import org.ldk.enums.*;
import org.ldk.util.*;
import java.util.Arrays;
+import java.lang.ref.Reference;
import javax.annotation.Nullable;
* Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
* equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
*
+ * A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
+ * transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
+ * [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
+ * [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
+ *
* Default value: 6.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+ * [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
*/
public int get_minimum_depth() {
int ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_minimum_depth(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
* Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
* equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
*
+ * A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
+ * transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
+ * [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
+ * [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
+ *
* Default value: 6.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+ * [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
*/
public void set_minimum_depth(int val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_minimum_depth(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
*/
public short get_our_to_self_delay() {
short ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_to_self_delay(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
*/
public void set_our_to_self_delay(short val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_to_self_delay(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
*/
public long get_our_htlc_minimum_msat() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
*/
public void set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(long val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Sets the percentage of the channel value we will cap the total value of outstanding inbound
+ * HTLCs to.
+ *
+ * This can be set to a value between 1-100, where the value corresponds to the percent of the
+ * channel value in whole percentages.
+ *
+ * Note that:
+ * If configured to another value than the default value 10, any new channels created with
+ * the non default value will cause versions of LDK prior to 0.0.104 to refuse to read the
+ * `ChannelManager`.
+ *
+ * This caps the total value for inbound HTLCs in-flight only, and there's currently
+ * no way to configure the cap for the total value of outbound HTLCs in-flight.
+ *
+ * The requirements for your node being online to ensure the safety of HTLC-encumbered funds
+ * are different from the non-HTLC-encumbered funds. This makes this an important knob to
+ * restrict exposure to loss due to being offline for too long.
+ * See [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] and [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
+ * for more information.
+ *
+ * Default value: 10.
+ * Minimum value: 1, any values less than 1 will be treated as 1 instead.
+ * Maximum value: 100, any values larger than 100 will be treated as 100 instead.
+ */
+ public byte get_max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel() {
+ byte ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Sets the percentage of the channel value we will cap the total value of outstanding inbound
+ * HTLCs to.
+ *
+ * This can be set to a value between 1-100, where the value corresponds to the percent of the
+ * channel value in whole percentages.
+ *
+ * Note that:
+ * If configured to another value than the default value 10, any new channels created with
+ * the non default value will cause versions of LDK prior to 0.0.104 to refuse to read the
+ * `ChannelManager`.
+ *
+ * This caps the total value for inbound HTLCs in-flight only, and there's currently
+ * no way to configure the cap for the total value of outbound HTLCs in-flight.
+ *
+ * The requirements for your node being online to ensure the safety of HTLC-encumbered funds
+ * are different from the non-HTLC-encumbered funds. This makes this an important knob to
+ * restrict exposure to loss due to being offline for too long.
+ * See [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] and [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
+ * for more information.
+ *
+ * Default value: 10.
+ * Minimum value: 1, any values less than 1 will be treated as 1 instead.
+ * Maximum value: 100, any values larger than 100 will be treated as 100 instead.
+ */
+ public void set_max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel(byte val) {
+ bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
+ * BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
+ * our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
+ * relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
+ *
+ * If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+ * prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+ * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
+ *
+ * Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+ * counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
+ * private channel without that option.
+ *
+ * Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
+ * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
+ * [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
+ *
+ * Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+ * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+ */
+ public boolean get_negotiate_scid_privacy() {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_scid_privacy(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
+ * BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
+ * our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
+ * relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
+ *
+ * If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+ * prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+ * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
+ *
+ * Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+ * counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
+ * private channel without that option.
+ *
+ * Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
+ * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
+ * [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
+ *
+ * Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+ * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+ */
+ public void set_negotiate_scid_privacy(boolean val) {
+ bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_scid_privacy(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
+ * channel.
+ *
+ * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
+ *
+ * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
+ * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
+ *
+ * Default value: false.
+ */
+ public boolean get_announced_channel() {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_announced_channel(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
+ * channel.
+ *
+ * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
+ *
+ * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
+ * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
+ *
+ * Default value: false.
+ */
+ public void set_announced_channel(boolean val) {
+ bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_announced_channel(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
+ * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
+ * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
+ *
+ * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
+ * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
+ * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
+ *
+ * The upfront key committed is provided from [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`].
+ *
+ * Default value: true.
+ *
+ * [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::sign::SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey
+ */
+ public boolean get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey() {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
+ * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
+ * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
+ *
+ * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
+ * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
+ * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
+ *
+ * The upfront key committed is provided from [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`].
+ *
+ * Default value: true.
+ *
+ * [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::sign::SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey
+ */
+ public void set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(boolean val) {
+ bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * The Proportion of the channel value to configure as counterparty's channel reserve,
+ * i.e., `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` for both outbound and inbound channels.
+ *
+ * `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` is the minimum balance that the other node has to maintain
+ * on their side, at all times.
+ * This ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
+ * claiming at least this value on chain.
+ *
+ * Channel reserve values greater than 30% could be considered highly unreasonable, since that
+ * amount can never be used for payments.
+ * Also, if our selected channel reserve for counterparty and counterparty's selected
+ * channel reserve for us sum up to equal or greater than channel value, channel negotiations
+ * will fail.
+ *
+ * Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.104 will fail to read channels with any channel reserve
+ * other than the default value.
+ *
+ * Default value: 1% of channel value, i.e., configured as 10,000 millionths.
+ * Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than 1000 sats, it will be treated
+ * as 1000 sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower bound.
+ * Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%)
+ * instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case.
+ */
+ public int get_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths() {
+ int ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * The Proportion of the channel value to configure as counterparty's channel reserve,
+ * i.e., `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` for both outbound and inbound channels.
+ *
+ * `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` is the minimum balance that the other node has to maintain
+ * on their side, at all times.
+ * This ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
+ * claiming at least this value on chain.
+ *
+ * Channel reserve values greater than 30% could be considered highly unreasonable, since that
+ * amount can never be used for payments.
+ * Also, if our selected channel reserve for counterparty and counterparty's selected
+ * channel reserve for us sum up to equal or greater than channel value, channel negotiations
+ * will fail.
+ *
+ * Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.104 will fail to read channels with any channel reserve
+ * other than the default value.
+ *
+ * Default value: 1% of channel value, i.e., configured as 10,000 millionths.
+ * Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than 1000 sats, it will be treated
+ * as 1000 sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower bound.
+ * Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%)
+ * instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case.
+ */
+ public void set_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(int val) {
+ bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * If set, we attempt to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`option for all future
+ * channels. This feature requires having a reserve of onchain funds readily available to bump
+ * transactions in the event of a channel force close to avoid the possibility of losing funds.
+ *
+ * Note that if you wish accept inbound channels with anchor outputs, you must enable
+ * [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and manually accept them with
+ * [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]. This is done to give you the chance to check
+ * whether your reserve of onchain funds is enough to cover the fees for all existing and new
+ * channels featuring anchor outputs in the event of a force close.
+ *
+ * If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+ * prior to 0.0.116, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+ * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
+ *
+ * Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+ * counterparties that do not support the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option; we will simply
+ * fall back to a `static_remote_key` channel.
+ *
+ * LDK will not support the legacy `option_anchors` commitment version due to a discovered
+ * vulnerability after its deployment. For more context, see the [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee
+ * Considered Harmful`] mailing list post.
+ *
+ * Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+ * [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+ * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+ * [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee Considered Harmful`]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/002796.html
+ */
+ public boolean get_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * If set, we attempt to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`option for all future
+ * channels. This feature requires having a reserve of onchain funds readily available to bump
+ * transactions in the event of a channel force close to avoid the possibility of losing funds.
+ *
+ * Note that if you wish accept inbound channels with anchor outputs, you must enable
+ * [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and manually accept them with
+ * [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]. This is done to give you the chance to check
+ * whether your reserve of onchain funds is enough to cover the fees for all existing and new
+ * channels featuring anchor outputs in the event of a force close.
+ *
+ * If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+ * prior to 0.0.116, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+ * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
+ *
+ * Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+ * counterparties that do not support the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option; we will simply
+ * fall back to a `static_remote_key` channel.
+ *
+ * LDK will not support the legacy `option_anchors` commitment version due to a discovered
+ * vulnerability after its deployment. For more context, see the [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee
+ * Considered Harmful`] mailing list post.
+ *
+ * Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+ * [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+ * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+ * [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee Considered Harmful`]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/002796.html
+ */
+ public void set_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(boolean val) {
+ bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * The maximum number of HTLCs in-flight from our counterparty towards us at the same time.
+ *
+ * Increasing the value can help improve liquidity and stability in
+ * routing at the cost of higher long term disk / DB usage.
+ *
+ * Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.115 will fail to read channels with a configuration
+ * other than the default value.
+ *
+ * Default value: 50
+ * Maximum value: 483, any values larger will be treated as 483.
+ * This is the BOLT #2 spec limit on `max_accepted_htlcs`.
+ */
+ public short get_our_max_accepted_htlcs() {
+ short ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_max_accepted_htlcs(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * The maximum number of HTLCs in-flight from our counterparty towards us at the same time.
+ *
+ * Increasing the value can help improve liquidity and stability in
+ * routing at the cost of higher long term disk / DB usage.
+ *
+ * Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.115 will fail to read channels with a configuration
+ * other than the default value.
+ *
+ * Default value: 50
+ * Maximum value: 483, any values larger will be treated as 483.
+ * This is the BOLT #2 spec limit on `max_accepted_htlcs`.
+ */
+ public void set_our_max_accepted_htlcs(short val) {
+ bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_max_accepted_htlcs(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* Constructs a new ChannelHandshakeConfig given each field
*/
- public static ChannelHandshakeConfig of(int minimum_depth_arg, short our_to_self_delay_arg, long our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(minimum_depth_arg, our_to_self_delay_arg, our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg);
+ public static ChannelHandshakeConfig of(int minimum_depth_arg, short our_to_self_delay_arg, long our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, byte max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg, boolean negotiate_scid_privacy_arg, boolean announced_channel_arg, boolean commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, int their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg, boolean negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_arg, short our_max_accepted_htlcs_arg) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(minimum_depth_arg, our_to_self_delay_arg, our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg, negotiate_scid_privacy_arg, announced_channel_arg, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg, negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_arg, our_max_accepted_htlcs_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(minimum_depth_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(our_to_self_delay_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(negotiate_scid_privacy_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(announced_channel_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(our_max_accepted_htlcs_arg);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
+ org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ long clone_ptr() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone_ptr(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
/**
* Creates a copy of the ChannelHandshakeConfig
*/
public ChannelHandshakeConfig clone() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
public static ChannelHandshakeConfig with_default() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_default();
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
+ org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
projects / ldk-java / blobdiff