1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
21 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
22 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
23 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
26 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
27 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
28 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
29 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
30 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
32 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
33 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
34 use util::config::UserConfig;
35 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
36 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
37 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
38 use util::logger::Logger;
39 use util::errors::APIError;
43 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
45 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
66 use ln::router::Route;
67 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
68 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
70 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
73 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
76 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
77 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
87 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
94 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
96 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
97 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
98 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
99 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
102 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
104 pub enum HTLCSource {
105 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
108 session_priv: SecretKey,
109 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
110 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
111 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
116 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
117 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
118 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
119 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
128 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
136 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
138 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
139 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
140 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
141 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
142 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
143 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
145 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
147 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
148 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
149 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
150 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
151 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
153 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
154 err: msgs::HandleError,
155 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
157 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
159 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
163 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
164 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
166 data: err.to_string()
170 shutdown_finish: None,
174 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
175 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
178 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
182 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
183 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
185 data: err.to_string()
189 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
193 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
196 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
198 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
200 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
202 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
203 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
205 data: msg.to_string()
210 shutdown_finish: None,
215 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
216 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
217 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
218 /// probably increase this significantly.
219 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
221 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
222 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
224 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
227 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
228 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
229 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
230 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
231 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
232 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
233 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
235 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
239 struct ChannelHolder {
240 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
241 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
242 next_forward: Instant,
243 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
244 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
245 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
246 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
247 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
248 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
249 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
251 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
252 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
253 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
254 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
256 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
257 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
258 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
259 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
260 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
261 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
262 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
265 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
267 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
268 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
269 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
270 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
271 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
272 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
277 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
278 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
280 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
281 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
283 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
284 /// to individual Channels.
286 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
287 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
288 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
289 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
291 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
292 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
293 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
294 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
295 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
296 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
297 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
299 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
300 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
301 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
302 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
304 pub struct ChannelManager {
305 default_configuration: UserConfig,
306 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
307 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
308 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
309 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
310 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
312 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
313 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
314 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
316 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
317 our_network_key: SecretKey,
319 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
320 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
321 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
322 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
323 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
325 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
330 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
331 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
332 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
333 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
334 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
335 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
336 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
338 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
339 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
340 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
341 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
342 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
345 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
347 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
348 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
351 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
353 macro_rules! secp_call {
354 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
357 Err(_) => return Err($err),
364 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
366 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
367 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
372 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
373 pub struct ChannelDetails {
374 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
375 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
376 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
377 /// lifetime of the channel.
378 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
379 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
380 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
381 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
382 /// The node_id of our counterparty
383 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
384 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
385 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
386 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
390 macro_rules! handle_error {
391 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
394 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
395 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
396 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
397 if let Some(update) = update_option {
398 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
399 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
410 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
411 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
414 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
415 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
417 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
418 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
419 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
420 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
421 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
423 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
429 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
430 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
433 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
434 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
436 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
437 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
438 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
439 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
440 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
442 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
448 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
449 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
450 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
452 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
453 if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
454 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
456 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
457 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
459 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
461 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
462 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
463 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
464 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
466 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
467 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
468 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
469 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
470 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
471 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
472 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
473 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
474 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
475 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
477 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
478 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
479 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
485 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
486 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
487 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
489 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
490 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
491 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
492 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
494 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
496 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
497 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
503 impl ChannelManager {
504 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
506 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
507 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
509 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
511 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
512 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
513 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
515 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
516 default_configuration: config.clone(),
517 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
518 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
519 monitor: monitor.clone(),
523 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
524 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
527 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
528 by_id: HashMap::new(),
529 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
530 next_forward: Instant::now(),
531 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
532 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
533 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
535 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
537 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
538 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
544 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
545 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
549 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
551 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
552 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
553 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
554 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
556 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
557 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
559 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
560 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
561 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
562 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
563 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
566 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
567 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
569 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
570 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
571 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
573 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
574 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
576 panic!("RNG is bad???");
579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
581 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
582 node_id: their_network_key,
588 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
589 /// more information.
590 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
591 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
592 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
593 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
594 res.push(ChannelDetails {
595 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
596 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
597 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
598 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
599 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
605 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
606 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
607 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
608 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
609 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
610 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
611 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
612 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
613 // really wanted anyway.
614 if channel.is_live() {
615 res.push(ChannelDetails {
616 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
617 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
618 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
619 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
620 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
627 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
628 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
629 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
631 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
632 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
633 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
635 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
636 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
637 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
638 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
639 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
640 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
641 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
642 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
645 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
646 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
647 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
649 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
650 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
652 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
655 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
656 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
658 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
659 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
664 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
665 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
666 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
675 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
676 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
677 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
678 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
679 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
681 for tx in local_txn {
682 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
686 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
687 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
688 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
689 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
692 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
693 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
694 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
695 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
696 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
703 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
704 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
705 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
706 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
707 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
713 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
714 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
715 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
716 for chan in self.list_channels() {
717 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
722 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
723 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
725 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
726 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
727 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
730 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
731 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
732 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
737 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
738 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
739 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
740 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
741 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
745 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
746 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
747 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
748 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
749 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
752 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
754 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
755 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
756 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
758 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
759 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
761 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
762 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
763 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
764 let blinding_factor = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
766 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
768 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
769 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
771 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
777 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
778 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
779 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
781 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
782 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
788 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
798 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
799 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
800 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
801 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
802 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
803 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
804 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
805 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
807 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
808 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
809 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
810 // the intended recipient).
811 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
812 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
813 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
815 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
816 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
817 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
818 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
822 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
823 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
824 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
826 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
827 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
828 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
830 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
832 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
836 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
838 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
846 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
847 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
849 for i in 0..dst.len() {
854 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
855 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
856 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
857 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
860 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
861 let end_len = iters * 65;
862 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
863 res.resize(end_len, 0);
865 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
866 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
867 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
868 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
869 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
874 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
875 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
877 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
878 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
879 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
880 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
882 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
883 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
884 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
887 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
890 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.mu);
891 hmac.input(&packet_data);
892 hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]);
893 hmac_res = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
898 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
899 hop_data: packet_data,
904 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
905 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
906 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
907 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
909 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
910 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
911 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
912 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
913 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
914 data: packet_crypted,
918 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
919 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
920 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
922 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
925 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
926 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
927 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
928 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
932 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
933 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
936 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
938 failuremsg: failuremsg,
942 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
943 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
944 packet.hmac = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
950 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
951 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
952 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
955 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
956 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
957 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
959 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
960 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
961 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
962 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
963 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
964 failure_code: $err_code,
965 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
970 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
971 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
974 let shared_secret = {
975 let mut arr = [0; 32];
976 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
979 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
981 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
982 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
983 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
984 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
985 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
986 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
987 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
988 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
992 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
993 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
994 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
995 if !crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
996 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
999 let mut channel_state = None;
1000 macro_rules! return_err {
1001 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1003 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1004 if channel_state.is_none() {
1005 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1007 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1008 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1009 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1010 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1011 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1016 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1017 let next_hop_data = {
1018 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1019 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1020 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1022 let error_code = match err {
1023 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1024 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1026 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1032 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1034 // final_expiry_too_soon
1035 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1036 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1038 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1039 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1040 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1042 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1043 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1044 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1047 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1048 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1049 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1050 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1052 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1054 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1055 short_channel_id: 0,
1056 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1057 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1058 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1061 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1062 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1063 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1065 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1067 let blinding_factor = {
1068 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1069 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1070 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1071 SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("SHA-256 is broken?")
1074 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1076 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1078 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1081 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1082 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1085 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1086 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1087 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1088 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1089 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1090 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1091 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1095 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1096 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1097 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1098 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1099 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1100 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1101 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1103 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1105 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1106 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1108 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1109 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1110 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1111 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1112 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1113 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1114 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1116 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1117 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1119 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1120 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1121 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1123 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1124 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1126 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1127 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1128 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1129 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1131 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1132 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1137 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1138 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1139 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1140 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1142 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1143 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1145 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1146 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1148 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1150 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1155 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1158 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1159 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1160 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1161 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1162 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1166 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1168 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1169 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1170 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1171 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1172 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1173 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1174 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1175 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1176 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1177 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1180 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1181 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1183 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1189 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1191 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1192 /// fields for more info.
1194 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1195 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1196 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1197 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1198 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1199 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1201 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1203 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1204 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1205 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1206 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1207 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1208 /// relevant updates.
1210 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1211 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1212 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1213 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1214 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1215 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1216 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1217 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1219 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1220 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1221 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1222 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1226 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1228 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1230 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1231 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1232 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1233 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1235 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1237 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1238 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1240 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1241 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1242 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1245 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1246 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1248 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1249 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1251 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1252 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1254 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1255 route: route.clone(),
1256 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1257 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1258 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1260 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1261 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1262 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1263 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1264 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1265 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1266 // something else in case we will resend later!
1267 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1270 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1271 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1272 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1273 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1274 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1275 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1276 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1284 } else { unreachable!(); }
1288 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1289 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1291 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1293 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1294 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1295 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1296 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1300 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1305 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1307 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1308 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1310 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1312 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1313 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1314 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1315 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1317 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1319 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1320 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1322 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1323 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1324 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1325 } else { unreachable!(); })
1331 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1332 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1333 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1336 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1337 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1338 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1339 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1346 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1347 // lock before add_update_monitor
1348 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1352 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1353 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1354 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1357 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1358 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1359 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1361 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1367 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1368 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1370 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1372 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1374 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1375 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1377 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1378 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1379 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1380 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1381 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1385 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1387 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1388 /// Will likely generate further events.
1389 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1390 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1392 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1393 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1395 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1396 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1398 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1402 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1403 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1404 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1405 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1407 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1408 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1409 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1410 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1411 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1412 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1414 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1419 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1421 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1422 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1423 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1424 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1425 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1426 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1428 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1430 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1431 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1436 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1438 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1439 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1440 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1441 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1442 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1443 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1444 // this channel currently :/.
1451 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1452 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1455 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1456 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1458 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1462 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1465 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1466 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1467 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1468 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1469 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1470 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1471 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1473 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1478 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1479 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1480 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1481 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1482 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1484 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1485 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1486 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1488 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1489 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1490 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1497 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1499 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1500 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1504 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1505 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1506 events.append(&mut new_events);
1509 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1510 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
1511 /// expected_value is the value you expected the payment to be for (not the amount it actually
1512 /// was for from the PaymentReceived event).
1513 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, expected_value: u64) -> bool {
1514 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1516 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1517 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1518 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1519 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1520 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1521 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1522 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1523 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(expected_value).to_vec() });
1529 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1530 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1531 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1532 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1533 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1534 /// still-available channels.
1535 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1537 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1538 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1539 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1540 match &onion_error {
1541 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1543 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1545 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1546 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1547 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1548 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1549 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1550 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1551 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1556 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1557 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1558 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1559 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1561 error_code: onion_error_code
1565 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1569 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1570 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1571 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1572 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1574 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1575 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1576 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1577 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1578 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1579 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1581 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1587 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1588 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1589 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1590 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1591 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1592 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1594 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1595 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1596 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1600 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1602 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1603 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1607 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1608 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1609 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1610 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1613 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1614 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1615 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1616 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1617 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1618 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1619 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1621 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1627 //TODO: Do something with e?
1635 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1636 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1637 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1639 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1640 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1641 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1643 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1645 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1646 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1647 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1648 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1649 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1650 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1655 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1657 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1658 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1659 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1660 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1664 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1665 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1666 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1668 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1669 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1671 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1672 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1678 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1679 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1680 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1681 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1682 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1683 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1686 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1687 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1688 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1689 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1690 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1691 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1692 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1693 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1701 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1702 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1703 //TODO: Do something with e?
1711 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1712 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1713 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1716 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1717 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1719 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1720 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1721 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1722 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1723 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1726 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1727 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1728 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1729 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1730 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1731 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1732 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1733 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1735 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1736 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1737 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1738 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1739 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1740 // on-chain confirmations.
1741 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1742 // should be written.
1743 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1744 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1746 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1747 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1748 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1754 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1757 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1758 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1759 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1761 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1763 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1764 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1765 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1766 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1771 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1772 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1773 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1774 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1775 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1780 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1784 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1795 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1796 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1798 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1800 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1801 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1805 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1806 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1807 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1810 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1811 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1812 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1813 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1814 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1815 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1817 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1818 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1819 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1821 entry.insert(channel);
1827 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1828 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1829 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1830 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1831 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1833 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1834 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1835 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1837 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1838 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1840 //TODO: same as above
1841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1844 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1845 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1846 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1847 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1848 output_script: output_script,
1849 user_channel_id: user_id,
1854 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1855 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1856 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1857 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1858 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1859 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1860 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1861 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1862 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1864 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1866 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1869 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1870 // lock before add_update_monitor
1871 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1874 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1875 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1876 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1877 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1878 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1880 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1881 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1882 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1891 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1892 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1893 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1894 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1895 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1896 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1897 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1898 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1899 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1901 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1902 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1905 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1907 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1910 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1911 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1912 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1913 user_channel_id: user_id,
1918 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1919 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1920 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1921 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1923 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1924 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1925 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1927 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1928 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1929 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1930 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1931 msg: announcement_sigs,
1936 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1940 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1941 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1942 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1943 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1945 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1946 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1947 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1948 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1949 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1951 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1952 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1953 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1954 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1958 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1959 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1960 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1964 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1965 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1966 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1968 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1969 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1971 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1974 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1975 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1977 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1978 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1979 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1980 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1988 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1989 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1990 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1991 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1992 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1993 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1994 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1995 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1996 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1998 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1999 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2000 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2001 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2006 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2007 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2008 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2009 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2010 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2011 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2012 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2014 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2015 } else { (tx, None) }
2017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2020 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2021 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2023 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2024 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2025 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2026 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2034 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2035 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2036 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2037 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2039 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2040 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2041 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2042 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2044 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2045 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2047 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2048 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2049 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2050 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2051 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2053 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2054 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2055 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2056 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2057 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2058 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2059 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2060 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2061 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2062 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2063 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2064 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2065 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2066 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2068 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2069 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2070 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2071 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2075 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2076 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2077 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2078 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2079 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2080 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2085 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2087 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2092 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2093 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2095 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2096 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2097 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2098 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2099 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2100 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2102 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2104 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2107 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2111 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2112 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2113 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool, Option<u16>) {
2114 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2117 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2118 let mut error_code_ret = None;
2119 let mut next_route_hop_ix = 0;
2120 let mut is_from_final_node = false;
2122 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2123 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2124 next_route_hop_ix += 1;
2125 if res.is_some() { return; }
2127 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2128 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2130 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2132 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2133 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2134 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2135 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2136 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2138 is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2140 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2141 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2142 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
2143 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2145 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) {
2146 if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
2147 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2148 const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
2149 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2151 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&error_code_slice);
2152 error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
2154 let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
2156 // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to
2157 // update Route object
2158 let payment_failed = (match error_code & 0xff {
2159 15|16|17|18|19 => true,
2161 } && is_from_final_node) // PERM bit observed below even this error is from the intermediate nodes
2162 || error_code == 21; // Special case error 21 as the Route object is bogus, TODO: Maybe fail the node if the CLTV was reasonable?
2164 let mut fail_channel_update = None;
2166 if error_code & NODE == NODE {
2167 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM });
2169 else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
2170 fail_channel_update = if payment_failed {None} else {Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2171 short_channel_id: route.hops[next_route_hop_ix - if next_route_hop_ix == route.hops.len() { 1 } else { 0 }].short_channel_id,
2175 else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
2176 if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
2177 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&update_len_slice) as usize;
2178 if let Some(update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
2179 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)) {
2180 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2181 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2182 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
2184 11 => amt_to_forward > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
2186 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2187 new_fee.is_some() && route_hop.fee_msat >= new_fee.unwrap()
2189 13 => route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
2190 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
2191 20 => chan_update.contents.flags & 2 == 0,
2192 _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
2194 fail_channel_update = if is_chan_update_invalid {
2195 // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
2196 // to the node in question corrupted something.
2197 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2198 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2202 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2209 if fail_channel_update.is_none() {
2210 // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
2211 // trying to relay through them anymore.
2212 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2213 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2217 } else if !payment_failed {
2218 // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to
2219 // forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its
2220 // really not worth trying any further.
2221 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2222 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2227 // TODO: Here (and a few other places) we assume that BADONION errors
2228 // are always "sourced" from the node previous to the one which failed
2229 // to decode the onion.
2230 res = Some((fail_channel_update, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2232 let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
2233 if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
2234 log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
2237 log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x})] {}", title, error_code, description);
2240 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2241 // definitely came from the peer in question
2242 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2243 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2245 }), !is_from_final_node));
2249 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2250 if let Some((channel_update, payment_retryable)) = res {
2251 (channel_update, payment_retryable, error_code_ret)
2253 // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
2254 // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
2255 (None, !is_from_final_node, None)
2257 } else { unreachable!(); }
2260 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2261 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2262 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2263 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2264 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2265 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2266 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2267 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2269 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2271 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2276 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2277 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2278 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2279 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2280 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2281 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2282 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2283 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2285 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2286 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2288 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2295 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2296 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2297 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2298 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2300 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2301 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2302 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2304 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2305 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2306 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2307 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
2308 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2310 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2311 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2312 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2314 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2315 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2316 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2317 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2318 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2319 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2320 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2321 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2323 commitment_signed: msg,
2327 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2328 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2329 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2335 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2340 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2341 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2342 let mut forward_event = None;
2343 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2344 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2345 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2346 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2347 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2349 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2350 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2351 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2352 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2355 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2360 match forward_event {
2362 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2363 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2364 time_forwardable: time
2372 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2373 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2374 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2375 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2376 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2377 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2378 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2379 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2380 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2382 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2383 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2384 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2385 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2387 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2388 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2389 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2393 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2394 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2395 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2399 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2401 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2404 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2405 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2407 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2412 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2413 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2414 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2415 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2416 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2417 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2418 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2419 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2421 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2423 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2428 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2429 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2430 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2432 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2434 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2435 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2437 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2438 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2441 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2442 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2443 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2445 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2446 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2447 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2448 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2449 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2452 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2454 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2455 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2456 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2457 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2458 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2459 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2460 contents: announcement,
2462 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2465 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2470 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2471 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2472 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2474 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2476 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2477 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2479 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2480 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2481 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2482 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2483 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2484 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2485 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2486 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2487 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2489 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2490 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2492 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
2493 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2496 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2497 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2498 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2502 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2503 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2504 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2505 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2510 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2511 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2512 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2513 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2519 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2523 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2528 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2529 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2530 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2536 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2540 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2541 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2542 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2543 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2545 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2546 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2548 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2549 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2550 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2552 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2554 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2555 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2556 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2558 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2559 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2561 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2562 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2564 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2565 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2566 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2568 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2571 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2572 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2573 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2574 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2575 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2576 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2577 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2578 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2588 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2589 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2591 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2593 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2594 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2595 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2596 node_id: their_node_id,
2600 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2606 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2607 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2608 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2609 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2610 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2612 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2613 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2614 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2615 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2616 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2618 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2619 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2624 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2625 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2626 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2631 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2632 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2633 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2634 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2635 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2637 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2638 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2639 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2640 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2641 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2643 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2644 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2649 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2650 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2651 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2656 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2657 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2658 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2659 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2660 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2661 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2663 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2664 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2665 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2666 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2667 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2668 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2669 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2670 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2671 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2672 msg: funding_locked,
2674 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2675 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2676 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2677 msg: announcement_sigs,
2680 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2681 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2682 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2683 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2684 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2688 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2689 for tx in txn_matched {
2690 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2691 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2692 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2693 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2694 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2696 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2697 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2698 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2699 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2700 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2701 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2710 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2711 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2712 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2714 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2715 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2716 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2717 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2718 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2719 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2720 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2729 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2730 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2732 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2733 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2736 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2737 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2738 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2739 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2741 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2742 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2743 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2744 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2745 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2746 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2747 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2748 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2750 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2751 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2752 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2762 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2763 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2765 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2766 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2770 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2771 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2772 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2773 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2774 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2777 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2778 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2779 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2782 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2783 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2784 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2787 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2788 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2789 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2792 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2793 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2794 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2797 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2798 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2799 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2802 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2803 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2804 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2807 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2808 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2809 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2812 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2813 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2814 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2817 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2818 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2819 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2822 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2823 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2824 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2827 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2828 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2829 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2832 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2833 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2834 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2837 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2838 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2839 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2842 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2843 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2844 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2847 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2848 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2849 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2852 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2853 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2854 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2855 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2857 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2858 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2859 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2860 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2861 if no_connection_possible {
2862 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2863 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2864 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2865 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2866 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2868 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2869 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2870 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2880 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2881 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2882 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2883 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2884 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2885 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2886 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2887 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2889 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2890 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2891 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2900 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2901 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2903 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2904 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2905 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2910 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2911 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2913 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2914 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2915 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2916 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2917 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2918 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2919 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2920 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2921 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2922 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2926 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2927 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2928 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2934 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2937 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2938 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2940 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2941 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2942 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2943 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2947 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2952 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2953 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2955 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2956 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2957 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2959 onion.write(writer)?;
2963 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2964 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2965 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2966 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2967 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2972 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2973 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2974 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2976 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2977 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2979 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2981 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2982 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2983 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2984 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2985 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2990 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2991 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2993 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2995 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2997 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2999 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3006 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3007 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3008 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3009 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3010 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3011 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3016 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3017 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3019 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3021 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3023 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3025 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3032 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3033 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3034 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3035 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3036 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3037 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3042 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3045 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3048 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3049 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3051 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3053 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3055 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3057 route.write(writer)?;
3058 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3059 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3066 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3067 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3068 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3069 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3070 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3071 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3072 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3073 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3075 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3080 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3081 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3083 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3087 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3089 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3090 data.write(writer)?;
3097 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3098 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3099 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3100 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3101 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3102 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3103 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3105 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3110 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3111 prev_short_channel_id,
3116 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3117 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3118 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3120 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3121 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3123 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3124 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3125 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3127 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3128 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3129 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3130 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3131 unfunded_channels += 1;
3134 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3135 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3136 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3137 channel.write(writer)?;
3141 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3142 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3143 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3144 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3145 for forward in pending_forwards {
3146 forward.write(writer)?;
3150 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3151 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3152 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3153 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3154 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3155 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3163 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3165 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3167 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3168 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3169 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3170 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3171 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3172 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3173 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3174 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3175 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3176 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3177 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3178 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3179 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3180 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3181 /// deserialization.
3182 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3184 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3186 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3187 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3188 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3190 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3191 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3192 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3193 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3194 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3196 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3197 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3198 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3199 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3200 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3201 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3202 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3203 /// deserialization.
3204 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3205 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3206 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3207 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3209 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3210 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3212 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3213 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3214 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3215 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3217 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3219 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3222 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3223 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3224 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3225 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3226 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3227 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3230 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3231 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3232 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3234 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3236 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3237 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3238 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3239 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3240 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3241 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3242 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3243 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3246 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3247 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3248 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3249 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3250 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3251 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3252 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3253 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3254 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3256 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3257 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3259 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3262 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3266 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3267 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3268 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3272 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3273 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3274 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3275 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3276 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3277 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3278 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3279 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3281 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3284 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3285 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3286 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3287 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3288 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3289 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3290 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3291 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3293 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3296 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3298 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3299 monitor: args.monitor,
3300 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3301 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3303 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3304 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3305 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3307 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3310 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3313 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3315 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3317 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3318 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3319 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3320 logger: args.logger,
3321 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3324 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3325 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3326 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3327 //connection or two.
3330 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3336 use chain::chaininterface;
3337 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3338 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3339 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3340 use chain::keysinterface;
3341 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3342 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3343 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3344 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
3345 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3347 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate};
3348 use util::test_utils;
3349 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3350 use util::errors::APIError;
3351 use util::logger::Logger;
3352 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3353 use util::config::UserConfig;
3355 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3356 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3357 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3358 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3359 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3360 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3361 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3362 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3363 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3364 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3366 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3367 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3371 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3372 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3374 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3376 use std::cell::RefCell;
3377 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
3378 use std::default::Default;
3380 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3381 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3382 use std::time::Instant;
3385 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3386 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3387 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3392 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3393 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3396 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3397 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3400 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3401 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3404 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3405 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3408 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3409 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3414 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3416 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3417 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3422 fn onion_vectors() {
3423 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3424 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3426 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3427 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3428 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3429 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3430 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3432 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3433 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3434 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3435 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3436 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3438 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3439 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3440 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3441 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3442 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3444 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3445 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3446 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3447 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3448 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3450 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3451 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3452 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3453 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3454 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3456 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3457 let payloads = vec!(
3458 msgs::OnionHopData {
3460 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3461 short_channel_id: 0,
3463 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3467 msgs::OnionHopData {
3469 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3470 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3471 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3472 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3476 msgs::OnionHopData {
3478 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3479 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3480 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3481 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3485 msgs::OnionHopData {
3487 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3488 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3489 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3490 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3494 msgs::OnionHopData {
3496 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3497 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3498 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3499 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3505 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32]));
3506 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3508 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3512 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3513 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3515 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3516 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3517 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3519 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3520 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3522 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3523 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3525 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3526 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3528 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3529 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3531 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3532 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3535 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3536 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3537 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3538 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3540 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3541 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3546 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3547 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3548 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3549 keys_manager: Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>,
3550 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3552 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3553 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3554 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3556 impl Drop for Node {
3557 fn drop(&mut self) {
3558 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3559 // Check that we processed all pending events
3560 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3561 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3562 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3567 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3568 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3571 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3572 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3573 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3574 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3577 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3578 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3580 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3581 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3583 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3584 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3587 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3588 }, match events[1] {
3589 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3590 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3591 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3592 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3593 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3594 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3595 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3596 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3604 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3605 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3607 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3608 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3610 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3611 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3614 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3620 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3621 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3623 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3624 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3626 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3627 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3630 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3636 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3637 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3639 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3640 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3647 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3648 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3649 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3650 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3652 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3656 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3657 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3659 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3660 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3661 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3663 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3664 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3666 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3668 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3669 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3670 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3671 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3672 added_monitors.clear();
3674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3677 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3679 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3680 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3681 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3682 added_monitors.clear();
3685 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3687 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3688 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3689 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3690 added_monitors.clear();
3693 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3694 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3696 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3697 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3698 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3700 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3706 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3707 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3708 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3712 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3713 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3714 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3715 ((match events_6[0] {
3716 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3717 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3718 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3721 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3722 }, match events_6[1] {
3723 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3724 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3727 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3731 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3732 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3733 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3737 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3738 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3739 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3740 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3742 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3743 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3744 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3745 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3748 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3751 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3752 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3753 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3754 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3755 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3756 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3757 assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
3758 assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, bs_update.contents.short_channel_id);
3761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3764 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3766 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3769 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3770 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3773 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3774 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3776 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3777 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3778 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3780 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3783 macro_rules! check_spends {
3784 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3786 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3787 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3788 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3789 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3794 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3795 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3797 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3798 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3799 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3800 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3801 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3804 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3805 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3807 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3808 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3811 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3818 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3819 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3820 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3823 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3824 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3826 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3827 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3828 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3829 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3830 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3836 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3837 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3840 Some(match events_1[1] {
3841 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3842 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3845 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3849 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3850 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3851 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3852 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3853 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3854 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3855 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3857 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3858 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3859 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3860 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3861 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3862 (as_update, bs_update)
3864 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3866 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3867 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3868 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3869 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3871 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3872 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3873 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3874 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3875 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3876 (as_update, bs_update)
3878 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3879 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3881 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3886 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3887 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3890 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3891 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3892 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3893 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3894 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3895 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3898 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3900 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3901 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3905 fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent {
3906 let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3907 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3908 SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap())
3912 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3913 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3915 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3916 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3917 added_monitors.clear();
3922 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3923 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3925 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3926 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3927 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3928 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3929 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3932 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3934 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3935 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3936 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3937 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3938 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3939 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3940 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3941 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3942 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3943 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3945 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3946 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3949 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3950 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3952 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3953 if $fail_backwards {
3954 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3955 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3957 (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack)
3960 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3962 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3963 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3964 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3965 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3966 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3967 assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none());
3971 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3973 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3974 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3976 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3977 if $fail_backwards {
3978 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3979 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3981 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3983 added_monitors.clear();
3988 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
3990 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
3993 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3995 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
3996 if $fail_backwards {
3997 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3998 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3999 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
4000 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4001 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4003 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4009 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
4012 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]);
4013 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
4014 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4015 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
4020 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4021 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4023 let mut payment_event = {
4024 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4025 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
4027 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4028 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4029 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4031 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
4033 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
4034 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4036 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4037 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
4038 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4040 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4041 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4043 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4044 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4047 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4048 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4050 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4051 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4052 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4054 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4055 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4056 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
4058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4061 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4062 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4063 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
4064 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4065 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4071 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
4074 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4075 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4076 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4078 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4079 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4080 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
4083 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4084 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4086 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4087 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4088 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4089 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4090 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4091 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4092 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4093 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4101 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4102 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4104 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4105 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4106 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4107 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4111 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4112 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4114 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4115 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4116 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4117 get_next_msgs!($node)
4119 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4122 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4123 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4128 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4129 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4130 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4131 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4132 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4133 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4134 } else if update_next_msgs {
4135 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4137 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4139 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4140 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4147 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4148 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4151 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4152 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4159 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4160 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4163 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4165 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4166 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4167 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4168 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4169 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4172 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4175 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4176 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4177 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4178 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4179 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4182 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4184 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4186 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4187 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4191 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4192 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4193 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4196 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4197 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, 0));
4198 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4200 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4201 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4202 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4204 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4205 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4210 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4211 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4212 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4213 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4214 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4215 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4216 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4217 // second-to-last node!
4218 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4221 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4222 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4223 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4225 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4226 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4227 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4228 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4229 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4230 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4231 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4232 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4237 assert!(events.is_empty());
4239 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4240 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4247 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4249 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4250 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4252 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
4253 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4254 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4256 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4261 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4262 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4265 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4266 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4267 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4268 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4270 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4271 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4273 for i in 0..node_count {
4274 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
4275 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4276 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4277 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4278 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4279 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4280 let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4281 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4282 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4283 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4284 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4285 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4286 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4287 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, keys_manager, node_seed: seed,
4288 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4289 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4297 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4298 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4299 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4300 let channel_id = chan.2;
4303 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4307 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4308 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4309 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4310 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4311 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4312 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4313 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4314 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4315 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4316 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4318 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4320 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4322 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4323 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4326 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4327 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4328 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4329 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4330 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4332 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4335 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4337 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4338 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4339 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4342 let payment_event = {
4343 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4344 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4345 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4347 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4348 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4350 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4351 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4352 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4353 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4354 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4357 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4358 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4359 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4360 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4363 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4364 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4365 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4366 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4367 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4368 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4369 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4372 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4373 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4374 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4375 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4376 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4377 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4378 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4381 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4382 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4383 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4386 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4387 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4390 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4393 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4394 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4396 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4397 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4400 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4405 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4406 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4407 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4408 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4409 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4410 let channel_id = chan.2;
4413 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4415 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4416 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4419 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4420 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4421 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4422 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4428 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4430 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4431 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4432 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4435 let payment_event = {
4436 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4437 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4438 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4440 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4441 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4443 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4444 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4445 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4446 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4447 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4450 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4453 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4457 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4458 let nodes = create_network(2);
4459 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4460 let channel_id = chan.2;
4463 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4464 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4465 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4466 // (3) update_fee ->
4467 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4468 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4469 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4470 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4471 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4472 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4473 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4474 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4475 // revoke_and_ack ->
4476 // B should send no response here
4477 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4478 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4479 // revoke_and_ack ->
4481 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4482 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4483 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4486 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4487 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4488 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4489 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4490 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4492 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4495 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4496 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4497 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4498 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4501 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4503 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4504 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4505 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4507 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4508 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4509 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4510 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4513 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4515 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4517 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4519 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4520 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4521 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4523 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4524 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4525 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4526 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4527 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4528 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4529 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4531 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4532 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4533 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4535 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4537 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4538 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4542 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4543 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4546 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4547 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4550 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4551 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4552 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4555 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4556 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4561 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4562 let nodes = create_network(2);
4563 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4564 let channel_id = chan.2;
4566 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4567 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4570 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4571 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4572 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4573 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4574 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4576 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4578 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4580 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4581 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4584 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4585 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4588 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4589 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4590 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4593 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4594 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4599 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4600 let nodes = create_network(2);
4601 let channel_value = 1888;
4602 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4603 let channel_id = chan.2;
4606 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4608 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4610 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4612 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4614 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4615 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4617 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4618 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4620 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4621 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4622 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4623 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4624 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4625 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4628 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4629 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4630 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4633 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4635 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4637 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4638 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4639 //Should produce and error.
4640 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4642 assert!(match err.err {
4643 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4647 //clear the message we could not handle
4648 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4652 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4653 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4654 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4655 let channel_id = chan.2;
4658 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4660 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4661 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4664 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4665 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4666 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4667 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4668 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4670 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4672 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4673 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4674 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4677 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4679 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4681 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4682 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4684 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4685 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4686 added_monitors.clear();
4688 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4689 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4690 // node[1] has nothing to do
4692 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4693 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4696 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4697 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4698 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4700 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4702 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4704 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4705 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4706 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4707 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4708 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4709 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4711 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4712 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4714 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4716 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4718 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4720 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4722 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4723 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4725 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4727 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4729 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4730 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4732 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4735 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4736 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4738 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4739 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4741 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4742 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4745 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4747 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4748 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4749 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4753 fn test_update_fee() {
4754 let nodes = create_network(2);
4755 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4756 let channel_id = chan.2;
4759 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4760 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4761 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4762 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4763 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4764 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4765 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4766 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4767 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4768 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4769 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4770 // revoke_and_ack ->
4772 // Create and deliver (1)...
4773 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4774 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4777 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4778 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4779 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4780 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4781 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4785 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4787 // Generate (2) and (3):
4788 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4789 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4793 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4794 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4797 // Create and deliver (4)...
4798 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4800 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4801 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4802 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4803 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4804 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4806 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4809 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4810 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4813 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4814 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4816 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4817 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4819 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4820 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4823 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4824 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4827 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4828 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4829 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4830 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4831 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4832 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4833 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4834 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4838 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4840 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4841 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4843 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4845 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4847 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4848 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4849 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4853 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4854 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4855 let nodes = create_network(2);
4856 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4857 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4858 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4859 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4861 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4862 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4863 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4864 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4865 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4867 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4868 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4869 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4870 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4871 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4872 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4874 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4875 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4879 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4880 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4881 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4882 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4883 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4884 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4885 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4887 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4889 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4890 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4891 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4892 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4893 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4895 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4896 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4898 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4899 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4900 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4901 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4902 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4904 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4906 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4907 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4908 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4909 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4910 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4911 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4912 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4914 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4915 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4917 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4918 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4919 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4920 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4921 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4922 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4923 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4925 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4926 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4928 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4929 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4934 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4935 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4936 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4937 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4938 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4939 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4941 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4943 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4944 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4945 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4946 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4947 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4951 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4952 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4953 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4954 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4955 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4957 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4958 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4959 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4961 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4962 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4963 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4964 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4965 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4966 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4968 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4969 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4970 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4971 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4973 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4974 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4976 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4977 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4979 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4980 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4981 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4982 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4983 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4984 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4986 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4987 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4989 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4990 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4992 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
4993 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4994 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
4996 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4999 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5000 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5001 let node_0_closing_signed = match msg_events[0] {
5002 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5003 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5008 match msg_events[1] {
5009 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
5010 assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_1.0.contents.short_channel_id);
5012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5015 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5016 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5017 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5018 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5019 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5020 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5022 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5024 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5025 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5026 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5027 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5028 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5031 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
5032 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
5033 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
5034 let nodes = create_network(3);
5035 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5036 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5038 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
5040 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5041 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5043 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5044 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5046 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5050 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5051 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5053 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5054 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5055 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5056 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5058 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5059 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5060 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5062 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5063 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5064 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5065 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5068 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5069 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5070 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5072 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5074 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5075 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5077 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5079 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5080 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5081 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5082 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5083 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5084 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5085 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5087 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5088 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5090 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5091 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5092 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5093 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5094 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5095 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5096 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5098 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5099 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5101 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5102 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5104 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5107 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5109 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5110 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5111 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5114 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5115 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5117 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5118 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5119 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5120 if recv_count == 0 {
5121 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5122 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5124 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5125 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5126 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5128 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5129 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5130 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5132 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5133 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5135 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5136 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5137 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5139 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5140 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5141 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5142 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5143 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5145 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5146 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5147 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5148 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5149 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5150 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5152 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5154 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5155 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5156 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5157 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5158 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5159 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5161 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5162 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5163 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5164 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5165 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5167 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5168 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5174 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5176 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5177 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5178 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5179 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5180 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5184 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5185 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5186 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5187 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5191 fn fake_network_test() {
5192 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5193 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5194 let nodes = create_network(4);
5196 // Create some initial channels
5197 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5198 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5199 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5201 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5202 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5203 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5204 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5205 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5207 // Send some more payments
5208 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5209 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5210 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5212 // Test failure packets
5213 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5214 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5216 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5217 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5219 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5220 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5221 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5222 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5223 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5224 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5225 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5227 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5228 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5229 hops.push(RouteHop {
5230 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5231 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5233 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5235 hops.push(RouteHop {
5236 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5237 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5239 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5241 hops.push(RouteHop {
5242 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5243 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5245 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5247 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5248 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5249 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5251 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5252 hops.push(RouteHop {
5253 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5254 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5256 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5258 hops.push(RouteHop {
5259 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5260 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5262 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5264 hops.push(RouteHop {
5265 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5266 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5268 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5270 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5271 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5272 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5274 // Claim the rebalances...
5275 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5276 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5278 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5279 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5281 // Send some payments across both channels
5282 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5283 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5284 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5286 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5288 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5290 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5291 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5292 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5294 // Close down the channels...
5295 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5296 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5297 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5298 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5299 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5303 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5304 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5305 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5306 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5308 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5309 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5310 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5311 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5312 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5313 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5315 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5317 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5318 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5320 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5321 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5323 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5324 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5325 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5328 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5329 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5330 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5332 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5333 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5334 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5336 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5337 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5339 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5341 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5342 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5343 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5345 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5346 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5347 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5348 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5349 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5350 res.push(tx.clone());
5355 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5356 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5359 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5361 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5362 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5363 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5364 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5365 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5366 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5368 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5370 res.push(tx.clone());
5374 assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3);
5376 assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]);
5380 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5384 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5385 /// HTLC transaction.
5386 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5387 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5388 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5389 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5390 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5391 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5395 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5398 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5399 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5401 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5402 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5403 let mut found_prev = false;
5405 for tx in prev_txn {
5406 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5407 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5408 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5409 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5415 assert!(found_prev);
5417 let mut res = Vec::new();
5418 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5422 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5423 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5424 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5425 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5426 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5429 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5432 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5433 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5434 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5435 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5438 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5442 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5443 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5447 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5449 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5450 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5452 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5453 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5455 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5456 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5460 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5462 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5463 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5465 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5466 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5467 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5468 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5469 chan.get_value_stat()
5473 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5474 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5475 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5477 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5478 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5480 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5481 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5483 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5484 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5485 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5486 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5487 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5491 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5493 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5494 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5495 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5496 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5501 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5502 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5503 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5504 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5506 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5507 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5508 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5510 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5515 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5516 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5518 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5520 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5522 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5523 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5524 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5526 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5527 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5531 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5532 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5533 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5535 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5536 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5539 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5542 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5543 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5544 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5545 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5546 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5549 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5550 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5551 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5552 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5553 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5557 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5558 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5559 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5560 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5562 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5563 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5567 // adding pending output
5568 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5569 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5571 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5572 let payment_event_1 = {
5573 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5576 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5577 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5578 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5580 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5582 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5583 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5585 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5586 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5587 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5588 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5593 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5594 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5596 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5597 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5598 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5599 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5600 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5602 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5604 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5605 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5606 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5607 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5608 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5609 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5611 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5612 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5613 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5614 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5618 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5620 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5622 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5623 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5624 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5625 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5626 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5627 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5628 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5629 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5637 // split the rest to test holding cell
5638 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5639 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5641 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5642 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5645 // now see if they go through on both sides
5646 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5647 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5648 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5650 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5651 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5653 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5655 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5656 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5657 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5658 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5662 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5663 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5664 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5666 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5667 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5669 // flush the pending htlc
5670 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5671 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5674 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5676 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5678 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5679 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5680 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5683 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5684 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5687 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5689 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5690 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5691 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5693 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5694 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5696 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5697 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5698 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5699 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5700 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5701 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5703 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5704 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5705 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5706 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5708 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5709 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5711 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5712 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5714 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5715 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5716 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5718 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5721 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5722 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5723 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5725 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5728 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5729 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5730 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5732 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5733 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5734 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5735 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5737 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5738 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5742 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5743 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5744 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5748 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5749 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5750 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5751 let nodes = create_network(5);
5753 // Create some initial channels
5754 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5755 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5756 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5757 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5759 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5760 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5761 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5762 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5763 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5765 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5766 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5768 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5769 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5770 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5771 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5773 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5774 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5775 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5777 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5778 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5780 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5781 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5783 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5784 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5785 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5786 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5788 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5789 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5790 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5792 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5793 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5795 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5796 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5798 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5799 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5801 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5802 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5803 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5804 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5806 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5812 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5813 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5814 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5816 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5818 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5819 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5821 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5822 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5824 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5826 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5827 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5828 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5830 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5831 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5832 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5835 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5836 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5837 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5838 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5839 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5843 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5844 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5845 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5846 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5847 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5850 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5852 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5853 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5855 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5856 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5857 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5858 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5859 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5862 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5864 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5865 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5867 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5869 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5870 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5871 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5875 fn test_justice_tx() {
5876 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5878 let nodes = create_network(2);
5879 // Create some new channels:
5880 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5882 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5883 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5884 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5885 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5886 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5887 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5888 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5889 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5890 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5891 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5892 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
5893 // Revoke the old state
5894 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5897 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5898 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5900 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5901 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5902 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5903 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5905 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5906 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5908 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5910 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5911 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5912 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5913 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5914 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5916 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5918 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5919 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5921 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5922 // Create some new channels:
5923 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5925 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5926 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5927 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5928 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5929 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5930 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5931 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5932 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5933 // Revoke the old state
5934 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5936 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5937 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5939 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5940 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5941 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5942 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5944 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5945 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5947 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5949 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5950 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5951 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5952 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5953 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5955 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5956 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5957 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5961 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5962 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5963 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5964 let nodes = create_network(2);
5965 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5966 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5967 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5968 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5969 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5970 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5971 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5972 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5974 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5975 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5976 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5977 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5978 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5980 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5982 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5983 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5985 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5986 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5987 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5991 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5992 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5993 let nodes = create_network(2);
5995 // Create some new channel:
5996 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5998 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5999 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6000 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
6001 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6002 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6004 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6005 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6006 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
6007 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6008 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6009 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6010 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
6011 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
6012 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6014 //Revoke the old state
6015 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6018 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6019 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6020 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6022 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6023 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6025 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6026 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6031 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6032 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6034 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
6035 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6037 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
6039 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6040 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6041 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6042 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6043 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6044 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6045 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6046 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6048 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
6049 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6050 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
6052 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6053 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
6054 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6055 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
6056 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6057 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
6059 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6060 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6061 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6065 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
6066 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
6067 let nodes = create_network(2);
6069 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6071 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6072 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6073 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6074 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6075 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6076 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6078 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6079 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6081 //Revoke the old state
6082 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6085 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6086 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6087 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6089 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6090 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6092 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6093 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6098 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6099 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6101 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6102 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6103 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6104 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6105 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6106 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6107 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6109 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6110 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6111 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6113 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6114 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6115 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6116 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6117 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6119 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6120 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6121 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6122 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6123 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6124 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6125 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6126 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6128 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6129 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6131 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6132 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6133 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6134 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6135 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6136 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6138 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6139 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6140 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6144 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
6145 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6146 // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6147 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6148 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
6149 // First, C should claim the HTLC output via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
6150 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
6151 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
6153 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
6154 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
6155 // the HTLC output via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
6156 // PaymentSent event).
6158 let nodes = create_network(3);
6160 // Create some initial channels
6161 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6162 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6164 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
6165 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6166 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6168 let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6169 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6171 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6172 // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
6173 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6174 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
6175 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6176 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6178 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6179 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6180 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6181 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6182 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6184 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6185 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6186 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6188 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6191 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
6192 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6193 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
6194 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6195 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6196 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6197 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6198 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6200 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
6201 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
6202 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6204 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6205 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6206 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6207 added_monitors.clear();
6209 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6211 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6212 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6215 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6216 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6217 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6218 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6219 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6220 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6222 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6225 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
6226 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transaction, as well as a
6227 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
6228 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6229 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6230 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6231 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6232 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6233 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6234 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6235 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6236 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6237 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6238 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6239 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6240 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6244 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
6245 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
6246 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6247 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6248 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6249 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6250 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6252 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6253 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6255 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan)
6256 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6257 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6258 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6259 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6260 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6261 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6262 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6263 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6264 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
6265 // we already checked the same situation with A.
6267 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
6268 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6269 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6270 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6272 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6275 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6276 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6278 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6279 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
6281 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6283 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6284 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6285 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6286 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6287 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6288 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6289 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6290 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6291 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6292 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6293 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6294 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6295 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6299 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
6300 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6301 // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6302 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6303 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
6304 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
6306 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
6308 let nodes = create_network(3);
6310 // Create some intial channels
6311 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6312 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6314 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
6315 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6316 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6318 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6319 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6321 // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6322 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6323 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6324 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
6326 let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6327 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6328 added_monitors.clear();
6330 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6331 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6333 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6334 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6335 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6336 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6337 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6338 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6340 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6342 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6343 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6344 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6346 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6347 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6349 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
6350 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6351 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6352 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6354 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain
6355 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
6356 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6359 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6360 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6361 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
6362 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
6363 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]);
6364 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6365 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6366 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6367 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6368 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6369 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6370 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone());
6371 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone());
6372 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6373 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6374 timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
6378 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
6379 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6381 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6383 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6384 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6387 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6388 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6389 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6390 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6391 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6392 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6394 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6396 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated
6397 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
6399 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
6400 let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6401 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6403 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6404 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6405 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6407 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6408 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6410 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan
6411 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6412 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6413 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6414 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6415 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6416 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6417 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6418 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6422 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
6423 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
6424 // and fail backward accordingly.
6426 let nodes = create_network(3);
6428 // Create some initial channels
6429 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6430 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6432 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6433 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6434 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6435 // Revoke the old state
6436 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6438 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6440 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6441 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6442 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6444 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6446 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6447 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6450 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6451 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6452 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6453 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6454 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6455 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6457 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6458 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6460 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6461 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6463 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6464 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6466 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6467 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6469 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
6470 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6473 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6477 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool) {
6478 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
6479 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
6480 // commitment transaction anymore.
6481 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
6482 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
6483 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
6484 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
6485 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
6486 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
6488 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
6489 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
6490 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
6491 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
6492 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
6493 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6495 // Create some initial channels
6496 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6497 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6499 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6500 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6501 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6502 // Revoke the old state
6503 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6505 let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6506 let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6507 let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6509 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, 0));
6510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6511 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6512 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6513 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6514 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6515 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6516 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6517 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6518 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
6519 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
6521 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, 0));
6522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6523 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6524 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6525 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6526 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6527 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6528 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6529 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6530 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6532 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6533 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6534 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6537 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, 0));
6538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6539 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6540 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6541 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6542 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6543 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6544 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6545 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6546 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
6547 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
6548 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6550 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6551 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6552 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6555 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
6556 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
6557 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6558 let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6559 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap();
6560 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6561 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6565 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
6566 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, one as we generate a commitment for
6567 // nodes[0] to fail first_payment_hash backwards.
6568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6571 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
6572 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6574 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6575 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6577 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6578 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6580 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6581 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
6583 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6586 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6587 // If we delivered the RAA already then we already failed first_payment_hash backwards.
6588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6591 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6592 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
6593 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 0 }] {
6594 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6595 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6599 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6600 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6601 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6602 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6603 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6604 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6609 // Due to the way backwards-failing occurs we do the updates in two steps.
6610 let updates = match events[1] {
6611 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6612 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6613 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6614 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6615 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6616 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6618 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6619 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6621 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6622 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6624 let bs_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6625 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6627 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6628 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6631 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6632 // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
6633 // that we should update our routing table for.
6634 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6635 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6637 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6638 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6641 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6642 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6644 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6645 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6647 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6652 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6655 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6656 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
6657 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6658 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6659 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6660 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
6661 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6663 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6664 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6665 for event in events {
6667 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6672 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6673 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6675 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6676 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6678 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6681 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6682 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6684 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6687 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
6688 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
6689 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
6693 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() {
6694 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false);
6695 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true);
6699 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6700 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6701 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6702 let nodes = create_network(2);
6703 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6705 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6706 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6708 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6709 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6711 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6712 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6714 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6718 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6719 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6721 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6722 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6725 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6726 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6728 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6729 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6731 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6735 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6736 // registering new transactions
6737 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6741 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6742 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6743 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6744 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6745 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6747 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6749 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6751 let mut payment_event = {
6752 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6755 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6756 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6757 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6760 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6761 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6763 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6764 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6766 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6770 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6771 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6773 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6774 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6775 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6776 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6779 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6780 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6782 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6784 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6785 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6786 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6788 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6789 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6790 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6792 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6793 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6795 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6799 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6800 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6801 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6802 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6803 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6807 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6808 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6810 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6811 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6812 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6814 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6815 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6817 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6820 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6822 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6823 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6824 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6826 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6827 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6828 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6829 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6830 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6831 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6832 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6834 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6838 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6839 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6840 let nodes = create_network(2);
6841 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6843 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6844 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6845 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6846 mem::drop(channel_state);
6848 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6849 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6850 headers.push(header.clone());
6852 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6853 headers.push(header.clone());
6855 while !headers.is_empty() {
6856 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6859 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6860 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6862 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6863 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6868 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6869 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6870 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6873 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6874 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6876 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6877 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6878 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6879 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6880 res.push(msg.clone());
6882 panic!("Unexpected event")
6890 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6891 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6893 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6895 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6897 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6903 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6904 let mut commitment_update = None;
6905 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6908 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6909 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6910 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6911 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6913 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6914 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6915 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6916 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6918 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6921 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6924 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6926 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6927 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6928 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6929 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6931 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6932 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6933 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6934 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6936 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6940 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6945 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6946 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6947 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6948 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6949 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6950 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6951 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6953 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6954 // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6956 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6957 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6960 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6961 // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6963 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6964 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6967 if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 {
6968 // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set
6969 // next_local_commitment_number to 1
6970 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6971 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6973 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6974 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6978 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6979 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6980 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6981 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6983 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6984 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6986 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
6989 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
6990 for msg in reestablish_2 {
6991 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6992 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
6994 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6995 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6997 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
7000 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
7001 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
7002 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
7004 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
7005 if send_funding_locked.0 {
7006 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7007 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7008 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7009 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7010 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7011 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7012 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7015 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7018 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7019 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7020 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7021 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7023 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7025 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
7026 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7027 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7028 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
7030 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7032 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7033 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7034 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7035 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7036 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7038 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7039 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7041 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7042 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7045 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7046 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7048 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7049 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7050 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
7051 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7052 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7053 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7054 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7057 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7061 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
7062 if send_funding_locked.1 {
7063 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7064 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7065 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7066 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7067 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7068 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7069 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7072 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7075 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7076 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7077 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7078 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7080 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7082 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7083 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7084 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7085 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
7087 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7088 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7089 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7090 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7091 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7093 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7094 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7096 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7097 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7100 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7101 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7103 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7104 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7105 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
7106 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7107 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7108 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7109 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7112 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7118 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
7119 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
7120 let nodes = create_network(3);
7121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
7124 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7125 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7126 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7128 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7129 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7130 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
7131 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
7133 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7134 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7135 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7137 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7138 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7139 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7140 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7142 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7143 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7145 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
7146 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
7148 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
7150 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7151 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7153 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
7154 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
7156 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7159 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
7160 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
7161 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
7163 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7167 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
7168 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
7171 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
7172 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
7173 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7174 if messages_delivered == 0 {
7175 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7176 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
7178 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7181 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7182 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7184 let payment_event = {
7185 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
7186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7188 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7189 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7190 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7192 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
7194 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7195 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
7197 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7198 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7199 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7201 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7203 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7204 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7205 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7208 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7209 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7210 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7211 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7214 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
7215 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7216 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7224 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7225 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7226 if messages_delivered < 3 {
7227 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
7228 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
7229 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7230 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7231 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7232 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7233 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7234 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7235 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7236 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7237 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7238 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7239 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
7240 // Everything was delivered...
7241 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7244 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7245 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7247 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7248 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7251 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7252 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7253 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7255 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7256 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7258 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7259 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7261 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7262 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7263 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7265 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7268 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
7269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7271 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7272 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7273 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
7274 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
7275 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7276 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7277 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7278 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7279 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7280 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7281 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
7283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7286 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
7287 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
7289 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7290 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7292 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7293 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7295 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7298 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
7299 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
7300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7301 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7303 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7304 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7305 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7308 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7309 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7310 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7311 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7314 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7315 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7316 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7324 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7325 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7326 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7327 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7328 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
7329 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
7330 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7331 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7333 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7334 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7336 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7339 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
7340 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7341 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7342 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7343 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7344 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7345 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7346 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7347 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7348 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7349 // Everything was delivered...
7350 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7353 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7354 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7355 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7357 // Channel should still work fine...
7358 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
7359 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7363 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
7364 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
7365 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
7366 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
7367 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
7371 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
7372 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
7373 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
7374 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
7378 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
7379 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
7380 let nodes = create_network(2);
7381 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7383 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7384 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7386 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7387 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7388 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7390 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7391 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7393 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7396 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7398 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7399 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7401 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7402 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7403 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
7405 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7406 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7408 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7411 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7412 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7414 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7417 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7419 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
7420 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
7422 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7423 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7424 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
7428 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
7429 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
7430 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
7431 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7432 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7434 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7436 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7437 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7438 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7440 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
7441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7443 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7444 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7446 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7447 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7450 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7453 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7454 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7456 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7457 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7458 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7459 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7460 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7461 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7462 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7464 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7465 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7466 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7468 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7469 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7471 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7474 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
7475 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7476 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7479 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7482 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7483 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7485 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7486 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7487 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7488 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7489 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7490 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7492 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7493 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7494 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7495 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7497 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7498 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7500 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7501 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7503 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7505 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7506 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7507 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7508 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7509 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7510 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7511 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7512 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7513 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7516 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
7517 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7518 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7519 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7520 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7521 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7522 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7525 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7526 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7527 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7528 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7529 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7530 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7531 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7534 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7535 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7536 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7539 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7540 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7541 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7544 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7545 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7548 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7549 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7551 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7555 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7556 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7558 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7559 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7561 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
7562 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7564 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7567 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7568 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7571 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7575 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
7576 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
7577 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7578 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7580 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7581 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7583 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7584 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7587 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7588 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
7590 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7591 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7594 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
7595 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7598 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7599 // PaymentFailed event
7601 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7604 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
7605 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
7606 // a disconnect in between
7607 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7608 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7610 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7611 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7613 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7614 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7617 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7618 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7619 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7622 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7623 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7624 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7627 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7628 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7631 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7632 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7633 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
7634 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7635 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7636 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7638 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7640 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7641 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7643 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7644 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7645 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7647 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7650 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7652 // Now set it to failed again...
7653 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7654 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7655 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7658 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7659 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7660 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7663 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7664 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7665 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7668 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7669 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7670 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7673 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7674 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7676 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7677 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7680 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7681 // PaymentFailed event
7683 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7687 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7688 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7689 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7692 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7693 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7695 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7696 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7697 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7698 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7699 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7700 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7701 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7702 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7703 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7704 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7705 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7706 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7707 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7708 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7709 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7710 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7711 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7712 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7713 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7715 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7717 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7718 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7719 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7721 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7722 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7725 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7726 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7727 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7729 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7730 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7731 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7733 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7734 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7735 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7736 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7737 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7738 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7739 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7740 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7741 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7742 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7744 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7745 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7746 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7747 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7749 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7750 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7755 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7756 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7757 } else { panic!(); }
7760 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7762 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7765 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7766 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7767 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7770 // Now fix monitor updating...
7771 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7772 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7775 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7776 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7777 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7779 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7780 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7781 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7782 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7783 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7784 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7786 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7787 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7788 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7789 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7791 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7792 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7794 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7797 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7798 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7799 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7801 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7802 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7803 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7804 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7805 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7806 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7808 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7810 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7811 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7813 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7815 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7816 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7818 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7819 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7820 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7822 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7823 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7824 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7826 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7827 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7828 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7829 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7830 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7831 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7833 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7835 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7836 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7837 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7839 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7840 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7842 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7845 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7846 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7847 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7850 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7854 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7855 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7857 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7858 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7859 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7861 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7862 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7865 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7867 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7868 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7869 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7870 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7871 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7874 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7878 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7880 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7881 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7882 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7883 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7886 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7887 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7889 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7890 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7892 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7893 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7896 let as_commitment_update;
7897 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7899 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7900 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7901 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7902 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7903 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7904 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7905 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7906 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7910 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7911 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7912 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7913 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7914 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7915 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7916 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7917 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7921 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7924 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7925 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7927 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7928 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7930 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7931 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7933 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7936 handle_initial_raa!();
7938 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7939 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7941 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7942 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7944 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7945 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7948 handle_initial_raa!();
7950 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7951 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7953 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7954 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7956 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7957 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7959 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7964 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7965 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7967 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7968 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7970 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7971 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7975 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7976 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7977 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7980 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7981 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7982 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7985 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7986 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7989 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7990 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7993 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7995 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7996 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7998 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7999 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
8000 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8002 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8005 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
8009 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
8010 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
8011 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
8012 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
8013 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
8014 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
8015 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
8019 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
8020 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
8021 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
8022 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
8023 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
8027 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
8028 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
8029 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
8030 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
8031 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
8032 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
8036 fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() {
8037 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed
8038 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8039 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8041 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8042 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8043 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8046 let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8047 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8049 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8050 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
8051 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8052 } else { panic!(); }
8053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8054 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8056 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8057 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8059 let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8060 assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2);
8062 match responses[0] {
8063 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => {
8064 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8065 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
8066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8070 match responses[1] {
8071 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => {
8072 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8073 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8074 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8075 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8076 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8077 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8079 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8080 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
8081 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8082 } else { panic!(); }
8083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8084 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8086 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8089 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8090 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8093 let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8094 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap();
8095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8097 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8098 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8100 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8101 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8103 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8104 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8106 events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8107 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8109 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => {
8110 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
8111 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8113 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8116 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
8119 fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) {
8120 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
8121 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8123 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8125 // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
8126 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
8128 // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards
8129 let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8131 // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
8132 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, 0));
8133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8135 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8136 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8137 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8138 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8139 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8140 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8141 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8143 let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
8144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8146 // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the
8148 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8149 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8150 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
8151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8153 let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8154 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8155 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8157 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8158 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
8160 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8164 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8165 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8167 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8169 // Now fail monitor updating.
8170 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8171 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() {
8172 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8173 } else { panic!(); }
8174 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8175 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8178 // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable
8181 let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8182 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8183 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
8184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8186 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
8187 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8188 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8189 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
8190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8192 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8193 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8194 match events_2.remove(0) {
8195 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8196 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8197 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8198 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8199 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8200 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8201 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8203 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8204 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
8206 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8207 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
8208 match msg_events[0] {
8209 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
8210 assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
8211 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); // temp disabled
8213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8216 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8217 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8218 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
8219 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
8220 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
8221 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8226 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8227 // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding
8228 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8229 let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8230 nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
8231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8233 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8234 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8235 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) {
8236 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
8237 } else { panic!(); }
8238 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8239 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8240 (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4))
8241 } else { (None, None) };
8243 // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
8244 // update_add update.
8245 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8246 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8249 let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8250 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8251 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3);
8253 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
8256 // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the
8257 // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order.
8258 let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() {
8259 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => {
8260 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8261 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8262 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8263 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8264 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8265 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8266 (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed)
8268 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8270 let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8271 match events_3.remove(1) {
8272 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => {
8273 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8279 let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0));
8280 assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8282 // Now deliver the new messages...
8284 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap();
8285 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
8286 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8287 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
8288 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events_4[0] {
8289 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
8290 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
8291 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8293 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8294 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8295 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap();
8296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8297 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8298 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap();
8299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8300 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8301 assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8302 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8303 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8304 assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8305 assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8307 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8309 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8310 assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8311 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8312 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8313 assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8314 assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8316 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8318 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8320 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8322 let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8324 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
8325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8326 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8328 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
8329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8330 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8332 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false);
8335 let events_5 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8336 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8338 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8339 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8342 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8343 nodes[2].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8345 let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8346 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
8348 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); },
8349 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8352 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8353 let events_7 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8354 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
8356 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8357 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8360 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8361 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8364 send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
8365 assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8366 assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8368 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8370 let events_8 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8371 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
8373 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8374 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8377 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8378 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8380 let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8381 assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1);
8383 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()),
8384 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8386 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap());
8389 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
8393 fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() {
8394 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false);
8395 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true);
8399 fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() {
8400 // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on
8401 // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell
8403 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8404 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8405 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8407 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8409 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8410 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8412 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
8413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8414 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8415 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8416 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8417 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8418 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8419 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8420 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8422 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8423 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8425 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8426 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8427 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8429 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8430 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8432 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8434 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() {
8435 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8436 } else { panic!(); }
8437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8439 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8440 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8442 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8443 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8445 assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8446 assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8448 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8450 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap();
8451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8452 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8454 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8455 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8458 updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8459 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8460 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8461 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8462 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8463 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8464 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8465 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8467 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8468 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8470 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage),
8471 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8476 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
8477 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
8478 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8479 let nodes = create_network(2);
8481 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8483 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8484 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8485 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8486 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8488 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8490 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8491 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8493 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8494 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8496 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
8498 let mut chan_announcement;
8500 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
8502 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
8503 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
8504 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
8505 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
8506 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
8507 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
8508 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
8509 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
8510 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8515 macro_rules! sign_msg {
8516 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
8517 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
8518 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8519 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8520 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
8521 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
8522 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
8523 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
8524 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
8525 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
8526 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
8527 contents: $unsigned_msg
8532 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8533 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8534 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
8535 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8537 // Configured with Network::Testnet
8538 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8539 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
8540 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8541 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8543 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8544 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
8545 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8546 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8549 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
8550 impl Writer for VecWriter {
8551 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
8552 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
8555 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
8556 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
8561 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8562 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8564 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
8566 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8568 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8569 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8570 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8572 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8573 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8574 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8575 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8577 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8578 let config = UserConfig::new();
8579 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8580 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8581 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8582 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8583 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8584 default_config: config,
8586 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8587 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8588 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8589 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8590 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8591 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8594 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8596 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8597 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8598 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
8599 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
8600 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
8601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8603 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8604 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
8605 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8606 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
8608 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
8609 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8610 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
8611 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8613 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8614 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8615 for node in nodes.iter() {
8616 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
8617 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
8618 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
8621 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8625 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8626 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8627 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8629 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8630 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8632 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8634 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8635 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8636 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8638 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8639 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8640 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8641 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8643 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8644 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8645 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8646 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8647 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8648 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8649 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8651 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8652 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8653 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8654 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8655 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8656 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8659 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8661 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8662 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8665 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8667 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
8668 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8672 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
8673 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
8674 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
8675 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8676 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
8677 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
8679 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
8681 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
8682 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8684 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
8685 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8686 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8687 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8689 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
8691 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
8692 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
8693 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8694 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
8695 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
8698 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8699 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
8700 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
8701 let mut read = &serialized[..];
8702 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8703 assert!(read.is_empty());
8704 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
8707 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8708 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8709 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8710 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8712 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8713 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8714 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8715 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8716 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8717 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
8719 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8721 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
8722 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8723 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8724 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
8725 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
8728 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
8729 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
8730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8732 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8734 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
8735 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8736 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8737 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
8738 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8740 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8741 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8742 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
8743 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
8744 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8745 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
8748 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
8749 ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
8751 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8752 let mut txn = Vec::new();
8753 for event in events {
8755 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
8756 for outp in outputs {
8758 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
8760 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8761 script_sig: Script::new(),
8763 witness: Vec::new(),
8766 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8767 value: output.value,
8769 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8775 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8776 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
8777 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8778 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8779 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8780 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8781 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8782 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8785 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
8787 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8788 script_sig: Script::new(),
8789 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
8790 witness: Vec::new(),
8793 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8794 value: output.value,
8796 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8802 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8803 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8804 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8805 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8806 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8807 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
8808 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
8811 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
8812 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8814 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8815 script_sig: Script::new(),
8817 witness: Vec::new(),
8820 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8821 value: output.value,
8823 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8827 output: vec![outp.clone()],
8830 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
8832 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
8834 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
8837 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
8840 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
8841 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8842 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8843 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
8844 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8845 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8846 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8852 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8861 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
8862 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
8863 let nodes = create_network(2);
8865 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8866 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8867 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8869 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8870 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8872 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8873 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8874 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8875 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8877 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8878 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8879 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8880 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8881 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8885 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
8886 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8887 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8889 let nodes = create_network(2);
8891 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8892 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8893 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8895 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8898 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8899 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8900 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8901 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8903 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8904 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8905 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8907 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8908 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8910 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8911 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8912 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8913 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8917 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
8918 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8919 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8921 let nodes = create_network(2);
8923 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
8924 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8925 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8926 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8927 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8929 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8930 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8931 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8932 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8934 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8935 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8937 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8938 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8939 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8940 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
8941 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8942 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
8943 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8947 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
8948 let nodes = create_network(2);
8950 // Create some initial channels
8951 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8953 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8955 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8956 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
8957 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8959 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
8960 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8961 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8963 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
8964 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8966 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8967 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8970 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8971 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8974 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
8975 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
8976 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
8977 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
8978 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8979 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
8981 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
8982 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8983 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8984 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8988 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
8989 let nodes = create_network(2);
8991 // Create some initial channels
8992 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8994 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8995 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8996 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8997 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8999 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9001 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9002 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9003 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9005 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9008 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9009 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
9010 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
9011 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
9012 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9014 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9015 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9016 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9017 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9021 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9022 let nodes = create_network(2);
9024 // Create some initial channels
9025 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9027 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9028 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9029 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9030 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9032 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9034 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9035 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
9036 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9037 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9039 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9040 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9042 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9043 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9044 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9045 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9046 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9047 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9048 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
9050 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9051 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9052 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9054 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9055 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9058 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9059 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9060 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9061 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9063 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9064 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9065 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
9066 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9067 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9068 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
9072 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
9073 let nodes = create_network(2);
9075 // Create some initial channels
9076 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9078 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9079 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9080 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9081 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9083 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9085 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9086 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
9087 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9088 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9090 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9093 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9095 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9096 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9097 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9098 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9099 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9101 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9102 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9103 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9105 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9106 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9109 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9110 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9111 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9112 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9114 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9115 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9116 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
9117 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9118 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9119 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
9120 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
9121 check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
9125 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
9126 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
9127 // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
9128 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
9129 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
9131 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
9134 let nodes = create_network(3);
9136 // Create some initial channels
9137 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9138 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9140 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
9141 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9142 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9144 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
9145 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9146 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9147 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9148 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9150 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9151 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9152 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9153 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9154 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9156 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9157 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9160 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9164 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
9165 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
9166 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
9167 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
9168 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
9169 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
9170 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
9171 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9172 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9173 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9175 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
9176 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
9178 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9179 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
9180 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
9181 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9182 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9183 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9184 assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9185 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9186 check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9187 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9188 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9189 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9192 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9194 match msg_events[0] {
9195 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9198 match msg_events[1] {
9199 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
9200 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9201 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9202 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9203 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9204 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
9206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9208 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
9209 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9210 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9211 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9212 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
9213 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9214 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9215 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
9216 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9217 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9218 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9219 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9220 match msg_events[0] {
9221 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9222 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9227 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
9228 // Topology : A --> B --> C
9229 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
9230 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
9232 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9233 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9235 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
9236 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
9237 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
9239 let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9240 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9241 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9243 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9244 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9245 let htlc_timeout_tx;
9246 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
9247 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9248 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
9249 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
9250 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
9251 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9252 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9253 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9254 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9255 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
9256 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9257 check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
9258 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
9259 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
9262 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9264 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9265 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9268 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
9269 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
9271 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9273 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9274 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9277 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9278 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9280 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9281 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
9282 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9283 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
9284 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9285 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9286 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
9287 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9288 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9289 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
9290 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9291 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9293 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
9294 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9295 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9296 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9297 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
9298 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9299 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9302 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9303 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9305 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9306 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9307 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9309 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
9311 _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
9314 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9316 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
9317 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
9319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9322 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
9323 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9324 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9325 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9326 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9327 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9328 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
9329 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9332 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9333 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
9335 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9337 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
9338 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
9340 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9345 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
9346 let nodes = create_network(2);
9348 // Create some initial channels
9349 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9351 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9352 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9353 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9354 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9356 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
9357 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9359 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9360 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9361 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9363 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9367 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9368 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9370 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9371 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9372 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9373 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9375 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9376 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9377 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9378 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9379 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
9383 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9384 let nodes = create_network(2);
9386 // Create some initial channels
9387 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9389 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9390 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9391 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9392 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9394 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9395 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9396 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9397 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9399 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9400 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9402 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9403 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9404 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9405 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9407 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9408 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9409 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
9410 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9411 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
9412 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
9413 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9414 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
9415 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
9416 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9417 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
9421 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
9422 let nodes = create_network(2);
9424 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9426 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
9427 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
9429 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9430 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9431 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
9432 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9433 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
9435 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9436 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
9437 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9438 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
9441 fn run_onion_failure_test<F1,F2>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, callback_msg: F1, callback_node: F2, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
9442 where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
9445 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept(_name, test_case, nodes, route, payment_hash, callback_msg, |_|{}, callback_node, expected_retryable, expected_error_code, expected_channel_update);
9449 // 0: node1 fail backward
9450 // 1: final node fail backward
9451 // 2: payment completed but the user reject the payment
9452 // 3: final node fail backward (but tamper onion payloads from node0)
9453 // 100: trigger error in the intermediate node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
9454 // 200: trigger error in the final node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
9455 fn run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept<F1,F2,F3>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, mut callback_msg: F1, mut callback_fail: F2, mut callback_node: F3, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
9456 where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
9457 F2: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
9460 use ln::msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate;
9462 // reset block height
9463 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9464 for ix in 0..nodes.len() {
9465 nodes[ix].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9468 macro_rules! expect_event {
9469 ($node: expr, $event_type: path) => {{
9470 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9471 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9473 $event_type { .. } => {},
9474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9479 macro_rules! expect_htlc_forward {
9481 expect_event!($node, Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable);
9482 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
9483 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9487 // 0 ~~> 2 send payment
9488 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash.clone()).unwrap();
9489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9490 let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9491 // temper update_add (0 => 1)
9492 let mut update_add_0 = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
9493 if test_case == 0 || test_case == 3 || test_case == 100 {
9494 callback_msg(&mut update_add_0);
9497 // 0 => 1 update_add & CS
9498 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_0).unwrap();
9499 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
9501 let update_1_0 = match test_case {
9502 0|100 => { // intermediate node failure; fail backward to 0
9503 let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9504 assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()+update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1 && (update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()==1 || update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1));
9507 1|2|3|200 => { // final node failure; forwarding to 2
9508 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9510 if test_case != 200 {
9513 expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[1]);
9515 let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9516 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
9517 assert_eq!(update_1.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9518 // tamper update_add (1 => 2)
9519 let mut update_add_1 = update_1.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
9520 if test_case != 3 && test_case != 200 {
9521 callback_msg(&mut update_add_1);
9525 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_1).unwrap();
9526 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false, true);
9528 if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
9529 expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[2]);
9530 expect_event!(&nodes[2], Event::PaymentReceived);
9534 let update_2_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9535 if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
9536 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[2], 1);
9538 assert!(update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
9540 let mut fail_msg = update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
9541 if test_case == 200 {
9542 callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
9546 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
9547 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_2_1.commitment_signed, true, true);
9549 // backward fail on 1
9550 let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9551 assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
9554 _ => unreachable!(),
9557 // 1 => 0 commitment_signed_dance
9558 if update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() > 0 {
9559 let mut fail_msg = update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
9560 if test_case == 100 {
9561 callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
9563 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
9565 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9568 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
9570 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9571 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9572 if let &Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash:_, ref rejected_by_dest, ref error_code } = &events[0] {
9573 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, !expected_retryable);
9574 assert_eq!(*error_code, expected_error_code);
9576 panic!("Uexpected event");
9579 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9580 if expected_channel_update.is_some() {
9581 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9583 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => {
9585 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } => {
9586 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {} else {
9587 panic!("channel_update not found!");
9590 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => {
9591 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: ref expected_short_channel_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
9592 assert!(*short_channel_id == *expected_short_channel_id);
9593 assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
9595 panic!("Unexpected message event");
9598 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => {
9599 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: ref expected_node_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
9600 assert!(*node_id == *expected_node_id);
9601 assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
9603 panic!("Unexpected message event");
9608 _ => panic!("Unexpected message event"),
9611 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9615 impl msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9616 fn dummy() -> msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9617 use secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9618 use secp256k1::Signature;
9619 msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9620 signature: Signature::from(FFISignature::new()),
9621 contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9622 chain_hash: Sha256dHash::from_data(&vec![0u8][..]),
9623 short_channel_id: 0,
9626 cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
9627 htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
9629 fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
9630 excess_data: vec![],
9637 fn test_onion_failure() {
9638 use ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate;
9639 use ln::channelmanager::CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY;
9642 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
9643 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
9644 const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
9645 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
9647 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
9648 for node in nodes.iter() {
9649 *node.keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some(SecretKey::from_slice(&Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap());
9651 let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2)];
9652 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
9653 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9655 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 40000);
9657 // intermediate node failure
9658 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9659 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9660 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
9661 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9662 let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
9663 onion_payloads[0].realm = 3;
9664 msg.onion_routing_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9665 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));//XXX incremented channels idx here
9667 // final node failure
9668 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 3, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9669 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9670 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
9671 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9672 let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
9673 onion_payloads[1].realm = 3;
9674 msg.onion_routing_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9675 }, ||{}, false, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9677 // the following three with run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept() test only the origin node
9678 // receiving simulated fail messages
9679 // intermediate node failure
9680 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9682 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9684 // and tamper returing error message
9685 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9686 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9687 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9688 }, ||{}, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
9690 // final node failure
9691 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9692 // and tamper returing error message
9693 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9694 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9695 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9697 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9698 }, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
9700 // intermediate node failure
9701 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9702 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9704 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9705 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9706 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9707 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9709 // final node failure
9710 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9711 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9712 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9713 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9715 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9716 }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9718 // intermediate node failure
9719 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9720 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9722 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9723 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9724 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
9726 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9727 }, true, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9729 // final node failure
9730 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9731 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9732 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9733 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
9735 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9736 }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9738 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_version", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.version = 1; }, ||{}, true,
9739 Some(BADONION|PERM|4), None);
9741 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_hmac", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac = [3; 32]; }, ||{}, true,
9742 Some(BADONION|PERM|5), None);
9744 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_key", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key = Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey);}, ||{}, true,
9745 Some(BADONION|PERM|6), None);
9747 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9748 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9750 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9751 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9752 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], UPDATE|7, &ChannelUpdate::dummy().encode_with_len()[..]);
9753 }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9755 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9756 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9758 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9759 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9760 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|8, &[0;0]);
9761 // short_channel_id from the processing node
9762 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|8), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9764 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_channel_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9765 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9767 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9768 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9769 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|9, &[0;0]);
9770 // short_channel_id from the processing node
9771 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|9), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9773 let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
9774 bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id -= 1;
9775 run_onion_failure_test("unknown_next_peer", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|10),
9776 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id, is_permanent:true}));
9778 let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap().get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1;
9779 let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
9780 let route_len = bogus_route.hops.len();
9781 bogus_route.hops[route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward;
9782 run_onion_failure_test("amount_below_minimum", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|11), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9784 //TODO: with new config API, we will be able to generate both valid and
9785 //invalid channel_update cases.
9786 run_onion_failure_test("fee_insufficient", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9787 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9788 }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|12), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9790 run_onion_failure_test("incorrect_cltv_expiry", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9791 // need to violate: cltv_expiry - cltv_expiry_delta >= outgoing_cltv_value
9792 msg.cltv_expiry -= 1;
9793 }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9795 run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9796 let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
9797 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9798 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9799 }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9801 run_onion_failure_test("unknown_payment_hash", 2, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9802 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9803 }, false, Some(PERM|15), None);
9805 run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9806 let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
9807 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9808 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9809 }, || {}, true, Some(17), None);
9811 run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_cltv_expiry", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9812 for (_, mut pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9813 for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
9814 f.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value += 1;
9817 }, true, Some(18), None);
9819 run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_htlc_amount", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9820 // violate amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat
9821 for (_, mut pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9822 for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
9823 f.forward_info.amt_to_forward -= 1;
9826 }, true, Some(19), None);
9828 run_onion_failure_test("channel_disabled", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9829 // disconnect event to the channel between nodes[1] ~ nodes[2]
9830 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9831 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9832 }, true, Some(UPDATE|20), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9833 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9835 run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_far", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9836 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9837 let mut route = route.clone();
9839 route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta += CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY + route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta + 1;
9840 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9841 let (onion_payloads, _, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, height).unwrap();
9842 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9843 msg.cltv_expiry = htlc_cltv;
9844 msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_packet;
9845 }, ||{}, true, Some(21), None);