+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
+ *
+ * The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
+ * and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
+ * the channel.
+ *
+ * The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
+ * with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
+ *
+ * Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
+ * for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
+ * used to accept such channels.
+ *
+ * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, org.ldk.util.UInt128 user_channel_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), user_channel_id.getLEBytes());
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
+ * it as confirmed immediately.
+ *
+ * The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
+ * with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
+ *
+ * Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
+ * and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
+ *
+ * This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
+ * transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
+ *
+ * If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
+ * does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
+ *
+ * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, org.ldk.util.UInt128 user_channel_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), user_channel_id.getLEBytes());
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
+ * enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
+ * [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
+ *
+ * Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
+ * the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
+ * The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
+ * - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
+ * [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
+ * - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
+ * - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
+ *
+ * If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
+ * [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
+ *
+ * # Payment
+ *
+ * The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
+ * when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
+ * been sent.
+ *
+ * To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
+ * invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
+ * payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
+ *
+ * # Privacy
+ *
+ * Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
+ * as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
+ * node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
+ * in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
+ *
+ * # Limitations
+ *
+ * Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
+ * [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
+ * [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
+ *
+ * # Errors
+ *
+ * Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
+ * or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
+ *
+ * [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
+ * [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
+ * [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
+ * [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
+ * [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
+ * [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
+ * [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
+ */
+ public Result_NoneBolt12SemanticErrorZ pay_for_offer(org.ldk.structs.Offer offer, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z quantity, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z amount_msats, org.ldk.structs.Option_StrZ payer_note, byte[] payment_id, org.ldk.structs.Retry retry_strategy, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z max_total_routing_fee_msat) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_pay_for_offer(this.ptr, offer == null ? 0 : offer.ptr, quantity.ptr, amount_msats.ptr, payer_note.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32), retry_strategy.ptr, max_total_routing_fee_msat.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(offer);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(quantity);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(amount_msats);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payer_note);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(retry_strategy);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(max_total_routing_fee_msat);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneBolt12SemanticErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneBolt12SemanticErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(offer); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(quantity); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(amount_msats); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(payer_note); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(retry_strategy); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(max_total_routing_fee_msat); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
+ * message.
+ *
+ * The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
+ * [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
+ * [`PaymentPreimage`].
+ *
+ * # Limitations
+ *
+ * Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
+ * [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
+ * node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
+ * received and no retries will be made.
+ *
+ * [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
+ */
+ public Result_NoneBolt12SemanticErrorZ request_refund_payment(org.ldk.structs.Refund refund) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_request_refund_payment(this.ptr, refund == null ? 0 : refund.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(refund);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneBolt12SemanticErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneBolt12SemanticErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(refund); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
+ * to pay us.
+ *
+ * This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
+ * [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
+ *
+ * The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
+ * will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
+ * its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
+ * passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
+ *
+ * See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
+ *
+ * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+ * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+ *
+ * # Note
+ *
+ * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+ * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+ *
+ * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+ *
+ * If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
+ * on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
+ *
+ * [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
+ * [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
+ * [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
+ * [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
+ * [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
+ * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ */
+ public Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZNoneZ create_inbound_payment(org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(min_value_msat); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
+ * stored external to LDK.
+ *
+ * A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
+ * payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
+ * the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
+ *
+ * The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
+ * note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
+ * payments.
+ *
+ * `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
+ * received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
+ * before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
+ * sender \"proof-of-payment\" unless they have paid the required amount.
+ *
+ * `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
+ * in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
+ * After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
+ * pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
+ * invoices when no timeout is set.
+ *
+ * Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
+ * to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
+ * accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
+ * If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
+ * [`PaymentClaimable`].
+ *
+ * Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
+ * set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
+ *
+ * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+ * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+ *
+ * # Note
+ *
+ * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+ * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+ *
+ * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+ *
+ * If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
+ * on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
+ *
+ * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ * [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
+ */
+ public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesNoneZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash(byte[] payment_hash, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, min_final_cltv_expiry.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(min_final_cltv_expiry);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_ThirtyTwoBytesNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(min_value_msat); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(min_final_cltv_expiry); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
+ * previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
+ *
+ * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ */
+ public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ get_payment_preimage(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_payment_preimage(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
+ * are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
+ *
+ * [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
+ */
+ public long get_phantom_scid() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_scid(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
+ *
+ * [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
+ */
+ public PhantomRouteHints get_phantom_route_hints() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_route_hints(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.PhantomRouteHints ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.PhantomRouteHints(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
+ * used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
+ * [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
+ *
+ * Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
+ * times to get a unique scid.
+ */
+ public long get_intercept_scid() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_intercept_scid(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);