1 package org.ldk.structs;
2 import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
3 import org.ldk.enums.*;
5 import java.util.Arrays;
6 import java.lang.ref.Reference;
7 import javax.annotation.Nullable;
9 public class UtilMethods {
11 * Constructs a new COption_NoneZ containing a
13 public static COption_NoneZ COption_NoneZ_some() {
14 COption_NoneZ ret = bindings.COption_NoneZ_some();
19 * Constructs a new COption_NoneZ containing nothing
21 public static COption_NoneZ COption_NoneZ_none() {
22 COption_NoneZ ret = bindings.COption_NoneZ_none();
27 * Read a ClosureReason from a byte array, created by ClosureReason_write
29 public static Result_COption_ClosureReasonZDecodeErrorZ ClosureReason_read(byte[] ser) {
30 long ret = bindings.ClosureReason_read(ser);
31 Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
32 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
33 Result_COption_ClosureReasonZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_ClosureReasonZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
38 * Read a Event from a byte array, created by Event_write
40 public static Result_COption_EventZDecodeErrorZ Event_read(byte[] ser) {
41 long ret = bindings.Event_read(ser);
42 Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
43 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
44 Result_COption_EventZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_EventZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
49 * Creates a digital signature of a message given a SecretKey, like the node's secret.
50 * A receiver knowing the PublicKey (e.g. the node's id) and the message can be sure that the signature was generated by the caller.
51 * Signatures are EC recoverable, meaning that given the message and the signature the PublicKey of the signer can be extracted.
53 public static Result_StringErrorZ sign(byte[] msg, byte[] sk) {
54 long ret = bindings.sign(msg, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(sk, 32));
55 Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
56 Reference.reachabilityFence(sk);
57 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
58 Result_StringErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_StringErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
63 * Recovers the PublicKey of the signer of the message given the message and the signature.
65 public static Result_PublicKeyErrorZ recover_pk(byte[] msg, java.lang.String sig) {
66 long ret = bindings.recover_pk(msg, sig);
67 Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
68 Reference.reachabilityFence(sig);
69 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
70 Result_PublicKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PublicKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
75 * Verifies a message was signed by a PrivateKey that derives to a given PublicKey, given a message, a signature,
78 public static boolean verify(byte[] msg, java.lang.String sig, byte[] pk) {
79 boolean ret = bindings.verify(msg, sig, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(pk, 33));
80 Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
81 Reference.reachabilityFence(sig);
82 Reference.reachabilityFence(pk);
87 * Construct the invoice's HRP and signatureless data into a preimage to be hashed.
89 public static byte[] construct_invoice_preimage(byte[] hrp_bytes, UInt5[] data_without_signature) {
90 byte[] ret = bindings.construct_invoice_preimage(hrp_bytes, data_without_signature != null ? InternalUtils.convUInt5Array(data_without_signature) : null);
91 Reference.reachabilityFence(hrp_bytes);
92 Reference.reachabilityFence(data_without_signature);
97 * Read a MonitorEvent from a byte array, created by MonitorEvent_write
99 public static Result_COption_MonitorEventZDecodeErrorZ MonitorEvent_read(byte[] ser) {
100 long ret = bindings.MonitorEvent_read(ser);
101 Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
102 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
103 Result_COption_MonitorEventZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_MonitorEventZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
108 * Read a C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ from a byte array, created by C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ_write
110 public static Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ_read(byte[] ser, KeysInterface arg) {
111 long ret = bindings.C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ_read(ser, arg == null ? 0 : arg.ptr);
112 Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
113 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
114 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
115 Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
116 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg);
121 * Read a C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ from a byte array, created by C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ_write
123 public static Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ_read(byte[] ser, KeysInterface arg_keys_manager, FeeEstimator arg_fee_estimator, Watch arg_chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface arg_tx_broadcaster, Logger arg_logger, UserConfig arg_default_config, ChannelMonitor[] arg_channel_monitors) {
124 long ret = bindings.C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ_read(ser, bindings.ChannelManagerReadArgs_new(arg_keys_manager == null ? 0 : arg_keys_manager.ptr, arg_fee_estimator == null ? 0 : arg_fee_estimator.ptr, arg_chain_monitor == null ? 0 : arg_chain_monitor.ptr, arg_tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : arg_tx_broadcaster.ptr, arg_logger == null ? 0 : arg_logger.ptr, arg_default_config == null ? 0 : arg_default_config.ptr & ~1, arg_channel_monitors != null ? Arrays.stream(arg_channel_monitors).mapToLong(arg_channel_monitors_conv_16 -> arg_channel_monitors_conv_16 == null ? 0 : arg_channel_monitors_conv_16.ptr & ~1).toArray() : null));
125 Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
126 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_keys_manager);
127 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_fee_estimator);
128 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_chain_monitor);
129 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_tx_broadcaster);
130 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_logger);
131 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_default_config);
132 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_channel_monitors);
133 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
134 Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
135 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_keys_manager);
136 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_fee_estimator);
137 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_chain_monitor);
138 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_tx_broadcaster);
139 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_logger);
141 for (ChannelMonitor arg_channel_monitors_conv_16: arg_channel_monitors) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_channel_monitors_conv_16); };
146 * Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction.
148 public static long htlc_success_tx_weight(boolean opt_anchors) {
149 long ret = bindings.htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors);
150 Reference.reachabilityFence(opt_anchors);
155 * Gets the weight for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
157 public static long htlc_timeout_tx_weight(boolean opt_anchors) {
158 long ret = bindings.htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors);
159 Reference.reachabilityFence(opt_anchors);
164 * Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
166 public static byte[] build_commitment_secret(byte[] commitment_seed, long idx) {
167 byte[] ret = bindings.build_commitment_secret(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(commitment_seed, 32), idx);
168 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_seed);
169 Reference.reachabilityFence(idx);
174 * Build a closing transaction
176 public static byte[] build_closing_transaction(long to_holder_value_sat, long to_counterparty_value_sat, byte[] to_holder_script, byte[] to_counterparty_script, OutPoint funding_outpoint) {
177 byte[] ret = bindings.build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat, to_counterparty_value_sat, to_holder_script, to_counterparty_script, funding_outpoint == null ? 0 : funding_outpoint.ptr & ~1);
178 Reference.reachabilityFence(to_holder_value_sat);
179 Reference.reachabilityFence(to_counterparty_value_sat);
180 Reference.reachabilityFence(to_holder_script);
181 Reference.reachabilityFence(to_counterparty_script);
182 Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_outpoint);
187 * Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
188 * from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
190 * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
191 * generated (ie our own).
193 public static Result_SecretKeyErrorZ derive_private_key(byte[] per_commitment_point, byte[] base_secret) {
194 long ret = bindings.derive_private_key(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(base_secret, 32));
195 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
196 Reference.reachabilityFence(base_secret);
197 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
198 Result_SecretKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SecretKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
203 * Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
204 * from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
205 * derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
207 * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
208 * generated (ie our own).
210 public static Result_PublicKeyErrorZ derive_public_key(byte[] per_commitment_point, byte[] base_point) {
211 long ret = bindings.derive_public_key(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(base_point, 33));
212 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
213 Reference.reachabilityFence(base_point);
214 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
215 Result_PublicKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PublicKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
220 * Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
222 * Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
223 * commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
224 * and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
225 * of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
227 * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
228 * generated (ie our own).
230 public static Result_SecretKeyErrorZ derive_private_revocation_key(byte[] per_commitment_secret, byte[] countersignatory_revocation_base_secret) {
231 long ret = bindings.derive_private_revocation_key(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_secret, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory_revocation_base_secret, 32));
232 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_secret);
233 Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
234 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
235 Result_SecretKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SecretKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
240 * Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
241 * the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
242 * public key instead of private keys.
244 * Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
245 * commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
246 * and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
247 * of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
249 * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
250 * generated (ie our own).
252 public static Result_PublicKeyErrorZ derive_public_revocation_key(byte[] per_commitment_point, byte[] countersignatory_revocation_base_point) {
253 long ret = bindings.derive_public_revocation_key(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory_revocation_base_point, 33));
254 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
255 Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory_revocation_base_point);
256 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
257 Result_PublicKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PublicKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
262 * A script either spendable by the revocation
263 * key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
264 * Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
266 public static byte[] get_revokeable_redeemscript(byte[] revocation_key, short contest_delay, byte[] broadcaster_delayed_payment_key) {
267 byte[] ret = bindings.get_revokeable_redeemscript(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(revocation_key, 33), contest_delay, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, 33));
268 Reference.reachabilityFence(revocation_key);
269 Reference.reachabilityFence(contest_delay);
270 Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster_delayed_payment_key);
275 * Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
276 * does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
278 public static byte[] get_htlc_redeemscript(HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc, boolean opt_anchors, TxCreationKeys keys) {
279 byte[] ret = bindings.get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr & ~1, opt_anchors, keys == null ? 0 : keys.ptr & ~1);
280 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
281 Reference.reachabilityFence(opt_anchors);
282 Reference.reachabilityFence(keys);
287 * Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
288 * Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
290 public static byte[] make_funding_redeemscript(byte[] broadcaster, byte[] countersignatory) {
291 byte[] ret = bindings.make_funding_redeemscript(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(broadcaster, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory, 33));
292 Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster);
293 Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory);
298 * Builds an unsigned HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transaction from the given channel and HTLC
299 * parameters. This is used by [`TrustedCommitmentTransaction::get_htlc_sigs`] to fetch the
300 * transaction which needs signing, and can be used to construct an HTLC transaction which is
301 * broadcastable given a counterparty HTLC signature.
303 * Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the
304 * commitment transaction).
306 public static byte[] build_htlc_transaction(byte[] commitment_txid, int feerate_per_kw, short contest_delay, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc, boolean opt_anchors, byte[] broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, byte[] revocation_key) {
307 byte[] ret = bindings.build_htlc_transaction(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(commitment_txid, 32), feerate_per_kw, contest_delay, htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr & ~1, opt_anchors, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(revocation_key, 33));
308 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_txid);
309 Reference.reachabilityFence(feerate_per_kw);
310 Reference.reachabilityFence(contest_delay);
311 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
312 Reference.reachabilityFence(opt_anchors);
313 Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster_delayed_payment_key);
314 Reference.reachabilityFence(revocation_key);
319 * Gets the witnessScript for an anchor output from the funding public key.
320 * The witness in the spending input must be:
321 * <BIP 143 funding_signature>
322 * After 16 blocks of confirmation, an alternative satisfying witness could be:
324 * (empty vector required to satisfy compliance with MINIMALIF-standard rule)
326 public static byte[] get_anchor_redeemscript(byte[] funding_pubkey) {
327 byte[] ret = bindings.get_anchor_redeemscript(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(funding_pubkey, 33));
328 Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_pubkey);
333 * Commitment transaction numbers which appear in the transactions themselves are XOR'd with a
334 * shared secret first. This prevents on-chain observers from discovering how many commitment
335 * transactions occurred in a channel before it was closed.
337 * This function gets the shared secret from relevant channel public keys and can be used to
338 * \"decrypt\" the commitment transaction number given a commitment transaction on-chain.
340 public static long get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(byte[] broadcaster_payment_basepoint, byte[] countersignatory_payment_basepoint, boolean outbound_from_broadcaster) {
341 long ret = bindings.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(broadcaster_payment_basepoint, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory_payment_basepoint, 33), outbound_from_broadcaster);
342 Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster_payment_basepoint);
343 Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory_payment_basepoint);
344 Reference.reachabilityFence(outbound_from_broadcaster);
349 * Read a NetworkUpdate from a byte array, created by NetworkUpdate_write
351 public static Result_COption_NetworkUpdateZDecodeErrorZ NetworkUpdate_read(byte[] ser) {
352 long ret = bindings.NetworkUpdate_read(ser);
353 Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
354 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
355 Result_COption_NetworkUpdateZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_NetworkUpdateZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
360 * Finds a route from us (payer) to the given target node (payee).
362 * If the payee provided features in their invoice, they should be provided via `params.payee`.
363 * Without this, MPP will only be used if the payee's features are available in the network graph.
365 * Private routing paths between a public node and the target may be included in `params.payee`.
367 * If some channels aren't announced, it may be useful to fill in `first_hops` with the results
368 * from [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]. If it is filled in, the view of our local
369 * channels from [`NetworkGraph`] will be ignored, and only those in `first_hops` will be used.
371 * The fees on channels from us to the next hop are ignored as they are assumed to all be equal.
372 * However, the enabled/disabled bit on such channels as well as the `htlc_minimum_msat` /
373 * `htlc_maximum_msat` *are* checked as they may change based on the receiving node.
377 * May be used to re-compute a [`Route`] when handling a [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`]. Any
378 * adjustments to the [`NetworkGraph`] and channel scores should be made prior to calling this
383 * Panics if first_hops contains channels without short_channel_ids;
384 * [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`] will never include such channels.
386 * [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
387 * [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentPathFailed
389 * Note that first_hops (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
391 public static Result_RouteLightningErrorZ find_route(byte[] our_node_pubkey, RouteParameters route_params, NetworkGraph network, @Nullable ChannelDetails[] first_hops, Logger logger, Score scorer) {
392 long ret = bindings.find_route(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(our_node_pubkey, 33), route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr & ~1, network == null ? 0 : network.ptr & ~1, first_hops != null ? Arrays.stream(first_hops).mapToLong(first_hops_conv_16 -> first_hops_conv_16 == null ? 0 : first_hops_conv_16.ptr & ~1).toArray() : null, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, scorer == null ? 0 : scorer.ptr);
393 Reference.reachabilityFence(our_node_pubkey);
394 Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params);
395 Reference.reachabilityFence(network);
396 Reference.reachabilityFence(first_hops);
397 Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
398 Reference.reachabilityFence(scorer);
399 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
400 Result_RouteLightningErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_RouteLightningErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
401 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(route_params);
402 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(network);
403 for (ChannelDetails first_hops_conv_16: first_hops) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(first_hops_conv_16); };
404 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger);
405 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(scorer);
410 * Writes the provided `ChannelManager` to the path provided at `FilesystemPersister`
411 * initialization, within a file called \"manager\".
413 public static Result_NoneErrorZ FilesystemPersister_persist_manager(java.lang.String data_dir, ChannelManager manager) {
414 long ret = bindings.FilesystemPersister_persist_manager(data_dir, manager == null ? 0 : manager.ptr & ~1);
415 Reference.reachabilityFence(data_dir);
416 Reference.reachabilityFence(manager);
417 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
418 Result_NoneErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
419 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(manager);
424 * Utility to create an invoice that can be paid to one of multiple nodes, or a \"phantom invoice.\"
425 * See [`PhantomKeysManager`] for more information on phantom node payments.
427 * `phantom_route_hints` parameter:
428 * Contains channel info for all nodes participating in the phantom invoice
429 * Entries are retrieved from a call to [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints`] on each
431 * It is fine to cache `phantom_route_hints` and reuse it across invoices, as long as the data is
432 * updated when a channel becomes disabled or closes
433 * Note that if too many channels are included in [`PhantomRouteHints::channels`], the invoice
434 * may be too long for QR code scanning. To fix this, `PhantomRouteHints::channels` may be pared
437 * `payment_hash` and `payment_secret` come from [`ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment`] or
438 * [`ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. These values can be retrieved from any
439 * participating node.
441 * Note that the provided `keys_manager`'s `KeysInterface` implementation must support phantom
442 * invoices in its `sign_invoice` implementation ([`PhantomKeysManager`] satisfies this
445 * [`PhantomKeysManager`]: lightning::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
446 * [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_phantom_route_hints
447 * [`PhantomRouteHints::channels`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::PhantomRouteHints::channels
449 public static Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_phantom_invoice(Option_u64Z amt_msat, java.lang.String description, byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret, PhantomRouteHints[] phantom_route_hints, KeysInterface keys_manager, org.ldk.enums.Currency network) {
450 long ret = bindings.create_phantom_invoice(amt_msat.ptr, description, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32), phantom_route_hints != null ? Arrays.stream(phantom_route_hints).mapToLong(phantom_route_hints_conv_19 -> phantom_route_hints_conv_19 == null ? 0 : phantom_route_hints_conv_19.ptr & ~1).toArray() : null, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, network);
451 Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat);
452 Reference.reachabilityFence(description);
453 Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
454 Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret);
455 Reference.reachabilityFence(phantom_route_hints);
456 Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager);
457 Reference.reachabilityFence(network);
458 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
459 Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
460 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager);
465 * Utility to construct an invoice. Generally, unless you want to do something like a custom
466 * cltv_expiry, this is what you should be using to create an invoice. The reason being, this
467 * method stores the invoice's payment secret and preimage in `ChannelManager`, so (a) the user
468 * doesn't have to store preimage/payment secret information and (b) `ChannelManager` can verify
469 * that the payment secret is valid when the invoice is paid.
471 public static Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_invoice_from_channelmanager(ChannelManager channelmanager, KeysInterface keys_manager, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, Option_u64Z amt_msat, java.lang.String description) {
472 long ret = bindings.create_invoice_from_channelmanager(channelmanager == null ? 0 : channelmanager.ptr & ~1, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, network, amt_msat.ptr, description);
473 Reference.reachabilityFence(channelmanager);
474 Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager);
475 Reference.reachabilityFence(network);
476 Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat);
477 Reference.reachabilityFence(description);
478 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
479 Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
480 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(channelmanager);
481 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager);
486 * See [`create_invoice_from_channelmanager`]
487 * This version can be used in a `no_std` environment, where [`std::time::SystemTime`] is not
488 * available and the current time is supplied by the caller.
490 public static Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(ChannelManager channelmanager, KeysInterface keys_manager, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, Option_u64Z amt_msat, java.lang.String description, long duration_since_epoch) {
491 long ret = bindings.create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(channelmanager == null ? 0 : channelmanager.ptr & ~1, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, network, amt_msat.ptr, description, duration_since_epoch);
492 Reference.reachabilityFence(channelmanager);
493 Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager);
494 Reference.reachabilityFence(network);
495 Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat);
496 Reference.reachabilityFence(description);
497 Reference.reachabilityFence(duration_since_epoch);
498 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
499 Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
500 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(channelmanager);
501 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager);