1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
27 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
28 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
33 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
34 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
35 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
36 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
37 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
41 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
44 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
45 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
47 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
49 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
50 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
51 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
53 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
54 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
55 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
56 /// the channel to an operational state.
58 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
59 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
60 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
62 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
63 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
64 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
65 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
66 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
67 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
70 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
71 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
72 /// channel operation.
74 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
75 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
76 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
78 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
82 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
83 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
84 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
85 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
86 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
88 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
90 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
91 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
92 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
93 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
94 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
95 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
98 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
99 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
100 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
103 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
104 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
105 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
106 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
107 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
108 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
110 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
111 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
112 /// any spends of it.
113 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
115 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
116 /// with success or failure backward
117 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
120 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
121 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
123 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
125 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
126 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
127 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
129 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
130 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
131 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
132 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
133 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
135 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
136 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
137 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
138 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
139 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
143 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
144 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
145 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
146 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
147 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
149 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
150 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
151 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
152 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
153 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
154 outputs: spendable_outputs,
158 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
159 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
160 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
163 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
167 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
168 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
169 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
170 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
172 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
173 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
174 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
175 // TODO: Note that we currently don't really use this as ChannelManager
176 // will fail/claim backwards after the first block. We really should delay
177 // a few blocks before failing backwards (but can claim backwards
178 // immediately) as long as we have a few blocks of headroom.
179 let mut existing_claim = false;
180 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
181 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
182 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
183 existing_claim = true;
189 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
192 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
193 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
198 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
199 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
202 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
205 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
206 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
207 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
208 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
209 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
210 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
213 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
214 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
217 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
218 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
222 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
223 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
224 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
225 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
226 Some(orig_monitor) => {
227 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
228 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
232 match monitor.key_storage {
233 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
236 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
238 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
239 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
240 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
241 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
245 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
246 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
249 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
254 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
255 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
256 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
258 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
262 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
263 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
264 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
265 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
267 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
269 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
274 pending_htlcs_updated
278 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
279 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
280 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
281 let mut ret = Vec::new();
282 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
287 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
288 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
289 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
290 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
291 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
292 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
293 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
294 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
295 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
296 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
297 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
298 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
299 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a confirmed HTLC-Timeout or previous revoked commitment
300 /// transaction before we fail corresponding inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards
301 /// and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
302 //TODO: We currently dont actually use this...we should
303 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
305 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
308 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
309 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
310 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
311 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
312 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
313 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
314 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
315 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
316 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
317 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
320 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
321 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
325 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
326 struct LocalSignedTx {
327 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
330 revocation_key: PublicKey,
331 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
332 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
333 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
335 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
338 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
339 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
341 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
342 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
344 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
345 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
347 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
348 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
350 key_storage: Storage,
351 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
352 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
353 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
354 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
356 our_to_self_delay: u16,
357 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
359 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
360 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
361 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
362 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
363 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
364 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
365 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
366 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
367 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
368 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
369 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
370 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
371 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
373 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
374 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
375 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
376 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
377 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
378 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
380 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
382 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
384 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
386 destination_script: Script,
388 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
389 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
390 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
391 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
392 // the full block_connected).
393 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
394 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
398 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
399 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
400 /// underlying object
401 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
402 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
403 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
404 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
405 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
406 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
407 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
408 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
409 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
410 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
411 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
412 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
413 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
414 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
415 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
416 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
417 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
421 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
422 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
431 impl ChannelMonitor {
432 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
434 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
436 key_storage: Storage::Local {
437 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
438 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
439 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
440 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
441 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
442 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
443 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
445 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
446 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
448 their_htlc_base_key: None,
449 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
450 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
452 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
453 their_to_self_delay: None,
455 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
456 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
457 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
458 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
460 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
461 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
462 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
464 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
465 destination_script: destination_script,
467 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
468 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
474 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
476 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
484 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
485 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
487 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
488 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
489 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
490 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
496 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
497 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
498 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
499 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
500 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
502 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
503 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
504 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
507 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
510 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
512 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
513 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
514 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
515 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
516 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
517 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
523 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
524 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
525 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
526 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
527 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
529 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
530 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
531 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
535 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
536 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
537 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
542 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
549 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
558 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
559 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
560 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
561 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
562 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
563 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
564 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
565 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
567 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
568 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
571 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
572 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
573 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
574 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
575 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
576 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
578 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
579 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
580 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
581 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
582 Some(old_points) => {
583 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
584 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
585 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
586 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
587 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
589 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
592 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
596 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
601 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
602 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
603 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
604 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
605 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
606 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
607 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
608 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
609 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
610 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
611 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
612 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
613 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
614 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
615 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
616 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
617 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
622 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
623 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
625 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
629 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
630 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
631 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
632 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
635 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
636 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
637 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
638 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
639 match self.key_storage {
640 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
641 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
642 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
643 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
644 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
645 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
646 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
647 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
648 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
651 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
654 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
655 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
658 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
662 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
663 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
664 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
665 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
667 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
668 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
669 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
670 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
671 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
672 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
676 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
677 // local transactions to decide how to merge
678 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
679 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
680 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
681 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
683 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
684 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
686 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
687 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
689 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
692 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
696 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
697 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
698 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
699 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
702 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
703 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
704 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
705 /// provides slightly better privacy.
706 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
707 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
708 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
709 match self.key_storage {
710 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
711 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
713 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
714 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
719 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
720 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
721 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
722 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
725 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
726 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
729 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
730 match self.key_storage {
731 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
732 *funding_info = None;
734 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
735 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
740 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
741 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
742 match self.key_storage {
743 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
745 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
749 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
755 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
756 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
757 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
758 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
759 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
760 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
761 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
762 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
763 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
769 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
770 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
771 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
772 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
773 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
774 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
776 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
777 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
779 macro_rules! write_option {
786 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
791 match self.key_storage {
792 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
793 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
794 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
795 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
796 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
797 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
798 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
799 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
800 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
801 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
803 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
805 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
806 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
807 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
809 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
812 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
813 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
814 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
815 script.write(writer)?;
818 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
821 write_option!(current_remote_commitment_txid);
822 write_option!(prev_remote_commitment_txid);
824 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
827 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
828 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
830 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
831 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
832 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
833 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
834 match second_option {
835 Some(second_pubkey) => {
836 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
839 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
844 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
848 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
849 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
851 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
852 writer.write_all(secret)?;
853 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
856 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
857 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
858 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
859 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
860 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
861 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
862 write_option!(&$htlc_output.transaction_output_index);
866 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
867 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
868 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
869 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
870 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
871 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
872 write_option!(htlc_source);
876 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
877 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
878 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
879 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
880 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
881 for script in txouts.iter() {
882 script.write(writer)?;
886 if for_local_storage {
887 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
888 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
889 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
890 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
893 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
896 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
897 ($local_tx: expr) => {
898 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
900 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
901 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
905 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
906 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
907 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
908 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
910 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
911 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
912 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
913 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
914 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
916 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
917 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
921 write_option!(htlc_source);
926 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
927 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
928 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
930 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
933 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
934 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
935 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
937 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
940 if for_local_storage {
941 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
943 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
946 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
947 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
948 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
951 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
952 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
957 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
959 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
960 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
961 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
962 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
963 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
964 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
965 self.write(writer, true)
968 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
970 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
971 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
972 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
973 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
974 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
975 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
976 self.write(writer, false)
979 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
980 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
981 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
982 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
983 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
986 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
990 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
991 //TODO This can be optimized?
992 let mut min = 1 << 48;
993 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1001 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1002 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1005 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1006 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1007 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1008 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1011 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1012 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1013 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1014 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1015 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1016 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1017 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
1018 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1019 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1020 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1021 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1022 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1023 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1025 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1026 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1028 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1029 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1032 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1037 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1038 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1039 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1040 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1041 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1042 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1043 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1044 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1045 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1046 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1048 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1049 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1050 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1051 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1055 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1056 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1057 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
1058 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1061 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1062 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1064 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1065 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1066 // script_pubkey version.
1067 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1068 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1071 let mut total_value = 0;
1072 let mut values = Vec::new();
1073 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1074 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
1076 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1077 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1079 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1080 txid: commitment_txid,
1083 script_sig: Script::new(),
1084 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1085 witness: Vec::new(),
1087 htlc_idxs.push(None);
1088 values.push(outp.value);
1089 total_value += outp.value;
1090 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1091 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1092 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1093 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1094 output: outp.clone(),
1099 macro_rules! sign_input {
1100 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1102 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1103 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1104 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1105 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1106 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1108 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1109 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1110 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1112 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1116 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1117 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1118 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1119 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1121 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1123 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1128 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1129 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1131 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1132 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1133 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1134 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1135 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1136 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1137 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1140 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1141 txid: commitment_txid,
1142 vout: transaction_output_index,
1144 script_sig: Script::new(),
1145 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1146 witness: Vec::new(),
1148 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1150 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1151 values.push(tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1152 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1154 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1158 output: vec!(TxOut {
1159 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1160 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1163 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1164 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1165 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1171 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1172 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1173 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1174 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1175 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1177 // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
1178 // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
1179 // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
1180 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1181 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1182 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&$txid) {
1183 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1184 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1185 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1186 htlc_updated.push(((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()));
1192 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1193 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1194 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1196 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1197 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1200 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1202 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1204 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1205 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1206 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1208 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1215 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1216 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1218 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1219 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1220 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1223 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1224 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1225 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1227 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1228 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1229 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1230 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1231 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1232 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1233 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1234 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1236 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1237 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1239 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1241 // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
1242 // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
1243 // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
1244 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1245 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1246 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&$txid) {
1247 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1248 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1249 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1250 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1251 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1252 // payment_preimage.
1253 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1254 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1255 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1256 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1258 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1259 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1263 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1264 htlc_updated.push(((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()));
1270 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1271 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1272 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1274 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1275 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1279 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1280 let revocation_point_option =
1281 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1282 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1283 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1285 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1286 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1287 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1288 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1289 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1291 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1292 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1293 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1296 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1297 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
1298 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1301 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1302 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1303 match self.key_storage {
1304 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1305 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1306 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1307 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1309 output: outp.clone(),
1313 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1315 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1319 let mut total_value = 0;
1320 let mut values = Vec::new();
1321 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1323 macro_rules! sign_input {
1324 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1326 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1327 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1328 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1329 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1330 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1331 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1332 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1334 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1338 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1339 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1340 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1341 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1346 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1347 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1348 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1349 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1350 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1351 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1352 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1354 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1356 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1357 txid: commitment_txid,
1358 vout: transaction_output_index,
1360 script_sig: Script::new(),
1361 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1362 witness: Vec::new(),
1364 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1366 values.push((tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1367 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1369 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1373 output: vec!(TxOut {
1374 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1375 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1378 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1379 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1380 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1381 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1382 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1384 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1388 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1389 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1391 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1392 txid: commitment_txid,
1393 vout: transaction_output_index,
1395 script_sig: Script::new(),
1396 sequence: idx as u32,
1397 witness: Vec::new(),
1399 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1401 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1403 output: vec!(TxOut {
1404 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1405 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1408 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1409 sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1410 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1415 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1417 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1418 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1419 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1421 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1428 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1429 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1431 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1432 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1433 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, (value.1).0.to_vec());
1436 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1437 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1438 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1440 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1445 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1448 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1449 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1450 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1454 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1455 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1458 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1463 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1464 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1465 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1466 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1467 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1468 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1470 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1471 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1474 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1475 None => return (None, None),
1476 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1478 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1479 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1480 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1482 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1485 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1487 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1491 script_sig: Script::new(),
1492 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1493 witness: Vec::new(),
1495 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1498 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1499 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1500 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1501 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1504 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1511 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1513 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1514 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1515 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1516 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1517 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1519 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1523 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1524 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1525 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1526 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1528 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1529 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1530 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1531 } else { (None, None) }
1534 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
1535 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1536 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1537 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1539 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1540 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1541 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1542 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1543 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1544 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1545 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1546 key: local_delayedkey,
1547 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1548 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1549 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1558 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1559 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1560 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1561 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1562 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1567 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1568 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1569 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1571 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
1572 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1574 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1576 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1577 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1578 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1579 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1581 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1582 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1584 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1585 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1587 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1588 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
1589 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1591 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1593 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1594 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1595 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1596 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1598 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1599 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1601 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1602 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1605 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1606 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
1610 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
1613 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1614 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1615 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1616 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1617 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1618 // TODO: If we find a match here we need to fail back HTLCs that were't included in the
1619 // broadcast commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because they
1620 // weren't yet included in our commitment transaction(s).
1621 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1622 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1623 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1624 match self.key_storage {
1625 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1626 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1627 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1629 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1630 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1631 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1636 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1637 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1638 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1639 match self.key_storage {
1640 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1641 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1642 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1644 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1645 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1646 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1651 (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new()))
1654 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1655 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1656 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1657 match self.key_storage {
1658 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
1659 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1660 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1661 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1662 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1663 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1664 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1665 output: output.clone(),
1670 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1671 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1672 // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1679 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1680 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1681 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1682 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1683 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1684 match self.key_storage {
1685 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1686 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1688 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1696 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
1697 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1698 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1699 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1700 for tx in txn_matched {
1701 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1702 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1703 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1704 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1706 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1707 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1708 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
1709 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1710 funding_info.clone()
1712 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1716 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1717 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output, mut updated) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1719 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1720 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1721 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1724 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1725 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1727 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1728 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1731 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1732 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1733 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1736 if updated.len() > 0 {
1737 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1740 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1741 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1742 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1745 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1746 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1750 for tx in txn.iter() {
1751 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1754 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1755 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1756 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1757 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx);
1758 if updated.len() > 0 {
1759 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1762 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1763 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1764 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1765 match self.key_storage {
1766 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1767 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1768 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1769 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1770 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1773 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1776 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1777 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1778 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1779 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1780 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1783 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1789 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1790 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1793 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1794 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1795 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1796 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1797 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1798 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
1799 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1800 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1801 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1802 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1803 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1804 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1805 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
1806 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
1807 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1808 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1809 // time out the HTLC first.
1810 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1811 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1812 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1813 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1814 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1815 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1816 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1817 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1818 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1819 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1820 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1821 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1822 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1823 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1824 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1825 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1826 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1827 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
1828 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1829 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1830 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1837 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1838 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
1841 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1842 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1843 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1844 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1847 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1848 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1849 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1857 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
1858 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
1859 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
1860 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1862 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
1863 let mut payment_data = None;
1864 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
1865 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
1866 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
1867 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
1869 macro_rules! log_claim {
1870 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
1871 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
1872 // as we have no corresponding source. This implies either it is an
1873 // inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
1874 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
1875 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
1876 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
1877 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
1878 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
1879 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
1880 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
1882 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
1883 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
1884 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
1885 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
1890 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1891 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
1892 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
1893 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
1894 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
1895 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
1896 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
1897 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
1898 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
1899 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
1900 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
1901 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
1903 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
1904 continue 'outer_loop;
1911 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1912 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1913 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
1914 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
1917 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1918 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1919 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
1920 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
1923 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1924 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
1925 "remote commitment tx", false);
1928 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
1929 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
1930 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
1931 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
1932 if accepted_preimage_claim {
1933 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
1934 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
1935 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
1936 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
1937 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
1939 htlc_updated.push((source, None, payment_hash));
1947 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1949 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1950 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1951 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1952 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1956 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1960 macro_rules! read_option { () => {
1961 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1963 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1964 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1968 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1969 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1970 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1971 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1974 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1976 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1978 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1979 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1980 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1981 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1982 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
1983 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1985 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1986 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1988 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1990 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1991 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1993 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1994 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1995 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1996 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1997 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1999 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2000 let current_remote_commitment_txid = read_option!();
2001 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = read_option!();
2003 revocation_base_key,
2005 delayed_payment_base_key,
2008 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
2009 latest_per_commitment_point,
2011 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2012 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2015 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2018 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2019 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2021 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2022 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2026 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2027 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2028 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2029 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2031 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
2036 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2037 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2039 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
2040 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
2041 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
2042 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2045 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2048 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2049 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2050 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2051 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2052 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = read_option!();
2054 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2055 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2061 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2062 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2063 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2064 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2065 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2066 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2067 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2068 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), read_option!().map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2070 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2071 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2075 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2076 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2077 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2078 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2079 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2080 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2081 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2082 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2083 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2085 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2086 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2090 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2091 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2092 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2093 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2094 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2095 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2096 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2100 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2103 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2106 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2107 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2111 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2112 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2113 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2116 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2117 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2118 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2119 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2120 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2122 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2123 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2124 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2125 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2126 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2128 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
2129 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2131 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, read_option!()));
2136 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
2143 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2146 Some(read_local_tx!())
2148 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2151 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2154 Some(read_local_tx!())
2156 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2159 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2161 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2162 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2163 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2164 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2165 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2166 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2167 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2171 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2172 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2174 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2175 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2178 their_htlc_base_key,
2179 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2180 their_cur_revocation_points,
2183 their_to_self_delay,
2186 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2187 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2188 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2190 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2191 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2192 current_remote_commitment_number,
2207 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
2208 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
2209 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2210 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2212 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2213 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2214 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2215 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2216 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2217 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2218 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2222 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2223 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2224 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2225 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2226 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2227 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2229 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2231 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2232 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2233 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2236 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2237 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2242 // insert_secret correct sequence
2243 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2246 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2247 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2248 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2251 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2252 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2253 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2256 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2257 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2258 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2261 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2262 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2263 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2266 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2267 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2268 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2271 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2272 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2273 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2276 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2277 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2278 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2281 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2282 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2283 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2288 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2289 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2292 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2293 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2294 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2297 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2298 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2299 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2300 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2304 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2305 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2308 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2309 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2310 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2313 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2314 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2315 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2318 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2319 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2320 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2323 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2324 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2325 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2326 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2330 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2331 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2334 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2335 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2336 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2339 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2340 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2341 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2344 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2345 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2346 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2349 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2350 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2351 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2352 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2356 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2357 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2360 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2361 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2362 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2365 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2366 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2367 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2370 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2371 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2372 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2375 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2376 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2377 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2380 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2381 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2382 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2385 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2386 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2387 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2390 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2391 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2392 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2395 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2396 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2397 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2398 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2402 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2403 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2406 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2407 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2408 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2411 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2412 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2413 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2416 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2417 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2418 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2421 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2422 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2423 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2426 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2427 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2428 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2431 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2432 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2433 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2434 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2438 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2439 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2442 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2443 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2444 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2447 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2448 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2449 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2452 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2453 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2454 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2457 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2458 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2459 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2462 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2463 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2464 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2467 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2468 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2469 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2472 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2473 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2474 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2477 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2478 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2479 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2480 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2484 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2485 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2488 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2489 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2490 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2493 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2494 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2495 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2498 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2499 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2500 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2503 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2504 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2505 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2508 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2509 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2510 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2513 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2514 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2515 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2518 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2519 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2520 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2523 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2524 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2525 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2526 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2530 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2531 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2534 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2535 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2536 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2539 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2540 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2541 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2544 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2545 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2546 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2549 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2550 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2551 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2554 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2555 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2556 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2559 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2560 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2561 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2564 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2565 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2566 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2569 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2570 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2571 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2572 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2577 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2578 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2579 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2581 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2582 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2586 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2587 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2588 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2589 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2590 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2591 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2596 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2598 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2600 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2602 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2603 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
2604 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2605 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2609 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2610 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2612 let mut res = Vec::new();
2613 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2614 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2618 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2619 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2626 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2627 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2629 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2630 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2636 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2637 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2638 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2639 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2644 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2646 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2647 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2649 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2650 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2651 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2652 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2653 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2654 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2655 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2658 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2659 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2660 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2661 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2662 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2663 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2664 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2666 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2667 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2668 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2669 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2670 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2671 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2673 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2674 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2675 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2676 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2677 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2678 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2679 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2680 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2682 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2683 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2684 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2685 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2686 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2687 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2690 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.