git.bitcoin.ninja Git - ldk-java/blob - src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/EcdsaChannelSigner.java

   1 package org.ldk.structs;
   2
   3 import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
   4 import org.ldk.enums.*;
   5 import org.ldk.util.*;
   6 import java.util.Arrays;
   7 import java.lang.ref.Reference;
   8 import javax.annotation.Nullable;
   9
  10 /**
  11  * A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in
  12  * [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md).
  13  *
  14  * Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet and should implement signing
  15  * policies in order to be secure. Please refer to the [VLS Policy
  16  * Controls](https://gitlab.com/lightning-signer/validating-lightning-signer/-/blob/main/docs/policy-controls.md)
  17  * for an example of such policies.
  18  */
  19 @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
  20 public class EcdsaChannelSigner extends CommonBase {
  21         final bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner bindings_instance;
  22         EcdsaChannelSigner(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); bindings_instance = null; }
  23         private EcdsaChannelSigner(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner arg, bindings.LDKChannelSigner ChannelSigner, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
  24                 super(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_new(arg, ChannelSigner, pubkeys.clone_ptr()));
  25                 this.ptrs_to.add(arg);
  26                 this.ptrs_to.add(ChannelSigner);
  27                 this.bindings_instance = arg;
  28         }
  29         @Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
  30         protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
  31                 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); } super.finalize();
  32         }
  33         /**
  34          * Destroys the object, freeing associated resources. After this call, any access
  35          * to this object may result in a SEGFAULT or worse.
  36          *
  37          * You should generally NEVER call this method. You should let the garbage collector
  38          * do this for you when it finalizes objects. However, it may be useful for types
  39          * which represent locks and should be closed immediately to avoid holding locks
  40          * until the GC runs.
  41          */
  42         public void destroy() {
  43                 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); }
  44                 ptr = 0;
  45         }
  46         public static interface EcdsaChannelSignerInterface {
  47                 /**
  48                  * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
  49                  *
  50                  * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
  51                  *
  52                  * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
  53                  * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
  54                  *
  55                  * The preimages of outbound and inbound HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment
  56                  * are provided. A validating signer should ensure that an outbound HTLC output is removed
  57                  * only when the matching preimage is provided and after the corresponding inbound HTLC has
  58                  * been removed for forwarded payments.
  59                  *
  60                  * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
  61                  * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
  62                  */
  63                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] inbound_htlc_preimages, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages);
  64                 /**
  65                  * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
  66                  *
  67                  * This will be called
  68                  * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
  69                  * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
  70                  *
  71                  * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
  72                  *
  73                  * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
  74                  *
  75                  * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
  76                  * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
  77                  * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
  78                  * monitor.
  79                  *
  80                  * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
  81                  */
  82                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
  83                 /**
  84                  * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
  85                  * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
  86                  *
  87                  * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
  88                  * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
  89                  * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
  90                  * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
  91                  *
  92                  * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
  93                  *
  94                  * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
  95                  * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
  96                  * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
  97                  * so).
  98                  *
  99                  * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
 100                  * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
 101                  * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
 102                  * monitor.
 103                  *
 104                  * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
 105                  */
 106                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key);
 107                 /**
 108                  * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
 109                  * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 110                  *
 111                  * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 112                  * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 113                  * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 114                  * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 115                  *
 116                  * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
 117                  * signature.
 118                  *
 119                  * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 120                  * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 121                  * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
 122                  * so).
 123                  *
 124                  * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
 125                  * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
 126                  *
 127                  * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
 128                  * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
 129                  * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
 130                  * monitor.
 131                  *
 132                  * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
 133                  */
 134                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
 135                 /**
 136                  * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
 137                  * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
 138                  * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
 139                  *
 140                  * Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
 141                  * [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
 142                  * broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
 143                  *
 144                  * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
 145                  * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
 146                  * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
 147                  * monitor.
 148                  *
 149                  * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType::All
 150                  * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
 151                  * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
 152                  */
 153                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor);
 154                 /**
 155                  * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
 156                  * transaction, either offered or received.
 157                  *
 158                  * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
 159                  * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
 160                  * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
 161                  * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 162                  *
 163                  * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
 164                  * outputs.
 165                  *
 166                  * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 167                  *
 168                  * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
 169                  * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
 170                  * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
 171                  * BIP 143 signature.
 172                  *
 173                  * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
 174                  * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
 175                  * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
 176                  * monitor.
 177                  *
 178                  * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
 179                  */
 180                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
 181                 /**
 182                  * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
 183                  *
 184                  * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
 185                  * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
 186                  */
 187                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx);
 188                 /**
 189                  * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
 190                  * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
 191                  *
 192                  * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
 193                  * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
 194                  * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
 195                  * monitor.
 196                  *
 197                  * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
 198                  */
 199                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input);
 200                 /**
 201                  * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
 202                  * channel participants.
 203                  *
 204                  * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
 205                  * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
 206                  *
 207                  * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
 208                  * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
 209                  * protocol.
 210                  *
 211                  * [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message
 212                  */
 213                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
 214         }
 215         private static class LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder { EcdsaChannelSigner held; }
 216         public static EcdsaChannelSigner new_impl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, ChannelSigner.ChannelSignerInterface ChannelSigner_impl, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
 217                 final LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder = new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder();
 218                 impl_holder.held = new EcdsaChannelSigner(new bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner() {
 219                         @Override public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long commitment_tx, byte[][] inbound_htlc_preimages, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages) {
 220                                 org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
 221                                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv, inbound_htlc_preimages, outbound_htlc_preimages);
 222                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 223                                 long result = ret.clone_ptr();
 224                                 return result;
 225                         }
 226                         @Override public long sign_holder_commitment(long commitment_tx) {
 227                                 org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
 228                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
 229                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 230                                 long result = ret.clone_ptr();
 231                                 return result;
 232                         }
 233                         @Override public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
 234                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key);
 235                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 236                                 long result = ret.clone_ptr();
 237                                 return result;
 238                         }
 239                         @Override public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, long htlc) {
 240                                 org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
 241                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc_hu_conv);
 242                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 243                                 long result = ret.clone_ptr();
 244                                 return result;
 245                         }
 246                         @Override public long sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long htlc_descriptor) {
 247                                 org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = null; if (htlc_descriptor < 0 || htlc_descriptor > 4096) { htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor(null, htlc_descriptor); }
 248                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor_hu_conv);
 249                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 250                                 long result = ret.clone_ptr();
 251                                 return result;
 252                         }
 253                         @Override public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, long htlc) {
 254                                 org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
 255                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc_hu_conv);
 256                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 257                                 long result = ret.clone_ptr();
 258                                 return result;
 259                         }
 260                         @Override public long sign_closing_transaction(long closing_tx) {
 261                                 org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (closing_tx < 0 || closing_tx > 4096) { closing_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction(null, closing_tx); }
 262                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx_hu_conv);
 263                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 264                                 long result = ret.clone_ptr();
 265                                 return result;
 266                         }
 267                         @Override public long sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
 268                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input);
 269                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 270                                 long result = ret.clone_ptr();
 271                                 return result;
 272                         }
 273                         @Override public long sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(long msg) {
 274                                 org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg_hu_conv = null; if (msg < 0 || msg > 4096) { msg_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, msg); }
 275                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(msg_hu_conv);
 276                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 277                                 long result = ret.clone_ptr();
 278                                 return result;
 279                         }
 280                 }, ChannelSigner.new_impl(ChannelSigner_impl, pubkeys).bindings_instance, pubkeys);
 281                 return impl_holder.held;
 282         }
 283
 284         /**
 285          * Gets the underlying ChannelSigner.
 286          */
 287         public ChannelSigner get_channel_signer() {
 288                 ChannelSigner res = new ChannelSigner(null, bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_get_ChannelSigner(this.ptr));
 289                 res.ptrs_to.add(this);
 290                 return res;
 291         }
 292
 293         /**
 294          * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
 295          *
 296          * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
 297          *
 298          * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
 299          * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
 300          *
 301          * The preimages of outbound and inbound HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment
 302          * are provided. A validating signer should ensure that an outbound HTLC output is removed
 303          * only when the matching preimage is provided and after the corresponding inbound HTLC has
 304          * been removed for forwarded payments.
 305          *
 306          * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
 307          * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
 308          */
 309         public Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] inbound_htlc_preimages, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages) {
 310                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx.ptr, inbound_htlc_preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(inbound_htlc_preimages).map(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null, outbound_htlc_preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(outbound_htlc_preimages).map(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
 311                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 312                 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
 313                 Reference.reachabilityFence(inbound_htlc_preimages);
 314                 Reference.reachabilityFence(outbound_htlc_preimages);
 315                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 316                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 317                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
 318                 return ret_hu_conv;
 319         }
 320
 321         /**
 322          * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
 323          *
 324          * This will be called
 325          * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
 326          * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
 327          *
 328          * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
 329          *
 330          * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
 331          *
 332          * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
 333          * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
 334          * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
 335          * monitor.
 336          *
 337          * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
 338          */
 339         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
 340                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx.ptr);
 341                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 342                 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
 343                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 344                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 345                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
 346                 return ret_hu_conv;
 347         }
 348
 349         /**
 350          * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
 351          * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 352          *
 353          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 354          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 355          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 356          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 357          *
 358          * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 359          *
 360          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 361          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 362          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
 363          * so).
 364          *
 365          * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
 366          * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
 367          * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
 368          * monitor.
 369          *
 370          * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
 371          */
 372         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
 373                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32));
 374                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 375                 Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
 376                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 377                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 378                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
 379                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 380                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 381                 return ret_hu_conv;
 382         }
 383
 384         /**
 385          * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
 386          * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 387          *
 388          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 389          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 390          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 391          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 392          *
 393          * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
 394          * signature.
 395          *
 396          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 397          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 398          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
 399          * so).
 400          *
 401          * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
 402          * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
 403          *
 404          * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
 405          * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
 406          * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
 407          * monitor.
 408          *
 409          * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
 410          */
 411         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
 412                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc.ptr);
 413                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 414                 Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
 415                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 416                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 417                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
 418                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
 419                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 420                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 421                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
 422                 return ret_hu_conv;
 423         }
 424
 425         /**
 426          * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
 427          * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
 428          * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
 429          *
 430          * Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
 431          * [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
 432          * broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
 433          *
 434          * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
 435          * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
 436          * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
 437          * monitor.
 438          *
 439          * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType::All
 440          * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
 441          * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
 442          */
 443         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor) {
 444                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor.ptr);
 445                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 446                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
 447                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 448                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_descriptor);
 449                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 450                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 451                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc_descriptor); };
 452                 return ret_hu_conv;
 453         }
 454
 455         /**
 456          * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
 457          * transaction, either offered or received.
 458          *
 459          * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
 460          * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
 461          * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
 462          * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 463          *
 464          * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
 465          * outputs.
 466          *
 467          * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 468          *
 469          * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
 470          * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
 471          * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
 472          * BIP 143 signature.
 473          *
 474          * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
 475          * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
 476          * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
 477          * monitor.
 478          *
 479          * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
 480          */
 481         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
 482                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc.ptr);
 483                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 484                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
 485                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 486                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 487                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
 488                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
 489                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 490                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 491                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
 492                 return ret_hu_conv;
 493         }
 494
 495         /**
 496          * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
 497          *
 498          * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
 499          * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
 500          */
 501         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
 502                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx.ptr);
 503                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 504                 Reference.reachabilityFence(closing_tx);
 505                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 506                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 507                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(closing_tx); };
 508                 return ret_hu_conv;
 509         }
 510
 511         /**
 512          * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
 513          * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
 514          *
 515          * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
 516          * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
 517          * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
 518          * monitor.
 519          *
 520          * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
 521          */
 522         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
 523                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, anchor_tx, input);
 524                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 525                 Reference.reachabilityFence(anchor_tx);
 526                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 527                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 528                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 529                 return ret_hu_conv;
 530         }
 531
 532         /**
 533          * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
 534          * channel participants.
 535          *
 536          * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
 537          * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
 538          *
 539          * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
 540          * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
 541          * protocol.
 542          *
 543          * [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message
 544          */
 545         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
 546                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(this.ptr, msg.ptr);
 547                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 548                 Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
 549                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 550                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 551                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(msg); };
 552                 return ret_hu_conv;
 553         }
 554
 555 }