import org.ldk.enums.*;
import org.ldk.util.*;
import java.util.Arrays;
+import javax.annotation.Nullable;
+
+/**
+ * Options which apply on a per-channel basis and may change at runtime or based on negotiation
+ * with our counterparty.
+ */
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase {
ChannelConfig(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); }
if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelConfig_free(ptr); }
}
- public int get_fee_proportional_millionths() {
- int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr);
+ /**
+ * Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound
+ * over the channel.
+ * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
+ * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
+ *
+ * Default value: 0.
+ */
+ public int get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths() {
+ int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound
+ * over the channel.
+ * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
+ * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
+ *
+ * Default value: 0.
+ */
+ public void set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(int val) {
+ bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in
+ * excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`].
+ * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
+ * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
+ *
+ * The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes
+ * as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through
+ * this node.
+ *
+ * Default value: 1000.
+ *
+ * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
+ */
+ public int get_forwarding_fee_base_msat() {
+ int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in
+ * excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`].
+ * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
+ * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
+ *
+ * The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes
+ * as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through
+ * this node.
+ *
+ * Default value: 1000.
+ *
+ * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
+ */
+ public void set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(int val) {
+ bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr, val);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
+ * the channel this config applies to.
+ *
+ * This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
+ * HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
+ * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
+ * (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
+ *
+ * Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
+ * we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
+ * commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
+ * enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
+ * the spending transaction).
+ *
+ * Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
+ * Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
+ * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
+ *
+ * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
+ */
+ public short get_cltv_expiry_delta() {
+ short ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr);
return ret;
}
- public void set_fee_proportional_millionths(int val) {
- bindings.ChannelConfig_set_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val);
+ /**
+ * The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
+ * the channel this config applies to.
+ *
+ * This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
+ * HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
+ * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
+ * (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
+ *
+ * Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
+ * we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
+ * commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
+ * enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
+ * the spending transaction).
+ *
+ * Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
+ * Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
+ * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
+ *
+ * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
+ */
+ public void set_cltv_expiry_delta(short val) {
+ bindings.ChannelConfig_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr, val);
}
+ /**
+ * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
+ * channel.
+ *
+ * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
+ *
+ * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
+ * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
+ *
+ * This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
+ *
+ * Default value: false.
+ */
public boolean get_announced_channel() {
boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_announced_channel(this.ptr);
return ret;
}
+ /**
+ * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
+ * channel.
+ *
+ * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
+ *
+ * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
+ * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
+ *
+ * This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
+ *
+ * Default value: false.
+ */
public void set_announced_channel(boolean val) {
bindings.ChannelConfig_set_announced_channel(this.ptr, val);
}
+ /**
+ * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
+ * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
+ * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
+ *
+ * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
+ * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
+ * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
+ *
+ * This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
+ *
+ * Default value: true.
+ */
public boolean get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey() {
boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr);
return ret;
}
+ /**
+ * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
+ * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
+ * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
+ *
+ * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
+ * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
+ * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
+ *
+ * This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
+ *
+ * Default value: true.
+ */
public void set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(boolean val) {
bindings.ChannelConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr, val);
}
- public static ChannelConfig constructor_new(int fee_proportional_millionths_arg, boolean announced_channel_arg, boolean commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(fee_proportional_millionths_arg, announced_channel_arg, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg);
- ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret);
+ /**
+ * Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
+ * small to claim on-chain.
+ *
+ * When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
+ * not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
+ * party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
+ * to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
+ * channel is force-closed.
+ *
+ * This limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
+ * exposure across all three types per-channel. Setting this too low may prevent the
+ * sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, and this limit is very
+ * important to prevent stealing of dust HTLCs by miners.
+ *
+ * Default value: 5_000_000 msat.
+ */
+ public long get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(this.ptr);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
+ * small to claim on-chain.
+ *
+ * When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
+ * not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
+ * party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
+ * to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
+ * channel is force-closed.
+ *
+ * This limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
+ * exposure across all three types per-channel. Setting this too low may prevent the
+ * sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, and this limit is very
+ * important to prevent stealing of dust HTLCs by miners.
+ *
+ * Default value: 5_000_000 msat.
+ */
+ public void set_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(long val) {
+ bindings.ChannelConfig_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(this.ptr, val);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
+ * `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
+ *
+ * When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
+ * closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
+ * funder/initiator.
+ *
+ * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
+ * acceptable fee by our [`Background`] and [`Normal`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
+ * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
+ * [`Normal`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
+ * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
+ * funds.
+ *
+ * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
+ * [`Background`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
+ * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
+ *
+ * Default value: 1000 satoshis.
+ *
+ * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+ */
+ public long get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
+ * `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
+ *
+ * When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
+ * closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
+ * funder/initiator.
+ *
+ * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
+ * acceptable fee by our [`Background`] and [`Normal`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
+ * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
+ * [`Normal`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
+ * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
+ * funds.
+ *
+ * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
+ * [`Background`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
+ * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
+ *
+ * Default value: 1000 satoshis.
+ *
+ * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+ */
+ public void set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(long val) {
+ bindings.ChannelConfig_set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr, val);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field
+ */
+ public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, boolean announced_channel_arg, boolean commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, long max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg, long force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, announced_channel_arg, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Creates a copy of the ChannelConfig
+ */
public ChannelConfig clone() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone(this.ptr);
- ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
- public static ChannelConfig constructor_default() {
+ /**
+ * Creates a "default" ChannelConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
+ */
+ public static ChannelConfig with_default() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_default();
- ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Serialize the ChannelConfig object into a byte array which can be read by ChannelConfig_read
+ */
public byte[] write() {
byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_write(this.ptr);
return ret;
}
- public static Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ constructor_read(byte[] ser) {
+ /**
+ * Read a ChannelConfig from a byte array, created by ChannelConfig_write
+ */
+ public static Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ read(byte[] ser) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_read(ser);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
projects / ldk-java / blobdiff