Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
- /**
- * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
- * channel.
- *
- * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
- *
- * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
- * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
- *
- * This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
- *
- * Default value: false.
- */
- public boolean get_announced_channel() {
- boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_announced_channel(this.ptr);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- return ret;
- }
-
- /**
- * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
- * channel.
- *
- * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
- *
- * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
- * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
- *
- * This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
- *
- * Default value: false.
- */
- public void set_announced_channel(boolean val) {
- bindings.ChannelConfig_set_announced_channel(this.ptr, val);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
- }
-
- /**
- * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
- * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
- * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
- *
- * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
- * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
- * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
- *
- * This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
- *
- * Default value: true.
- */
- public boolean get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey() {
- boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- return ret;
- }
-
- /**
- * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
- * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
- * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
- *
- * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
- * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
- * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
- *
- * This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
- *
- * Default value: true.
- */
- public void set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(boolean val) {
- bindings.ChannelConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr, val);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
- }
-
/**
* Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
* small to claim on-chain.
* to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
* channel is force-closed.
*
+ * The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
+ * channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
+ * a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
+ * (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
+ * account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero.
+ *
* This limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
* exposure across all three types per-channel. Setting this too low may prevent the
* sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, and this limit is very
* to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
* channel is force-closed.
*
+ * The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
+ * channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
+ * a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
+ * (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
+ * account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero.
+ *
* This limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
* exposure across all three types per-channel. Setting this too low may prevent the
* sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, and this limit is very
/**
* Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field
*/
- public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, boolean announced_channel_arg, boolean commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, long max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg, long force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, announced_channel_arg, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg);
+ public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, long max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg, long force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(cltv_expiry_delta_arg);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(announced_channel_arg);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Checks if two ChannelConfigs contain equal inner contents.
+ * This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields.
+ * Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here.
+ */
+ public boolean eq(ChannelConfig b) {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_eq(this.ptr, b == null ? 0 : b.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(b);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(b); };
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ @Override public boolean equals(Object o) {
+ if (!(o instanceof ChannelConfig)) return false;
+ return this.eq((ChannelConfig)o);
+ }
/**
* Creates a "default" ChannelConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
*/
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_default();
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}