+ /**
+ * Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
+ * to decode.
+ *
+ * This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
+ */
+ public void set_excess_data(byte[] val) {
+ bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_excess_data(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Constructs a new UnsignedChannelUpdate given each field
+ */
+ public static UnsignedChannelUpdate of(byte[] chain_hash_arg, long short_channel_id_arg, int timestamp_arg, byte flags_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, long htlc_minimum_msat_arg, long htlc_maximum_msat_arg, int fee_base_msat_arg, int fee_proportional_millionths_arg, byte[] excess_data_arg) {
+ long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_new(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(chain_hash_arg, 32), short_channel_id_arg, timestamp_arg, flags_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, htlc_minimum_msat_arg, htlc_maximum_msat_arg, fee_base_msat_arg, fee_proportional_millionths_arg, excess_data_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(chain_hash_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(short_channel_id_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(timestamp_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(flags_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(cltv_expiry_delta_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_minimum_msat_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_maximum_msat_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_base_msat_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_proportional_millionths_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(excess_data_arg);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ long clone_ptr() {
+ long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_clone_ptr(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Creates a copy of the UnsignedChannelUpdate
+ */
+ public UnsignedChannelUpdate clone() {
+ long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_clone(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Generates a non-cryptographic 64-bit hash of the UnsignedChannelUpdate.
+ */
+ public long hash() {
+ long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_hash(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ @Override public int hashCode() {
+ return (int)this.hash();
+ }
+ /**
+ * Checks if two UnsignedChannelUpdates contain equal inner contents.
+ * This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields.
+ * Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here.
+ */
+ public boolean eq(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate b) {
+ boolean ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_eq(this.ptr, b == null ? 0 : b.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(b);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(b); };
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ @Override public boolean equals(Object o) {
+ if (!(o instanceof UnsignedChannelUpdate)) return false;
+ return this.eq((UnsignedChannelUpdate)o);
+ }
+ /**
+ * Serialize the UnsignedChannelUpdate object into a byte array which can be read by UnsignedChannelUpdate_read
+ */
+ public byte[] write() {
+ byte[] ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_write(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;