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1683 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1685 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1686 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1688 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1689 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1695 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1696 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1697 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1698 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1699 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1700 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1703 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1704 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1705 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1706 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1707 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1708 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1709 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1710 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1718 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1719 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1720 //TODO: Do something with e?
1728 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1729 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1730 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1733 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1734 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1736 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1737 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1738 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1739 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1740 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1743 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1744 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1745 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1746 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1747 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1748 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1749 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1750 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1752 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1753 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1754 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1755 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1756 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1757 // on-chain confirmations.
1758 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1759 // should be written.
1760 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1761 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1763 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1764 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1765 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1771 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1774 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1775 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1776 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1778 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1780 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1781 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1782 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1783 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1788 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1789 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1790 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1791 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1792 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1797 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1801 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1812 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1813 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1815 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1817 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1818 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1822 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1823 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1824 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1827 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1828 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1829 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1830 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1831 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1833 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1834 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1835 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1836 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1838 entry.insert(channel);
1844 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1845 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1846 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1847 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1848 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1850 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1851 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1852 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1854 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1855 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1857 //TODO: same as above
1858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1861 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1862 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1863 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1864 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1865 output_script: output_script,
1866 user_channel_id: user_id,
1871 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1872 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1873 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1874 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1875 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1876 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1877 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1878 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1879 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1881 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1883 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1886 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1887 // lock before add_update_monitor
1888 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1891 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1892 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1893 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1895 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1897 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1898 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1899 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1908 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1909 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1910 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1911 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1912 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1913 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1914 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1915 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1916 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1918 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1919 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1922 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1927 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1928 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1929 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1930 user_channel_id: user_id,
1935 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1936 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1937 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1938 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1939 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1940 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1941 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1942 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1944 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1945 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1946 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1947 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1948 msg: announcement_sigs,
1953 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1957 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1958 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1959 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1960 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1962 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1963 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1964 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1965 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1966 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1968 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1969 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1970 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1971 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1975 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1976 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1977 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1981 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1982 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1983 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1985 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1986 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1988 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1991 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1992 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1994 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1995 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1996 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1997 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2005 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2006 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2007 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2008 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2009 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2010 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2011 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2012 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2013 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2015 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2016 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2017 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2018 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2023 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2024 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2025 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2026 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2027 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2028 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2029 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2031 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2032 } else { (tx, None) }
2034 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2037 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2038 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2040 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2041 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2042 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2043 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2051 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2052 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2053 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2054 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2056 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2057 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2058 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2059 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2061 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2062 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2064 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2065 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2066 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2067 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2068 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2070 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2071 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2072 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2073 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2074 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2075 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2076 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2077 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2078 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2079 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2080 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2081 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2082 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2083 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2085 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2086 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2087 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2088 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2092 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2093 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2094 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2095 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2096 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2097 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2102 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2104 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2109 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2110 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2112 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2113 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2115 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2116 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2117 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2119 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2121 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2124 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2128 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2129 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2130 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool, Option<u16>) {
2131 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2134 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2135 let mut error_code_ret = None;
2136 let mut next_route_hop_ix = 0;
2137 let mut is_from_final_node = false;
2139 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2140 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2141 next_route_hop_ix += 1;
2142 if res.is_some() { return; }
2144 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2145 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2147 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2149 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2150 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2151 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2152 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2153 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2155 is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2157 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2158 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2159 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2160 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2161 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2162 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2164 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2165 if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
2166 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2167 const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
2168 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2170 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&error_code_slice);
2171 error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
2173 let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
2175 // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to
2176 // update Route object
2177 let payment_failed = (match error_code & 0xff {
2178 15|16|17|18|19 => true,
2180 } && is_from_final_node) // PERM bit observed below even this error is from the intermediate nodes
2181 || error_code == 21; // Special case error 21 as the Route object is bogus, TODO: Maybe fail the node if the CLTV was reasonable?
2183 let mut fail_channel_update = None;
2185 if error_code & NODE == NODE {
2186 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM });
2188 else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
2189 fail_channel_update = if payment_failed {None} else {Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2190 short_channel_id: route.hops[next_route_hop_ix - if next_route_hop_ix == route.hops.len() { 1 } else { 0 }].short_channel_id,
2194 else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
2195 if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
2196 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&update_len_slice) as usize;
2197 if let Some(update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
2198 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)) {
2199 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2200 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2201 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
2203 11 => amt_to_forward > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
2205 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2206 new_fee.is_some() && route_hop.fee_msat >= new_fee.unwrap()
2208 13 => route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
2209 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
2210 20 => chan_update.contents.flags & 2 == 0,
2211 _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
2213 fail_channel_update = if is_chan_update_invalid {
2214 // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
2215 // to the node in question corrupted something.
2216 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2217 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2221 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2228 if fail_channel_update.is_none() {
2229 // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
2230 // trying to relay through them anymore.
2231 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2232 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2236 } else if !payment_failed {
2237 // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to
2238 // forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its
2239 // really not worth trying any further.
2240 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2241 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2246 // TODO: Here (and a few other places) we assume that BADONION errors
2247 // are always "sourced" from the node previous to the one which failed
2248 // to decode the onion.
2249 res = Some((fail_channel_update, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2251 let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
2252 if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
2253 log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
2256 log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x})] {}", title, error_code, description);
2259 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2260 // definitely came from the peer in question
2261 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2262 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2264 }), !is_from_final_node));
2268 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2269 if let Some((channel_update, payment_retryable)) = res {
2270 (channel_update, payment_retryable, error_code_ret)
2272 // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
2273 // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
2274 (None, !is_from_final_node, None)
2276 } else { unreachable!(); }
2279 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2280 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2281 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2282 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2283 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2284 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2285 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2286 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2288 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2290 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2295 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2296 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2297 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2298 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2300 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2301 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2302 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2304 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2305 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2307 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2310 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2314 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2315 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2316 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2317 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2319 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2320 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2321 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2323 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2324 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2325 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2326 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
2327 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2329 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2330 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2331 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2333 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2334 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2335 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2336 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2337 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2338 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2339 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2340 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2342 commitment_signed: msg,
2346 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2347 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2348 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2359 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2360 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2361 let mut forward_event = None;
2362 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2363 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2364 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2365 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2366 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2368 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2369 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2370 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2371 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2373 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2374 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2379 match forward_event {
2381 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2382 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2383 time_forwardable: time
2391 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2392 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2393 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2394 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2395 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2396 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2397 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2398 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2399 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2401 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2402 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2403 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2404 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2406 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2407 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2408 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2412 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2413 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2414 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2418 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2420 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2423 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2424 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2426 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2431 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2432 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2433 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2434 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2436 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2437 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2438 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2440 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2447 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2448 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2449 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2451 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2452 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2453 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2454 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2456 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2457 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2460 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2461 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2462 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2464 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2465 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2466 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2467 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2468 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2471 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2473 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2474 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2475 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2476 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2477 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2478 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2479 contents: announcement,
2481 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2484 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2489 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2490 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2491 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2493 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2494 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2495 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2496 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2498 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2499 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2500 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2501 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2502 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2503 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2504 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2505 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2506 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2508 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2509 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2511 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
2512 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2515 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2516 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2517 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2521 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2522 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2523 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2524 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2529 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2530 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2531 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2532 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2538 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2542 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2547 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2548 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2549 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2555 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2559 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2560 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2561 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2562 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2564 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2565 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2567 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2568 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2569 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2571 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2572 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2573 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2574 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2575 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2577 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2578 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2580 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2581 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2583 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2584 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2585 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2587 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2590 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2591 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2592 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2593 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2594 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2595 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2596 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2597 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2607 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2608 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2610 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2612 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2613 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2614 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2615 node_id: their_node_id,
2619 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2625 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2626 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2627 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2628 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2629 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2631 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2632 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2633 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2634 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2635 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2637 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2638 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2643 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2644 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2645 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2650 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2651 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2652 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2653 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2654 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2656 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2657 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2658 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2659 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2660 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2662 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2663 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2668 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2669 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2670 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2675 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2676 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2677 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2678 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2679 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2680 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2682 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2683 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2684 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2685 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2686 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2687 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2688 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2689 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2690 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2691 msg: funding_locked,
2693 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2694 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2695 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2696 msg: announcement_sigs,
2699 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2700 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2701 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2702 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2703 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2707 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2708 for tx in txn_matched {
2709 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2710 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2711 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2712 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2713 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2715 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2716 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2717 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2718 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2719 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2720 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2729 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2730 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2731 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2733 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2734 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2735 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2736 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2737 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2738 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2739 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2748 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2749 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2751 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2752 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2755 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2756 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2757 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2758 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2760 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2761 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2762 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2763 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2764 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2765 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2766 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2767 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2769 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2770 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2771 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2781 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2782 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2784 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2785 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2789 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2790 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2791 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2792 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2793 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2796 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2797 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2798 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2801 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2802 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2803 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2806 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2807 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2808 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2811 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2812 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2813 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2816 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2817 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2818 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2821 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2822 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2823 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2826 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2827 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2828 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2831 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2832 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2833 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2836 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2837 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2838 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2841 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2842 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2843 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2846 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2847 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2848 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2851 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2852 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2853 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2856 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2857 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2858 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2861 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2862 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2863 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2866 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2867 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2868 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2871 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2872 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2873 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2874 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2876 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2877 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2878 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2879 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2880 if no_connection_possible {
2881 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2882 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2883 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2884 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2885 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2887 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2888 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2889 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2899 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2900 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2901 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2902 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2903 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2904 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2905 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2906 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2908 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2909 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2910 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2919 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2920 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2922 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2923 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2924 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2929 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2930 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2932 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2933 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2934 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2935 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2936 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2937 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2938 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2939 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2940 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2941 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2945 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2946 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2947 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2953 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2956 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2957 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2959 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2960 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2961 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2962 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2966 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2971 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2972 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2974 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2975 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2976 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2978 onion.write(writer)?;
2982 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2983 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2984 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2985 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2986 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2991 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2992 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2993 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2995 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2996 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2998 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3000 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3001 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3002 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3003 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3004 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3009 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3010 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3012 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3014 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3016 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3018 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3025 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3026 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3027 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3028 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3029 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3030 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3035 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3036 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3038 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3040 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3042 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3044 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3051 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3052 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3053 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3054 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3055 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3056 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3061 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3064 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3067 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3068 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3070 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3072 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3074 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3076 route.write(writer)?;
3077 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3078 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3085 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3086 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3087 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3088 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3089 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3090 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3091 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3092 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3094 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3099 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3100 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3102 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3106 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3108 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3109 data.write(writer)?;
3116 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3117 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3118 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3119 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3120 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3121 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3122 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3124 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3129 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3130 prev_short_channel_id,
3135 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3136 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3137 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3139 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3140 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3142 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3143 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3144 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3146 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3147 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3148 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3149 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3150 unfunded_channels += 1;
3153 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3154 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3155 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3156 channel.write(writer)?;
3160 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3161 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3162 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3163 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3164 for forward in pending_forwards {
3165 forward.write(writer)?;
3169 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3170 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3171 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3172 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3173 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3174 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3182 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3184 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3186 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3187 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3188 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3189 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3190 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3191 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3192 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3193 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3194 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3195 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3196 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3197 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3198 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3199 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3200 /// deserialization.
3201 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3203 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3205 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3206 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3207 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3209 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3210 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3211 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3212 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3213 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3215 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3216 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3217 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3218 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3219 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3220 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3221 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3222 /// deserialization.
3223 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3224 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3225 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3226 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3228 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3229 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3231 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3232 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3233 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3234 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3236 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3238 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3241 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3242 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3243 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3244 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3245 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3246 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3249 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3250 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3251 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3253 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3255 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3256 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3257 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3258 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3259 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3260 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3261 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3262 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3265 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3266 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3267 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3268 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3269 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3270 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3271 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3272 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3273 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3275 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3276 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3278 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3281 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3285 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3286 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3287 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3291 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3292 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3293 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3294 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3295 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3296 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3297 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3298 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3300 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3303 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3304 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3305 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3306 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3307 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3308 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3309 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3310 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3312 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3315 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3317 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3318 monitor: args.monitor,
3319 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3320 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3322 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3323 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3324 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3326 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3329 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3332 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3334 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3336 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3337 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3338 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3339 logger: args.logger,
3340 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3343 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3344 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3345 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3346 //connection or two.
3349 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3355 use chain::chaininterface;
3356 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3357 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3358 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3359 use chain::keysinterface;
3360 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3361 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3362 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3363 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
3364 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3366 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate};
3367 use util::test_utils;
3368 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3369 use util::errors::APIError;
3370 use util::logger::Logger;
3371 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3372 use util::config::UserConfig;
3374 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3375 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3376 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3377 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3378 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3379 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3380 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3381 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3382 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3383 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3387 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3388 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3390 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3391 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3393 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3395 use std::cell::RefCell;
3396 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
3397 use std::default::Default;
3399 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3400 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3401 use std::time::Instant;
3404 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3405 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3406 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3411 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3412 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3415 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3416 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3419 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3420 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3423 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3424 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3427 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3428 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3433 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3435 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3436 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3441 fn onion_vectors() {
3442 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3443 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3445 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3446 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3447 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3448 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3449 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3451 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3452 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3453 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3454 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3455 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3457 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3458 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3459 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3460 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3461 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3463 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3464 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3465 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3466 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3467 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3469 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3470 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3471 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3472 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3473 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3475 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3476 let payloads = vec!(
3477 msgs::OnionHopData {
3479 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3480 short_channel_id: 0,
3482 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3486 msgs::OnionHopData {
3488 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3489 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3490 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3491 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3495 msgs::OnionHopData {
3497 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3498 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3499 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3500 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3504 msgs::OnionHopData {
3506 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3507 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3508 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3509 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3513 msgs::OnionHopData {
3515 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3516 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3517 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3518 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3524 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32]));
3525 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3527 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3531 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3532 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3534 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3535 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3536 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3538 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3539 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3541 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3542 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3544 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3545 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3547 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3548 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3550 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3551 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3554 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3555 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3556 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3557 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3559 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3560 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3565 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3566 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3567 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3568 keys_manager: Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>,
3569 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3571 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3572 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3573 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3575 impl Drop for Node {
3576 fn drop(&mut self) {
3577 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3578 // Check that we processed all pending events
3579 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3580 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3581 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3586 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3587 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3590 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3591 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3592 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3593 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3596 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3597 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3599 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3600 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3602 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3603 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3607 }, match events[1] {
3608 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3609 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3610 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3611 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3612 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3613 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3614 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3615 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3623 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3624 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3626 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3629 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3630 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3639 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3640 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3642 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3643 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3645 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3646 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3649 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3655 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3656 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3658 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3659 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3666 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3667 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3668 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3669 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3671 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3675 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3676 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3678 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3679 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3680 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3682 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3683 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3685 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3687 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3688 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3689 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3690 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3691 added_monitors.clear();
3693 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3696 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3698 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3699 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3700 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3701 added_monitors.clear();
3704 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3706 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3707 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3708 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3709 added_monitors.clear();
3712 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3713 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3715 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3716 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3717 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3725 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3726 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3727 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3731 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3732 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3733 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3734 ((match events_6[0] {
3735 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3736 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3737 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3741 }, match events_6[1] {
3742 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3743 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3750 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3751 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3752 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3756 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3757 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3758 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3759 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3761 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3762 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3763 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3764 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3770 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3771 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3772 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3773 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3774 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3775 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3776 assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
3777 assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, bs_update.contents.short_channel_id);
3780 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3783 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3785 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3788 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3789 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3792 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3793 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3795 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3796 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3797 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3799 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3802 macro_rules! check_spends {
3803 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3805 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3806 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3807 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3808 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3813 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3814 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3816 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3817 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3818 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3819 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3820 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3823 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3824 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3826 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3827 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3830 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3837 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3838 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3839 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3842 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3843 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3845 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3846 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3847 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3848 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3849 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3852 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3855 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3856 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3859 Some(match events_1[1] {
3860 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3861 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3864 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3868 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3869 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3870 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3871 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3872 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3873 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3874 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3876 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3877 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3878 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3879 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3880 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3881 (as_update, bs_update)
3883 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3885 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3886 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3887 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3888 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3890 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3891 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3892 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3893 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3894 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3895 (as_update, bs_update)
3897 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3898 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3900 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3905 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3906 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3909 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3910 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3911 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3912 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3913 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3914 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3917 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3919 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3920 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3924 fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent {
3925 let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3926 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3927 SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap())
3931 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3932 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3934 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3935 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3936 added_monitors.clear();
3941 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3942 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3944 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3945 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3946 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3947 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3948 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3951 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3953 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3954 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3955 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3956 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3957 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3958 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3959 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3960 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3961 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3962 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3964 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3965 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3969 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3971 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3972 if $fail_backwards {
3973 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3974 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3976 (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack)
3979 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3981 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3982 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3983 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3984 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3985 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3986 assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none());
3990 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3992 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3993 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3995 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3996 if $fail_backwards {
3997 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3998 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
4000 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4002 added_monitors.clear();
4007 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
4009 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
4012 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
4014 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
4015 if $fail_backwards {
4016 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4017 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
4018 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
4019 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4020 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4022 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4028 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
4031 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]);
4032 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
4033 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
4034 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
4035 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
4036 sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]);
4037 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
4042 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4043 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4045 let mut payment_event = {
4046 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4047 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
4049 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4050 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4051 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4053 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
4055 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
4056 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4058 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4059 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
4060 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4062 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4063 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4065 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4066 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4069 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4070 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4072 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4073 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4074 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4076 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4077 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4078 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
4080 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4083 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4084 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4085 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
4086 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4087 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4093 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
4096 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4097 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4098 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4100 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4101 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4102 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
4105 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4106 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4108 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4109 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4110 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4111 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4112 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4113 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4114 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4115 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4123 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4124 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4126 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4127 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4128 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4129 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4133 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4134 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4136 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4137 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4138 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4139 get_next_msgs!($node)
4141 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4144 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4145 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4150 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4151 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4152 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4153 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4154 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4155 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4156 } else if update_next_msgs {
4157 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4159 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4161 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4162 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4169 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4170 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4171 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4173 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4174 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4176 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4181 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4182 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4185 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4187 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4188 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4189 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4190 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4191 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4194 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4197 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4198 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4199 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4200 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4201 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4204 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4206 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4208 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4209 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4213 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4214 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4215 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4218 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4219 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, 0));
4220 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4222 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4223 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4224 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4226 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4227 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4232 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4233 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4234 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4235 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4236 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4237 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4238 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4239 // second-to-last node!
4240 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4243 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4244 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4245 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4247 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4248 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4249 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4250 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4251 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4252 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4253 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4254 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4256 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4259 assert!(events.is_empty());
4261 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4262 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4269 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4271 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4272 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4274 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
4275 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4276 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4283 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4284 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4287 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4288 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4289 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4290 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4292 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4293 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4295 for i in 0..node_count {
4296 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
4297 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4298 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4299 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4300 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4301 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4302 let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4303 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4304 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4305 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4306 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4307 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4308 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4309 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, keys_manager, node_seed: seed,
4310 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4311 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4319 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4320 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4321 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4322 let channel_id = chan.2;
4325 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4329 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4330 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4331 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4332 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4333 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4334 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4335 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4336 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4337 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4338 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4340 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4342 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4344 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4345 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4348 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4349 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4350 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4351 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4352 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4354 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4357 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4359 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4360 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4361 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4364 let payment_event = {
4365 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4366 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4367 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4369 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4370 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4372 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4373 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4374 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4375 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4376 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4379 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4380 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4381 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4382 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4385 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4386 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4387 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4388 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4389 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4390 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4391 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4394 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4395 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4396 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4397 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4398 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4399 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4400 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4403 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4404 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4405 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4408 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4409 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4412 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4415 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4416 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4418 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4419 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4422 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4427 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4428 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4429 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4430 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4431 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4432 let channel_id = chan.2;
4435 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4437 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4438 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4441 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4442 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4443 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4444 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4447 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4450 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4452 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4453 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4454 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4457 let payment_event = {
4458 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4459 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4460 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4462 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4463 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4465 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4466 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4467 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4468 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4469 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4472 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4475 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4479 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4480 let nodes = create_network(2);
4481 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4482 let channel_id = chan.2;
4485 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4486 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4487 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4488 // (3) update_fee ->
4489 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4490 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4491 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4492 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4493 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4494 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4495 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4496 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4497 // revoke_and_ack ->
4498 // B should send no response here
4499 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4500 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4501 // revoke_and_ack ->
4503 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4504 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4505 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4508 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4509 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4510 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4511 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4512 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4514 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4517 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4518 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4519 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4520 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4523 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4525 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4526 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4527 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4529 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4530 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4531 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4532 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4535 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4537 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4539 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4541 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4542 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4543 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4545 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4546 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4547 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4548 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4549 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4550 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4551 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4553 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4554 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4555 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4557 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4559 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4560 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4564 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4565 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4568 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4569 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4572 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4573 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4574 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4577 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4578 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4583 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4584 let nodes = create_network(2);
4585 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4586 let channel_id = chan.2;
4588 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4589 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4592 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4593 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4594 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4595 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4596 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4600 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4602 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4603 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4606 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4607 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4610 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4611 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4612 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4615 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4616 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4621 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4622 let nodes = create_network(2);
4623 let channel_value = 1888;
4624 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4625 let channel_id = chan.2;
4628 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4630 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4632 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4634 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4636 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4637 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4639 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4640 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4642 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4643 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4644 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4645 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4646 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4647 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4650 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4651 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4652 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4655 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4657 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4659 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4660 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4661 //Should produce and error.
4662 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4664 assert!(match err.err {
4665 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4669 //clear the message we could not handle
4670 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4674 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4675 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4676 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4677 let channel_id = chan.2;
4680 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4682 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4683 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4686 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4687 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4688 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4689 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4690 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4692 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4694 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4695 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4696 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4699 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4701 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4703 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4704 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4706 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4707 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4708 added_monitors.clear();
4710 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4711 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4712 // node[1] has nothing to do
4714 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4715 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4718 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4719 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4720 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4722 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4724 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4726 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4727 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4728 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4729 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4730 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4731 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4733 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4734 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4736 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4738 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4740 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4742 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4744 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4745 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4747 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4749 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4751 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4752 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4754 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4755 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4757 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4758 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4760 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4761 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4763 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4764 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4767 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4769 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4770 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4771 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4775 fn test_update_fee() {
4776 let nodes = create_network(2);
4777 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4778 let channel_id = chan.2;
4781 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4782 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4783 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4784 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4785 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4786 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4787 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4788 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4789 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4790 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4791 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4792 // revoke_and_ack ->
4794 // Create and deliver (1)...
4795 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4796 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4799 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4800 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4801 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4802 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4803 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4807 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4809 // Generate (2) and (3):
4810 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4811 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4815 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4816 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4819 // Create and deliver (4)...
4820 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4822 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4823 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4824 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4825 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4826 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4828 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4831 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4832 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4835 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4836 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4838 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4839 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4841 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4842 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4845 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4846 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4849 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4850 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4851 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4852 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4853 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4854 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4855 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4856 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4860 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4862 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4863 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4865 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4867 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4869 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4870 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4871 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4875 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4876 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4877 let nodes = create_network(2);
4878 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4879 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4880 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4881 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4883 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4884 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4885 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4886 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4887 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4889 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4890 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4891 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4892 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4893 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4894 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4896 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4897 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4901 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4902 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4903 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4904 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4905 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4906 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4907 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4909 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4911 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4912 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4913 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4914 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4915 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4917 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4918 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4920 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4921 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4922 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4923 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4924 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4926 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4928 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4929 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4930 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4931 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4932 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4933 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4934 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4936 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4937 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4939 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4940 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4941 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4942 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4943 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4944 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4945 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4947 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4948 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4950 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4951 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4956 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4957 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4958 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4959 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4960 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4961 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4963 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4965 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4966 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4967 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4968 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4969 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4973 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4974 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4975 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4976 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4977 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4979 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4980 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4981 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4983 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4984 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4985 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4986 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4987 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4988 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4990 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4991 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4992 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4993 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4995 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4996 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4998 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4999 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
5001 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5002 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5003 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5004 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5005 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5006 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5008 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5009 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5011 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5012 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5014 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
5015 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5016 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5018 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5021 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5022 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5023 let node_0_closing_signed = match msg_events[0] {
5024 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5025 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5030 match msg_events[1] {
5031 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
5032 assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_1.0.contents.short_channel_id);
5034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5037 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5038 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5039 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5040 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5041 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5042 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5044 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5046 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5047 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5048 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5049 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5050 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5053 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
5054 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
5055 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
5056 let nodes = create_network(3);
5057 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5058 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5060 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
5062 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5063 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5065 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5066 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5068 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5072 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5073 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5075 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5076 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5077 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5078 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5080 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5081 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5082 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5084 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5085 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5086 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5087 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5090 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5091 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5092 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5094 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5096 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5097 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5099 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5101 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5102 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5103 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5104 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5105 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5106 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5107 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5109 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5110 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5112 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5113 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5114 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5115 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5116 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5117 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5118 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5120 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5121 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5123 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5124 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5126 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5129 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5131 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5132 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5133 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5136 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5137 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5139 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5140 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5141 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5142 if recv_count == 0 {
5143 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5144 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5146 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5147 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5148 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5150 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5151 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5152 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5154 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5155 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5157 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5158 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5159 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5161 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5162 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5163 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5164 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5165 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5167 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5168 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5169 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5170 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5171 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5172 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5174 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5176 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5177 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5178 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5179 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5180 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5181 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5183 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5184 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5185 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5186 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5187 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5189 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5190 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5192 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5196 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5198 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5199 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5200 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5201 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5202 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5206 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5207 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5208 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5209 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5213 fn fake_network_test() {
5214 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5215 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5216 let nodes = create_network(4);
5218 // Create some initial channels
5219 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5220 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5221 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5223 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5224 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5225 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5226 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5227 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5229 // Send some more payments
5230 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5231 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5232 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5234 // Test failure packets
5235 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5236 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5238 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5239 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5241 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5242 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5243 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5244 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5245 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5246 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5247 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5249 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5250 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5251 hops.push(RouteHop {
5252 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5253 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5255 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5257 hops.push(RouteHop {
5258 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5259 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5261 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5263 hops.push(RouteHop {
5264 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5265 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5267 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5269 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5270 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5271 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5273 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5274 hops.push(RouteHop {
5275 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5276 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5278 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5280 hops.push(RouteHop {
5281 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5282 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5284 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5286 hops.push(RouteHop {
5287 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5288 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5290 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5292 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5293 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5294 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5296 // Claim the rebalances...
5297 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5298 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5300 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5301 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5303 // Send some payments across both channels
5304 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5305 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5306 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5308 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5310 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5312 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5313 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5314 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5316 // Close down the channels...
5317 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5318 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5319 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5320 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5321 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5325 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5326 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5327 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5328 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5330 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5331 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5332 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5333 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5334 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5335 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5337 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5339 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5340 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5342 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5343 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5345 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5346 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5347 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5350 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5351 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5352 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5354 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5355 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5356 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5358 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5359 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5361 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5363 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5364 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5365 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5367 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5368 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5369 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5370 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5371 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5372 res.push(tx.clone());
5377 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5378 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5381 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5383 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5384 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5385 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5386 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5387 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5388 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5390 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5392 res.push(tx.clone());
5396 assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3);
5398 assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]);
5402 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5406 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5407 /// HTLC transaction.
5408 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5409 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5410 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5411 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5412 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5413 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5417 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5420 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5421 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5423 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5424 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5425 let mut found_prev = false;
5427 for tx in prev_txn {
5428 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5429 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5430 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5431 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5437 assert!(found_prev);
5439 let mut res = Vec::new();
5440 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5444 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5445 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5446 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5447 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5448 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5451 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5454 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5455 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5456 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5457 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5460 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5464 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5465 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5469 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5471 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5472 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5474 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5475 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5477 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5478 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5482 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5484 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5485 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5487 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5488 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5489 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5490 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5491 chan.get_value_stat()
5495 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5496 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5497 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5499 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5500 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5502 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5503 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5505 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5506 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5507 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5508 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5509 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5513 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5515 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5516 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5517 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5518 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5523 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5524 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5525 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5526 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5528 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5529 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5530 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5532 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5537 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5538 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5540 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5542 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5544 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5545 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5546 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5548 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5549 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5553 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5554 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5555 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5557 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5558 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5561 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5564 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5565 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5566 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5567 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5568 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5571 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5572 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5573 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5574 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5575 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5579 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5580 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5581 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5582 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5584 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5585 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5589 // adding pending output
5590 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5591 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5593 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5594 let payment_event_1 = {
5595 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5598 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5599 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5600 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5602 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5604 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5605 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5607 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5608 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5609 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5610 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5615 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5616 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5618 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5619 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5620 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5621 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5622 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5624 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5626 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5627 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5628 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5629 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5630 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5631 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5633 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5634 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5635 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5636 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5640 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5642 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5644 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5645 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5646 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5647 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5648 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5649 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5650 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5651 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5659 // split the rest to test holding cell
5660 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5661 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5663 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5664 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5667 // now see if they go through on both sides
5668 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5669 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5670 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5672 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5673 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5675 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5677 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5678 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5679 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5680 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5684 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5685 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5686 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5688 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5689 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5691 // flush the pending htlc
5692 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5693 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5696 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5698 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5700 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5701 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5702 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5705 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5706 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5709 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5711 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5712 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5713 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5715 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5716 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5718 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5719 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5720 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5721 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5722 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5723 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5725 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5726 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5727 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5728 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5730 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5731 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5733 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5734 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5736 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5737 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5738 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5743 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5744 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5745 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5747 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5750 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5751 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5752 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5754 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5755 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5756 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5757 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5759 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5760 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5764 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5765 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5766 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5770 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5771 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5772 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5773 let nodes = create_network(5);
5775 // Create some initial channels
5776 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5777 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5778 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5779 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5781 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5782 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5783 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5784 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5785 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5787 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5788 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5790 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5791 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5792 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5793 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5795 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5796 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5797 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5799 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5800 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5802 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5803 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5805 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5806 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5807 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5808 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5810 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5811 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5812 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5814 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5815 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5817 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5818 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5820 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5821 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5823 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5824 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5825 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5826 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5828 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5834 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5835 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5836 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5838 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5840 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5841 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5843 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5844 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5846 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5848 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5849 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5850 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5852 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5853 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5854 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5857 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5858 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5859 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5860 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5861 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5865 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5866 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5867 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5868 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5869 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5872 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5874 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5875 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5877 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5878 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5879 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5880 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5881 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5884 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5886 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5887 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5889 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5891 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5892 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5893 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5897 fn test_justice_tx() {
5898 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5900 let nodes = create_network(2);
5901 // Create some new channels:
5902 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5904 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5905 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5906 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5907 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5908 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5909 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5910 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5911 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5912 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5913 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5914 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
5915 // Revoke the old state
5916 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5919 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5920 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5922 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5923 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5924 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5925 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5927 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5928 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5930 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5932 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5933 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5934 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5935 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5936 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5938 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5940 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5941 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5943 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5944 // Create some new channels:
5945 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5947 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5948 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5949 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5950 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5951 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5952 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5953 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5954 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5955 // Revoke the old state
5956 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5958 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5959 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5961 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5962 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5963 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5964 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5966 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5967 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5969 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5971 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5972 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5973 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5974 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5975 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5977 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5978 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5979 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5983 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5984 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5985 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5986 let nodes = create_network(2);
5987 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5988 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5989 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5990 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5991 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5992 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5993 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5994 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5996 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5997 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5998 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5999 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6000 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
6002 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6004 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6005 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6007 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
6008 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6009 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6013 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
6014 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
6015 let nodes = create_network(2);
6017 // Create some new channel:
6018 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6020 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6021 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6022 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
6023 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6024 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6026 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6027 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6028 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
6029 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6030 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6031 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6032 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
6033 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
6034 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6036 //Revoke the old state
6037 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6040 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6041 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6042 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6044 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6045 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6047 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6048 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6050 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6053 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6054 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6056 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
6057 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6059 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
6061 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6062 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6063 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6064 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6065 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6066 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6067 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6068 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6070 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
6071 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6072 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
6074 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6075 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
6076 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6077 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
6078 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6079 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
6081 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6082 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6083 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6087 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
6088 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
6089 let nodes = create_network(2);
6091 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6093 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6094 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6095 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6096 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6097 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6098 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6100 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6101 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6103 //Revoke the old state
6104 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6107 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6108 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6109 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6111 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6112 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6114 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6115 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6120 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6121 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6123 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6124 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6125 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6126 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6127 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6128 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6129 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6131 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6132 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6133 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6135 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6136 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6137 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6138 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6139 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6141 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6142 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6143 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6144 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6145 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6146 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6147 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6148 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6150 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6151 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6153 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6154 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6155 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6156 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6157 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6158 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6160 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6161 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6162 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6166 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
6167 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6168 // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6169 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6170 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
6171 // First, C should claim the HTLC output via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
6172 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
6173 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
6175 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
6176 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
6177 // the HTLC output via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
6178 // PaymentSent event).
6180 let nodes = create_network(3);
6182 // Create some initial channels
6183 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6184 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6186 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
6187 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6188 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6190 let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6191 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6193 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6194 // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
6195 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6196 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
6197 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6198 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6200 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6201 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6202 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6203 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6204 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6206 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6207 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6208 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6210 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6211 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6213 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
6214 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6215 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
6216 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6217 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6218 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6219 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6220 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6222 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
6223 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
6224 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6226 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6227 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6228 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6229 added_monitors.clear();
6231 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6233 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6237 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6238 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6239 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6240 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6241 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6242 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6247 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
6248 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transaction, as well as a
6249 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
6250 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6251 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6252 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6253 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6254 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6255 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6256 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6257 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6258 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6259 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6260 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6261 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6262 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6266 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
6267 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
6268 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6269 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6270 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6271 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6272 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6274 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6275 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6277 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan)
6278 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6279 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6280 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6281 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6282 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6283 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6284 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6285 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6286 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
6287 // we already checked the same situation with A.
6289 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
6290 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6291 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6294 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6295 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6297 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6298 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6300 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6301 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
6303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6305 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6306 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6307 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6308 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6309 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6310 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6311 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6312 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6313 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6314 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6315 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6316 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6317 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6321 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
6322 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6323 // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6324 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6325 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
6326 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
6328 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
6330 let nodes = create_network(3);
6332 // Create some intial channels
6333 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6334 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6336 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
6337 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6338 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6340 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6341 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6343 // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6344 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6345 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6346 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
6348 let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6349 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6350 added_monitors.clear();
6352 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6353 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6355 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6356 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6357 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6358 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6359 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6360 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6364 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6365 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6366 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6368 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6369 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6371 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
6372 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6373 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6374 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6376 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain
6377 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
6378 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6381 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6382 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6383 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
6384 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
6385 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]);
6386 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6387 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6388 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6389 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6390 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6391 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6392 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone());
6393 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone());
6394 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6395 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6396 timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
6400 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
6401 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6403 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6405 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6406 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6409 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6410 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6411 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6412 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6413 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6414 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6418 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated
6419 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
6421 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
6422 let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6423 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6425 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6426 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6427 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6429 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6430 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6432 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan
6433 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6434 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6435 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6436 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6437 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6438 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6439 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6440 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6444 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
6445 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
6446 // and fail backward accordingly.
6448 let nodes = create_network(3);
6450 // Create some initial channels
6451 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6452 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6454 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6455 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6456 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6457 // Revoke the old state
6458 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6460 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6462 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6463 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6464 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6466 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6468 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6469 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6472 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6473 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6474 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6475 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6476 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6477 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6479 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6480 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6482 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6483 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6485 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6488 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6489 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6491 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
6492 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6495 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6499 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool) {
6500 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
6501 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
6502 // commitment transaction anymore.
6503 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
6504 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
6505 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
6506 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
6507 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
6508 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
6510 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
6511 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
6512 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
6513 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
6514 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
6515 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6517 // Create some initial channels
6518 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6519 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6521 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6522 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6523 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6524 // Revoke the old state
6525 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6527 let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6528 let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6529 let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6531 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, 0));
6532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6533 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6534 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6535 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6536 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6537 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6538 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6539 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6540 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
6541 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
6543 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, 0));
6544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6545 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6546 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6547 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6548 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6549 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6550 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6551 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6552 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6554 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6555 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6556 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6559 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, 0));
6560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6561 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6562 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6563 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6564 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6565 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6566 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6567 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6568 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
6569 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
6570 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6572 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6573 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6574 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6577 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
6578 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
6579 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6580 let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6581 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap();
6582 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6583 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6587 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
6588 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, one as we generate a commitment for
6589 // nodes[0] to fail first_payment_hash backwards.
6590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6593 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
6594 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6596 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6597 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6599 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6600 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6602 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6603 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
6605 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6608 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6609 // If we delivered the RAA already then we already failed first_payment_hash backwards.
6610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6613 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6614 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
6615 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 0 }] {
6616 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6621 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6622 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6623 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6624 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6625 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6626 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6631 // Due to the way backwards-failing occurs we do the updates in two steps.
6632 let updates = match events[1] {
6633 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6634 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6635 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6636 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6637 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6638 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6640 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6641 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6643 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6644 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6646 let bs_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6647 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6649 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6650 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6653 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6654 // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
6655 // that we should update our routing table for.
6656 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6657 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6659 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6660 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6663 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6664 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6666 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6667 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6677 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6678 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
6679 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6680 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6681 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6682 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
6683 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6685 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6686 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6687 for event in events {
6689 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6694 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6695 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6697 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6698 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6700 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6703 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6704 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6709 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
6710 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
6711 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
6715 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() {
6716 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false);
6717 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true);
6721 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6722 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6723 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6724 let nodes = create_network(2);
6725 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6727 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6728 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6730 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6731 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6733 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6734 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6736 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6740 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6741 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6743 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6744 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6747 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6748 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6750 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6751 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6753 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6757 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6758 // registering new transactions
6759 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6763 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6764 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6765 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6766 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6767 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6769 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6771 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6773 let mut payment_event = {
6774 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6777 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6778 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6779 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6782 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6783 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6785 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6786 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6788 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6789 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6792 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6793 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6795 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6796 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6797 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6798 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6801 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6802 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6804 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6806 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6807 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6808 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6810 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6811 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6812 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6814 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6815 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6817 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6821 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6822 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6823 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6824 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6825 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6829 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6830 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6832 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6833 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6834 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6836 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6837 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6839 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6842 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6844 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6845 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6846 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6848 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6849 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6850 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6851 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6852 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6853 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6854 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6856 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6860 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6861 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6862 let nodes = create_network(2);
6863 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6865 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6866 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6867 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6868 mem::drop(channel_state);
6870 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6871 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6872 headers.push(header.clone());
6874 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6875 headers.push(header.clone());
6877 while !headers.is_empty() {
6878 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6881 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6882 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6884 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6885 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6890 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6891 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6892 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6895 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6896 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6898 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6899 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6900 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6901 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6902 res.push(msg.clone());
6904 panic!("Unexpected event")
6912 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6913 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6915 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6917 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6919 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6925 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6926 let mut commitment_update = None;
6927 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6930 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6931 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6932 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6933 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6935 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6936 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6937 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6938 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6943 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6946 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6948 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6949 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6950 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6951 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6953 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6954 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6955 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6956 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6962 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6967 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6968 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6969 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6970 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6971 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6972 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6973 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6975 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6976 // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6978 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6979 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6982 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6983 // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6985 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6986 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6989 if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 {
6990 // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set
6991 // next_local_commitment_number to 1
6992 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6993 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6995 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6996 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
7000 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
7001 for msg in reestablish_1 {
7002 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
7003 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
7005 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
7006 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7008 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
7011 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
7012 for msg in reestablish_2 {
7013 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
7014 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
7016 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7017 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7019 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
7022 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
7023 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
7024 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
7026 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
7027 if send_funding_locked.0 {
7028 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7029 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7030 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7031 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7032 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7033 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7034 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7037 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7040 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7041 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7042 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7043 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7045 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7047 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
7048 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7049 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7050 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
7052 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7054 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7055 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7056 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7057 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7058 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7060 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7061 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7063 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7064 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7067 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7068 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7070 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7071 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7072 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
7073 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7074 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7075 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7076 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7079 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7083 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
7084 if send_funding_locked.1 {
7085 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7086 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7087 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7088 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7089 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7090 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7091 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7094 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7097 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7098 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7099 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7100 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7102 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7104 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7105 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7106 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7107 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
7109 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7110 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7111 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7112 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7113 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7115 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7116 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7118 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7119 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7122 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7123 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7125 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7126 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7127 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
7128 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7129 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7130 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7131 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7134 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7140 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
7141 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
7142 let nodes = create_network(3);
7143 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7144 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
7146 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7147 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7148 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7150 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7151 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7152 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
7153 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
7155 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7156 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7157 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7159 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7160 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7161 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7162 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7164 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7165 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7167 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
7168 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
7170 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
7172 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7173 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7175 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
7176 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
7178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7181 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
7182 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
7183 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
7185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7189 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
7190 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
7193 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
7194 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
7195 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7196 if messages_delivered == 0 {
7197 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7198 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
7200 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7203 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7204 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7206 let payment_event = {
7207 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
7208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7210 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7211 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7212 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7214 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
7216 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7217 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
7219 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7220 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7221 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7223 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7225 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7226 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7227 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7230 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7231 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7232 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7233 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7236 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
7237 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7238 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7246 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7247 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7248 if messages_delivered < 3 {
7249 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
7250 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
7251 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7252 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7253 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7254 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7255 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7256 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7257 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7258 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7259 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7260 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7261 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
7262 // Everything was delivered...
7263 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7266 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7267 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7269 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7270 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7273 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7274 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7275 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7277 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7278 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7280 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7281 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7283 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7284 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7285 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7287 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7290 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
7291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7293 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7294 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7295 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
7296 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
7297 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7298 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7299 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7300 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7301 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7302 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7303 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
7305 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7308 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
7309 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
7311 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7312 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7314 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7315 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7320 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
7321 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
7322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7323 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7325 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7326 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7327 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7330 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7331 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7332 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7333 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7336 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7337 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7338 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7346 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7347 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7348 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7349 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7350 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
7351 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
7352 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7353 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7355 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7356 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7358 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7361 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
7362 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7363 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7364 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7365 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7366 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7367 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7368 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7369 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7370 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7371 // Everything was delivered...
7372 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7375 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7376 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7377 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7379 // Channel should still work fine...
7380 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
7381 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7385 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
7386 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
7387 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
7388 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
7389 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
7393 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
7394 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
7395 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
7396 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
7400 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
7401 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
7402 let nodes = create_network(2);
7403 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7405 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7406 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7408 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7409 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7410 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7412 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7413 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7415 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7418 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7420 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7421 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7423 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7424 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7425 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
7427 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7428 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7430 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7433 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7434 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7436 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7439 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7441 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
7442 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
7444 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7445 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7446 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
7450 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
7451 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
7452 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
7453 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7454 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7456 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7458 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7459 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7460 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7462 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
7463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7465 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7466 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7468 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7469 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7472 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7475 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7476 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7478 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7479 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7480 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7481 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7482 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7483 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7484 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7486 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7487 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7488 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7490 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7491 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7493 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7496 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
7497 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7498 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7501 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7504 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7505 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7507 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7508 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7509 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7510 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7511 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7512 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7514 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7515 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7516 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7517 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7519 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7520 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7522 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7523 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7525 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7527 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7528 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7529 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7530 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7531 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7532 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7533 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7534 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7535 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7538 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
7539 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7540 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7541 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7542 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7543 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7544 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7547 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7548 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7549 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7550 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7551 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7552 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7553 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7556 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7557 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7558 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7561 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7562 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7563 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7566 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7567 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7570 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7571 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7573 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7574 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7577 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7578 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7580 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7581 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7583 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
7584 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7586 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7589 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7590 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7593 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7597 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
7598 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
7599 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7600 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7602 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7603 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7605 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7606 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7609 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7610 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
7612 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7616 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
7617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7620 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7621 // PaymentFailed event
7623 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7626 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
7627 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
7628 // a disconnect in between
7629 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7630 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7632 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7633 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7635 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7636 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7639 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7640 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7641 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7644 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7645 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7646 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7649 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7650 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7653 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7654 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7655 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
7656 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7657 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7658 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7660 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7662 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7663 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7665 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7666 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7667 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7672 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7674 // Now set it to failed again...
7675 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7676 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7677 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7680 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7681 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7682 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7685 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7686 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7687 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7690 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7691 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7692 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7695 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7696 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7698 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7702 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7703 // PaymentFailed event
7705 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7709 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7710 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7711 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7714 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7715 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7717 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7718 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7719 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7720 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7721 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7722 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7723 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7724 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7725 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7726 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7727 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7728 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7729 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7730 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7731 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7732 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7733 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7734 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7735 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7737 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7739 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7740 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7741 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7743 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7744 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7747 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7748 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7749 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7751 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7752 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7753 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7755 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7756 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7757 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7758 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7759 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7760 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7761 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7762 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7763 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7764 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7766 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7767 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7768 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7769 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7771 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7772 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7777 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7778 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7779 } else { panic!(); }
7782 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7787 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7788 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7789 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7792 // Now fix monitor updating...
7793 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7794 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7797 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7798 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7799 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7801 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7802 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7803 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7804 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7805 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7806 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7808 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7809 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7810 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7811 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7813 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7814 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7816 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7819 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7820 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7821 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7823 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7824 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7825 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7826 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7827 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7828 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7830 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7832 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7833 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7835 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7837 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7838 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7840 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7841 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7842 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7844 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7845 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7846 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7848 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7849 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7850 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7851 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7852 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7853 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7855 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7857 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7858 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7859 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7861 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7862 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7864 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7867 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7868 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7869 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7872 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7876 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7877 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7879 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7880 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7881 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7883 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7884 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7887 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7889 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7890 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7891 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7892 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7893 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7900 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7902 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7903 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7904 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7905 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7908 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7909 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7911 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7912 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7914 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7915 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7918 let as_commitment_update;
7919 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7921 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7922 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7923 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7924 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7925 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7926 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7927 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7928 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7932 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7933 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7934 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7935 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7936 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7937 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7938 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7939 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7943 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7946 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7947 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7949 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7950 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7952 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7953 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7955 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7958 handle_initial_raa!();
7960 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7961 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7963 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7964 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7966 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7967 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7970 handle_initial_raa!();
7972 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7973 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7975 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7976 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7978 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7979 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7981 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7986 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7987 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7989 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7990 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7992 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7993 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7997 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7998 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7999 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
8000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8002 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8003 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8004 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
8005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8007 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8008 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8011 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8012 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8015 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8017 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8018 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8020 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
8021 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
8022 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8024 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8027 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
8031 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
8032 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
8033 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
8034 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
8035 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
8036 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
8037 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
8041 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
8042 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
8043 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
8044 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
8045 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
8049 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
8050 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
8051 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
8052 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
8053 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
8054 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
8058 fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() {
8059 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed
8060 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8061 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8063 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8064 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8065 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8068 let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8069 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8071 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8072 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
8073 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8074 } else { panic!(); }
8075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8076 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8078 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8079 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8081 let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8082 assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2);
8084 match responses[0] {
8085 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => {
8086 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8087 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
8088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8090 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8092 match responses[1] {
8093 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => {
8094 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8095 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8096 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8097 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8098 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8099 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8101 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8102 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
8103 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8104 } else { panic!(); }
8105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8106 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8108 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8111 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8112 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8115 let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8116 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap();
8117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8119 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8120 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8122 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8123 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8125 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8126 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8128 events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8129 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8131 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => {
8132 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
8133 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8135 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8138 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
8141 fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) {
8142 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
8143 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8144 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8145 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8147 // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
8148 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
8150 // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards
8151 let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8153 // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
8154 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, 0));
8155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8157 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8158 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8159 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8160 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8161 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8162 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8163 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8165 let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
8166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8168 // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the
8170 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8171 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8172 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
8173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8175 let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8176 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8177 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8179 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8180 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
8182 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8186 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8187 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8189 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8191 // Now fail monitor updating.
8192 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8193 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() {
8194 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8195 } else { panic!(); }
8196 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8197 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8200 // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable
8203 let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8204 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8205 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
8206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8208 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
8209 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8210 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8211 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
8212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8214 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8215 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8216 match events_2.remove(0) {
8217 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8218 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8219 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8220 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8221 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8222 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8223 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8225 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8226 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
8228 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8229 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
8230 match msg_events[0] {
8231 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
8232 assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
8233 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); // temp disabled
8235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8238 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8239 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8240 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
8241 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
8242 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
8243 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8245 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8248 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8249 // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding
8250 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8251 let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8252 nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
8253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8255 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8256 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8257 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) {
8258 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
8259 } else { panic!(); }
8260 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8261 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8262 (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4))
8263 } else { (None, None) };
8265 // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
8266 // update_add update.
8267 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8268 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8271 let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8272 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8273 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3);
8275 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
8278 // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the
8279 // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order.
8280 let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() {
8281 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => {
8282 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8283 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8284 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8285 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8286 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8287 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8288 (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed)
8290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8292 let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8293 match events_3.remove(1) {
8294 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => {
8295 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8298 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8301 let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0));
8302 assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8304 // Now deliver the new messages...
8306 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap();
8307 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
8308 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8309 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
8310 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events_4[0] {
8311 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
8312 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
8313 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8315 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8316 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8317 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap();
8318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8319 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8320 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap();
8321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8322 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8323 assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8324 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8325 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8326 assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8327 assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8329 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8331 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8332 assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8333 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8334 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8335 assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8336 assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8338 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8340 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8342 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8344 let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8346 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
8347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8348 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8350 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
8351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8352 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8354 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false);
8357 let events_5 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8358 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8360 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8361 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8364 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8365 nodes[2].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8367 let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8368 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
8370 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); },
8371 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8374 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8375 let events_7 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8376 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
8378 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8379 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8382 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8383 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8386 send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
8387 assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8388 assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8389 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8390 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8392 let events_8 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8393 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
8395 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8396 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8399 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8400 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8402 let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8403 assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1);
8405 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()),
8406 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8408 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap());
8411 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
8415 fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() {
8416 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false);
8417 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true);
8421 fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() {
8422 // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on
8423 // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell
8425 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8426 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8427 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8429 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8431 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8432 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8434 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
8435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8436 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8437 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8438 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8439 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8440 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8441 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8442 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8444 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8445 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8447 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8448 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8449 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8451 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8452 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8454 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8456 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() {
8457 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8458 } else { panic!(); }
8459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8461 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8462 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8464 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8465 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8467 assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8468 assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8470 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8472 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap();
8473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8474 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8476 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8477 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8480 updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8481 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8482 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8483 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8484 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8485 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8486 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8487 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8489 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8490 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8492 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage),
8493 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8498 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
8499 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
8500 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8501 let nodes = create_network(2);
8503 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8505 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8506 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8507 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8508 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8510 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8512 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8513 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8515 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8516 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8518 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
8520 let mut chan_announcement;
8522 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
8524 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
8525 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
8526 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
8527 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
8528 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
8529 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
8530 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
8531 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
8532 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8537 macro_rules! sign_msg {
8538 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
8539 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
8540 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8541 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8542 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
8543 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
8544 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
8545 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
8546 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
8547 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
8548 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
8549 contents: $unsigned_msg
8554 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8555 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8556 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
8557 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8559 // Configured with Network::Testnet
8560 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8561 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
8562 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8563 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8565 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8566 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
8567 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8568 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8571 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
8572 impl Writer for VecWriter {
8573 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
8574 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
8577 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
8578 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
8583 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8584 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8586 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
8588 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8590 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8591 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8592 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8594 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8595 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8596 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8597 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8599 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8600 let config = UserConfig::new();
8601 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8602 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8603 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8604 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8605 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8606 default_config: config,
8608 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8609 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8610 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8611 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8612 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8613 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8616 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8618 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8619 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8620 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
8621 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
8622 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
8623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8625 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8626 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
8627 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8628 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
8630 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
8631 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8632 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
8633 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8635 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8636 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8637 for node in nodes.iter() {
8638 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
8639 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
8640 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
8643 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8647 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8648 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8649 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8651 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8652 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8654 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8656 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8657 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8658 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8660 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8661 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8662 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8663 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8665 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8666 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8667 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8668 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8669 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8670 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8671 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8673 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8674 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8675 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8676 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8677 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8678 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8681 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8683 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8684 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8687 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8689 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
8690 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8694 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
8695 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
8696 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
8697 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8698 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
8699 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
8701 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
8703 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
8704 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8706 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
8707 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8708 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8709 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8711 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
8713 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
8714 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
8715 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8716 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
8717 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
8720 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8721 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
8722 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
8723 let mut read = &serialized[..];
8724 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8725 assert!(read.is_empty());
8726 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
8729 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8730 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8731 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8732 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8734 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8735 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8736 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8737 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8738 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8739 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
8741 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8743 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
8744 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8745 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8746 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
8747 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
8750 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
8751 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
8752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8754 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8756 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
8757 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8758 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8759 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
8760 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8762 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8763 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8764 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
8765 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
8766 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8767 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
8770 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
8771 ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
8773 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8774 let mut txn = Vec::new();
8775 for event in events {
8777 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
8778 for outp in outputs {
8780 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
8782 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8783 script_sig: Script::new(),
8785 witness: Vec::new(),
8788 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8789 value: output.value,
8791 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8797 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8798 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
8799 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8800 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8801 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8802 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8803 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8804 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8807 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
8809 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8810 script_sig: Script::new(),
8811 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
8812 witness: Vec::new(),
8815 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8816 value: output.value,
8818 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8824 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8825 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8826 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8827 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8828 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8829 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
8830 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
8833 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
8834 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8836 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8837 script_sig: Script::new(),
8839 witness: Vec::new(),
8842 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8843 value: output.value,
8845 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8849 output: vec![outp.clone()],
8852 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
8854 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
8856 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
8859 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
8862 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
8863 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8864 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8865 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
8866 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8867 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8868 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8874 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8883 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
8884 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
8885 let nodes = create_network(2);
8887 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8888 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8889 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8891 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8892 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8894 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8895 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8896 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8897 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8899 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8900 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8901 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8902 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8903 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8907 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
8908 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8909 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8911 let nodes = create_network(2);
8913 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8914 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8915 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8917 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8918 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8920 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8921 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8922 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8923 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8925 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8926 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8927 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8929 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8930 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8932 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8933 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8934 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8935 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8939 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
8940 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8941 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8943 let nodes = create_network(2);
8945 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
8946 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8947 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8948 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8949 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8951 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8952 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8953 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8954 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8956 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8957 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8959 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8960 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8961 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8962 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
8963 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8964 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
8965 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8969 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
8970 let nodes = create_network(2);
8972 // Create some initial channels
8973 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8975 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8977 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8978 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
8979 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8981 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
8982 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8983 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8985 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
8986 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8988 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8989 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8992 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8993 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8996 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
8997 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
8998 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
8999 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
9000 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9001 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
9003 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
9004 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9005 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9006 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9010 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
9011 let nodes = create_network(2);
9013 // Create some initial channels
9014 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9016 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9017 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9018 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9019 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9021 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9023 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9024 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9025 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9027 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9030 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9031 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
9032 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
9033 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
9034 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9036 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9037 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9038 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9039 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9043 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9044 let nodes = create_network(2);
9046 // Create some initial channels
9047 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9049 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9050 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9051 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9052 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9054 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9056 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9057 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
9058 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9059 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9061 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9064 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9065 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9066 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9067 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9068 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9069 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9070 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
9072 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9073 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9074 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9076 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9077 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9080 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9081 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9082 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9083 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9085 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9086 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9087 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
9088 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9089 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9090 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
9094 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
9095 let nodes = create_network(2);
9097 // Create some initial channels
9098 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9100 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9101 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9102 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9103 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9105 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9107 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9108 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
9109 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9110 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9112 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9113 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9115 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9117 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9118 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9119 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9120 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9121 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9123 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9124 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9125 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9127 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9131 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9132 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9133 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9134 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9136 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9137 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9138 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
9139 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9140 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9141 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
9142 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
9143 check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
9147 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
9148 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
9149 // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
9150 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
9151 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
9153 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
9156 let nodes = create_network(3);
9158 // Create some initial channels
9159 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9160 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9162 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
9163 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9164 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9166 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
9167 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9168 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9169 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9170 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9172 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9173 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9174 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9175 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9176 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9178 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9179 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9180 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9182 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9186 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
9187 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
9188 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
9189 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
9190 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
9191 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
9192 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
9193 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9194 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9195 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9197 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
9198 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
9200 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9201 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
9202 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
9203 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9204 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9205 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9206 assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9207 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9208 check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9209 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9210 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9211 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9214 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9216 match msg_events[0] {
9217 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9218 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9220 match msg_events[1] {
9221 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
9222 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9223 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9224 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9225 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9226 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
9228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9230 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
9231 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9232 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9233 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9234 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
9235 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9236 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9237 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
9238 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9239 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9240 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9241 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9242 match msg_events[0] {
9243 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9249 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
9250 // Topology : A --> B --> C
9251 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
9252 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
9254 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9255 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9257 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
9258 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
9259 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
9261 let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9262 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9263 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9265 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9266 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9267 let htlc_timeout_tx;
9268 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
9269 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9270 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
9271 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
9272 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
9273 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9274 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9275 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9276 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9277 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
9278 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9279 check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
9280 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
9281 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
9284 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9286 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9287 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9290 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
9291 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
9293 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9295 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9296 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9299 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9300 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9302 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9303 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
9304 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9305 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
9306 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9307 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9308 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
9309 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9310 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9311 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
9312 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9313 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9315 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
9316 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9317 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9318 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9319 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
9320 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9321 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9324 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9325 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9327 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9328 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9329 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9331 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
9333 _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
9336 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9338 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
9339 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
9341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9344 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
9345 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9346 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9347 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9348 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9349 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9350 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
9351 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9354 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9355 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
9357 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9359 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
9360 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
9362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9367 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
9368 let nodes = create_network(2);
9370 // Create some initial channels
9371 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9373 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9374 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9375 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9376 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9378 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
9379 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9381 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9382 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9383 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9385 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9386 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9389 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9390 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9392 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9393 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9394 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9395 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9397 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9398 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9399 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9400 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9401 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
9405 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9406 let nodes = create_network(2);
9408 // Create some initial channels
9409 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9411 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9412 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9413 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9414 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9416 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9417 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9418 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9419 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9421 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9422 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9424 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9425 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9426 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9427 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9429 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9430 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9431 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
9432 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9433 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
9434 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
9435 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9436 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
9437 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
9438 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9439 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
9443 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
9444 let nodes = create_network(2);
9446 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9448 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
9449 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
9451 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9452 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9453 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
9454 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9455 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
9457 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9458 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
9459 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9460 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
9463 fn run_onion_failure_test<F1,F2>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, callback_msg: F1, callback_node: F2, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
9464 where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
9467 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept(_name, test_case, nodes, route, payment_hash, callback_msg, |_|{}, callback_node, expected_retryable, expected_error_code, expected_channel_update);
9471 // 0: node1 fail backward
9472 // 1: final node fail backward
9473 // 2: payment completed but the user reject the payment
9474 // 3: final node fail backward (but tamper onion payloads from node0)
9475 // 100: trigger error in the intermediate node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
9476 // 200: trigger error in the final node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
9477 fn run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept<F1,F2,F3>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, mut callback_msg: F1, mut callback_fail: F2, mut callback_node: F3, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
9478 where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
9479 F2: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
9482 use ln::msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate;
9484 // reset block height
9485 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9486 for ix in 0..nodes.len() {
9487 nodes[ix].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9490 macro_rules! expect_event {
9491 ($node: expr, $event_type: path) => {{
9492 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9493 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9495 $event_type { .. } => {},
9496 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9501 macro_rules! expect_htlc_forward {
9503 expect_event!($node, Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable);
9504 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
9505 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9509 // 0 ~~> 2 send payment
9510 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash.clone()).unwrap();
9511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9512 let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9513 // temper update_add (0 => 1)
9514 let mut update_add_0 = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
9515 if test_case == 0 || test_case == 3 || test_case == 100 {
9516 callback_msg(&mut update_add_0);
9519 // 0 => 1 update_add & CS
9520 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_0).unwrap();
9521 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
9523 let update_1_0 = match test_case {
9524 0|100 => { // intermediate node failure; fail backward to 0
9525 let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9526 assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()+update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1 && (update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()==1 || update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1));
9529 1|2|3|200 => { // final node failure; forwarding to 2
9530 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9532 if test_case != 200 {
9535 expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[1]);
9537 let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9538 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
9539 assert_eq!(update_1.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9540 // tamper update_add (1 => 2)
9541 let mut update_add_1 = update_1.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
9542 if test_case != 3 && test_case != 200 {
9543 callback_msg(&mut update_add_1);
9547 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_1).unwrap();
9548 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false, true);
9550 if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
9551 expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[2]);
9552 expect_event!(&nodes[2], Event::PaymentReceived);
9556 let update_2_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9557 if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
9558 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[2], 1);
9560 assert!(update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
9562 let mut fail_msg = update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
9563 if test_case == 200 {
9564 callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
9568 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
9569 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_2_1.commitment_signed, true, true);
9571 // backward fail on 1
9572 let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9573 assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
9576 _ => unreachable!(),
9579 // 1 => 0 commitment_signed_dance
9580 if update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() > 0 {
9581 let mut fail_msg = update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
9582 if test_case == 100 {
9583 callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
9585 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
9587 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9590 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
9592 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9593 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9594 if let &Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash:_, ref rejected_by_dest, ref error_code } = &events[0] {
9595 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, !expected_retryable);
9596 assert_eq!(*error_code, expected_error_code);
9598 panic!("Uexpected event");
9601 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9602 if expected_channel_update.is_some() {
9603 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9605 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => {
9607 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } => {
9608 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {} else {
9609 panic!("channel_update not found!");
9612 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => {
9613 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: ref expected_short_channel_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
9614 assert!(*short_channel_id == *expected_short_channel_id);
9615 assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
9617 panic!("Unexpected message event");
9620 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => {
9621 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: ref expected_node_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
9622 assert!(*node_id == *expected_node_id);
9623 assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
9625 panic!("Unexpected message event");
9630 _ => panic!("Unexpected message event"),
9633 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9637 impl msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9638 fn dummy() -> msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9639 use secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9640 use secp256k1::Signature;
9641 msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9642 signature: Signature::from(FFISignature::new()),
9643 contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9644 chain_hash: Sha256dHash::from_data(&vec![0u8][..]),
9645 short_channel_id: 0,
9648 cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
9649 htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
9651 fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
9652 excess_data: vec![],
9659 fn test_onion_failure() {
9660 use ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate;
9661 use ln::channelmanager::CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY;
9664 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
9665 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
9666 const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
9667 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
9669 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
9670 for node in nodes.iter() {
9671 *node.keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some(SecretKey::from_slice(&Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap());
9673 let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2)];
9674 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
9675 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9677 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 40000);
9679 // intermediate node failure
9680 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9681 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9682 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
9683 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9684 let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
9685 onion_payloads[0].realm = 3;
9686 msg.onion_routing_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9687 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));//XXX incremented channels idx here
9689 // final node failure
9690 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 3, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9691 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9692 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
9693 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9694 let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
9695 onion_payloads[1].realm = 3;
9696 msg.onion_routing_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9697 }, ||{}, false, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9699 // the following three with run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept() test only the origin node
9700 // receiving simulated fail messages
9701 // intermediate node failure
9702 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9704 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9706 // and tamper returing error message
9707 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9708 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9709 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9710 }, ||{}, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
9712 // final node failure
9713 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9714 // and tamper returing error message
9715 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9716 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9717 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9719 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9720 }, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
9722 // intermediate node failure
9723 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9724 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9726 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9727 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9728 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9729 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9731 // final node failure
9732 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9733 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9734 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9735 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9737 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9738 }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9740 // intermediate node failure
9741 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9742 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9744 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9745 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9746 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
9748 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9749 }, true, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9751 // final node failure
9752 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9753 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9754 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9755 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
9757 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9758 }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9760 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_version", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.version = 1; }, ||{}, true,
9761 Some(BADONION|PERM|4), None);
9763 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_hmac", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac = [3; 32]; }, ||{}, true,
9764 Some(BADONION|PERM|5), None);
9766 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_key", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key = Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey);}, ||{}, true,
9767 Some(BADONION|PERM|6), None);
9769 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9770 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9772 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9773 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9774 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], UPDATE|7, &ChannelUpdate::dummy().encode_with_len()[..]);
9775 }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9777 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9778 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9780 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9781 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9782 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|8, &[0;0]);
9783 // short_channel_id from the processing node
9784 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|8), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9786 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_channel_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9787 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9789 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9790 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9791 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|9, &[0;0]);
9792 // short_channel_id from the processing node
9793 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|9), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9795 let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
9796 bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id -= 1;
9797 run_onion_failure_test("unknown_next_peer", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|10),
9798 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id, is_permanent:true}));
9800 let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap().get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1;
9801 let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
9802 let route_len = bogus_route.hops.len();
9803 bogus_route.hops[route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward;
9804 run_onion_failure_test("amount_below_minimum", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|11), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9806 //TODO: with new config API, we will be able to generate both valid and
9807 //invalid channel_update cases.
9808 run_onion_failure_test("fee_insufficient", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9809 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9810 }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|12), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9812 run_onion_failure_test("incorrect_cltv_expiry", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9813 // need to violate: cltv_expiry - cltv_expiry_delta >= outgoing_cltv_value
9814 msg.cltv_expiry -= 1;
9815 }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9817 run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9818 let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
9819 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9820 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9821 }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9823 run_onion_failure_test("unknown_payment_hash", 2, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9824 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9825 }, false, Some(PERM|15), None);
9827 run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9828 let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
9829 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9830 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9831 }, || {}, true, Some(17), None);
9833 run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_cltv_expiry", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9834 for (_, mut pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9835 for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
9836 f.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value += 1;
9839 }, true, Some(18), None);
9841 run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_htlc_amount", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9842 // violate amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat
9843 for (_, mut pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9844 for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
9845 f.forward_info.amt_to_forward -= 1;
9848 }, true, Some(19), None);
9850 run_onion_failure_test("channel_disabled", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9851 // disconnect event to the channel between nodes[1] ~ nodes[2]
9852 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9853 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9854 }, true, Some(UPDATE|20), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9855 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9857 run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_far", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9858 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9859 let mut route = route.clone();
9861 route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta += CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY + route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta + 1;
9862 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9863 let (onion_payloads, _, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, height).unwrap();
9864 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9865 msg.cltv_expiry = htlc_cltv;
9866 msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_packet;
9867 }, ||{}, true, Some(21), None);