use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
-use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
-use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, LocalCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys};
+use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
+use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
use util::transaction_utils;
-use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
+use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
/// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
/// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
/// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
- /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
+ /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
}
const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
-const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
+pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
/// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
/// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
// has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
// calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
// inbound channel.
+//
+// Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
+// Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
pub(super) struct Channel<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
config: ChannelConfig,
channel_id: [u8; 32],
channel_state: u32,
- channel_outbound: bool,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
- funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
-
/// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
/// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
/// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
// get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16,
- holder_selected_contest_delay: u16,
#[cfg(test)]
pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
#[cfg(not(test))]
//implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
minimum_depth: u32,
- counterparty_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
+ pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
{
let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
+ let pubkeys = chan_keys.pubkeys().clone();
if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
Ok(Channel {
- user_id: user_id,
+ user_id,
config: config.channel_options.clone(),
channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
- channel_outbound: true,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
- channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
+ channel_value_satoshis,
latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- funding_txo: None,
funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
short_channel_id: None,
last_block_connected: Default::default(),
counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
- counterparty_selected_contest_delay: 0,
- holder_selected_contest_delay,
counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
- counterparty_pubkeys: None,
+ channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
+ holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ is_outbound_from_holder: true,
+ counterparty_parameters: None,
+ funding_outpoint: None
+ },
counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
+ let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
+ let pubkeys = chan_keys.pubkeys().clone();
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
};
- chan_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, msg.to_self_delay, config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay);
let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than 483", msg.max_accepted_htlcs)));
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
}
// Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
} else { None };
let chan = Channel {
- user_id: user_id,
+ user_id,
config: local_config,
channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
- channel_outbound: false,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- funding_txo: None,
funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
short_channel_id: None,
last_block_connected: Default::default(),
feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
- holder_dust_limit_satoshis: holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
- counterparty_selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
- holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
- counterparty_pubkeys: Some(counterparty_pubkeys),
+ channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
+ holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ is_outbound_from_holder: false,
+ counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
+ selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
+ pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
+ }),
+ funding_outpoint: None
+ },
counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
Ok(chan)
}
- // Utilities to build transactions:
-
- fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
-
- let counterparty_payment_point = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point.serialize();
- if self.channel_outbound {
- sha.input(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
- sha.input(counterparty_payment_point);
- } else {
- sha.input(counterparty_payment_point);
- sha.input(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
- }
- let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
- ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
- ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
- ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
- ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
- ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
- }
-
/// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
/// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
/// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
/// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
/// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
/// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
- /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
+ /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
/// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
/// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
/// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
#[inline]
- fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
- let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
-
- let txins = {
- let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
- ins.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- ins
- };
-
- let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
+ fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
+ let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
+ let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
- log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
- txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
- }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
+ included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
} else {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
- txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
- }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
+ included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
} else {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
}
- let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
- let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
+ let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+ let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
(value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
} else {
(value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
};
- let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
- let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
+ let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
+ let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
- txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
- if local { self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay } else { self.holder_selected_contest_delay },
- &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: value_to_a as u64
- }, None));
+ } else {
+ value_to_a = 0;
}
if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
- let static_payment_pk = if local {
- self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point
- } else {
- self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point
- }.serialize();
- txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
- .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&static_payment_pk)[..])
- .into_script(),
- value: value_to_b as u64
- }, None));
- }
-
- transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
- if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
- if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
- a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
- // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
- // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
- // may fail)!
- .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
- // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
- // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
- } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
- } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
- });
-
- let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
- let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
- for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
- outputs.push(out.0);
- if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
- htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
- htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
- }
+ } else {
+ value_to_b = 0;
}
- let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
+
+ let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
+
+ let channel_parameters =
+ if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
+ else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
+ let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
+ value_to_a as u64,
+ value_to_b as u64,
+ keys.clone(),
+ feerate_per_kw,
+ &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
+ &channel_parameters
+ );
+ let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
+ // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
+ htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
- (Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
- input: txins,
- output: outputs,
- }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
+ (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
}
#[inline]
}
#[inline]
- fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
- (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
+ fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
+ let mut ret =
+ (4 + // version
+ 1 + // input count
+ 36 + // prevout
+ 1 + // script length (0)
+ 4 + // sequence
+ 1 + // output count
+ 4 // lock time
+ )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
+ 2 + // witness marker and flag
+ 1 + // witness element count
+ 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
+ self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
+ 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
+ if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
+ ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
+ spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
+ }
+ if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
+ ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
+ spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
+ }
+ ret
}
#[inline]
let txins = {
let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
ins.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
+ previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xffffffff,
witness: Vec::new(),
let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
- let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
- let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
+ let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
+ let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
if value_to_self < 0 {
- assert!(self.channel_outbound);
+ assert!(self.is_outbound());
total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
} else if value_to_remote < 0 {
- assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
+ assert!(!self.is_outbound());
total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
}
}, total_fee_satoshis)
}
+ fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
+ }
+
#[inline]
/// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
/// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
/// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
let per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let delayed_payment_base = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
- let htlc_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
- let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
+ let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
+ let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
}
fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
//TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
//may see payments to it!
- let revocation_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
- let htlc_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
- let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
+ let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
+ let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
}
/// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
/// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
- make_funding_redeemscript(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
+ make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
}
/// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
/// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
/// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
- chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay } else { self.holder_selected_contest_delay }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
+ chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
}
/// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
// Check sanity of message fields:
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
}
if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than 483", msg.max_accepted_htlcs)));
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
}
// Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
- self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
};
- self.holder_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, msg.to_self_delay, self.holder_selected_contest_delay);
- self.counterparty_pubkeys = Some(counterparty_pubkeys);
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
+ selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
+ pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
+ });
self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
Ok(())
}
- fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Transaction, LocalCommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&initial_commitment_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
-
- // They sign the "our" commitment transaction...
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_tx), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
-
- let tx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(initial_commitment_tx, sig.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey(), keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
+ {
+ let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
+ }
let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
- let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys);
- let counterparty_signature = self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &pre_remote_keys, &Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
+
+ let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+
+ let counterparty_signature = self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
// We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, tx, counterparty_signature))
+ Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
}
fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
- &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("funding_pubkey() only allowed after accept_channel").funding_pubkey
+ &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
}
pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
}
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
- let funding_txo = OutPoint{ txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
- self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
+ let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
+ // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
+ // funding_created_signature may fail.
+ self.holder_keys.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
- let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
+ let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
+ },
Err(e) => {
- self.funding_txo = None;
- return Err(e);
+ // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
+ // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
+ panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
}
};
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ initial_commitment_tx,
+ msg.signature,
+ Vec::new(),
+ &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
+
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
- let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- macro_rules! create_monitor {
- () => { {
- let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(),
- &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay,
- &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
- &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
- initial_commitment_tx.clone());
-
- channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
- channel_monitor
- } }
- }
+ let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
+ let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(),
+ &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
+ funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ obscure_factor,
+ holder_commitment_tx);
- let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
+ channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
- signature: signature
+ signature
}, channel_monitor))
}
/// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
/// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
}
if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
+ let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
let holder_keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&initial_commitment_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ {
+ let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
+ }
+ }
- let counterparty_funding_pubkey = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ initial_commitment_tx,
+ msg.signature,
+ Vec::new(),
+ &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
- // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, counterparty_funding_pubkey) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
- }
- let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let funding_txo = self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap();
+ let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- macro_rules! create_monitor {
- () => { {
- let commitment_tx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(initial_commitment_tx.clone(), msg.signature.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, counterparty_funding_pubkey, holder_keys.clone(), self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
- let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(),
- &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay,
- &self.destination_script, (funding_txo.clone(), funding_txo_script.clone()),
- &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
- commitment_tx);
-
- channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
-
- channel_monitor
- } }
- }
+ let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
+ let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(),
+ &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
+ funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ obscure_factor,
+ holder_commitment_tx);
- let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
+ channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
// to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust
// HTLCs are excluded.
fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
- assert!(self.channel_outbound);
+ assert!(self.is_outbound());
let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len();
for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
// to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust HTLCs
// are excluded.
fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
- assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
+ assert!(!self.is_outbound());
// When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next
// commitment_signed, all inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be
// Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
// feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
- let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else {
+ let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
// +1 for this HTLC.
self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1)
};
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
}
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
// `+1` for this HTLC, `2 *` and `+1` fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from the
// spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's side,
// only on the sender's.
let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
let mut update_fee = false;
- let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
+ let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
update_fee = true;
self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
} else {
self.feerate_per_kw
};
- let mut commitment_tx = {
- let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
- let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
- (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
+ let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
+ let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
+ let commitment_txid = {
+ let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
+ let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
+
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
+ }
+ bitcoin_tx.txid
+ };
+ let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
+ (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
};
- let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.0.txid();
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&commitment_tx.0).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_tx.0), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
- return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
- }
//If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
if update_fee {
- let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.1;
let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
}
}
- if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_tx.1 {
- return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_tx.1))));
+ if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
}
- // TODO: Merge these two, sadly they are currently both required to be passed separately to
- // ChannelMonitor:
- let mut htlcs_without_source = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_tx.2.len());
- let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_tx.2.len());
- for (idx, (htlc, source)) in commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
+ // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
+ let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
+ for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
}
- htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx])));
htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
} else {
- htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), None));
htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
}
}
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ commitment_tx,
+ msg.signature,
+ msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
+ &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
+
let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
let mut need_commitment = false;
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
// We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
}
}
- let counterparty_funding_pubkey = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
-
self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
- commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(commitment_tx.0, msg.signature.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &counterparty_funding_pubkey, keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_without_source),
+ commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
}]
};
Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
- per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ per_commitment_secret,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
}, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
}
update_fulfill_htlcs,
update_fail_htlcs,
update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: update_fee,
+ update_fee,
commitment_signed,
}, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
} else {
}
self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
}
/// further details on the optionness of the return value.
/// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
}
if !self.is_usable() {
Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
- feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw,
+ feerate_per_kw,
})
}
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
- let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
+ let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
// Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
// MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
// monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
// monitor was persisted.
let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
- assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
+ assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
})
} else { None };
pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
}
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
}), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
}
let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
})
} else { None };
fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
+ if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
return None;
if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
}
- let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
+ let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
let sig = self.holder_keys
.sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.ok();
+ assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
if sig.is_none() { return None; }
self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
// BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
// 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
- if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
+ if self.is_outbound() && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got counterparty shutdown_scriptpubkey ({}) of absurd length from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
}
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
- let funding_key = self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
+ let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
+ if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
}
}
let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- let counterparty_funding_pubkey = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
-
- match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, counterparty_funding_pubkey) {
+ match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_e) => {
// The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
},
};
+ let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
+ if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
+ if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
+ assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
+ debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.update_time_counter += 1;
return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
($new_feerate: expr) => {
- let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
- let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
+ let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
+ let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
let sig = self.holder_keys
.sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
+ assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
}
}
- let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight() as u64;
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ let mut min_feerate = 253;
+ if self.is_outbound() {
let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- if (proposed_sat_per_kw as u32) > max_feerate {
+ if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
}
} else {
- let min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- if (proposed_sat_per_kw as u32) < min_feerate {
- if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
- if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
- }
+ min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ }
+ if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
+ if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
}
- propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
}
+ propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
}
let sig = self.holder_keys
.sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
+ assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
+ debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.update_time_counter += 1;
/// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
/// get_outbound_funding_created.
pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
- self.funding_txo
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
+ }
+
+ fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
+ }
+
+ fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
+ }
+
+ fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
+ }
+
+ fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
}
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
}
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ #[cfg(test)]
pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
}
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
+ self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
}
pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
}
pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_outbound
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
}
/// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
// the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
// + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
}
///
/// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
/// back.
- pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[usize]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
+ pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
match htlc_update {
}
}
if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
- if tx.txid() == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid {
- let txo_idx = self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as usize;
+ for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
+ let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
+ if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
+ let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
// If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
// should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
// tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
});
} else {
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
for input in tx.input.iter() {
if input.witness.is_empty() {
// We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
}
}
}
- if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (*index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
+ if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
}
assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
- self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
- ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
- ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
+ self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
+ ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
+ ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
}
}
}
let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
}), timed_out_htlcs));
} else {
self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
// something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
}
if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
}
let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let keys = self.holder_keys.pubkeys();
+ let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
msgs::OpenChannel {
- chain_hash: chain_hash,
+ chain_hash,
temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
- to_self_delay: self.holder_selected_contest_delay,
+ to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
}
pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
}
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
}
let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let keys = self.holder_keys.pubkeys();
+ let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
msgs::AcceptChannel {
temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
- to_self_delay: self.holder_selected_contest_delay,
+ to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
- let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys);
- Ok(self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &pre_remote_keys, &Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
+ Ok(self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
}
/// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
}
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
- self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
+ self.holder_keys.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
+
let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
- self.funding_txo = None;
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
return Err(e);
}
};
temporary_channel_id,
funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
- signature: signature
+ signature
})
}
let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
- chain_hash: chain_hash,
+ chain_hash,
short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
- bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
- bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
+ bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
+ bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
}
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
// Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
// The `+1` is for the HTLC currently being added to the commitment tx and
// the `2 *` and `+1` are for the fee spike buffer.
- let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.channel_outbound {
+ let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1)
} else { 0 };
if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
}
self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
- let (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
+ let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
- unsigned_commitment_tx: counterparty_commitment_tx.clone(),
+ commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
/// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
/// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
- fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
feerate_per_kw = feerate;
}
}
let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
+ let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
let (signature, htlc_signatures);
{
htlcs.push(htlc);
}
- let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys);
- let res = self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &pre_remote_keys, &htlcs, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let res = self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
signature = res.0;
htlc_signatures = res.1;
- let counterparty_keys = pre_remote_keys.trust_key_derivation();
log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
- encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0),
+ &counterparty_commitment_txid,
encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
- encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.txid(), feerate_per_kw, self.holder_selected_contest_delay, htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
- encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, counterparty_keys)),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
}
channel_id: self.channel_id,
signature,
htlc_signatures,
- }, (counterparty_commitment_tx.0, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
+ }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
}
/// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
_ => {}
}
}
-
- for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
- //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
- //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
- //which correspond)
- }
+ let funding_txo = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
+ // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
+ // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
+ // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
+ // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
+ // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
+ // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
+ // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
+ Some(funding_txo.clone())
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None };
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.update_time_counter += 1;
self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- (self.funding_txo.clone(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ (funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
}, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> Writeable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
// Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
// called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
(self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
- self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
- self.holder_keys.write(writer)?;
+ let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ self.holder_keys.write(&mut key_data)?;
+ assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
+ assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
+ (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
+
self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
}
- self.funding_txo.write(writer)?;
self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay.write(writer)?;
- self.holder_selected_contest_delay.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_pubkeys.write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
- fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
+impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<ChanSigner>
+ where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner> {
+ fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let holder_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
+ while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
+ // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
+ let mut data = [0; 1024];
+ let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
+ reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
+ keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
+ }
+ let holder_keys = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
+
let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
- let funding_txo = Readable::read(reader)?;
let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let counterparty_selected_contest_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let holder_selected_contest_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let counterparty_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
config,
channel_id,
channel_state,
- channel_outbound,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
channel_value_satoshis,
last_sent_closing_fee,
- funding_txo,
funding_tx_confirmed_in,
short_channel_id,
last_block_connected,
counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
- counterparty_selected_contest_delay,
- holder_selected_contest_delay,
counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
minimum_depth,
- counterparty_pubkeys,
+ channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
- use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
+ use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect, DecodeError};
use ln::chan_utils;
- use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction, ChannelPublicKeys};
+ use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
self.chan_keys.clone()
}
fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::ChanKeySigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
}
fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
- chan.counterparty_selected_contest_delay = 144;
chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
- chan.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
};
- chan_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, chan.counterparty_selected_contest_delay, chan.holder_selected_contest_delay);
+ chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
+ CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
+ pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
+ selected_contest_delay: 144
+ });
+ chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
+ chan_keys.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
- chan.counterparty_pubkeys = Some(counterparty_pubkeys);
-
- let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
-
- let mut localtx;
macro_rules! test_commitment {
( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
$( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
} ) => { {
- unsigned_tx = {
+ let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
+
let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
.filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
.collect();
(res.0, htlcs)
};
+ let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
+ let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&unsigned_tx.0).signature_hash(0, &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
+ let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
- let mut per_htlc = Vec::new();
+ let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
+ let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
+ counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
$({
let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- per_htlc.push((unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
+ per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
+ counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
})*
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), per_htlc.len());
+ assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
+
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ commitment_tx.clone(),
+ counterparty_signature,
+ counterparty_htlc_sigs,
+ &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
+ let holder_sig = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
- localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), counterparty_signature.clone(), &chan_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey(), keys.clone(), chan.feerate_per_kw, per_htlc);
- let local_sig = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&localtx, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), local_sig);
+ let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
- assert_eq!(serialize(&localtx.add_local_sig(&redeemscript, local_sig))[..],
- hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
+ let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
- let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&localtx, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
- let mut htlc_sig_iter = localtx.per_htlc.iter().zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
+ // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
+ let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
$({
let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
- let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
+ let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
+ let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
assert!(preimage.is_some());
}
- let mut htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
- while (htlc_sig.1).1.is_none() { htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap(); }
- assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx));
+ let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(Some(signature), *(htlc_sig.1).1);
- assert_eq!(serialize(&localtx.get_signed_htlc_tx((htlc_sig.1).0, &(htlc_sig.1).1.unwrap(), &preimage, chan.counterparty_selected_contest_delay))[..],
- hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
+ let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
+ let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
+ let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
+ hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
})*
- loop {
- let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next();
- if htlc_sig.is_none() { break; }
- assert!((htlc_sig.unwrap().1).1.is_none());
- }
+ assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
} }
}