X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;ds=sidebyside;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Frouting%2Fnetwork_graph.rs;h=a26b549b43d45de4d96cc91ddf3d32921c241f3b;hb=1a24dcc3e91240e5b1d1df24bfde063e84da1472;hp=67dc302246325b7efa219e98acdde875e5be702c;hpb=4677e14c007a5453613afc20b088cbe938251226;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/routing/network_graph.rs b/lightning/src/routing/network_graph.rs index 67dc3022..a26b549b 100644 --- a/lightning/src/routing/network_graph.rs +++ b/lightning/src/routing/network_graph.rs @@ -249,6 +249,14 @@ where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger self.chain_access = chain_access; } + /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in + /// [`NetGraphMsgHandler::new`]. + /// + /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet + pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G { + &self.network_graph + } + /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer. fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool { //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map. @@ -286,10 +294,21 @@ where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger } macro_rules! secp_verify_sig { - ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr ) => { + ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => { match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) { Ok(_) => {}, - Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: "Invalid signature from remote node".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}), + Err(_) => { + return Err(LightningError { + err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type), + action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage { + msg: msgs::WarningMessage { + channel_id: [0; 32], + data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type), + }, + log_level: Level::Trace, + }, + }); + }, } }; } @@ -842,7 +861,7 @@ impl NetworkGraph { /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol. pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result<(), LightningError> { let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]); - secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id); + secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"); self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg)) } @@ -902,10 +921,10 @@ impl NetworkGraph { C::Target: chain::Access, { let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]); - secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1); - secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2); - secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1); - secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2); + secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"); + secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"); + secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"); + secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"); self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access) } @@ -1074,6 +1093,8 @@ impl NetworkGraph { /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here. /// + /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be + /// automatically called regularly for you. /// /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use. @@ -1132,6 +1153,9 @@ impl NetworkGraph { /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol. + /// + /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or + /// materially in the future will be rejected. pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result<(), LightningError> { self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx))) } @@ -1139,6 +1163,9 @@ impl NetworkGraph { /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers. + /// + /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or + /// materially in the future will be rejected. pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> { self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1)>) } @@ -1148,6 +1175,19 @@ impl NetworkGraph { let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1); let chan_was_enabled; + #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))] + { + // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we + // disable this check during tests! + let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs(); + if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { + return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)}); + } + if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 { + return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)}); + } + } + let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap(); match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) { None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}), @@ -1210,7 +1250,7 @@ impl NetworkGraph { secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{ err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug) - })?); + })?, "channel_update"); } maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two); } else { @@ -1219,7 +1259,7 @@ impl NetworkGraph { secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{ err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug) - })?); + })?, "channel_update"); } maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one); } @@ -1493,7 +1533,7 @@ mod tests { contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone() }) { Ok(_) => panic!(), - Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node") + Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message") }; let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| { @@ -1622,7 +1662,7 @@ mod tests { invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new(); match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) { Ok(_) => panic!(), - Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node") + Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message") }; let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx); @@ -1731,7 +1771,7 @@ mod tests { invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey); match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) { Ok(_) => panic!(), - Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node") + Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message") }; }