//! Various user-configurable channel limits and settings which ChannelManager
//! applies for you.
-use std::str::FromStr;
-use std::ffi::c_void;
+use alloc::str::FromStr;
+use core::ffi::c_void;
use core::convert::Infallible;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use crate::c_types::*;
+#[cfg(feature="no-std")]
+use alloc::{vec::Vec, boxed::Box};
use lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig as nativeChannelHandshakeConfigImport;
#[allow(unused)]
/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
- unsafe { let _ = Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelHandshakeConfig); }
+ let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelHandshakeConfig) };
}
#[allow(unused)]
impl ChannelHandshakeConfig {
pub(crate) fn take_inner(mut self) -> *mut nativeChannelHandshakeConfig {
assert!(self.is_owned);
let ret = ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner);
- self.inner = std::ptr::null_mut();
+ self.inner = core::ptr::null_mut();
ret
}
}
/// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
/// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
///
+/// A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
+/// transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
+/// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
+///
/// Default value: 6.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_minimum_depth(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u32 {
let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().minimum_depth;
/// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
/// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
///
+/// A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
+/// transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
+/// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
+///
/// Default value: 6.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_minimum_depth(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u32) {
unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.minimum_depth = val;
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u64) {
unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.our_htlc_minimum_msat = val;
}
+/// Sets the percentage of the channel value we will cap the total value of outstanding inbound
+/// HTLCs to.
+///
+/// This can be set to a value between 1-100, where the value corresponds to the percent of the
+/// channel value in whole percentages.
+///
+/// Note that:
+/// * If configured to another value than the default value 10, any new channels created with
+/// the non default value will cause versions of LDK prior to 0.0.104 to refuse to read the
+/// `ChannelManager`.
+///
+/// * This caps the total value for inbound HTLCs in-flight only, and there's currently
+/// no way to configure the cap for the total value of outbound HTLCs in-flight.
+///
+/// * The requirements for your node being online to ensure the safety of HTLC-encumbered funds
+/// are different from the non-HTLC-encumbered funds. This makes this an important knob to
+/// restrict exposure to loss due to being offline for too long.
+/// See [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] and [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
+/// for more information.
+///
+/// Default value: 10.
+/// Minimum value: 1, any values less than 1 will be treated as 1 instead.
+/// Maximum value: 100, any values larger than 100 will be treated as 100 instead.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u8 {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// Sets the percentage of the channel value we will cap the total value of outstanding inbound
+/// HTLCs to.
+///
+/// This can be set to a value between 1-100, where the value corresponds to the percent of the
+/// channel value in whole percentages.
+///
+/// Note that:
+/// * If configured to another value than the default value 10, any new channels created with
+/// the non default value will cause versions of LDK prior to 0.0.104 to refuse to read the
+/// `ChannelManager`.
+///
+/// * This caps the total value for inbound HTLCs in-flight only, and there's currently
+/// no way to configure the cap for the total value of outbound HTLCs in-flight.
+///
+/// * The requirements for your node being online to ensure the safety of HTLC-encumbered funds
+/// are different from the non-HTLC-encumbered funds. This makes this an important knob to
+/// restrict exposure to loss due to being offline for too long.
+/// See [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] and [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
+/// for more information.
+///
+/// Default value: 10.
+/// Minimum value: 1, any values less than 1 will be treated as 1 instead.
+/// Maximum value: 100, any values larger than 100 will be treated as 100 instead.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u8) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = val;
+}
+/// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
+/// BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
+/// our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
+/// relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
+///
+/// If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+/// prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
+///
+/// Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+/// counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
+/// private channel without that option.
+///
+/// Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
+///
+/// Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_scid_privacy(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().negotiate_scid_privacy;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
+/// BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
+/// our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
+/// relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
+///
+/// If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+/// prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
+///
+/// Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+/// counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
+/// private channel without that option.
+///
+/// Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
+///
+/// Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_scid_privacy(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.negotiate_scid_privacy = val;
+}
+/// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
+/// channel.
+///
+/// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
+///
+/// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
+/// channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_announced_channel(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().announced_channel;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
+/// channel.
+///
+/// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
+///
+/// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
+/// channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_announced_channel(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.announced_channel = val;
+}
+/// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
+/// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
+/// at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
+///
+/// This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
+/// any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
+/// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
+///
+/// The upfront key committed is provided from [`KeysInterface::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`].
+///
+/// Default value: true.
+///
+/// [`KeysInterface::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
+/// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
+/// at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
+///
+/// This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
+/// any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
+/// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
+///
+/// The upfront key committed is provided from [`KeysInterface::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`].
+///
+/// Default value: true.
+///
+/// [`KeysInterface::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = val;
+}
+/// The Proportion of the channel value to configure as counterparty's channel reserve,
+/// i.e., `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` for both outbound and inbound channels.
+///
+/// `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` is the minimum balance that the other node has to maintain
+/// on their side, at all times.
+/// This ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
+/// claiming at least this value on chain.
+///
+/// Channel reserve values greater than 30% could be considered highly unreasonable, since that
+/// amount can never be used for payments.
+/// Also, if our selected channel reserve for counterparty and counterparty's selected
+/// channel reserve for us sum up to equal or greater than channel value, channel negotiations
+/// will fail.
+///
+/// Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.104 will fail to read channels with any channel reserve
+/// other than the default value.
+///
+/// Default value: 1% of channel value, i.e., configured as 10,000 millionths.
+/// Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than 1000 sats, it will be treated
+/// as 1000 sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower bound.
+/// Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%)
+/// instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u32 {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// The Proportion of the channel value to configure as counterparty's channel reserve,
+/// i.e., `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` for both outbound and inbound channels.
+///
+/// `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` is the minimum balance that the other node has to maintain
+/// on their side, at all times.
+/// This ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
+/// claiming at least this value on chain.
+///
+/// Channel reserve values greater than 30% could be considered highly unreasonable, since that
+/// amount can never be used for payments.
+/// Also, if our selected channel reserve for counterparty and counterparty's selected
+/// channel reserve for us sum up to equal or greater than channel value, channel negotiations
+/// will fail.
+///
+/// Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.104 will fail to read channels with any channel reserve
+/// other than the default value.
+///
+/// Default value: 1% of channel value, i.e., configured as 10,000 millionths.
+/// Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than 1000 sats, it will be treated
+/// as 1000 sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower bound.
+/// Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%)
+/// instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u32) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = val;
+}
/// Constructs a new ChannelHandshakeConfig given each field
#[must_use]
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(mut minimum_depth_arg: u32, mut our_to_self_delay_arg: u16, mut our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg: u64) -> ChannelHandshakeConfig {
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(mut minimum_depth_arg: u32, mut our_to_self_delay_arg: u16, mut our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg: u64, mut max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg: u8, mut negotiate_scid_privacy_arg: bool, mut announced_channel_arg: bool, mut commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg: bool, mut their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg: u32) -> ChannelHandshakeConfig {
ChannelHandshakeConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(nativeChannelHandshakeConfig {
minimum_depth: minimum_depth_arg,
our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay_arg,
our_htlc_minimum_msat: our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg,
+ max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel: max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg,
+ negotiate_scid_privacy: negotiate_scid_privacy_arg,
+ announced_channel: announced_channel_arg,
+ commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg,
+ their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths: their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg,
}), is_owned: true }
}
impl Clone for ChannelHandshakeConfig {
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
Self {
- inner: if <*mut nativeChannelHandshakeConfig>::is_null(self.inner) { std::ptr::null_mut() } else {
+ inner: if <*mut nativeChannelHandshakeConfig>::is_null(self.inner) { core::ptr::null_mut() } else {
ObjOps::heap_alloc(unsafe { &*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }.clone()) },
is_owned: true,
}
#[allow(unused)]
/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
- unsafe { let _ = Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelHandshakeLimits); }
+ let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelHandshakeLimits) };
}
#[allow(unused)]
impl ChannelHandshakeLimits {
pub(crate) fn take_inner(mut self) -> *mut nativeChannelHandshakeLimits {
assert!(self.is_owned);
let ret = ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner);
- self.inner = std::ptr::null_mut();
+ self.inner = core::ptr::null_mut();
ret
}
}
-/// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded, this is supplied by the sender and so
+/// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
/// only applies to inbound channels.
///
/// Default value: 0.
let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().min_funding_satoshis;
*inner_val
}
-/// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded, this is supplied by the sender and so
+/// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
/// only applies to inbound channels.
///
/// Default value: 0.
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_min_funding_satoshis(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: u64) {
unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.min_funding_satoshis = val;
}
+/// Maximum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
+/// only applies to inbound channels.
+///
+/// Default value: 2^24 - 1.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_max_funding_satoshis(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> u64 {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().max_funding_satoshis;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// Maximum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
+/// only applies to inbound channels.
+///
+/// Default value: 2^24 - 1.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_max_funding_satoshis(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: u64) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_funding_satoshis = val;
+}
/// The remote node sets a limit on the minimum size of HTLCs we can send to them. This allows
/// you to limit the maximum minimum-size they can require.
///
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_max_minimum_depth(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: u32) {
unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_minimum_depth = val;
}
+/// Whether we implicitly trust funding transactions generated by us for our own outbound
+/// channels to not be double-spent.
+///
+/// If this is set, we assume that our own funding transactions are *never* double-spent, and
+/// thus we can trust them without any confirmations. This is generally a reasonable
+/// assumption, given we're the only ones who could ever double-spend it (assuming we have sole
+/// control of the signing keys).
+///
+/// You may wish to un-set this if you allow the user to (or do in an automated fashion)
+/// double-spend the funding transaction to RBF with an alternative channel open.
+///
+/// This only applies if our counterparty set their confirmations-required value to 0, and we
+/// always trust our own funding transaction at 1 confirmation irrespective of this value.
+/// Thus, this effectively acts as a `min_minimum_depth`, with the only possible values being
+/// `true` (0) and `false` (1).
+///
+/// Default value: true
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_trust_own_funding_0conf(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().trust_own_funding_0conf;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// Whether we implicitly trust funding transactions generated by us for our own outbound
+/// channels to not be double-spent.
+///
+/// If this is set, we assume that our own funding transactions are *never* double-spent, and
+/// thus we can trust them without any confirmations. This is generally a reasonable
+/// assumption, given we're the only ones who could ever double-spend it (assuming we have sole
+/// control of the signing keys).
+///
+/// You may wish to un-set this if you allow the user to (or do in an automated fashion)
+/// double-spend the funding transaction to RBF with an alternative channel open.
+///
+/// This only applies if our counterparty set their confirmations-required value to 0, and we
+/// always trust our own funding transaction at 1 confirmation irrespective of this value.
+/// Thus, this effectively acts as a `min_minimum_depth`, with the only possible values being
+/// `true` (0) and `false` (1).
+///
+/// Default value: true
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_trust_own_funding_0conf(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.trust_own_funding_0conf = val;
+}
/// Set to force an incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
-/// [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`].
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`].
///
/// For a node which is not online reliably, this should be set to true and
-/// [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] set to false, ensuring that no announced (aka public)
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] set to false, ensuring that no announced (aka public)
/// channels will ever be opened.
///
/// Default value: true.
*inner_val
}
/// Set to force an incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
-/// [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`].
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`].
///
/// For a node which is not online reliably, this should be set to true and
-/// [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] set to false, ensuring that no announced (aka public)
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] set to false, ensuring that no announced (aka public)
/// channels will ever be opened.
///
/// Default value: true.
/// Constructs a new ChannelHandshakeLimits given each field
#[must_use]
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_new(mut min_funding_satoshis_arg: u64, mut max_htlc_minimum_msat_arg: u64, mut min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat_arg: u64, mut max_channel_reserve_satoshis_arg: u64, mut min_max_accepted_htlcs_arg: u16, mut max_minimum_depth_arg: u32, mut force_announced_channel_preference_arg: bool, mut their_to_self_delay_arg: u16) -> ChannelHandshakeLimits {
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_new(mut min_funding_satoshis_arg: u64, mut max_funding_satoshis_arg: u64, mut max_htlc_minimum_msat_arg: u64, mut min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat_arg: u64, mut max_channel_reserve_satoshis_arg: u64, mut min_max_accepted_htlcs_arg: u16, mut max_minimum_depth_arg: u32, mut trust_own_funding_0conf_arg: bool, mut force_announced_channel_preference_arg: bool, mut their_to_self_delay_arg: u16) -> ChannelHandshakeLimits {
ChannelHandshakeLimits { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(nativeChannelHandshakeLimits {
min_funding_satoshis: min_funding_satoshis_arg,
+ max_funding_satoshis: max_funding_satoshis_arg,
max_htlc_minimum_msat: max_htlc_minimum_msat_arg,
min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat_arg,
max_channel_reserve_satoshis: max_channel_reserve_satoshis_arg,
min_max_accepted_htlcs: min_max_accepted_htlcs_arg,
max_minimum_depth: max_minimum_depth_arg,
+ trust_own_funding_0conf: trust_own_funding_0conf_arg,
force_announced_channel_preference: force_announced_channel_preference_arg,
their_to_self_delay: their_to_self_delay_arg,
}), is_owned: true }
impl Clone for ChannelHandshakeLimits {
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
Self {
- inner: if <*mut nativeChannelHandshakeLimits>::is_null(self.inner) { std::ptr::null_mut() } else {
+ inner: if <*mut nativeChannelHandshakeLimits>::is_null(self.inner) { core::ptr::null_mut() } else {
ObjOps::heap_alloc(unsafe { &*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }.clone()) },
is_owned: true,
}
#[allow(unused)]
/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
- unsafe { let _ = Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelConfig); }
+ let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelConfig) };
}
#[allow(unused)]
impl ChannelConfig {
pub(crate) fn take_inner(mut self) -> *mut nativeChannelConfig {
assert!(self.is_owned);
let ret = ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner);
- self.inner = std::ptr::null_mut();
+ self.inner = core::ptr::null_mut();
ret
}
}
pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: u16) {
unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.cltv_expiry_delta = val;
}
-/// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
-/// channel.
-///
-/// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
-///
-/// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
-/// channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
-///
-/// This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
-///
-/// Default value: false.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_announced_channel(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
- let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().announced_channel;
- *inner_val
-}
-/// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
-/// channel.
-///
-/// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
-///
-/// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
-/// channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
-///
-/// This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
-///
-/// Default value: false.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_announced_channel(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: bool) {
- unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.announced_channel = val;
-}
-/// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
-/// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
-/// at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
-///
-/// This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
-/// any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
-/// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
-///
-/// This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
-///
-/// Default value: true.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
- let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey;
- *inner_val
-}
-/// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
-/// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
-/// at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
-///
-/// This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
-/// any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
-/// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
-///
-/// This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
-///
-/// Default value: true.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: bool) {
- unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = val;
-}
/// Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
/// small to claim on-chain.
///
/// to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
/// channel is force-closed.
///
+/// The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
+/// channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
+/// a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
+/// (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
+/// account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero.
+///
/// This limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
/// exposure across all three types per-channel. Setting this too low may prevent the
/// sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, and this limit is very
/// to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
/// channel is force-closed.
///
+/// The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
+/// channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
+/// a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
+/// (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
+/// account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero.
+///
/// This limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
/// exposure across all three types per-channel. Setting this too low may prevent the
/// sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, and this limit is very
/// Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field
#[must_use]
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_new(mut forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg: u32, mut forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg: u32, mut cltv_expiry_delta_arg: u16, mut announced_channel_arg: bool, mut commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg: bool, mut max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg: u64, mut force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg: u64) -> ChannelConfig {
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_new(mut forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg: u32, mut forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg: u32, mut cltv_expiry_delta_arg: u16, mut max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg: u64, mut force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg: u64) -> ChannelConfig {
ChannelConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(nativeChannelConfig {
forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg,
forwarding_fee_base_msat: forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg,
cltv_expiry_delta: cltv_expiry_delta_arg,
- announced_channel: announced_channel_arg,
- commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg,
max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat: max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg,
force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis: force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg,
}), is_owned: true }
impl Clone for ChannelConfig {
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
Self {
- inner: if <*mut nativeChannelConfig>::is_null(self.inner) { std::ptr::null_mut() } else {
+ inner: if <*mut nativeChannelConfig>::is_null(self.inner) { core::ptr::null_mut() } else {
ObjOps::heap_alloc(unsafe { &*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }.clone()) },
is_owned: true,
}
pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_clone(orig: &ChannelConfig) -> ChannelConfig {
orig.clone()
}
+/// Checks if two ChannelConfigs contain equal inner contents.
+/// This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields.
+/// Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_eq(a: &ChannelConfig, b: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
+ if a.inner == b.inner { return true; }
+ if a.inner.is_null() || b.inner.is_null() { return false; }
+ if a.get_native_ref() == b.get_native_ref() { true } else { false }
+}
/// Creates a "default" ChannelConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
#[must_use]
#[no_mangle]
}
#[no_mangle]
/// Serialize the ChannelConfig object into a byte array which can be read by ChannelConfig_read
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_write(obj: &ChannelConfig) -> crate::c_types::derived::CVec_u8Z {
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_write(obj: &crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig) -> crate::c_types::derived::CVec_u8Z {
crate::c_types::serialize_obj(unsafe { &*obj }.get_native_ref())
}
#[no_mangle]
/// Read a ChannelConfig from a byte array, created by ChannelConfig_write
pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_read(ser: crate::c_types::u8slice) -> crate::c_types::derived::CResult_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ {
let res: Result<lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig, lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::c_types::deserialize_obj(ser);
- let mut local_res = match res { Ok(mut o) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::ok( { crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(o), is_owned: true } }).into(), Err(mut e) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::err( { crate::lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(e), is_owned: true } }).into() };
+ let mut local_res = match res { Ok(mut o) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::ok( { crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(o), is_owned: true } }).into(), Err(mut e) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::err( { crate::lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError::native_into(e) }).into() };
local_res
}
#[allow(unused)]
/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
pub(crate) extern "C" fn UserConfig_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
- unsafe { let _ = Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeUserConfig); }
+ let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeUserConfig) };
}
#[allow(unused)]
impl UserConfig {
pub(crate) fn take_inner(mut self) -> *mut nativeUserConfig {
assert!(self.is_owned);
let ret = ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner);
- self.inner = std::ptr::null_mut();
+ self.inner = core::ptr::null_mut();
ret
}
}
-/// Channel config that we propose to our counterparty.
+/// Channel handshake config that we propose to our counterparty.
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_own_channel_config(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig {
- let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().own_channel_config;
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_channel_handshake_config(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().channel_handshake_config;
crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig { inner: unsafe { ObjOps::nonnull_ptr_to_inner((inner_val as *const lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig<>) as *mut _) }, is_owned: false }
}
-/// Channel config that we propose to our counterparty.
+/// Channel handshake config that we propose to our counterparty.
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_own_channel_config(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig) {
- unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.own_channel_config = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_channel_handshake_config(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.channel_handshake_config = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
}
-/// Limits applied to our counterparty's proposed channel config settings.
+/// Limits applied to our counterparty's proposed channel handshake config settings.
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_peer_channel_config_limits(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits {
- let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().peer_channel_config_limits;
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_channel_handshake_limits(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().channel_handshake_limits;
crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits { inner: unsafe { ObjOps::nonnull_ptr_to_inner((inner_val as *const lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits<>) as *mut _) }, is_owned: false }
}
-/// Limits applied to our counterparty's proposed channel config settings.
+/// Limits applied to our counterparty's proposed channel handshake config settings.
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_peer_channel_config_limits(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits) {
- unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.peer_channel_config_limits = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_channel_handshake_limits(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.channel_handshake_limits = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
}
/// Channel config which affects behavior during channel lifetime.
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_channel_options(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig {
- let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().channel_options;
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_channel_config(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().channel_config;
crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig { inner: unsafe { ObjOps::nonnull_ptr_to_inner((inner_val as *const lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig<>) as *mut _) }, is_owned: false }
}
/// Channel config which affects behavior during channel lifetime.
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_channel_options(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig) {
- unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.channel_options = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_channel_config(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.channel_config = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
}
/// If this is set to false, we will reject any HTLCs which were to be forwarded over private
/// channels. This prevents us from taking on HTLC-forwarding risk when we intend to run as a
/// node which is not online reliably.
///
/// For nodes which are not online reliably, you should set all channels to *not* be announced
-/// (using [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and
+/// (using [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
/// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`]) and set this to false to
/// ensure you are not exposed to any forwarding risk.
///
/// node which is not online reliably.
///
/// For nodes which are not online reliably, you should set all channels to *not* be announced
-/// (using [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and
+/// (using [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
/// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`]) and set this to false to
/// ensure you are not exposed to any forwarding risk.
///
pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_accept_forwards_to_priv_channels(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: bool) {
unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = val;
}
+/// If this is set to false, we do not accept inbound requests to open a new channel.
+/// Default value: true.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_accept_inbound_channels(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().accept_inbound_channels;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// If this is set to false, we do not accept inbound requests to open a new channel.
+/// Default value: true.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_accept_inbound_channels(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.accept_inbound_channels = val;
+}
+/// If this is set to true, the user needs to manually accept inbound requests to open a new
+/// channel.
+///
+/// When set to true, [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] will be triggered once a request to open a
+/// new inbound channel is received through a [`msgs::OpenChannel`] message. In that case, a
+/// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message will not be sent back to the counterparty node unless the
+/// user explicitly chooses to accept the request.
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+///
+/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::util::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+/// [`msgs::OpenChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::OpenChannel
+/// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_manually_accept_inbound_channels(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().manually_accept_inbound_channels;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// If this is set to true, the user needs to manually accept inbound requests to open a new
+/// channel.
+///
+/// When set to true, [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] will be triggered once a request to open a
+/// new inbound channel is received through a [`msgs::OpenChannel`] message. In that case, a
+/// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message will not be sent back to the counterparty node unless the
+/// user explicitly chooses to accept the request.
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+///
+/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::util::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+/// [`msgs::OpenChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::OpenChannel
+/// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_manually_accept_inbound_channels(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.manually_accept_inbound_channels = val;
+}
+/// If this is set to true, LDK will intercept HTLCs that are attempting to be forwarded over
+/// fake short channel ids generated via [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]. Upon HTLC
+/// intercept, LDK will generate an [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`] which MUST be handled by the user.
+///
+/// Setting this to true may break backwards compatibility with LDK versions < 0.0.113.
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
+/// [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::util::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_accept_intercept_htlcs(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().accept_intercept_htlcs;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// If this is set to true, LDK will intercept HTLCs that are attempting to be forwarded over
+/// fake short channel ids generated via [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]. Upon HTLC
+/// intercept, LDK will generate an [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`] which MUST be handled by the user.
+///
+/// Setting this to true may break backwards compatibility with LDK versions < 0.0.113.
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
+/// [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::util::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_accept_intercept_htlcs(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.accept_intercept_htlcs = val;
+}
/// Constructs a new UserConfig given each field
#[must_use]
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_new(mut own_channel_config_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut peer_channel_config_limits_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut channel_options_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig, mut accept_forwards_to_priv_channels_arg: bool) -> UserConfig {
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_new(mut channel_handshake_config_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut channel_handshake_limits_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut channel_config_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig, mut accept_forwards_to_priv_channels_arg: bool, mut accept_inbound_channels_arg: bool, mut manually_accept_inbound_channels_arg: bool, mut accept_intercept_htlcs_arg: bool) -> UserConfig {
UserConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(nativeUserConfig {
- own_channel_config: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(own_channel_config_arg.take_inner()) },
- peer_channel_config_limits: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(peer_channel_config_limits_arg.take_inner()) },
- channel_options: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(channel_options_arg.take_inner()) },
+ channel_handshake_config: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(channel_handshake_config_arg.take_inner()) },
+ channel_handshake_limits: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(channel_handshake_limits_arg.take_inner()) },
+ channel_config: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(channel_config_arg.take_inner()) },
accept_forwards_to_priv_channels: accept_forwards_to_priv_channels_arg,
+ accept_inbound_channels: accept_inbound_channels_arg,
+ manually_accept_inbound_channels: manually_accept_inbound_channels_arg,
+ accept_intercept_htlcs: accept_intercept_htlcs_arg,
}), is_owned: true }
}
impl Clone for UserConfig {
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
Self {
- inner: if <*mut nativeUserConfig>::is_null(self.inner) { std::ptr::null_mut() } else {
+ inner: if <*mut nativeUserConfig>::is_null(self.inner) { core::ptr::null_mut() } else {
ObjOps::heap_alloc(unsafe { &*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }.clone()) },
is_owned: true,
}