* disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
* from after `params.latest_hash`.
*/
- public static ChannelManager constructor_new(FeeEstimator fee_est, Watch chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, Logger logger, KeysInterface keys_manager, UserConfig config, LDKNetwork params_network_arg, BestBlock params_best_block_arg) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est == null ? 0 : fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor == null ? 0 : chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : tx_broadcaster.ptr, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr & ~1, bindings.ChainParameters_new(params_network_arg, params_best_block_arg == null ? 0 : params_best_block_arg.ptr & ~1));
+ public static ChannelManager of(FeeEstimator fee_est, Watch chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, Logger logger, KeysInterface keys_manager, UserConfig config, ChainParameters params) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est == null ? 0 : fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor == null ? 0 : chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : tx_broadcaster.ptr, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr & ~1, params == null ? 0 : params.ptr & ~1);
ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = new ChannelManager(null, ret);
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(fee_est);
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger);
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager);
ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(config);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(params_best_block_arg);
+ ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(params);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
* Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
* get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
*
- * These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
- * ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
+ * These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
+ * documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
+ * are.
*/
public ChannelDetails[] list_usable_channels() {
long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_usable_channels(this.ptr);
* Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
* not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
* create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
+ *
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
*/
public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] funding_transaction) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction);
}
/**
- * Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
- * BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
- * seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
+ * Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
+ * arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
+ * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
+ * on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
+ * announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
+ * our network addresses.
+ *
+ * `rgb` is a node \"color\" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
+ * node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
*
- * RGB is a node \"color\" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
- * to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
+ * `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
+ * accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
+ * tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
+ * addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
*
- * addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
- * incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
- * addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
- * only Tor Onion addresses.
+ * Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
*
- * Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
+ * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
*/
public void broadcast_node_announcement(byte[] rgb, byte[] alias, NetAddress[] addresses) {
bindings.ChannelManager_broadcast_node_announcement(this.ptr, rgb, alias, Arrays.stream(addresses).mapToLong(addresses_conv_12 -> addresses_conv_12.ptr).toArray());
* Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
* HTLC backwards has been started.
*/
- public boolean fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) {
- boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, payment_hash, payment_secret);
+ public boolean fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash) {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, payment_hash);
return ret;
}
* generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
* should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
*
- * You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
- * available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
- * reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
- * payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
- * privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
- * motivated attackers.
- *
- * Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
- * set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
+ * Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
+ * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
+ * event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
+ * the sender \"proof-of-payment\" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
*
* May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
+ *
+ * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
*/
- public boolean claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage, byte[] payment_secret, long expected_amount) {
- boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, payment_preimage, payment_secret, expected_amount);
+ public boolean claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage) {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, payment_preimage);
return ret;
}
this.ptrs_to.add(funding_txo);
}
+ /**
+ * Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
+ * to pay us.
+ *
+ * This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
+ * [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
+ *
+ * The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
+ * will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
+ * passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
+ *
+ * See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
+ *
+ * [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
+ * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
+ * [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
+ * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ */
+ public TwoTuple<byte[], byte[]> create_inbound_payment(Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, long user_payment_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id);
+ byte[] ret_a = bindings.LDKC2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZ_get_a(ret);
+ byte[] ret_b = bindings.LDKC2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZ_get_b(ret);
+ TwoTuple<byte[], byte[]> ret_conv = new TwoTuple<byte[], byte[]>(ret_a, ret_b, () -> {
+ bindings.C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZ_free(ret);
+ });
+ return ret_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
+ * stored external to LDK.
+ *
+ * A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
+ * payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
+ * the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
+ *
+ * The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
+ * method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
+ *
+ * `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
+ * allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
+ * [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
+ * copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
+ * with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
+ *
+ * `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
+ * received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
+ * before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
+ * sender \"proof-of-payment\" unless they have paid the required amount.
+ *
+ * `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
+ * in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
+ * After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
+ * pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
+ * invoices when no timeout is set.
+ *
+ * Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
+ * to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
+ * accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
+ * If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
+ * [`PaymentReceived`].
+ *
+ * Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
+ * [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
+ * space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
+ *
+ * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
+ *
+ * Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
+ * set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
+ *
+ * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
+ * [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
+ */
+ public Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, long user_payment_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash(this.ptr, payment_hash, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id);
+ Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
/**
* Constructs a new MessageSendEventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
* This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned MessageSendEventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is
}
/**
- * Updates channel state to take note of transactions which were confirmed in the given block
- * at the given height.
- *
- * Note that you must still call (or have called) [`update_best_block`] with the block
- * information which is included here.
- *
- * This method may be called before or after [`update_best_block`] for a given block's
- * transaction data and may be called multiple times with additional transaction data for a
- * given block.
- *
- * This method may be called for a previous block after an [`update_best_block`] call has
- * been made for a later block, however it must *not* be called with transaction data from a
- * block which is no longer in the best chain (ie where [`update_best_block`] has already
- * been informed about a blockchain reorganization which no longer includes the block which
- * corresponds to `header`).
- *
- * [`update_best_block`]: `Self::update_best_block`
+ * Constructs a new Confirm which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+ * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Confirm must be freed before this_arg is
*/
- public void transactions_confirmed(byte[] header, int height, TwoTuple<Long, byte[]>[] txdata) {
- bindings.ChannelManager_transactions_confirmed(this.ptr, header, height, Arrays.stream(txdata).mapToLong(txdata_conv_24 -> bindings.C2Tuple_usizeTransactionZ_new(txdata_conv_24.a, txdata_conv_24.b)).toArray());
- /* TODO 2 TwoTuple<Long, byte[]> */;
- }
-
- /**
- * Updates channel state with the current best blockchain tip. You should attempt to call this
- * quickly after a new block becomes available, however if multiple new blocks become
- * available at the same time, only a single `update_best_block()` call needs to be made.
- *
- * This method should also be called immediately after any block disconnections, once at the
- * reorganization fork point, and once with the new chain tip. Calling this method at the
- * blockchain reorganization fork point ensures we learn when a funding transaction which was
- * previously confirmed is reorganized out of the blockchain, ensuring we do not continue to
- * accept payments which cannot be enforced on-chain.
- *
- * In both the block-connection and block-disconnection case, this method may be called either
- * once per block connected or disconnected, or simply at the fork point and new tip(s),
- * skipping any intermediary blocks.
- */
- public void update_best_block(byte[] header, int height) {
- bindings.ChannelManager_update_best_block(this.ptr, header, height);
- }
-
- /**
- * Gets the set of txids which should be monitored for their confirmation state.
- *
- * If you're providing information about reorganizations via [`transaction_unconfirmed`], this
- * is the set of transactions which you may need to call [`transaction_unconfirmed`] for.
- *
- * This may be useful to poll to determine the set of transactions which must be registered
- * with an Electrum server or for which an Electrum server needs to be polled to determine
- * transaction confirmation state.
- *
- * This may update after any [`transactions_confirmed`] or [`block_connected`] call.
- *
- * Note that this is NOT the set of transactions which must be included in calls to
- * [`transactions_confirmed`] if they are confirmed, but a small subset of it.
- *
- * [`transactions_confirmed`]: Self::transactions_confirmed
- * [`transaction_unconfirmed`]: Self::transaction_unconfirmed
- * [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
- */
- public byte[][] get_relevant_txids() {
- byte[][] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_relevant_txids(this.ptr);
- return ret;
- }
-
- /**
- * Marks a transaction as having been reorganized out of the blockchain.
- *
- * If a transaction is included in [`get_relevant_txids`], and is no longer in the main branch
- * of the blockchain, this function should be called to indicate that the transaction should
- * be considered reorganized out.
- *
- * Once this is called, the given transaction will no longer appear on [`get_relevant_txids`],
- * though this may be called repeatedly for a given transaction without issue.
- *
- * Note that if the transaction is confirmed on the main chain in a different block (indicated
- * via a call to [`transactions_confirmed`]), it may re-appear in [`get_relevant_txids`], thus
- * be very wary of race-conditions wherein the final state of a transaction indicated via
- * these APIs is not the same as its state on the blockchain.
- *
- * [`transactions_confirmed`]: Self::transactions_confirmed
- * [`get_relevant_txids`]: Self::get_relevant_txids
- */
- public void transaction_unconfirmed(byte[] txid) {
- bindings.ChannelManager_transaction_unconfirmed(this.ptr, txid);
+ public Confirm as_Confirm() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Confirm(this.ptr);
+ Confirm ret_hu_conv = new Confirm(null, ret);
+ ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**