/**
- * The unsigned part of a channel_update
+ * The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message.
+ *
+ * [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
*/
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
public class UnsignedChannelUpdate extends CommonBase {
/**
* The number of blocks such that if:
* `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
- * then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, cltv_expiry_delta determines
- * the outgoing HTLC's minimum cltv_expiry value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
- * cltv_expiry of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a cltv_expiry_delta value of 10,
- * then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's cltv_expiry value is at least 100010 before
+ * then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
+ * the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
+ * `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
+ * then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
* forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
* constructing the route.
*/
/**
* The number of blocks such that if:
* `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
- * then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, cltv_expiry_delta determines
- * the outgoing HTLC's minimum cltv_expiry value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
- * cltv_expiry of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a cltv_expiry_delta value of 10,
- * then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's cltv_expiry value is at least 100010 before
+ * then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
+ * the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
+ * `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
+ * then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
* forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
* constructing the route.
*/
}
/**
- * The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi. Used to be optional.
+ * The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
+ *
+ * This used to be optional.
*/
public long get_htlc_maximum_msat() {
long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_get_htlc_maximum_msat(this.ptr);
}
/**
- * The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi. Used to be optional.
+ * The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
+ *
+ * This used to be optional.
*/
public void set_htlc_maximum_msat(long val) {
bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_htlc_maximum_msat(this.ptr, val);
/**
* Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
- * to decode. This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the
- * lightning gossip
+ * to decode.
+ *
+ * This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
*
* Returns a copy of the field.
*/
/**
* Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
- * to decode. This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the
- * lightning gossip
+ * to decode.
+ *
+ * This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
*/
public void set_excess_data(byte[] val) {
bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_set_excess_data(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(excess_data_arg);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate(null, ret); }
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate(null, ret); }
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
+ /**
+ * Generates a non-cryptographic 64-bit hash of the UnsignedChannelUpdate.
+ */
+ public long hash() {
+ long ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_hash(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ @Override public int hashCode() {
+ return (int)this.hash();
+ }
+ /**
+ * Checks if two UnsignedChannelUpdates contain equal inner contents.
+ * This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields.
+ * Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here.
+ */
+ public boolean eq(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelUpdate b) {
+ boolean ret = bindings.UnsignedChannelUpdate_eq(this.ptr, b.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(b);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(b); };
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ @Override public boolean equals(Object o) {
+ if (!(o instanceof UnsignedChannelUpdate)) return false;
+ return this.eq((UnsignedChannelUpdate)o);
+ }
/**
* Serialize the UnsignedChannelUpdate object into a byte array which can be read by UnsignedChannelUpdate_read
*/