1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
4 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
5 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use crypto::digest::Digest;
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
10 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
12 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
14 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
15 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
16 use util::sha2::Sha256;
18 use std::collections::HashMap;
19 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
22 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
23 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
24 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
25 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
26 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
27 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
28 /// the channel to an operational state.
30 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
31 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
32 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
36 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
37 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
38 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
40 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
41 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
42 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
43 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
44 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
45 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given funding_txid+funding_output_index.
46 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
49 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
50 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
51 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
52 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
53 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
54 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
55 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
56 /// (Sha256dHash, u16) as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
57 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
58 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
59 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
60 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
63 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
64 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
65 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
66 for monitor in monitors.values() {
67 monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
71 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
74 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
75 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
76 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
77 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
81 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
82 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
86 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
87 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
88 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
89 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
92 match monitor.funding_txo {
93 None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
94 Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index)) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txid, funding_output_index as u32)),
96 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
101 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
102 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
103 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
105 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
110 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
111 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
112 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
113 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
114 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
115 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
120 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
121 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
124 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
125 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
126 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
131 struct LocalSignedTx {
134 revocation_key: PublicKey,
135 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
136 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
137 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
139 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
142 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
143 funding_txo: Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)>,
144 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
146 key_storage: KeyStorage,
147 delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
148 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
149 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
150 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
152 our_to_self_delay: u16,
153 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
155 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
156 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
157 remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
158 //hash to commitment number mapping use to determine the state of transaction owning it
159 // (revoked/non-revoked) and so lightnen pruning
160 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
162 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
163 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
164 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
165 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
166 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
167 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
169 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
171 destination_script: Script,
172 secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
174 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
175 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
177 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
178 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
180 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
181 delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
182 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
183 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
185 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
186 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
188 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
189 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
190 remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
191 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
193 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
194 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
196 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
198 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
199 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
204 impl ChannelMonitor {
205 pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
208 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
210 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
211 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
212 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
214 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
215 their_htlc_base_key: None,
216 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
218 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
219 their_to_self_delay: None,
221 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
222 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
223 remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
224 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
226 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
227 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
229 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
231 destination_script: destination_script,
232 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
237 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
239 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
247 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
248 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
250 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
251 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
252 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
253 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
255 sha.result(&mut res);
261 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
262 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
263 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
264 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
265 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
266 pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
267 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
269 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
270 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
271 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", msg: None})
274 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
276 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
277 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
278 Some(old_points) => {
279 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
280 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
281 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
282 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
283 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
285 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
288 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
292 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
297 let mut waste_hash_state : Vec<[u8;32]> = Vec::new();
299 let local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx;
300 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
301 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
302 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
303 for &(ref htlc, _s1, _s2) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !").htlc_outputs {
304 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
308 if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
313 waste_hash_state.push(k);
317 for h in waste_hash_state {
318 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&h);
324 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
325 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
326 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
327 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
328 pub fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
329 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
330 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
331 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
333 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
334 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
336 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
339 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
340 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
341 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
342 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
343 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
344 pub fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
345 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
346 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
347 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
348 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
349 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
350 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
351 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
352 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
353 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
359 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
360 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
361 pub fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
362 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
365 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
366 match self.funding_txo {
367 Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo {
368 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None});
370 None => if other.funding_txo.is_some() {
371 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo;
374 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
375 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
376 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
377 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
379 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
380 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
381 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
382 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
384 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
385 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
387 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
388 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
390 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
395 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
396 pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
397 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
398 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
401 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
402 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
403 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
404 /// provides slightly better privacy.
405 pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_txid: Sha256dHash, funding_output_index: u16) {
406 self.funding_txo = Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index));
409 pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
410 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
413 pub fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
414 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
417 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
418 self.funding_txo = None;
421 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
425 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
426 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
428 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
429 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
430 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
431 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
432 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
435 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
436 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", msg: None})
439 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
440 //TODO This can be optimized?
441 let mut min = 1 << 48;
442 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
450 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
451 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
452 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
453 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
454 /// applicable) as well.
455 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
456 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
457 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
458 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
459 macro_rules! ignore_error {
460 ( $thing : expr ) => {
463 Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast
468 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
469 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
471 let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
472 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
473 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
474 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
475 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
476 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
477 let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
478 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
479 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
481 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
482 let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
483 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
484 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
487 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
488 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
489 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
490 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)),
493 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
494 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
496 let mut total_value = 0;
497 let mut values = Vec::new();
498 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
499 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
501 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
502 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
504 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
505 prev_index: idx as u32,
506 script_sig: Script::new(),
507 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
510 htlc_idxs.push(None);
511 values.push(outp.value);
512 total_value += outp.value;
513 break; // There can only be one of these
517 macro_rules! sign_input {
518 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
520 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
521 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
522 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
523 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
524 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
526 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
527 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
528 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)), redeemscript)
530 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
534 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
535 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
536 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
537 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
539 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
541 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
546 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
547 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
549 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
550 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
551 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
552 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
553 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
554 return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
557 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
558 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
559 script_sig: Script::new(),
560 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
563 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
565 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
566 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
567 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
569 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
574 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
575 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
578 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
579 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
580 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
585 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() {
586 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
587 // TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface!
588 self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
590 if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
592 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
593 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
594 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
596 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
603 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
604 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
606 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
607 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
608 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
611 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
612 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
613 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
614 let revocation_point_option =
615 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
616 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
617 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
619 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
620 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
621 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
622 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
623 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
625 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
626 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
627 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
630 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
631 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
632 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
635 let mut total_value = 0;
636 let mut values = Vec::new();
637 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
639 macro_rules! sign_input {
640 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
642 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
643 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
644 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
645 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
646 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
647 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
648 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key)), redeemscript)
650 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
654 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
655 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
656 $input.witness.push($preimage);
657 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
662 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
663 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
665 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
666 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
667 script_sig: Script::new(),
668 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
671 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
673 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
674 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
676 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
681 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
682 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
685 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
686 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
687 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
692 if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
694 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
695 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
696 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
698 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
705 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
706 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
708 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
709 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
710 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
713 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
717 //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain map!
723 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
724 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
726 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
728 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
730 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
732 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
733 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
734 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
735 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
737 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
738 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
740 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
742 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
743 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
745 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
747 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
748 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
749 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
750 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
752 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
753 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
755 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
763 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
764 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
765 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
766 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
767 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
768 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
769 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
770 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
773 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
774 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
775 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
781 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
782 for tx in txn_matched {
783 for txin in tx.input.iter() {
784 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().0 && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().1 as u32) {
785 let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
787 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
789 for tx in txn.iter() {
790 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
795 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
796 let mut needs_broadcast = false;
797 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
798 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
799 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
800 needs_broadcast = true;
806 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
807 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
808 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
814 pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
815 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
816 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
817 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
818 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
830 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
831 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
832 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160,Sha256dHash};
833 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
834 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
835 use ln::channelmonitor::LocalSignedTx;
836 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
837 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
838 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
839 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
840 use std::collections::HashMap;
843 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
844 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
845 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
846 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
847 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
849 macro_rules! test_secrets {
851 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
852 for secret in secrets.iter() {
853 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
856 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
857 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
862 // insert_secret correct sequence
863 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
866 secrets.push([0; 32]);
867 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
868 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
871 secrets.push([0; 32]);
872 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
873 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
876 secrets.push([0; 32]);
877 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
878 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
881 secrets.push([0; 32]);
882 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
883 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
886 secrets.push([0; 32]);
887 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
888 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
891 secrets.push([0; 32]);
892 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
893 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
896 secrets.push([0; 32]);
897 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
898 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
901 secrets.push([0; 32]);
902 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
903 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
908 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
909 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
912 secrets.push([0; 32]);
913 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
914 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
917 secrets.push([0; 32]);
918 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
919 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
920 "Previous secret did not match new one");
924 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
925 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
928 secrets.push([0; 32]);
929 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
930 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
933 secrets.push([0; 32]);
934 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
935 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
938 secrets.push([0; 32]);
939 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
940 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
943 secrets.push([0; 32]);
944 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
945 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
946 "Previous secret did not match new one");
950 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
951 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
954 secrets.push([0; 32]);
955 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
956 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
959 secrets.push([0; 32]);
960 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
961 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
964 secrets.push([0; 32]);
965 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
966 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
969 secrets.push([0; 32]);
970 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
971 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
972 "Previous secret did not match new one");
976 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
977 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
980 secrets.push([0; 32]);
981 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
982 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
985 secrets.push([0; 32]);
986 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
987 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
990 secrets.push([0; 32]);
991 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
992 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
995 secrets.push([0; 32]);
996 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
997 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1000 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1001 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1002 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1005 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1006 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1007 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1010 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1011 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1012 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1015 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1016 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1017 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1018 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1022 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1023 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1026 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1027 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1028 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1031 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1032 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1033 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1036 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1037 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1038 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1041 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1042 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1043 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1046 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1047 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1048 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1051 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1052 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1053 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1054 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1058 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1059 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1062 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1063 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1064 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1067 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1068 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1069 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1072 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1073 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1074 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1077 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1078 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1079 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1082 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1083 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1084 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1087 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1088 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1089 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1092 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1093 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1094 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1097 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1098 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1099 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1100 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1104 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1105 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1108 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1109 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1110 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1113 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1114 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1115 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1118 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1119 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1120 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1123 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1124 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1125 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1128 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1129 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1130 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1133 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1134 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1135 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1138 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1139 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1140 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1143 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1144 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1145 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1146 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1150 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1151 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1154 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1155 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1156 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1159 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1160 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1161 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1164 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1165 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1166 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1169 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1170 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1171 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1174 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1175 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1176 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1179 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1180 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1181 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1184 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1185 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1186 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1189 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1190 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1191 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1192 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1196 macro_rules! gen_local_tx {
1197 ($hex : expr, $monitor : expr, $htlcs : expr, $rng : expr, $preimage : expr, $hash : expr) => {
1200 let mut htlcs = Vec::new();
1202 for _i in 0..$htlcs {
1203 $rng.fill_bytes(&mut $preimage);
1204 $hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&$preimage)[0..20]);
1205 $monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&$hash, &$preimage);
1206 htlcs.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1210 payment_hash : $hash.clone(),
1211 transaction_output_index : 0,
1212 }, Signature::from_der(&Secp256k1::new(), $hex).unwrap(),
1213 Signature::from_der(&Secp256k1::new(), $hex).unwrap()))
1216 Some(LocalSignedTx {
1217 txid: Sha256dHash::from_data(&[]),
1224 revocation_key: PublicKey::new(),
1225 a_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
1226 b_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
1227 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey::new(),
1229 htlc_outputs: htlcs,
1235 macro_rules! gen_remote_outpoints {
1236 ($monitor : expr, $tx : expr, $htlcs : expr, $rng : expr, $preimage : expr, $hash: expr, $number : expr) => {
1238 let mut commitment_number = $number;
1242 let tx_zero = Transaction {
1249 let mut htlcs = Vec::new();
1251 for _i in 0..$htlcs {
1252 $rng.fill_bytes(&mut $preimage);
1253 $hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&$preimage)[0..20]);
1254 $monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&$hash, &$preimage);
1255 htlcs.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1259 payment_hash : $hash.clone(),
1260 transaction_output_index : 0,
1263 commitment_number -= 1;
1264 $monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&tx_zero, htlcs, commitment_number);
1271 fn test_prune_preimages() {
1273 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1274 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1275 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1276 let mut preimage: [u8;32] = [0;32];
1277 let mut hash: [u8;32] = [0;32];
1278 let mut rng = thread_rng();
1281 // insert 30 random hash, 10 from local, 10 from remote, prune 30/50
1282 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1285 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1286 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1287 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1289 monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 10, rng, preimage, hash);
1290 gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 1, 10, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710654);
1292 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1293 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1294 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None);
1295 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 20);
1300 // insert 30 random hash, prune 30/30
1301 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1304 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1305 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1306 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1308 monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 0, rng, preimage, hash);
1309 gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 0, 0, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710655);
1311 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1312 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1313 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None);
1314 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 0);
1318 // insert 30 random hash, 25 on 5 remotes, prune 30/55
1319 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1322 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1323 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1324 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1326 monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 0, rng, preimage, hash);
1327 gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 5, 5, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710654);
1329 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1330 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1331 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None);
1332 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 25);
1336 // insert 30 random hash, 25 from local, prune 30/55
1337 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1340 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1341 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1342 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1344 monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 25, rng, preimage, hash);
1345 gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 0, 0, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710655);
1347 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1348 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1349 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None);
1350 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 25);
1354 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.