+ super.finalize();
+ if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelManager_free(ptr); }
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
+ *
+ * The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
+ *
+ * This is the main \"logic hub\" for all channel-related actions, and implements
+ * [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
+ *
+ * Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
+ *
+ * Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
+ * disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
+ * from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
+ * more details.
+ *
+ * [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
+ * [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
+ * [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
+ */
+ public static ChannelManager of(org.ldk.structs.FeeEstimator fee_est, org.ldk.structs.Watch chain_monitor, org.ldk.structs.BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, org.ldk.structs.Router router, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, org.ldk.structs.EntropySource entropy_source, org.ldk.structs.NodeSigner node_signer, org.ldk.structs.SignerProvider signer_provider, org.ldk.structs.UserConfig config, org.ldk.structs.ChainParameters params, int current_timestamp) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster.ptr, router.ptr, logger.ptr, entropy_source.ptr, node_signer.ptr, signer_provider.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr, params == null ? 0 : params.ptr, current_timestamp);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_est);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(chain_monitor);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(tx_broadcaster);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(router);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(entropy_source);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(node_signer);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(signer_provider);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(config);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(params);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(current_timestamp);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(fee_est); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(chain_monitor); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(tx_broadcaster); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(router); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(entropy_source); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(node_signer); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(signer_provider); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(config); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(params); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
+ */
+ public UserConfig get_current_default_configuration() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_current_default_configuration(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.UserConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UserConfig(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
+ *
+ * `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
+ * correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
+ * randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
+ * is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
+ *
+ * Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
+ * greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
+ *
+ * Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
+ * generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
+ * [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
+ *
+ * Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
+ * connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
+ * the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
+ *
+ * Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
+ * [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
+ * [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
+ * one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
+ * immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
+ *
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
+ *
+ * Note that override_config (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
+ */
+ public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, org.ldk.util.UInt128 user_channel_id, @Nullable org.ldk.structs.UserConfig override_config) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(their_network_key, 33), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id.getLEBytes(), override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(their_network_key);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_value_satoshis);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(push_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(override_config);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(override_config); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
+ * more information.
+ */
+ public ChannelDetails[] list_channels() {
+ long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
+ ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
+ for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
+ long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
+ org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
+ if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
+ }
+ return ret_conv_16_arr;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
+ * [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
+ *
+ * These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
+ * documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
+ * are.
+ */
+ public ChannelDetails[] list_usable_channels() {
+ long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_usable_channels(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
+ ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
+ for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
+ long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
+ org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
+ if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
+ }
+ return ret_conv_16_arr;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
+ */
+ public ChannelDetails[] list_channels_with_counterparty(byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
+ long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels_with_counterparty(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
+ ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
+ for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
+ long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
+ org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
+ if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
+ }
+ return ret_conv_16_arr;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
+ * successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
+ *
+ * This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
+ * result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
+ * [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
+ *
+ * [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
+ */
+ public RecentPaymentDetails[] list_recent_payments() {
+ long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_recent_payments(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ int ret_conv_22_len = ret.length;
+ RecentPaymentDetails[] ret_conv_22_arr = new RecentPaymentDetails[ret_conv_22_len];
+ for (int w = 0; w < ret_conv_22_len; w++) {
+ long ret_conv_22 = ret[w];
+ org.ldk.structs.RecentPaymentDetails ret_conv_22_hu_conv = org.ldk.structs.RecentPaymentDetails.constr_from_ptr(ret_conv_22);
+ if (ret_conv_22_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_22_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_22_arr[w] = ret_conv_22_hu_conv;
+ }
+ return ret_conv_22_arr;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
+ * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
+ * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
+ *
+ * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
+ * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
+ * estimate.
+ * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
+ * transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
+ * would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
+ * counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
+ *
+ * May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ *
+ * Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
+ * generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
+ * [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
+ * channel.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
+ * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+ * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ * [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
+ * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
+ * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
+ *
+ * `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
+ * the channel being closed or not:
+ * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
+ * transaction. The upper-bound is set by
+ * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
+ * estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
+ * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
+ * transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
+ * will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
+ *
+ * The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
+ * Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
+ * ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
+ * also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
+ *
+ * May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ *
+ * Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
+ * generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
+ * [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
+ * channel.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
+ * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+ * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ * [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
+ *
+ * Note that shutdown_script (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, org.ldk.structs.Option_u32Z target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, @Nullable org.ldk.structs.ShutdownScript shutdown_script) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight.ptr, shutdown_script == null ? 0 : shutdown_script.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(shutdown_script);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(shutdown_script); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
+ * rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
+ * the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
+ * channel.
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
+ * the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
+ * `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
+ *
+ * You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
+ * [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
+ * for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
+ */
+ public void force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn() {
+ bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
+ * local transaction(s).
+ */
+ public void force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn() {
+ bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Sends a payment along a given route.
+ *
+ * Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
+ * fields for more info.
+ *
+ * May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
+ * [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
+ *
+ * # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
+ *
+ * If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
+ * method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
+ * is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
+ * [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
+ * second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
+ *
+ * Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
+ * tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
+ * should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
+ * consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
+ * [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
+ *
+ * Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
+ * before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
+ * using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
+ * [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
+ *
+ * # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
+ *
+ * Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
+ * each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
+ * [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
+ *
+ * In general, a path may raise:
+ * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
+ * node public key) is specified.
+ * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
+ * closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
+ * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
+ * relevant updates.
+ *
+ * Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
+ * irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
+ * different route unless you intend to pay twice!
+ *
+ * [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
+ * [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
+ * [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
+ * [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
+ * [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
+ * [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
+ */
+ public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ send_payment_with_route(org.ldk.structs.Route route, byte[] payment_hash, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment_with_route(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(recipient_onion);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(recipient_onion); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
+ * `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
+ */
+ public Result_NoneRetryableSendFailureZ send_payment(byte[] payment_hash, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id, org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.Retry retry_strategy) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32), route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, retry_strategy.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(recipient_onion);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(retry_strategy);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneRetryableSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneRetryableSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(recipient_onion); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route_params); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(retry_strategy); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
+ * pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
+ * retries are exhausted.
+ *
+ * # Event Generation
+ *
+ * If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
+ * as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
+ *
+ * Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
+ * wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
+ * determine the ultimate status of a payment.
+ *
+ * # Restart Behavior
+ *
+ * If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
+ * [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
+ */
+ public void abandon_payment(byte[] payment_id) {
+ bindings.ChannelManager_abandon_payment(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
+ * generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
+ * the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
+ * would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
+ * never reach the recipient.
+ *
+ * See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
+ * and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
+ *
+ * Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
+ * [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
+ *
+ * [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
+ */
+ public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment(org.ldk.structs.Route route, org.ldk.structs.Option_ThirtyTwoBytesZ payment_preimage, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, payment_preimage.ptr, recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(recipient_onion);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(payment_preimage); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(recipient_onion); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
+ * based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
+ *
+ * See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
+ * payments.
+ *
+ * [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
+ */
+ public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(org.ldk.structs.Option_ThirtyTwoBytesZ payment_preimage, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id, org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.Retry retry_strategy) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(this.ptr, payment_preimage.ptr, recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32), route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, retry_strategy.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(recipient_onion);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(retry_strategy);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(payment_preimage); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(recipient_onion); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route_params); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(retry_strategy); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
+ * [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
+ * us to easily discern them from real payments.
+ */
+ public Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ send_probe(org.ldk.structs.Path path) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_probe(this.ptr, path == null ? 0 : path.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(path);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(path); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
+ * amount to the given `node_id`.
+ *
+ * See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
+ */
+ public Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(byte[] node_id, long amount_msat, int final_cltv_expiry_delta, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z liquidity_limit_multiplier) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(node_id, 33), amount_msat, final_cltv_expiry_delta, liquidity_limit_multiplier.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(amount_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(final_cltv_expiry_delta);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(liquidity_limit_multiplier);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(liquidity_limit_multiplier); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
+ * according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
+ *
+ * This may be used to send \"pre-flight\" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
+ * the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
+ * probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
+ * confirmation in a wallet UI.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
+ * actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
+ * liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
+ * payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
+ * amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
+ * probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
+ */
+ public Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ send_preflight_probes(org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z liquidity_limit_multiplier) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_preflight_probes(this.ptr, route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, liquidity_limit_multiplier.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(liquidity_limit_multiplier);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route_params); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(liquidity_limit_multiplier); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
+ *
+ * Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
+ * or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
+ *
+ * Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
+ * across the p2p network.
+ *
+ * Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
+ * for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
+ *
+ * May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
+ * channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
+ * keys per-channel).
+ *
+ * Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
+ * counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
+ * [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
+ *
+ * Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
+ * not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
+ * create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
+ *
+ * Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
+ * the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
+ * implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[] funding_transaction) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), funding_transaction);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_transaction);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;