Merge pull request #120 from TheBlueMatt/main
[ldk-java] / src / main / java / org / ldk / structs / UnsignedChannelUpdate.java
index 47a7687f5246afb77ccbd4f58279d3281b6f8f48..7805cc07b208ec45311ac3105d1bdebdc72b713e 100644 (file)
@@ -4,7 +4,13 @@ import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
 import org.ldk.enums.*;
 import org.ldk.util.*;
 import java.util.Arrays;
+import java.lang.ref.Reference;
+import javax.annotation.Nullable;
 
+
+/**
+ * The unsigned part of a channel_update
+ */
 @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
 public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase {
        UnsignedChannelUpdate(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); }
@@ -14,92 +20,278 @@ public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase {
                if (ptr != 0) { bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_free(ptr); }
        }
 
+       /**
+        * The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
+        */
        public byte[] get_chain_hash() {
                byte[] ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_chain_hash(this.ptr);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                return ret;
        }
 
+       /**
+        * The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
+        */
        public void set_chain_hash(byte[] val) {
-               bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_chain_hash(this.ptr, val);
+               bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_chain_hash(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(val, 32));
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
        }
 
+       /**
+        * The short channel ID
+        */
        public long get_short_channel_id() {
                long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_short_channel_id(this.ptr);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                return ret;
        }
 
+       /**
+        * The short channel ID
+        */
        public void set_short_channel_id(long val) {
                bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_short_channel_id(this.ptr, val);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
        }
 
+       /**
+        * A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
+        */
        public int get_timestamp() {
                int ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_timestamp(this.ptr);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                return ret;
        }
 
+       /**
+        * A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
+        */
        public void set_timestamp(int val) {
                bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_timestamp(this.ptr, val);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
        }
 
+       /**
+        * Channel flags
+        */
        public byte get_flags() {
                byte ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_flags(this.ptr);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                return ret;
        }
 
+       /**
+        * Channel flags
+        */
        public void set_flags(byte val) {
                bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_flags(this.ptr, val);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
        }
 
+       /**
+        * The number of blocks such that if:
+        * `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
+        * then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, cltv_expiry_delta determines
+        * the outgoing HTLC's minimum cltv_expiry value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
+        * cltv_expiry of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a cltv_expiry_delta value of 10,
+        * then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's cltv_expiry value is at least 100010 before
+        * forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
+        * constructing the route.
+        */
        public short get_cltv_expiry_delta() {
                short ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                return ret;
        }
 
+       /**
+        * The number of blocks such that if:
+        * `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
+        * then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, cltv_expiry_delta determines
+        * the outgoing HTLC's minimum cltv_expiry value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
+        * cltv_expiry of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a cltv_expiry_delta value of 10,
+        * then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's cltv_expiry value is at least 100010 before
+        * forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
+        * constructing the route.
+        */
        public void set_cltv_expiry_delta(short val) {
                bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr, val);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
        }
 
+       /**
+        * The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
+        */
        public long get_htlc_minimum_msat() {
                long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                return ret;
        }
 
+       /**
+        * The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
+        */
        public void set_htlc_minimum_msat(long val) {
                bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr, val);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+       }
+
+       /**
+        * The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi. Used to be optional.
+        */
+       public long get_htlc_maximum_msat() {
+               long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_htlc_maximum_msat(this.ptr);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               return ret;
+       }
+
+       /**
+        * The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi. Used to be optional.
+        */
+       public void set_htlc_maximum_msat(long val) {
+               bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_htlc_maximum_msat(this.ptr, val);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
        }
 
+       /**
+        * The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
+        */
        public int get_fee_base_msat() {
                int ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_fee_base_msat(this.ptr);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                return ret;
        }
 
+       /**
+        * The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
+        */
        public void set_fee_base_msat(int val) {
                bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_fee_base_msat(this.ptr, val);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
        }
 
+       /**
+        * The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
+        */
        public int get_fee_proportional_millionths() {
                int ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                return ret;
        }
 
+       /**
+        * The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
+        */
        public void set_fee_proportional_millionths(int val) {
                bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+       }
+
+       /**
+        * Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
+        * to decode. This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the
+        * lightning gossip
+        * 
+        * Returns a copy of the field.
+        */
+       public byte[] get_excess_data() {
+               byte[] ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_excess_data(this.ptr);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               return ret;
+       }
+
+       /**
+        * Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
+        * to decode. This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the
+        * lightning gossip
+        */
+       public void set_excess_data(byte[] val) {
+               bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_excess_data(this.ptr, val);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
        }
 
+       /**
+        * Constructs a new UnsignedChannelUpdate given each field
+        */
+       public static UnsignedChannelUpdate of(byte[] chain_hash_arg, long short_channel_id_arg, int timestamp_arg, byte flags_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, long htlc_minimum_msat_arg, long htlc_maximum_msat_arg, int fee_base_msat_arg, int fee_proportional_millionths_arg, byte[] excess_data_arg) {
+               long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_new(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(chain_hash_arg, 32), short_channel_id_arg, timestamp_arg, flags_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, htlc_minimum_msat_arg, htlc_maximum_msat_arg, fee_base_msat_arg, fee_proportional_millionths_arg, excess_data_arg);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(chain_hash_arg);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(short_channel_id_arg);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(timestamp_arg);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(flags_arg);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(cltv_expiry_delta_arg);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_minimum_msat_arg);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_maximum_msat_arg);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_base_msat_arg);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_proportional_millionths_arg);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(excess_data_arg);
+               if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+               org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate(null, ret); }
+               if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
+               return ret_hu_conv;
+       }
+
+       long clone_ptr() {
+               long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_clone_ptr(this.ptr);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               return ret;
+       }
+
+       /**
+        * Creates a copy of the UnsignedChannelUpdate
+        */
        public UnsignedChannelUpdate clone() {
                long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_clone(this.ptr);
-               UnsignedChannelUpdate ret_hu_conv = new UnsignedChannelUpdate(null, ret);
-               ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+               org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate(null, ret); }
+               if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }
 
+       /**
+        * Checks if two UnsignedChannelUpdates contain equal inner contents.
+        * This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields.
+        * Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here.
+        */
+       public boolean eq(UnsignedChannelUpdate b) {
+               boolean ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_eq(this.ptr, b == null ? 0 : b.ptr);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(b);
+               if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(b); };
+               return ret;
+       }
+
+       @Override public boolean equals(Object o) {
+               if (!(o instanceof UnsignedChannelUpdate)) return false;
+               return this.eq((UnsignedChannelUpdate)o);
+       }
+       /**
+        * Serialize the UnsignedChannelUpdate object into a byte array which can be read by UnsignedChannelUpdate_read
+        */
        public byte[] write() {
                byte[] ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_write(this.ptr);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                return ret;
        }
 
-       public static Result_UnsignedChannelUpdateDecodeErrorZ constructor_read(byte[] ser) {
+       /**
+        * Read a UnsignedChannelUpdate from a byte array, created by UnsignedChannelUpdate_write
+        */
+       public static Result_UnsignedChannelUpdateDecodeErrorZ read(byte[] ser) {
                long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_read(ser);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
+               if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_UnsignedChannelUpdateDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_UnsignedChannelUpdateDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }