Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
- /**
- * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
- * channel.
- *
- * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
- *
- * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
- * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
- *
- * This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
- *
- * Default value: false.
- */
- public boolean get_announced_channel() {
- boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_announced_channel(this.ptr);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- return ret;
- }
-
- /**
- * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
- * channel.
- *
- * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
- *
- * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
- * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
- *
- * This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
- *
- * Default value: false.
- */
- public void set_announced_channel(boolean val) {
- bindings.ChannelConfig_set_announced_channel(this.ptr, val);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
- }
-
- /**
- * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
- * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
- * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
- *
- * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
- * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
- * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
- *
- * This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
- *
- * Default value: true.
- */
- public boolean get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey() {
- boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- return ret;
- }
-
- /**
- * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
- * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
- * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
- *
- * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
- * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
- * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
- *
- * This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
- *
- * Default value: true.
- */
- public void set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(boolean val) {
- bindings.ChannelConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr, val);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
- }
-
/**
* Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
* small to claim on-chain.
/**
* Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field
*/
- public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, boolean announced_channel_arg, boolean commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, long max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg, long force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, announced_channel_arg, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg);
+ public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, long max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg, long force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(cltv_expiry_delta_arg);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(announced_channel_arg);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_default();
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}