import org.ldk.enums.*;
import org.ldk.util.*;
import java.util.Arrays;
+import java.lang.ref.Reference;
+import javax.annotation.Nullable;
+
+/**
+ * Configuration we set when applicable.
+ *
+ * Default::default() provides sane defaults.
+ */
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
public class ChannelHandshakeConfig extends CommonBase {
ChannelHandshakeConfig(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); }
if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_free(ptr); }
}
- public ChannelHandshakeConfig clone() {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone(this.ptr);
- ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret);
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
+ /**
+ * Confirmations we will wait for before considering the channel locked in.
+ * Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
+ * equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
+ *
+ * Default value: 6.
+ */
public int get_minimum_depth() {
int ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_minimum_depth(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
+ /**
+ * Confirmations we will wait for before considering the channel locked in.
+ * Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
+ * equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
+ *
+ * Default value: 6.
+ */
public void set_minimum_depth(int val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_minimum_depth(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
+ /**
+ * Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
+ * the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
+ * transaction).
+ *
+ * This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
+ * be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay
+ * blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction,
+ * possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction).
+ *
+ * Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
+ * case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
+ * our channel.
+ *
+ * Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
+ * can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
+ */
public short get_our_to_self_delay() {
short ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_to_self_delay(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
+ /**
+ * Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
+ * the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
+ * transaction).
+ *
+ * This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
+ * be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay
+ * blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction,
+ * possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction).
+ *
+ * Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
+ * case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
+ * our channel.
+ *
+ * Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
+ * can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
+ */
public void set_our_to_self_delay(short val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_to_self_delay(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
+ /**
+ * Set to the smallest value HTLC we will accept to process.
+ *
+ * This value is sent to our counterparty on channel-open and we close the channel any time
+ * our counterparty misbehaves by sending us an HTLC with a value smaller than this.
+ *
+ * Default value: 1. If the value is less than 1, it is ignored and set to 1, as is required
+ * by the protocol.
+ */
public long get_our_htlc_minimum_msat() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
+ /**
+ * Set to the smallest value HTLC we will accept to process.
+ *
+ * This value is sent to our counterparty on channel-open and we close the channel any time
+ * our counterparty misbehaves by sending us an HTLC with a value smaller than this.
+ *
+ * Default value: 1. If the value is less than 1, it is ignored and set to 1, as is required
+ * by the protocol.
+ */
public void set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(long val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
- public static ChannelHandshakeConfig constructor_new(int minimum_depth_arg, short our_to_self_delay_arg, long our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(minimum_depth_arg, our_to_self_delay_arg, our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg);
- ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret);
+ /**
+ * If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
+ * BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
+ * our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
+ * relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
+ *
+ * If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+ * prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+ * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`].
+ *
+ * Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+ * counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
+ * private channel without that option.
+ *
+ * Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
+ * [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and
+ * [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
+ *
+ * Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+ * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+ */
+ public boolean get_negotiate_scid_privacy() {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_scid_privacy(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
+ * BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
+ * our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
+ * relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
+ *
+ * If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+ * prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+ * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`].
+ *
+ * Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+ * counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
+ * private channel without that option.
+ *
+ * Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
+ * [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and
+ * [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
+ *
+ * Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+ * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+ */
+ public void set_negotiate_scid_privacy(boolean val) {
+ bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_scid_privacy(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Constructs a new ChannelHandshakeConfig given each field
+ */
+ public static ChannelHandshakeConfig of(int minimum_depth_arg, short our_to_self_delay_arg, long our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, boolean negotiate_scid_privacy_arg) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(minimum_depth_arg, our_to_self_delay_arg, our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, negotiate_scid_privacy_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(minimum_depth_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(our_to_self_delay_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(negotiate_scid_privacy_arg);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
+ ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ long clone_ptr() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone_ptr(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Creates a copy of the ChannelHandshakeConfig
+ */
+ public ChannelHandshakeConfig clone() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
+ ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
- public static ChannelHandshakeConfig constructor_default() {
+ /**
+ * Creates a "default" ChannelHandshakeConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
+ */
+ public static ChannelHandshakeConfig with_default() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_default();
- ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
+ ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
return ret_hu_conv;
}