*
* If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
* prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
- * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`].
+ * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
*
* Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
* counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
* private channel without that option.
*
* Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
- * [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and
+ * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
* [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
*
* Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
*
* [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
- * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+ * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
*/
public boolean get_negotiate_scid_privacy() {
boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_scid_privacy(this.ptr);
*
* If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
* prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
- * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`].
+ * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
*
* Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
* counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
* private channel without that option.
*
* Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
- * [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and
+ * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
* [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
*
* Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
*
* [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
- * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+ * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
*/
public void set_negotiate_scid_privacy(boolean val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_scid_privacy(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
+ /**
+ * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
+ * channel.
+ *
+ * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
+ *
+ * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
+ * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
+ *
+ * Default value: false.
+ */
+ public boolean get_announced_channel() {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_announced_channel(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
+ * channel.
+ *
+ * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
+ *
+ * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
+ * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
+ *
+ * Default value: false.
+ */
+ public void set_announced_channel(boolean val) {
+ bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_announced_channel(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
+ * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
+ * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
+ *
+ * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
+ * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
+ * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
+ *
+ * The upfront key committed is provided from [`KeysInterface::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`].
+ *
+ * Default value: true.
+ *
+ * [`KeysInterface::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey
+ */
+ public boolean get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey() {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
+ * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
+ * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
+ *
+ * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
+ * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
+ * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
+ *
+ * The upfront key committed is provided from [`KeysInterface::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`].
+ *
+ * Default value: true.
+ *
+ * [`KeysInterface::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey
+ */
+ public void set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(boolean val) {
+ bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr, val);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+ }
+
/**
* Constructs a new ChannelHandshakeConfig given each field
*/
- public static ChannelHandshakeConfig of(int minimum_depth_arg, short our_to_self_delay_arg, long our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, byte max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg, boolean negotiate_scid_privacy_arg) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(minimum_depth_arg, our_to_self_delay_arg, our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg, negotiate_scid_privacy_arg);
+ public static ChannelHandshakeConfig of(int minimum_depth_arg, short our_to_self_delay_arg, long our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, byte max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg, boolean negotiate_scid_privacy_arg, boolean announced_channel_arg, boolean commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(minimum_depth_arg, our_to_self_delay_arg, our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg, negotiate_scid_privacy_arg, announced_channel_arg, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(minimum_depth_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(our_to_self_delay_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(negotiate_scid_privacy_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(announced_channel_arg);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);