+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ int ret_conv_14_len = ret.length;
+ MonitorEvent[] ret_conv_14_arr = new MonitorEvent[ret_conv_14_len];
+ for (int o = 0; o < ret_conv_14_len; o++) {
+ long ret_conv_14 = ret[o];
+ org.ldk.structs.MonitorEvent ret_conv_14_hu_conv = org.ldk.structs.MonitorEvent.constr_from_ptr(ret_conv_14);
+ if (ret_conv_14_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_14_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_14_arr[o] = ret_conv_14_hu_conv;
+ }
+ return ret_conv_14_arr;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
+ *
+ * For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
+ * events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
+ * within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
+ * safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
+ * environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
+ *
+ * An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
+ * order to handle these events.
+ *
+ * [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::events::Event::SpendableOutputs
+ * [`BumpTransaction`]: crate::events::Event::BumpTransaction
+ */
+ public void process_pending_events(org.ldk.structs.EventHandler handler) {
+ bindings.ChannelMonitor_process_pending_events(this.ptr, handler.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(handler);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(handler); };
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment
+ * transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of
+ * the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for
+ * watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions.
+ *
+ * This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except
+ * that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update.
+ *
+ * This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading
+ * to LDK 0.0.117+.
+ *
+ * [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel
+ *
+ * Note that the return value (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
+ */
+ @Nullable
+ public CommitmentTransaction initial_counterparty_commitment_tx() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This
+ * may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned
+ * commitment transactions are unsigned.
+ *
+ * This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build
+ * justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be
+ * used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided
+ * with a monitor and an update. Once revoked, signing a justice transaction can be done using
+ * [`Self::sign_to_local_justice_tx`].
+ *
+ * It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty
+ * commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which
+ * the monitor has been updated with the corresponding revocation data, at which point the
+ * monitor can sign the justice transaction.
+ *
+ * This will only return a non-empty list for monitor updates that have been created after
+ * upgrading to LDK 0.0.117+. Note that no restriction lies on the monitors themselves, which
+ * may have been created prior to upgrading.
+ *
+ * [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::update_persisted_channel
+ */
+ public CommitmentTransaction[] counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(org.ldk.structs.ChannelMonitorUpdate update) {
+ long[] ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(this.ptr, update == null ? 0 : update.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(update);
+ int ret_conv_23_len = ret.length;
+ CommitmentTransaction[] ret_conv_23_arr = new CommitmentTransaction[ret_conv_23_len];
+ for (int x = 0; x < ret_conv_23_len; x++) {
+ long ret_conv_23 = ret[x];
+ org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction ret_conv_23_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_23 < 0 || ret_conv_23 > 4096) { ret_conv_23_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, ret_conv_23); }
+ if (ret_conv_23_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_23_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_23_arr[x] = ret_conv_23_hu_conv;
+ }
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(update); };
+ return ret_conv_23_arr;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Wrapper around [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`] to make
+ * signing the justice transaction easier for implementors of
+ * [`chain::chainmonitor::Persist`]. On success this method returns the provided transaction
+ * signing the input at `input_idx`. This method will only produce a valid signature for
+ * a transaction spending the `to_local` output of a commitment transaction, i.e. this cannot
+ * be used for revoked HTLC outputs.
+ *
+ * `Value` is the value of the output being spent by the input at `input_idx`, committed
+ * in the BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * This method will only succeed if this monitor has received the revocation secret for the
+ * provided `commitment_number`. If a commitment number is provided that does not correspond
+ * to the commitment transaction being revoked, this will return a signed transaction, but
+ * the signature will not be valid.
+ *
+ * [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`]: crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output
+ * [`Persist`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist
+ */
+ public Result_TransactionNoneZ sign_to_local_justice_tx(byte[] justice_tx, long input_idx, long value, long commitment_number) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_sign_to_local_justice_tx(this.ptr, justice_tx, input_idx, value, commitment_number);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(input_idx);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(value);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_number);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_TransactionNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_TransactionNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
+ *
+ * Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
+ * otherwise.
+ *
+ * Note that the return value (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
+ */
+ @Nullable
+ public byte[] get_counterparty_node_id() {
+ byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_get_counterparty_node_id(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Used by [`ChannelManager`] deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy
+ * of the channel state was out-of-date.
+ *
+ * You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
+ * a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our
+ * counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
+ *
+ * Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
+ * side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
+ * close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
+ * may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
+ * to you.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+ */
+ public byte[][] get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(org.ldk.structs.Logger logger) {
+ byte[][] ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(this.ptr, logger.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(logger); };
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
+ * - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
+ * - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
+ * - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
+ * - detect settled outputs for later spending
+ * - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
+ *
+ * Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
+ * [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
+ *
+ * [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
+ */
+ public TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] block_connected(byte[] header, TwoTuple_usizeTransactionZ[] txdata, int height, org.ldk.structs.BroadcasterInterface broadcaster, org.ldk.structs.FeeEstimator fee_estimator, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger) {
+ long[] ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_block_connected(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(header, 80), txdata != null ? Arrays.stream(txdata).mapToLong(txdata_conv_28 -> txdata_conv_28 != null ? txdata_conv_28.ptr : 0).toArray() : null, height, broadcaster.ptr, fee_estimator.ptr, logger.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(header);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(txdata);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(height);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_estimator);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
+ int ret_conv_49_len = ret.length;
+ TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] ret_conv_49_arr = new TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[ret_conv_49_len];
+ for (int x = 0; x < ret_conv_49_len; x++) {
+ long ret_conv_49 = ret[x];
+ TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ ret_conv_49_hu_conv = new TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ(null, ret_conv_49);
+ if (ret_conv_49_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_49_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_49_arr[x] = ret_conv_49_hu_conv;
+ }
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(broadcaster); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(fee_estimator); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(logger); };
+ return ret_conv_49_arr;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
+ * appropriately.
+ */
+ public void block_disconnected(byte[] header, int height, org.ldk.structs.BroadcasterInterface broadcaster, org.ldk.structs.FeeEstimator fee_estimator, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger) {
+ bindings.ChannelMonitor_block_disconnected(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(header, 80), height, broadcaster.ptr, fee_estimator.ptr, logger.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(header);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(height);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_estimator);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(broadcaster); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(fee_estimator); };
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(logger); };
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
+ * outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
+ *
+ * Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
+ * blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
+ *
+ * [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
+ */
+ public TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] transactions_confirmed(byte[] header, TwoTuple_usizeTransactionZ[] txdata, int height, org.ldk.structs.BroadcasterInterface broadcaster, org.ldk.structs.FeeEstimator fee_estimator, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger) {
+ long[] ret = bindings.ChannelMonitor_transactions_confirmed(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(header, 80), txdata != null ? Arrays.stream(txdata).mapToLong(txdata_conv_28 -> txdata_conv_28 != null ? txdata_conv_28.ptr : 0).toArray() : null, height, broadcaster.ptr, fee_estimator.ptr, logger.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(header);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(txdata);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(height);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_estimator);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
+ int ret_conv_49_len = ret.length;
+ TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[] ret_conv_49_arr = new TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ[ret_conv_49_len];
+ for (int x = 0; x < ret_conv_49_len; x++) {
+ long ret_conv_49 = ret[x];
+ TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ ret_conv_49_hu_conv = new TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesCVec_C2Tuple_u32TxOutZZZ(null, ret_conv_49);
+ if (ret_conv_49_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_49_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ ret_conv_49_arr[x] = ret_conv_49_hu_conv;