* [`u64::max_value`] is given to indicate sufficient capacity for the invoice's full amount.
* Thus, implementations should be overflow-safe.
*/
- long channel_penalty_msat(long short_channel_id, long send_amt_msat, long capacity_msat, NodeId source, NodeId target);
+ long channel_penalty_msat(long short_channel_id, NodeId source, NodeId target, ChannelUsage usage);
/**
* Handles updating channel penalties after failing to route through a channel.
*/
public static Score new_impl(ScoreInterface arg) {
final LDKScoreHolder impl_holder = new LDKScoreHolder();
impl_holder.held = new Score(new bindings.LDKScore() {
- @Override public long channel_penalty_msat(long short_channel_id, long send_amt_msat, long capacity_msat, long source, long target) {
- NodeId source_hu_conv = null; if (source < 0 || source > 4096) { source_hu_conv = new NodeId(null, source); }
- NodeId target_hu_conv = null; if (target < 0 || target > 4096) { target_hu_conv = new NodeId(null, target); }
- long ret = arg.channel_penalty_msat(short_channel_id, send_amt_msat, capacity_msat, source_hu_conv, target_hu_conv);
+ @Override public long channel_penalty_msat(long short_channel_id, long source, long target, long usage) {
+ org.ldk.structs.NodeId source_hu_conv = null; if (source < 0 || source > 4096) { source_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.NodeId(null, source); }
+ org.ldk.structs.NodeId target_hu_conv = null; if (target < 0 || target > 4096) { target_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.NodeId(null, target); }
+ org.ldk.structs.ChannelUsage usage_hu_conv = null; if (usage < 0 || usage > 4096) { usage_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelUsage(null, usage); }
+ usage_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ long ret = arg.channel_penalty_msat(short_channel_id, source_hu_conv, target_hu_conv, usage_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
return ret;
}
RouteHop[] path_conv_10_arr = new RouteHop[path_conv_10_len];
for (int k = 0; k < path_conv_10_len; k++) {
long path_conv_10 = path[k];
- RouteHop path_conv_10_hu_conv = null; if (path_conv_10 < 0 || path_conv_10 > 4096) { path_conv_10_hu_conv = new RouteHop(null, path_conv_10); }
+ org.ldk.structs.RouteHop path_conv_10_hu_conv = null; if (path_conv_10 < 0 || path_conv_10 > 4096) { path_conv_10_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.RouteHop(null, path_conv_10); }
path_conv_10_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
path_conv_10_arr[k] = path_conv_10_hu_conv;
}
RouteHop[] path_conv_10_arr = new RouteHop[path_conv_10_len];
for (int k = 0; k < path_conv_10_len; k++) {
long path_conv_10 = path[k];
- RouteHop path_conv_10_hu_conv = null; if (path_conv_10 < 0 || path_conv_10 > 4096) { path_conv_10_hu_conv = new RouteHop(null, path_conv_10); }
+ org.ldk.structs.RouteHop path_conv_10_hu_conv = null; if (path_conv_10 < 0 || path_conv_10 > 4096) { path_conv_10_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.RouteHop(null, path_conv_10); }
path_conv_10_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
path_conv_10_arr[k] = path_conv_10_hu_conv;
}
* [`u64::max_value`] is given to indicate sufficient capacity for the invoice's full amount.
* Thus, implementations should be overflow-safe.
*/
- public long channel_penalty_msat(long short_channel_id, long send_amt_msat, long capacity_msat, NodeId source, NodeId target) {
- long ret = bindings.Score_channel_penalty_msat(this.ptr, short_channel_id, send_amt_msat, capacity_msat, source == null ? 0 : source.ptr & ~1, target == null ? 0 : target.ptr & ~1);
+ public long channel_penalty_msat(long short_channel_id, NodeId source, NodeId target, ChannelUsage usage) {
+ long ret = bindings.Score_channel_penalty_msat(this.ptr, short_channel_id, source == null ? 0 : source.ptr & ~1, target == null ? 0 : target.ptr & ~1, usage == null ? 0 : usage.ptr & ~1);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(short_channel_id);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(send_amt_msat);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(capacity_msat);
Reference.reachabilityFence(source);
Reference.reachabilityFence(target);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(usage);
this.ptrs_to.add(source);
this.ptrs_to.add(target);
return ret;