use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
-use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript};
+use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys};
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
local_keys: ChanSigner,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) local_keys: ChanSigner,
shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
// Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
//implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
minimum_depth: u32,
- their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
+
their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
- channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
+ channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
network_sync: UpdateStatus,
/// it's 2^24.
pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 138; //Here we have a diff due to HTLC CLTV expiry being < 2^15 in test
-#[cfg(not(test))]
-pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 139;
-pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
-
/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
/// channel_id in ChannelManager.
-pub(super) enum ChannelError {
+pub(super) enum ChannelError<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
Ignore(&'static str),
Close(&'static str),
CloseDelayBroadcast {
msg: &'static str,
- update: Option<ChannelMonitor>
+ update: Option<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
},
}
-impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> fmt::Debug for ChannelError<ChanSigner> {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
match self {
&ChannelError::Ignore(e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
// Constructors:
pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError> {
- let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);
+ let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(chan_keys.funding_key(), chan_keys.revocation_base_key(), chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key(),
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(chan_keys.clone(),
+ chan_keys.funding_key(), chan_keys.revocation_base_key(), chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key(),
chan_keys.htlc_base_key(), chan_keys.payment_base_key(), &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
- their_funding_pubkey: None,
- their_revocation_basepoint: None,
- their_payment_basepoint: None,
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
- their_htlc_basepoint: None,
+ their_pubkeys: None,
their_cur_commitment_point: None,
their_prev_commitment_point: None,
})
}
- fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
}
/// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
/// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
- pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError> {
- let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
- chan_keys.set_remote_funding_pubkey(&msg.funding_pubkey);
+ pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
+ let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
+ let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
+ funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
+ };
+ chan_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
}
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(chan_keys.funding_key(), chan_keys.revocation_base_key(), chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key(),
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(chan_keys.clone(),
+ chan_keys.funding_key(), chan_keys.revocation_base_key(), chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key(),
chan_keys.htlc_base_key(), chan_keys.payment_base_key(), &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
- their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
- their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
- their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
- their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
+ their_pubkeys: Some(their_pubkeys),
their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
their_prev_commitment_point: None,
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key());
+ let their_payment_basepoint = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_basepoint.serialize();
if self.channel_outbound {
sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
- sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
+ sha.input(their_payment_basepoint);
} else {
- sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
+ sha.input(their_payment_basepoint);
sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
}
let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
/// our counterparty!)
/// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
/// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
- fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
+ fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key());
let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
+ let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
- Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
+ Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
}
#[inline]
/// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
/// will sign and send to our counterparty.
/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
- fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
+ fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
//TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
//may see payments to it!
let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key());
let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key());
let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
+ let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
- Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
+ Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
}
/// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
/// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key());
- let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.expect("get_funding_redeemscript only allowed after accept_channel");
- make_funding_redeemscript(&our_funding_key, &their_funding_key)
+ make_funding_redeemscript(&our_funding_key, self.their_funding_pubkey())
}
/// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
/// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
/// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
/// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
- fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
+ fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
// Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
// caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
// incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
}), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
}
- pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
(Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
/// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
/// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
/// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
- pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
}
// Message handlers:
- pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
// Check sanity of message fields:
if !self.channel_outbound {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
- self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
- self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
- self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
- self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
- self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
+
+ let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
+ funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
+ };
+
+ self.local_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
+ self.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
+
self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
self.channel_monitor.set_basic_channel_info(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint, msg.to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, obscure_factor);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
- self.local_keys.set_remote_funding_pubkey(&msg.funding_pubkey);
Ok(())
}
- fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, LocalCommitmentTransaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError> {
+ fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, LocalCommitmentTransaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
// They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
- let localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, sig, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), self.their_funding_pubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
+ let localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, sig, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), self.their_funding_pubkey());
let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
- let remote_signature = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let remote_signature = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0;
// We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, localtx, remote_signature, local_keys))
}
- pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ fn their_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
+ &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("their_funding_pubkey() only allowed after accept_channel").funding_pubkey
+ }
+
+ pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if self.channel_outbound {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
}
/// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
/// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
- pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if !self.channel_outbound {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
}
let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
+
// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(
- LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), self.their_funding_pubkey.as_ref().unwrap()),
+ LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), their_funding_pubkey),
local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32));
self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
}
}
- pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
}
cmp::min(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
}
- pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
}
/// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
#[inline]
- fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
+ fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
match check_preimage {
Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
}
- pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
}
self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
}
- pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
}
Ok(())
}
- pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
}
Ok(())
}
- pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state"));
}
};
let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
+ log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
//If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
if update_fee {
}
}
+ let their_funding_pubkey = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(
- LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), self.their_funding_pubkey.as_ref().unwrap()),
+ LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), &their_funding_pubkey),
local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
/// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
/// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
- fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+ fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>)>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
log_trace!(self, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
/// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
/// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
/// revoke_and_ack message.
- pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
}
self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
.map_err(|e| ChannelError::Close(e.0))?;
+ if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
+ // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
+ // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
+ // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
+ // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
+ // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
+ // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
+ // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack"));
+ }
+
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
// (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
// OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
})
}
- pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>)>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
Some(update_fee) => {
let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
(raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
}
- pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if self.channel_outbound {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
}
/// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
/// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
- pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
// While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
// almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
}
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
self.channel_monitor.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(data_loss.my_current_per_commitment_point);
- return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting", update: Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())
- });
+ return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting", update: Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())});
}
},
OptionalField::Absent => {}
let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
let our_sig = self.local_keys
- .sign_closing_transaction(self.channel_value_satoshis, &self.get_funding_redeemscript(), &closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
+ .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.ok();
if our_sig.is_none() { return None; }
})
}
- pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
}
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()).serialize();
- let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
+ let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize();
if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
}
- pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
}
}
let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
+ let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
+
+ match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_e) => {
// The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
// limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
},
};
let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
let our_sig = self.local_keys
- .sign_closing_transaction(self.channel_value_satoshis, &funding_redeemscript, &closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
+ .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, our_sig.clone()));
return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
}
let our_sig = self.local_keys
- .sign_closing_transaction(self.channel_value_satoshis, &funding_redeemscript, &closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
+ .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
}
/// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
- pub fn channel_monitor(&mut self) -> &mut ChannelMonitor {
+ pub fn channel_monitor(&mut self) -> &mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
}
pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
- self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
- self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
- let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
- true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
- true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
- // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
- // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
- false
- } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
- panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
- } else {
- // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
- // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
- false
- };
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
-
- //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
- //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
- //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
- //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
- if need_commitment_update {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
- let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
- return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
- }));
- } else {
- self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
- return Ok(None);
- }
- }
- }
}
}
if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
}
}
}
+ if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
+ self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
+ let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+ // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+ false
+ } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
+ panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
+ } else {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+ // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+ false
+ };
+ self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
+
+ //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
+ //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
+ //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
+ //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
+ if need_commitment_update {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+ return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ }));
+ } else {
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
Ok(None)
}
}
/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
- fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
+ fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
- Ok((self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
+ Ok((self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0, remote_initial_commitment_tx))
}
/// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
/// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
- pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if !self.channel_outbound {
panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
}
/// closing).
/// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
/// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
- pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if !self.config.announced_channel {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
}
short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
- bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
- bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
+ bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() },
+ bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
/// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
/// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
/// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
- pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
}
/// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
/// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
/// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
- pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
}
self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
}
/// Only fails in case of bad keys
- fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
// We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
// fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
// is acceptable.
/// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
/// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
- fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> {
+ fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
if self.channel_outbound {
htlcs.push(htlc);
}
- let res = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.channel_value_satoshis, feerate_per_kw, &remote_commitment_tx.0, &remote_keys, &htlcs, self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let res = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &remote_commitment_tx.0, &remote_keys, &htlcs, self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?;
signature = res.0;
htlc_signatures = res.1;
/// to send to the remote peer in one go.
/// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
/// more info.
- pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>)>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
Some(update_add_htlc) => {
let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
- write_option!(self.their_funding_pubkey);
- write_option!(self.their_revocation_basepoint);
- write_option!(self.their_payment_basepoint);
- write_option!(self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint);
- write_option!(self.their_htlc_basepoint);
+ write_option!(self.their_pubkeys);
write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_funding_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_htlc_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
// We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
- // doing full block connection operations on the internal CHannelMonitor copies
+ // doing full block connection operations on the internal ChannelMonitor copies
if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
their_max_accepted_htlcs,
minimum_depth,
- their_funding_pubkey,
- their_revocation_basepoint,
- their_payment_basepoint,
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint,
- their_htlc_basepoint,
+ their_pubkeys,
their_cur_commitment_point,
their_prev_commitment_point,
use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
use ln::chan_utils;
- use ln::chan_utils::LocalCommitmentTransaction;
+ use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction, ChannelPublicKeys};
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::test_utils;
use util::logger::Logger;
- use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
+ use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
}
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> InMemoryChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
+ self.chan_keys.clone()
+ }
fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { panic!(); }
fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
}
+ fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
+ }
+
#[test]
fn outbound_commitment_test() {
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys {
- funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ let chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
+ &secp_ctx,
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
// These aren't set in the test vectors:
- revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
- remote_funding_pubkey: None,
- };
+ [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
+ 7000000000,
+ );
+
assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan_keys.funding_key()).serialize()[..],
hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys>> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
- chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
- assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+ let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
+ funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
+ revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
+ htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
+ };
- chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
- assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint.serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
- chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
- assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
- chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
// We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
// derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
- let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
+
+ chan.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, chan.their_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
- let mut localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), &their_signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.funding_key()), chan.their_funding_pubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
+ let mut localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), &their_signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.funding_key()), chan.their_funding_pubkey());
localtx.add_local_sig(chan.local_keys.funding_key(), &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis, &chan.secp_ctx);
assert_eq!(serialize(localtx.with_valid_witness())[..],