+ /**
+ * Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
+ * generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
+ * the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
+ * would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
+ * never reach the recipient.
+ *
+ * See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
+ * and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
+ *
+ * Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
+ * [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
+ *
+ * [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
+ */
+ public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment(org.ldk.structs.Route route, org.ldk.structs.Option_ThirtyTwoBytesZ payment_preimage, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, payment_preimage.ptr, recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(recipient_onion);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(payment_preimage); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(recipient_onion); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
+ * based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
+ *
+ * See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
+ * payments.
+ *
+ * [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
+ */
+ public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(org.ldk.structs.Option_ThirtyTwoBytesZ payment_preimage, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id, org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.Retry retry_strategy) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(this.ptr, payment_preimage.ptr, recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32), route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, retry_strategy.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(recipient_onion);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(retry_strategy);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(payment_preimage); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(recipient_onion); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route_params); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(retry_strategy); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
+ * [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
+ * us to easily discern them from real payments.
+ */
+ public Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ send_probe(org.ldk.structs.Path path) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_probe(this.ptr, path == null ? 0 : path.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(path);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(path); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
+ * amount to the given `node_id`.
+ *
+ * See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
+ */
+ public Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(byte[] node_id, long amount_msat, int final_cltv_expiry_delta, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z liquidity_limit_multiplier) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(node_id, 33), amount_msat, final_cltv_expiry_delta, liquidity_limit_multiplier.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(amount_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(final_cltv_expiry_delta);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(liquidity_limit_multiplier);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(liquidity_limit_multiplier); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
+ * according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
+ *
+ * This may be used to send \"pre-flight\" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
+ * the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
+ * probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
+ * confirmation in a wallet UI.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
+ * actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
+ * liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
+ * payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
+ * amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
+ * probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
+ */
+ public Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ send_preflight_probes(org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z liquidity_limit_multiplier) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_preflight_probes(this.ptr, route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, liquidity_limit_multiplier.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(liquidity_limit_multiplier);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route_params); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(liquidity_limit_multiplier); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
+ *
+ * Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
+ * or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
+ *
+ * Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
+ * across the p2p network.
+ *
+ * Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
+ * for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
+ *
+ * May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
+ * channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
+ * keys per-channel).
+ *
+ * Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
+ * counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
+ * [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
+ *
+ * Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
+ * not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
+ * create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
+ *
+ * Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
+ * the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
+ * implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[] funding_transaction) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), funding_transaction);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_transaction);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
+ *
+ * Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
+ * each individual channel and transaction output.
+ *
+ * Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
+ * will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
+ * signature for each channel.
+ *
+ * If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ batch_funding_transaction_generated(TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesPublicKeyZ[] temporary_channels, byte[] funding_transaction) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_batch_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, temporary_channels != null ? Arrays.stream(temporary_channels).mapToLong(temporary_channels_conv_35 -> temporary_channels_conv_35 != null ? temporary_channels_conv_35.ptr : 0).toArray() : null, funding_transaction);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channels);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_transaction);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
+ *
+ * Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
+ * ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
+ * or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
+ * containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
+ *
+ * Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
+ * `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
+ *
+ * Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
+ * below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
+ *
+ * If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
+ *
+ * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
+ * [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
+ * [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
+ * [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
+ * [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
+ * [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
+ * [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ update_partial_channel_config(byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[][] channel_ids, org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfigUpdate config_update) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_update_partial_channel_config(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), channel_ids != null ? Arrays.stream(channel_ids).map(channel_ids_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_ids_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null, config_update == null ? 0 : config_update.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_ids);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(config_update);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(config_update); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
+ *
+ * Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
+ * ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
+ * or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
+ * containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
+ *
+ * Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
+ * `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
+ *
+ * Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
+ * below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
+ *
+ * If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
+ *
+ * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
+ * [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
+ * [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
+ * [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
+ * [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
+ * [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
+ * [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ update_channel_config(byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[][] channel_ids, org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig config) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_update_channel_config(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), channel_ids != null ? Arrays.stream(channel_ids).map(channel_ids_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_ids_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_ids);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(config);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(config); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
+ * amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
+ *
+ * Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
+ * channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
+ *
+ * To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
+ * [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
+ * receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
+ * [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
+ * [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
+ *
+ * Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
+ * you from forwarding more than you received. See
+ * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
+ * than expected.
+ *
+ * Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
+ * backwards.
+ *
+ * [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
+ * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+ * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ forward_intercepted_htlc(byte[] intercept_id, byte[] next_hop_channel_id, byte[] next_node_id, long amt_to_forward_msat) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_forward_intercepted_htlc(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(intercept_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(next_hop_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(next_node_id, 33), amt_to_forward_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(intercept_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(next_hop_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(next_node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_to_forward_msat);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
+ * an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
+ *
+ * Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
+ * backwards.
+ *
+ * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ fail_intercepted_htlc(byte[] intercept_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_intercepted_htlc(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(intercept_id, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(intercept_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
+ *
+ * Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
+ * Will likely generate further events.
+ */