1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
38 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
42 use util::{byte_utils, events};
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
45 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
46 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
54 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57 /// the channel to an operational state.
59 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
63 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
71 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73 /// channel operation.
75 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
79 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
83 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
98 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
100 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
103 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
104 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
105 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
108 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
109 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
110 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
111 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
112 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
113 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
115 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
116 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
117 /// any spends of it.
118 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
120 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
121 /// with success or failure backward
122 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
125 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
126 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
128 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
130 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
131 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
132 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
134 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
135 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
136 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
137 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
138 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
140 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
141 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
142 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
143 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
144 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
146 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
149 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
150 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
151 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
152 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
153 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
155 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
156 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
157 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
158 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
159 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
160 outputs: spendable_outputs,
164 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
165 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
166 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
169 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
173 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
174 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
175 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
176 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
178 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
179 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
180 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
181 // TODO: Note that we currently don't really use this as ChannelManager
182 // will fail/claim backwards after the first block. We really should delay
183 // a few blocks before failing backwards (but can claim backwards
184 // immediately) as long as we have a few blocks of headroom.
185 let mut existing_claim = false;
186 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
187 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
188 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
189 existing_claim = true;
195 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
198 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
199 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
204 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
205 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
208 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
211 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
212 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
213 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
214 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
215 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
216 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
219 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
220 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
222 fee_estimator: feeest,
224 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
225 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
229 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
230 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
231 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
232 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
233 Some(orig_monitor) => {
234 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
235 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
239 match monitor.key_storage {
240 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
243 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
245 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
246 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
247 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
248 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
252 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
253 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
256 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
261 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
262 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
263 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
265 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
269 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
270 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
271 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
272 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
274 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
276 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
281 pending_htlcs_updated
285 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
286 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
287 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
288 let mut ret = Vec::new();
289 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
294 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
295 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
296 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
297 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
298 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
299 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
300 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
301 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
302 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
303 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
304 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
305 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
306 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a confirmed HTLC-Timeout or previous revoked commitment
307 /// transaction before we fail corresponding inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards
308 /// and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
309 //TODO: We currently don't actually use this...we should
310 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
312 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
315 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
316 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
317 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
318 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
319 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
320 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
321 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
322 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
323 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
324 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
327 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
328 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
332 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
333 struct LocalSignedTx {
334 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
337 revocation_key: PublicKey,
338 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
339 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
340 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
342 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
346 enum InputDescriptors {
351 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
354 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
355 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
357 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
358 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
360 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
361 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
363 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
364 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
366 key_storage: Storage,
367 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
368 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
369 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
370 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
372 our_to_self_delay: u16,
373 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
375 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
376 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
377 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
378 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
379 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
380 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
381 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
382 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
383 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
384 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
385 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
386 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
387 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
389 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
390 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
391 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
392 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
393 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
394 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
396 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
398 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
400 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
402 destination_script: Script,
404 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
405 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
406 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
407 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
408 // the full block_connected).
409 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
410 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
414 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
415 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr) => {
417 let mut fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * $predicted_weight / 1000;
419 fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * $predicted_weight / 1000;
421 fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) * $predicted_weight / 1000;
423 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
424 $spent_txid, fee, $value);
427 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
428 $spent_txid, $value);
433 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
434 $spent_txid, $value);
446 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
447 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
448 /// underlying object
449 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
450 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
451 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
452 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
453 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
454 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
455 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
456 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
457 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
458 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
459 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
460 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
461 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
462 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
463 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
464 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
465 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
469 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
470 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
479 impl ChannelMonitor {
480 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
482 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
484 key_storage: Storage::Local {
485 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
486 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
487 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
488 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
489 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
490 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
491 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
493 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
494 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
496 their_htlc_base_key: None,
497 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
498 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
500 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
501 their_to_self_delay: None,
503 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
504 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
505 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
506 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
508 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
509 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
510 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
512 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
513 destination_script: destination_script,
515 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
516 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
521 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> u64 {
522 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
524 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
525 tx_weight += match inp {
526 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
527 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
528 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
530 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
531 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
532 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
534 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
535 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
536 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
538 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
539 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
540 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
542 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
543 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
544 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
552 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
554 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
562 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
563 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
565 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
566 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
567 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
568 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
574 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
575 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
576 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
577 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
578 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
580 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
581 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
582 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
585 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
588 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
590 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
591 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
592 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
593 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
594 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
595 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
601 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
602 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
603 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
604 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
605 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
607 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
608 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
609 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
613 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
614 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
615 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
620 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
627 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
636 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
637 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
638 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
639 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
640 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
641 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
642 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
643 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
645 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
646 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
649 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
650 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
651 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
652 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
653 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
654 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
656 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
657 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
658 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
659 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
660 Some(old_points) => {
661 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
662 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
663 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
664 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
665 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
667 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
670 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
674 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
679 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
680 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
681 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
682 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
683 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
684 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
685 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
686 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
687 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
688 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
689 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
690 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
691 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
692 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
693 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
694 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
695 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
700 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
701 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
703 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
707 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
708 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
709 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
710 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
713 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
714 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
715 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
716 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
717 match self.key_storage {
718 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
719 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
720 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
721 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
722 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
723 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
724 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
725 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
726 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
729 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
732 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
733 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
736 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
740 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
741 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
742 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
743 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
745 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
746 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
747 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
748 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
749 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
750 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
754 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
755 // local transactions to decide how to merge
756 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
757 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
758 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
759 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
761 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
762 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
764 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
765 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
767 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
770 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
774 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
775 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
776 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
777 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
780 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
781 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
782 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
783 /// provides slightly better privacy.
784 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
785 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
786 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
787 match self.key_storage {
788 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
789 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
791 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
792 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
797 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
798 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
799 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
800 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
803 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
804 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
807 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
808 match self.key_storage {
809 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
810 *funding_info = None;
812 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
813 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
818 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
819 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
820 match self.key_storage {
821 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
823 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
827 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
833 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
834 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
835 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
836 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
837 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
838 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
839 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
840 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
841 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
847 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
848 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
849 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
850 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
851 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
852 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
854 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
855 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
857 macro_rules! write_option {
864 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
869 match self.key_storage {
870 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
871 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
872 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
873 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
874 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
875 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
876 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
877 prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
878 latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
880 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
881 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
882 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
883 script.write(writer)?;
886 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
889 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
890 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
892 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
895 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
896 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
898 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
899 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
900 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
901 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
902 match second_option {
903 Some(second_pubkey) => {
904 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
907 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
912 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
916 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
917 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
919 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
920 writer.write_all(secret)?;
921 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
924 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
925 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
926 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
927 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
928 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
929 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
930 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
934 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
935 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
936 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
937 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
938 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
939 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
940 write_option!(htlc_source);
944 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
945 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
946 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
947 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
948 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
949 for script in txouts.iter() {
950 script.write(writer)?;
954 if for_local_storage {
955 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
956 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
957 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
958 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
961 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
964 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
965 ($local_tx: expr) => {
966 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
968 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
969 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
973 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
974 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
975 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
976 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
978 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
979 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
980 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
981 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
982 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
984 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
985 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
989 write_option!(htlc_source);
994 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
995 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
996 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
998 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1001 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1002 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1003 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1005 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1008 if for_local_storage {
1009 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1011 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1014 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1015 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1016 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1019 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1020 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1025 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1027 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1028 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1029 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1030 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1031 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1032 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1033 self.write(writer, true)
1036 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1038 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1039 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1040 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1041 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1042 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1043 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1044 self.write(writer, false)
1047 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1048 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1049 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1050 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1051 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1054 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1058 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1059 //TODO This can be optimized?
1060 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1061 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1069 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1070 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1073 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1074 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1075 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1076 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1079 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1080 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1081 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1082 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1083 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1084 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1085 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
1086 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1087 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1088 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1089 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1090 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1091 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1093 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1094 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1096 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1097 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1100 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1105 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1106 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1107 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1108 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1109 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1110 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1111 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1112 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1113 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1114 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1116 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1117 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1118 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1119 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1123 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1124 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1125 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
1126 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1129 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1130 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1132 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1133 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1134 // script_pubkey version.
1135 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1136 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1139 let mut total_value = 0;
1140 let mut values = Vec::new();
1141 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1142 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
1143 let mut input_descriptors = Vec::new();
1145 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1146 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1148 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1149 txid: commitment_txid,
1152 script_sig: Script::new(),
1153 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1154 witness: Vec::new(),
1156 htlc_idxs.push(None);
1157 values.push(outp.value);
1158 total_value += outp.value;
1159 input_descriptors.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1160 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1161 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1162 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1163 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1164 output: outp.clone(),
1169 macro_rules! sign_input {
1170 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1172 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1173 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1174 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1175 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1176 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1178 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1179 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1180 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1182 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1186 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1187 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1188 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1189 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1191 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1193 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1198 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1199 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1201 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1202 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1203 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1204 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1205 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1206 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1207 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1210 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1211 txid: commitment_txid,
1212 vout: transaction_output_index,
1214 script_sig: Script::new(),
1215 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1216 witness: Vec::new(),
1218 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1220 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1221 values.push(tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1222 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1223 input_descriptors.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1225 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1229 output: vec!(TxOut {
1230 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1231 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1234 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1235 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1236 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1237 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1238 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1239 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1246 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1247 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1248 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1249 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1250 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1252 // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
1253 // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
1254 // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
1255 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1256 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1257 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1258 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1259 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1260 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1261 htlc_updated.push(((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()));
1267 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1268 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1269 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1271 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1272 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1275 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1277 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1279 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1280 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1283 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1289 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&input_descriptors[..]);
1291 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1292 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated);
1295 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1296 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1298 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1299 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1300 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1302 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1304 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1305 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1306 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1308 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1309 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1310 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1311 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1312 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1313 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1314 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1315 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1317 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1318 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1320 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1322 // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
1323 // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
1324 // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
1325 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1326 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1327 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1328 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1329 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1330 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1331 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1332 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1333 // payment_preimage.
1334 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1335 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1336 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1337 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1339 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1340 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1344 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1345 htlc_updated.push(((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()));
1351 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1352 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1353 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1355 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1356 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1360 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1361 let revocation_point_option =
1362 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1363 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1364 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1366 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1367 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1368 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1369 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1370 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1372 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1373 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1374 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1377 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1378 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
1379 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1382 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1383 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1384 match self.key_storage {
1385 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1386 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1387 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1388 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1390 output: outp.clone(),
1394 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1396 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1400 let mut total_value = 0;
1401 let mut values = Vec::new();
1402 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1403 let mut input_descriptors = Vec::new();
1405 macro_rules! sign_input {
1406 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1408 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1409 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1410 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1411 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1412 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1413 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1414 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1416 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1420 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1421 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1422 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1423 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1428 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1429 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1430 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1431 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1432 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1433 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1434 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1436 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1438 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1439 txid: commitment_txid,
1440 vout: transaction_output_index,
1442 script_sig: Script::new(),
1443 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1444 witness: Vec::new(),
1446 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1448 values.push((tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1449 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1450 input_descriptors.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1452 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1456 output: vec!(TxOut {
1457 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1458 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1461 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1462 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1463 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1464 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1465 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1466 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1467 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1468 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1470 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1475 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1476 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1478 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1479 txid: commitment_txid,
1480 vout: transaction_output_index,
1482 script_sig: Script::new(),
1483 sequence: idx as u32,
1484 witness: Vec::new(),
1486 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1488 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1490 output: vec!(TxOut {
1491 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1492 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1495 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1496 sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1497 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1502 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1504 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1505 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1508 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1514 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&input_descriptors[..]);
1515 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1516 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated);
1519 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1520 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1522 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1523 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1524 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, (value.1).0.to_vec());
1527 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1528 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1529 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1530 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1532 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1537 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1540 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1541 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1542 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1546 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1547 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1550 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1555 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1556 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1557 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1558 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1559 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1560 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1562 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1563 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1566 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1567 None => return (None, None),
1568 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1570 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1571 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1572 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1574 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1577 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1579 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1583 script_sig: Script::new(),
1584 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1585 witness: Vec::new(),
1587 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1590 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1591 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1592 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1596 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1602 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
1603 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1604 return (None, None);
1607 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1609 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1610 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1611 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
1612 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1613 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1615 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1619 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1620 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1621 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1622 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1624 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1625 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1626 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1627 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1628 } else { (None, None) }
1631 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
1632 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1633 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1634 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1636 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1637 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1638 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1639 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1640 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1641 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1642 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1643 key: local_delayedkey,
1644 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1645 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1646 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1655 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1656 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1657 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1658 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1659 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1664 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1665 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1666 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1668 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
1669 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1671 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1673 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1674 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1675 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1676 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1678 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1679 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1681 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1682 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1684 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1685 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
1686 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1688 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1690 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1691 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1692 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1693 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1695 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1696 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1698 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1699 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1702 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1703 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
1707 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
1710 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1711 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1712 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1713 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1714 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1715 // TODO: If we find a match here we need to fail back HTLCs that weren't included in the
1716 // broadcast commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because they
1717 // weren't yet included in our commitment transaction(s).
1718 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1719 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1720 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1721 match self.key_storage {
1722 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1723 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1724 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1726 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1727 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1728 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1733 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1734 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1735 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1736 match self.key_storage {
1737 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1738 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1739 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1741 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1742 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1743 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1748 (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new()))
1751 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1752 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1753 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1754 match self.key_storage {
1755 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
1756 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1757 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1758 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1759 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1760 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1761 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1762 output: output.clone(),
1767 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1768 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1769 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1776 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1777 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1778 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1779 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1780 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1781 match self.key_storage {
1782 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1783 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1785 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1793 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
1794 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1795 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1796 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1797 for tx in txn_matched {
1798 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1799 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1800 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1801 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1803 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1804 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1805 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
1806 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1807 funding_info.clone()
1809 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1813 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1814 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output, mut updated) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator);
1816 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1817 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1818 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1821 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1822 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1824 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1825 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1828 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1829 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1830 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1833 if updated.len() > 0 {
1834 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1837 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1838 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, fee_estimator);
1839 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1842 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1843 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1847 for tx in txn.iter() {
1848 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1851 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1852 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1853 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1854 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx);
1855 if updated.len() > 0 {
1856 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1859 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1860 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1861 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1862 match self.key_storage {
1863 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1864 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1865 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1866 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1867 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1870 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1873 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1874 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1875 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1876 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1877 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1880 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1886 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1887 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1890 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1891 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1892 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1893 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1894 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1895 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
1896 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1897 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1898 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1899 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1900 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1901 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1902 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
1903 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
1904 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1905 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1906 // time out the HTLC first.
1907 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1908 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1909 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1910 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1911 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1912 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1913 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1914 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1915 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1916 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1917 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1918 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1919 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1920 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1921 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1922 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1923 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
1924 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1925 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
1926 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
1927 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
1928 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1929 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1930 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1937 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1938 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
1941 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1942 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1943 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1944 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1947 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1948 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1949 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1957 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
1958 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
1959 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
1960 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1962 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
1963 let mut payment_data = None;
1964 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
1965 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
1966 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
1967 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
1969 macro_rules! log_claim {
1970 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
1971 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
1972 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
1973 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
1974 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
1975 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
1976 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
1977 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
1978 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
1979 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
1980 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
1981 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
1983 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
1984 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
1985 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
1986 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
1991 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
1992 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
1993 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
1994 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
1995 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
1996 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
1997 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
1998 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2007 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2008 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2009 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2010 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2011 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2012 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2013 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2014 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2015 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2016 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2017 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2018 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2019 } else if !$local_tx {
2020 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2021 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2023 if payment_data.is_none() {
2024 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2025 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2029 if payment_data.is_none() {
2030 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2031 continue 'outer_loop;
2038 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2039 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2040 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2041 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2044 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2045 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2046 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2047 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2050 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2051 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2052 "remote commitment tx", false);
2055 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2056 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2057 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2058 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2059 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2060 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2061 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2062 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2063 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2064 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2066 htlc_updated.push((source, None, payment_hash));
2074 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2076 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
2077 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2078 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2079 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2083 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2088 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2089 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2090 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2091 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2094 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2096 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2098 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2099 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2100 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2101 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2102 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2103 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2104 let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2105 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2106 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2107 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2108 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2109 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2111 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2112 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2113 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2115 revocation_base_key,
2117 delayed_payment_base_key,
2120 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
2121 latest_per_commitment_point,
2123 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2124 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2127 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2130 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2131 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2133 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2134 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2138 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2139 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2140 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2141 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2143 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2148 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2149 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2151 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
2152 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
2153 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
2154 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2157 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2160 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2161 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2162 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2163 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2164 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2166 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2167 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2173 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2174 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2175 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2176 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2177 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2178 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2179 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2180 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2182 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2183 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2187 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2188 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2189 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2190 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2191 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2192 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2193 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2194 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2195 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2197 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2198 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2202 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2203 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2204 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2205 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2206 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2207 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2208 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2212 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2215 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2218 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2219 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2223 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2224 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2225 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2228 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2229 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2230 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2231 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2232 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2234 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2235 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2236 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2237 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2238 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2240 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
2241 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2243 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2248 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
2255 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2258 Some(read_local_tx!())
2260 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2263 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2266 Some(read_local_tx!())
2268 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2271 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2273 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2274 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2275 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2276 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2277 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2278 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2279 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2283 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2284 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2286 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2287 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2290 their_htlc_base_key,
2291 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2292 their_cur_revocation_points,
2295 their_to_self_delay,
2298 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2299 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2300 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2302 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2303 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2304 current_remote_commitment_number,
2319 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2320 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2321 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2322 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2323 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2324 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2325 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2326 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2327 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
2329 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2330 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
2332 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2333 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2334 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2335 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2336 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2340 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2341 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2342 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2343 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2344 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2345 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2347 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2349 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2350 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2351 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2354 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2355 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2360 // insert_secret correct sequence
2361 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2364 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2365 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2366 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2369 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2370 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2371 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2374 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2375 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2376 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2379 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2380 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2381 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2384 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2385 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2386 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2389 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2390 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2391 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2394 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2395 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2396 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2399 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2400 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2401 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2406 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2407 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2410 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2411 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2412 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2415 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2416 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2417 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2418 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2422 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2423 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2426 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2427 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2428 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2431 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2432 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2433 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2436 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2437 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2438 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2441 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2442 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2443 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2444 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2448 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2449 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2452 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2453 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2454 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2457 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2458 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2459 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2462 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2463 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2464 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2467 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2468 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2469 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2470 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2474 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2475 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2478 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2479 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2480 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2483 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2484 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2485 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2488 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2489 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2490 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2493 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2494 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2495 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2498 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2499 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2500 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2503 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2504 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2505 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2508 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2509 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2510 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2513 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2514 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2515 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2516 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2520 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2521 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2524 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2525 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2526 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2529 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2530 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2531 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2534 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2535 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2536 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2539 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2540 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2541 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2544 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2545 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2546 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2549 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2550 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2551 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2552 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2556 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2557 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2560 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2561 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2562 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2565 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2566 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2567 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2570 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2571 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2572 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2575 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2576 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2577 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2580 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2581 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2582 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2585 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2586 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2587 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2590 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2591 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2592 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2595 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2596 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2597 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2598 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2602 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2603 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2606 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2607 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2608 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2611 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2612 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2613 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2616 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2617 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2618 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2621 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2622 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2623 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2626 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2627 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2628 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2631 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2632 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2633 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2636 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2637 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2638 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2641 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2642 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2643 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2644 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2648 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2649 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2652 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2653 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2654 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2657 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2658 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2659 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2662 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2663 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2664 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2667 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2668 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2669 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2672 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2673 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2674 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2677 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2678 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2679 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2682 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2683 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2684 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2687 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2688 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2689 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2690 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2695 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2696 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2697 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2699 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2700 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2704 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2705 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2706 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2707 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2708 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2709 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2714 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2716 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2718 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2720 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2721 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
2722 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2723 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2727 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2728 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2730 let mut res = Vec::new();
2731 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2732 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2736 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2737 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2744 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2745 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2747 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2748 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2754 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2755 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2756 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2757 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2762 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2764 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2765 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2767 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2768 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2769 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2770 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2771 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2772 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2773 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2776 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2777 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2778 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2779 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2780 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2781 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2782 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2784 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2785 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2786 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2787 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2788 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2789 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2791 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2792 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2793 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2794 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2795 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2796 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2797 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2798 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2800 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2801 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2802 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2803 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2804 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2805 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2809 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2810 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2811 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2813 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2814 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2815 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2816 let mut sum_actual_sigs: u64 = 0;
2818 macro_rules! sign_input {
2819 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2820 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2821 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2823 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2824 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2825 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
2827 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2828 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
2829 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2830 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2831 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2832 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len() as u64;
2833 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2834 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
2835 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2836 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2837 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2838 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
2840 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2842 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2843 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
2844 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
2845 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
2849 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2850 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2852 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2853 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2855 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2856 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2860 script_sig: Script::new(),
2861 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2862 witness: Vec::new(),
2865 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2866 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2869 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2870 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2871 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2872 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2873 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2875 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
2877 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2878 claim_tx.input.clear();
2879 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2881 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2882 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2886 script_sig: Script::new(),
2887 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2888 witness: Vec::new(),
2891 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2892 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2893 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2894 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2895 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2897 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
2899 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2900 claim_tx.input.clear();
2901 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2902 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2903 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2907 script_sig: Script::new(),
2908 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2909 witness: Vec::new(),
2911 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2912 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2913 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2914 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2915 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2917 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
2920 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.