X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;ds=sidebyside;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=52ea21f07591e86eaff4436c1d4dc515c9a9725c;hb=d2955be5cf7fa96057c416a7899e7db6a0c5e622;hp=f134f74aa1f22b362cb546141e6b989959c1dca8;hpb=e84f5edbc5b959c7bbad17b5968f2c9e32df68df;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index f134f74a..52ea21f0 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -578,7 +578,10 @@ pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO? /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments. /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least /// this value. -pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER; +// Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for +// any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while +// a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe. +pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3; // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within @@ -590,7 +593,7 @@ pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER; #[allow(dead_code)] const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; -// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See +// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed. #[deny(const_err)] #[allow(dead_code)] @@ -1743,13 +1746,17 @@ impl ChannelMana /// only Tor Onion addresses. /// /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500). - pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec) { + pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); if addresses.len() > 500 { panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!"); } + // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that + // addresses be sorted for future compatibility. + addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id()); + let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement { features: NodeFeatures::known(), timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32, @@ -2536,6 +2543,7 @@ impl ChannelMana }, } if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable { + log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid()); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); } if let Some(msg) = funding_locked { @@ -2691,6 +2699,7 @@ impl ChannelMana hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; + log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid()); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx); Ok(()) } @@ -2805,7 +2814,7 @@ impl ChannelMana } }; if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx)); + log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx)); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx); } if let Some(chan) = chan_option {