X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;ds=sidebyside;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=3aa5c7b2d6ca0c2c377128b86fd62c5899dbcf14;hb=fe12a57464609ae43f42e029baa0dac6dfb40c24;hp=cdde8bd85325f9a68f5ed1ed4510c891428421c7;hpb=61341df39e90de9d650851a624c0644f5c9dd055;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index cdde8bd8..3aa5c7b2 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -49,14 +49,14 @@ use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters}; use ln::msgs; use ln::msgs::NetAddress; use ln::onion_utils; -use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField}; +use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField}; use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner}; use util::config::UserConfig; use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; use util::{byte_utils, events}; use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer}; use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader}; -use util::logger::{Logger, Level}; +use util::logger::{Level, Logger}; use util::errors::APIError; use io; @@ -67,10 +67,299 @@ use io::{Cursor, Read}; use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard}; use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use core::time::Duration; -#[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))] -use std::time::Instant; use core::ops::Deref; +#[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))] +use std::time::Instant; + +mod inbound_payment { + use alloc::string::ToString; + use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine}; + use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq; + use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine}; + use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; + use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign}; + use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret}; + use ln::channelmanager::APIError; + use ln::msgs; + use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT; + use util::chacha20::ChaCha20; + use util::logger::Logger; + + use core::convert::TryInto; + use core::ops::Deref; + + const IV_LEN: usize = 16; + const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16; + const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32; + const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8; + // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to + // retrieve said payment type bits. + const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5; + + /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to + /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]. + /// + /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material + pub(super) struct ExpandedKey { + /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and + /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption). + metadata_key: [u8; 32], + /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously + /// registered with LDK. + ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32], + /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously + /// registered with LDK. + user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32], + } + + impl ExpandedKey { + pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey { + hkdf_extract_expand(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material) + } + } + + enum Method { + LdkPaymentHash = 0, + UserPaymentHash = 1, + } + + impl Method { + fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result { + match bits { + bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash), + bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash), + unknown => Err(unknown), + } + } + } + + pub(super) fn create(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> + where K::Target: KeysInterface + { + let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?; + + let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN]; + let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]); + + let mut hmac = HmacEngine::::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key); + hmac.input(&iv_bytes); + hmac.input(&metadata_bytes); + let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(); + + let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner()); + let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key); + Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret)) + } + + pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result { + let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?; + + let mut hmac = HmacEngine::::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key); + hmac.input(&metadata_bytes); + hmac.input(&payment_hash.0); + let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(); + + let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN]; + iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]); + + Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key)) + } + + fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> { + if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT { + return Err(()); + } + + let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat { + Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(), + None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN], + }; + min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET; + + // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when + // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more + // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we + // absolutely never fail a payment too early. + // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps. + let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes(); + + let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN]; + metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes); + metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes); + + Ok(metadata_bytes) + } + + fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret { + let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32]; + let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN); + iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes); + + let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes); + for i in 0..METADATA_LEN { + encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i]; + } + PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes) + } + + /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane. + /// + /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment + /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the + /// payment. + /// + /// The metadata is constructed as: + /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes) + /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]. + /// + /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret + /// match what was constructed. + /// + /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to + /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former + /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as + /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`]. + /// + /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and + /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata + /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on + /// payment receipt. + /// + /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash + /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment + /// hash and metadata on payment receipt. + /// + /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used. + /// + /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material + /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment + /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + pub(super) fn verify(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result, ()> + where L::Target: Logger + { + let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys); + + let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET); + let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN]; + amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]); + // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type. + amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111; + let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into()); + let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap()); + + // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing + // attacks. + let mut payment_preimage = None; + match payment_type_res { + Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => { + let mut hmac = HmacEngine::::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key); + hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]); + hmac.input(&payment_hash.0); + if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) { + log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + return Err(()) + } + }, + Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => { + match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) { + Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage), + Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => { + log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes)); + return Err(()) + } + } + }, + Err(unknown_bits) => { + log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits); + return Err(()); + } + } + + if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat { + log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat); + return Err(()) + } + + if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp { + log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + return Err(()) + } + + Ok(payment_preimage) + } + + pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result { + let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys); + + match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) { + Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => { + derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) + .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError { + err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes)) + }) + }, + Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { + err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string() + }), + Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }), + } + } + + fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) { + let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN]; + let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN); + iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice); + + let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes); + let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN]; + for i in 0..METADATA_LEN { + metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i]; + } + + (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) + } + + // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in + // this case. + fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result { + let mut hmac = HmacEngine::::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key); + hmac.input(iv_bytes); + hmac.input(metadata_bytes); + let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(); + if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) { + return Err(decoded_payment_preimage); + } + return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage)) + } + + fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey { + let mut hmac = HmacEngine::::new(salt); + hmac.input(&ikm.0); + let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(); + let mut hmac = HmacEngine::::new(&prk[..]); + hmac.input(&[1; 1]); + let metadata_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(); + + let mut hmac = HmacEngine::::new(&prk[..]); + hmac.input(&metadata_key); + hmac.input(&[2; 1]); + let ldk_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(); + + let mut hmac = HmacEngine::::new(&prk[..]); + hmac.input(&ldk_pmt_hash_key); + hmac.input(&[3; 1]); + let user_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(); + + ExpandedKey { + metadata_key, + ldk_pmt_hash_key, + user_pmt_hash_key, + } + } +} + // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself: // // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should @@ -413,6 +702,9 @@ struct PeerState { /// /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that /// here. +/// +/// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data +/// and instead encoding it in the payment secret. struct PendingInboundPayment { /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment payment_secret: PaymentSecret, @@ -449,6 +741,18 @@ pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment { /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled. Fulfilled { session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>, + payment_hash: Option, + }, + /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a + /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race + /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple + /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a + /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed. + /// + /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164 + Abandoned { + session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>, + payment_hash: PaymentHash, }, } @@ -465,6 +769,12 @@ impl PendingOutboundPayment { _ => false, } } + fn abandoned(&self) -> bool { + match self { + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true, + _ => false, + } + } fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option { match self { PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(), @@ -472,15 +782,43 @@ impl PendingOutboundPayment { } } + fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option { + match self { + PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None, + PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash), + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash, + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash), + } + } + fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) { let mut session_privs = HashSet::new(); core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self { PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } | PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } - => session_privs + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } | + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } + => session_privs, }); - *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs }; + let payment_hash = self.payment_hash(); + *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash }; + } + + fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> { + let mut session_privs = HashSet::new(); + let our_payment_hash; + core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self { + PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } | + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => + return Err(()), + PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } | + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => { + our_payment_hash = *payment_hash; + session_privs + }, + }); + *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash }; + Ok(()) } /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled @@ -488,7 +826,8 @@ impl PendingOutboundPayment { let remove_res = match self { PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } | PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => { + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } | + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => { session_privs.remove(session_priv) } }; @@ -511,7 +850,8 @@ impl PendingOutboundPayment { PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => { session_privs.insert(session_priv) } - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false, + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false, }; if insert_res { if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self { @@ -529,7 +869,8 @@ impl PendingOutboundPayment { match self { PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } | PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => { + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } | + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => { session_privs.len() } } @@ -639,6 +980,8 @@ pub struct ChannelManager, /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound. pub user_channel_id: u64, + /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel. + /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this + /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close. + /// + /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose + /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include + /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent. + /// This does not consider any on-chain fees. + /// + /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] + pub balance_msat: u64, /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include - /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not + /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent. /// + /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] + /// /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we /// should be able to spend nearly this amount. pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64, /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not - /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not + /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs). /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this. @@ -1141,7 +1501,7 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { res } }; ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { - handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new()); + handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new()) } } @@ -1169,7 +1529,7 @@ macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err { macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked { ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr, $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr, - $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { { + $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { { let mut htlc_forwards = None; let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); @@ -1204,14 +1564,14 @@ macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked { node_id: counterparty_node_id, msg, }); - if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) { - $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: counterparty_node_id, - msg: announcement_sigs, - }); - } $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id()); } + if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs { + $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + msg, + }); + } let funding_broadcastable: Option = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update { @@ -1315,7 +1675,8 @@ impl ChannelMana pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self { let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); - + let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material(); + let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material); ChannelManager { default_configuration: config.clone(), genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(), @@ -1339,6 +1700,8 @@ impl ChannelMana our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), secp_ctx, + inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key, + last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0), highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0), @@ -1398,7 +1761,8 @@ impl ChannelMana let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap(); let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration }; - Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config)? + Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, + channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())? }, None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }), } @@ -1435,6 +1799,7 @@ impl ChannelMana res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len()); for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) { let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(); + let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat(); let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) = channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(); res.push(ChannelDetails { @@ -1449,6 +1814,7 @@ impl ChannelMana short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis, + balance_msat, inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat, user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), @@ -1959,17 +2325,24 @@ impl ChannelMana break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap()))); } let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1; - // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty - // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational) + // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, + // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see + // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap()))); } if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None)); } - // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS. - // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay. - if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 { + // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our + // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with + // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and + // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline. + // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure + // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it, + // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our + // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments. + if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 { break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap()))); } @@ -2085,6 +2458,21 @@ impl ChannelMana Some(id) => id.clone(), }; + macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment { + () => { + let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { + session_privs: HashSet::new(), + pending_amt_msat: 0, + pending_fee_msat: Some(0), + payment_hash: *payment_hash, + payment_secret: *payment_secret, + starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), + total_msat: total_value, + }); + assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path)); + } + } + let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) { match { @@ -2094,7 +2482,7 @@ impl ChannelMana if !chan.get().is_live() { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()}); } - let send_res = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit( + break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit( htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path: path.clone(), session_priv: session_priv.clone(), @@ -2103,20 +2491,7 @@ impl ChannelMana payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(), payee: payee.clone(), }, onion_packet, &self.logger), - channel_state, chan); - - let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { - session_privs: HashSet::new(), - pending_amt_msat: 0, - pending_fee_msat: Some(0), - payment_hash: *payment_hash, - payment_secret: *payment_secret, - starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), - total_msat: total_value, - }); - assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path)); - - send_res + channel_state, chan) } { Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => { if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { @@ -2126,8 +2501,10 @@ impl ChannelMana // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below. + insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above. return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed); } + insert_outbound_payment!(); log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { @@ -2142,7 +2519,7 @@ impl ChannelMana }, }); }, - None => {}, + None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); }, } } else { unreachable!(); } return Ok(()); @@ -2275,6 +2652,9 @@ impl ChannelMana } else { None }, }) } else if has_err { + // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into + // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all. + debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none()); Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect())) } else { Ok(payment_id) @@ -2285,10 +2665,12 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the - /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment - /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success). + /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment + /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if + /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`]. /// /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] + /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10; for path in route.paths.iter() { @@ -2320,8 +2702,13 @@ impl ChannelMana })) }, PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError { - err: "Payment already completed" + return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { + err: "Payment already completed".to_owned() + })); + }, + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => { + return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { + err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned() })); }, } @@ -2334,6 +2721,37 @@ impl ChannelMana return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ()) } + /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur. + /// + /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id` + /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated, + /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining + /// pending HTLCs for this payment. + /// + /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still + /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to + /// determine the ultimate status of a payment. + /// + /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment + /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed + /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent + pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + + let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) { + if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() { + if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { + self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed { + payment_id, + payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"), + }); + payment.remove(); + } + } + } + } + /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node @@ -2415,7 +2833,8 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]. /// - /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel. + /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided + /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`]. /// /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction @@ -2430,6 +2849,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction. /// /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady + /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); @@ -2467,27 +2887,6 @@ impl ChannelMana }) } - fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option { - if !chan.should_announce() { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); - return None - } - - let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing - }; - let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]); - let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key); - - Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures { - channel_id: chan.channel_id(), - short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), - node_signature: our_node_sig, - bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig, - }) - } - #[allow(dead_code)] // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when @@ -2545,7 +2944,7 @@ impl ChannelMana let mut announced_chans = false; for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { - if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) { + if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) { @@ -2633,7 +3032,7 @@ impl ChannelMana htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, }); - match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) { + match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) { Err(e) => { if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg); @@ -2786,6 +3185,59 @@ impl ChannelMana } } + macro_rules! check_total_value { + ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{ + let mut total_value = 0; + let mut payment_received_generated = false; + let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) + .or_insert(Vec::new()); + if htlcs.len() == 1 { + if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); + continue + } + } + htlcs.push(claimable_htlc); + for htlc in htlcs.iter() { + total_value += htlc.value; + match &htlc.onion_payload { + OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => { + if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})", + log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat); + total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT; + } + if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; } + }, + _ => unreachable!(), + } + } + if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)", + log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat); + for htlc in htlcs.iter() { + fail_htlc!(htlc); + } + } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat { + new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { + payment_hash, + purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { + payment_preimage: $payment_preimage, + payment_secret: $payment_secret, + }, + amt: total_value, + }); + payment_received_generated = true; + } else { + // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total + // payment value yet, wait until we receive more + // MPP parts. + } + payment_received_generated + }} + } + // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose @@ -2796,9 +3248,17 @@ impl ChannelMana match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) { hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { match claimable_htlc.onion_payload { - OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); + OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => { + let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) { + Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage, + Err(()) => { + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); + continue + } + }; + let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat; + let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone(); + check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage); }, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => { match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) { @@ -2835,55 +3295,9 @@ impl ChannelMana log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap()); fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); } else { - let mut total_value = 0; - let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) - .or_insert(Vec::new()); - if htlcs.len() == 1 { - if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); - continue - } - } - htlcs.push(claimable_htlc); - for htlc in htlcs.iter() { - total_value += htlc.value; - match &htlc.onion_payload { - OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => { - if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})", - log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat); - total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT; - } - if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; } - }, - _ => unreachable!(), - } - } - if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)", - log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat); - for htlc in htlcs.iter() { - fail_htlc!(htlc); - } - } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat { - new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { - payment_hash, - purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { - payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage, - payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret, - user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id, - }, - amt: total_value, - }); - // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived - // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't - // claimed. + let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage); + if payment_received_generated { inbound_payment.remove_entry(); - } else { - // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total - // payment value yet, wait until we receive more - // MPP parts. } } }, @@ -3160,22 +3574,28 @@ impl ChannelMana final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta, }) } else { None }; - self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push( - events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { - payment_id: Some(payment_id), - payment_hash, - rejected_by_dest: false, - network_update: None, - all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0, - path: path.clone(), - short_channel_id: None, - retry, - #[cfg(test)] - error_code: None, - #[cfg(test)] - error_data: None, - } - ); + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { + payment_id: Some(payment_id), + payment_hash, + rejected_by_dest: false, + network_update: None, + all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0, + path: path.clone(), + short_channel_id: None, + retry, + #[cfg(test)] + error_code: None, + #[cfg(test)] + error_data: None, + }); + if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { + pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed { + payment_id, + payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"), + }); + payment.remove(); + } } } else { log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); @@ -3206,6 +3626,7 @@ impl ChannelMana session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); let mut all_paths_failed = false; + let mut full_failure_ev = None; if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) { if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) { log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); @@ -3217,6 +3638,13 @@ impl ChannelMana } if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { all_paths_failed = true; + if payment.get().abandoned() { + full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed { + payment_id, + payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"), + }); + payment.remove(); + } } } else { log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); @@ -3232,7 +3660,8 @@ impl ChannelMana }) } else { None }; log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - match &onion_error { + + let path_failure = match &onion_error { &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => { #[cfg(test)] let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone()); @@ -3241,22 +3670,20 @@ impl ChannelMana // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our // next-hop is needlessly blaming us! - self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push( - events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { - payment_id: Some(payment_id), - payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), - rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable, - network_update, - all_paths_failed, - path: path.clone(), - short_channel_id, - retry, + events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { + payment_id: Some(payment_id), + payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), + rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable, + network_update, + all_paths_failed, + path: path.clone(), + short_channel_id, + retry, #[cfg(test)] - error_code: onion_error_code, + error_code: onion_error_code, #[cfg(test)] - error_data: onion_error_data - } - ); + error_data: onion_error_data + } }, &HTLCFailReason::Reason { #[cfg(test)] @@ -3271,24 +3698,25 @@ impl ChannelMana // ChannelDetails. // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway. - self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push( - events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { - payment_id: Some(payment_id), - payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), - rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1, - network_update: None, - all_paths_failed, - path: path.clone(), - short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id), - retry, + events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { + payment_id: Some(payment_id), + payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), + rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1, + network_update: None, + all_paths_failed, + path: path.clone(), + short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id), + retry, #[cfg(test)] - error_code: Some(*failure_code), + error_code: Some(*failure_code), #[cfg(test)] - error_data: Some(data.clone()), - } - ); + error_data: Some(data.clone()), + } } - } + }; + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events.push(path_failure); + if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); } }, HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => { let err_packet = match onion_error { @@ -3326,19 +3754,21 @@ impl ChannelMana } } - /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and - /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you - /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true! + /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any + /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment. /// /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived` /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment. /// - /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event. + /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now + /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]. /// + /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool { let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); @@ -3476,14 +3906,23 @@ impl ChannelMana } fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec) { + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); for source in sources.drain(..) { - if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } = source { + if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source { let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32]; session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) { assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled()); - payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None); + if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) { + pending_events.push( + events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { + payment_id, + payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(), + path, + } + ); + } if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { payment.remove(); } @@ -3500,9 +3939,21 @@ impl ChannelMana session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) { - let found_payment = !payment.get().is_fulfilled(); - let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat(); - payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled(); + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() { + let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); + let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat(); + pending_events.push( + events::Event::PaymentSent { + payment_id: Some(payment_id), + payment_preimage, + payment_hash, + fee_paid_msat, + } + ); + payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled(); + } + if from_onchain { // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain. // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early, @@ -3510,22 +3961,21 @@ impl ChannelMana // restart. // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments // irrevocably fulfilled. - payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)); + if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) { + let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner())); + pending_events.push( + events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { + payment_id, + payment_hash, + path, + } + ); + } + if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { payment.remove(); } } - if found_payment { - let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); - self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push( - events::Event::PaymentSent { - payment_id: Some(payment_id), - payment_preimage, - payment_hash: payment_hash, - fee_paid_msat, - } - ); - } } else { log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0)); } @@ -3602,18 +4052,19 @@ impl ChannelMana return; } - let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger); - let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() { + let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()); + let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() { // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a - // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the - // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public - // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel. + // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a + // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public + // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees + // now. Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(), }) } else { None }; - chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked); + chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs); if let Some(upd) = channel_update { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); } @@ -3631,7 +4082,12 @@ impl ChannelMana return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } - let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration) + if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); + } + + let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), + &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger) .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?; let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; @@ -3774,23 +4230,21 @@ impl ChannelMana if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); - if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); - // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our - // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote - // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking - // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever - // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs - // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer - // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware - // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs - // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network. + let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(), + self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan); + if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: announcement_sigs, }); } else if chan.get().is_usable() { + // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public) + // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our + // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a + // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an + // announcement_signatures. + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(), @@ -4194,7 +4648,8 @@ impl ChannelMana } channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { - msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan), + msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures( + self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan), // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced, // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here. update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(), @@ -4255,10 +4710,11 @@ impl ChannelMana // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here. - let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) = - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); + let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish( + msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash, + &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan); let mut channel_update = None; - if let Some(msg) = shutdown { + if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, @@ -4273,11 +4729,13 @@ impl ChannelMana }); } let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take(); - chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked); + chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!( + self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order, + responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs); if let Some(upd) = channel_update { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); } - (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) + (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } @@ -4503,9 +4961,13 @@ impl ChannelMana } } - fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result { + fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result { assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106 + if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) }); + } + let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); @@ -4513,9 +4975,10 @@ impl ChannelMana match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) { hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(PendingInboundPayment { - payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage, + payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage, + user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - - // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in + // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future. // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely // never fail a payment too early. @@ -4533,7 +4996,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// to pay us. /// /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the - /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second. + /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you. /// /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be @@ -4541,17 +5004,37 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements. /// + /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by + /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime. + /// + /// # Note + /// + /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then + /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received. + /// + /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply. + /// /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash - pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) { + pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> { + inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64) + } + + /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share + /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier. + /// + /// # Note + /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon. + /// + /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment + #[deprecated] + pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> { let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); - - (payment_hash, - self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id) - .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash")) + let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?; + Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) } /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is @@ -4561,14 +5044,9 @@ impl ChannelMana /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided. /// - /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This - /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending. - /// - /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to - /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and - /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply - /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events - /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere. + /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though + /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound + /// payments. /// /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat` @@ -4587,20 +5065,45 @@ impl ChannelMana /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of /// [`PaymentReceived`]. /// - /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this - /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and - /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation. - /// /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year. /// /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry` /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`]. /// + /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by + /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime. + /// + /// # Note + /// + /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then + /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received. + /// + /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply. + /// /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived - /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id - pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result { - self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id) + pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result { + inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64) + } + + /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share + /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier. + /// + /// # Note + /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon. + /// + /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + #[deprecated] + pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result { + self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs) + } + + /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were + /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. + /// + /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment + pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result { + inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key) } #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))] @@ -4615,6 +5118,11 @@ impl ChannelMana pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool { !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty() } + + #[cfg(test)] + pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) { + self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear() + } } impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager @@ -4730,7 +5238,7 @@ where *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height) } - self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)); } } @@ -4751,7 +5259,8 @@ where log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height); let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new()))); + self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger) + .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b))); } fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) { @@ -4766,7 +5275,7 @@ where *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height); - self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)); macro_rules! max_time { ($timestamp: expr) => { @@ -4791,14 +5300,19 @@ where inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64 }); + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); - outbounds.retain(|_, payment| { - const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3; + outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| { if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true } - if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment { - return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height - } - true + if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment { + if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height { + log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed { + payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash, + }); + false + } else { true } + } else { true } }); } @@ -4818,9 +5332,9 @@ where self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| { if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() { if funding_txo.txid == *txid { - channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new())) - } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) } - } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) } + channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None)) + } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) } + } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) } }); } } @@ -4836,7 +5350,7 @@ where /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by /// the function. - fn do_chain_event) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>> + fn do_chain_event) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option), ClosureReason>> (&self, height_opt: Option, f: FN) { // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. @@ -4851,7 +5365,7 @@ where let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| { let res = f(channel); - if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res { + if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res { for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) { let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { @@ -4859,29 +5373,40 @@ where data: chan_update, })); } - if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res { + if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: funding_locked, }); - if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg: announcement_sigs, - }); - } else if channel.is_usable() { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + if channel.is_usable() { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(), }); } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); } short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()); } - } else if let Err(e) = res { + if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg: announcement_sigs, + }); + if let Some(height) = height_opt { + if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { + msg: announcement, + // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced, + // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here. + update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(), + }); + } + } + } + } else if let Err(reason) = res { if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } @@ -4893,10 +5418,14 @@ where msg: update }); } - self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + let reason_message = format!("{}", reason); + self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason); pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }, + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { + channel_id: channel.channel_id(), + data: reason_message, + } }, }); return false; } @@ -4936,8 +5465,9 @@ where /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken /// up. - /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function. - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))] + /// + /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature. + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))] pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool { self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait) } @@ -5232,7 +5762,7 @@ impl PersistenceNotifier { } } - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))] + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))] fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool { let current_time = Instant::now(); loop { @@ -5535,6 +6065,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment, }, (1, Fulfilled) => { (0, session_privs, required), + (1, payment_hash, option), }, (2, Retryable) => { (0, session_privs, required), @@ -5545,6 +6076,10 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment, (8, pending_amt_msat, required), (10, starting_block_height, required), }, + (3, Abandoned) => { + (0, session_privs, required), + (2, payment_hash, required), + }, ); impl Writeable for ChannelManager @@ -5638,7 +6173,7 @@ impl Writeable f // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length. let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0; for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() { - if !outbound.is_fulfilled() { + if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() { num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64; } } @@ -5652,6 +6187,7 @@ impl Writeable f } } PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {}, + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {}, } } @@ -5815,7 +6351,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut channel_closures = Vec::new(); for _ in 0..channel_count { - let mut channel: Channel = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?; + let mut channel: Channel = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?; let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?; funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone()); if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) { @@ -5850,6 +6386,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager }); } else { + log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id()); } @@ -5867,6 +6404,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() { if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) { + log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id())); monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); } } @@ -6027,6 +6565,8 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures); } + let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material(); + let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material); let channel_manager = ChannelManager { genesis_hash, fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator, @@ -6042,6 +6582,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> claimable_htlcs, pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), }), + inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key, pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments), pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), @@ -6080,23 +6621,25 @@ mod tests { use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; use core::time::Duration; + use core::sync::atomic::Ordering; use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret}; use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure}; + use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment; use ln::features::InitFeatures; use ln::functional_test_utils::*; use ln::msgs; use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route}; - use routing::scorer::Scorer; use util::errors::APIError; use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; + use util::test_utils; #[cfg(feature = "std")] #[test] fn test_wait_timeout() { use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier; use sync::Arc; - use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; + use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool; use std::thread; let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new()); @@ -6301,9 +6844,10 @@ mod tests { nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); - // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No - // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes. + // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first + // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success. let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 3); match events[0] { Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id); @@ -6312,6 +6856,22 @@ mod tests { }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } + match events[1] { + Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => { + assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id); + assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap()); + assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match events[2] { + Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => { + assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id); + assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap()); + assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } } #[test] @@ -6325,7 +6885,7 @@ mod tests { let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); - let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0); + let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0); // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it. let expected_route = [&nodes[1]]; @@ -6338,8 +6898,8 @@ mod tests { final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV, }; let route = find_route( - &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, - &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer + &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None, + nodes[0].logger, &scorer ).unwrap(); nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); @@ -6369,8 +6929,8 @@ mod tests { // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it. let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]); let route = find_route( - &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, - &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer + &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None, + nodes[0].logger, &scorer ).unwrap(); let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); @@ -6428,9 +6988,9 @@ mod tests { final_value_msat: 10000, final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40, }; - let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph; + let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph; let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels(); - let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0); + let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0); let route = find_route( &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::>()), nodes[0].logger, &scorer @@ -6471,9 +7031,9 @@ mod tests { final_value_msat: 10000, final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40, }; - let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph; + let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph; let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels(); - let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0); + let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0); let route = find_route( &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::>()), nodes[0].logger, &scorer @@ -6525,6 +7085,35 @@ mod tests { _ => panic!("unexpected error") } } + + #[test] + fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() { + // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]); + let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { + payment_secret, + total_msat: 100_000, + }; + + // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original, + // payment verification fails as expected. + let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone(); + bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1; + match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) { + Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"), + Err(()) => { + nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1); + } + } + + // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds. + assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok()); + } } #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))] @@ -6538,7 +7127,7 @@ pub mod bench { use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init}; use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph; use routing::router::{Payee, get_route}; - use routing::scorer::Scorer; + use routing::scoring::Scorer; use util::test_utils; use util::config::UserConfig; use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose}; @@ -6646,7 +7235,7 @@ pub mod bench { macro_rules! send_payment { ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => { let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels(); - let payee = Payee::new($node_b.get_our_node_id()) + let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id()) .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known()); let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0); let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph, @@ -6656,7 +7245,7 @@ pub mod bench { payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes()); payment_count += 1; let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()); - let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap(); + let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap(); $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap(); let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());