X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;ds=sidebyside;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Ffunctional_tests.rs;h=7a39db2f312b1bf97b7a340906d55018b6d13e53;hb=7af9976261436fe2357a187c2aaa6792fb0506c6;hp=9a0c06e776cf4db266050b7986d08dc7fab67d2b;hpb=feeb89305a449703a341ce52bca8b3194c716f60;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 9a0c06e7..7a39db2f 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ //! claim outputs on-chain. use chain; +use chain::Listen; use chain::Watch; use chain::channelmonitor; use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY}; @@ -8225,7 +8226,7 @@ fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() { watchtower }; let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&header, &[], 200); + watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200); // Try to update ChannelMonitor assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage, &None, 9_000_000)); @@ -8284,7 +8285,7 @@ fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() { watchtower }; let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&header, &vec![], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS); + watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS); // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout { @@ -8310,7 +8311,7 @@ fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() { watchtower }; let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&header, &vec![], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS); + watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS); // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); @@ -8336,7 +8337,8 @@ fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() { check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout - watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&header, &vec![], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS); + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS); // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout let bob_state_y; @@ -8348,7 +8350,8 @@ fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() { }; // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout - watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&header, &vec![(0, &bob_state_y)], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS); + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS); { let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due @@ -8825,3 +8828,53 @@ fn test_error_chans_closed() { assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1); assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2); } + +#[test] +fn test_invalid_funding_tx() { + // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer. + // + // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize + // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical + // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had + // un-released crashes in the sanitization process). + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())); + nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())); + + let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42); + for output in tx.output.iter_mut() { + // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey + output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new(); + } + + nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0); + + assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx); + nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear(); + + confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] { + assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action { + assert_eq!(msg.data, "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index"); + } else { panic!(); } + } else { panic!(); } + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); +}