X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;ds=sidebyside;f=src%2Fmain%2Fjava%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FChannelManager.java;h=883234c20afbe9ab91322b0ce1470af6a65e2da4;hb=890e35a4387758c0447aab34166caa579bbf3a08;hp=c5afb1964e181236eeaf01bd593594c63ff5f053;hpb=1b870a3ffab1c0024411e30102bc6d198300f095;p=ldk-java
diff --git a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java
index c5afb196..883234c2 100644
--- a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java
+++ b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
import org.ldk.enums.*;
import org.ldk.util.*;
import java.util.Arrays;
+import java.lang.ref.Reference;
+import javax.annotation.Nullable;
/**
@@ -36,7 +38,7 @@ import java.util.Arrays;
* ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
* spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
* offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
- * timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
+ * timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
*
* Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
* a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
@@ -61,43 +63,85 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
*
* Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
*
- * panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
- *
* Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
* disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
* from after `params.latest_hash`.
*/
- public static ChannelManager constructor_new(FeeEstimator fee_est, Watch chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, Logger logger, KeysInterface keys_manager, UserConfig config, LDKNetwork params_network_arg, byte[] params_latest_hash_arg, long params_latest_height_arg) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est == null ? 0 : fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor == null ? 0 : chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : tx_broadcaster.ptr, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr & ~1, bindings.ChainParameters_new(params_network_arg, params_latest_hash_arg, params_latest_height_arg));
- ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = new ChannelManager(null, ret);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(fee_est);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(chain_monitor);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(tx_broadcaster);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(config);
+ public static ChannelManager of(FeeEstimator fee_est, Watch chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, Logger logger, KeysInterface keys_manager, UserConfig config, ChainParameters params) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est == null ? 0 : fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor == null ? 0 : chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : tx_broadcaster.ptr, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr, params == null ? 0 : params.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_est);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(chain_monitor);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(tx_broadcaster);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(config);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(params);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(fee_est); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(chain_monitor); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(tx_broadcaster); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(config); };
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(params); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
+ */
+ public UserConfig get_current_default_configuration() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_current_default_configuration(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.UserConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UserConfig(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
*
- * user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
- * FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
- * create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
- * may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
+ * `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
+ * correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
+ * for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
+ * `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
+ * ignored.
*
- * If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
- * PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
+ * Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
+ * greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
*
- * Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
- * greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
+ * Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
+ * connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
+ * the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
+ *
+ * Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
+ * [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
+ * [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
+ * one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
+ * immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
+ *
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
+ *
+ * Note that override_config (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
*/
- public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, long user_id, UserConfig override_config) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr & ~1);
- Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- this.ptrs_to.add(override_config);
+ public Result__u832APIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, long user_channel_id, @Nullable UserConfig override_config) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(their_network_key, 33), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(their_network_key);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_value_satoshis);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(push_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(override_config);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result__u832APIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result__u832APIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(override_config); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
@@ -107,30 +151,37 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
*/
public ChannelDetails[] list_channels() {
long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels(this.ptr);
- ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret.length];
- for (int q = 0; q < ret.length; q++) {
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
+ ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
+ for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
- ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16);
- ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
+ if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
}
return ret_conv_16_arr;
}
/**
- * Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
- * get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
+ * Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
+ * to ensure non-announced channels are used.
+ *
+ * These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
+ * documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
+ * are.
*
- * These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
- * ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
+ * [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
*/
public ChannelDetails[] list_usable_channels() {
long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_usable_channels(this.ptr);
- ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret.length];
- for (int q = 0; q < ret.length; q++) {
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
+ ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
+ for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
- ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16);
- ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
+ if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
}
return ret_conv_16_arr;
@@ -141,20 +192,92 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
* will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
* pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
*
+ * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
+ * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
+ * estimate.
+ * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
+ * transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
+ * would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
+ * counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
+ *
+ * May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
+ * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+ * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
+ * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
+ * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
+ *
+ * `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
+ * the channel being closed or not:
+ * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
+ * transaction. The upper-bound is set by
+ * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
+ * estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
+ * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
+ * transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
+ * will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
+ *
* May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
+ * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+ * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel_with_target_feerate(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, int target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel_with_target_feerate(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
+ * rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
+ * the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
+ * channel.
*/
- public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, channel_id);
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
- * Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
- * the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
+ * Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
+ * the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
+ * `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
+ *
+ * You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
+ * [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
*/
- public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_channel(byte[] channel_id) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_channel(this.ptr, channel_id);
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
@@ -163,8 +286,18 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
* Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
* for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
*/
- public void force_close_all_channels() {
- bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels(this.ptr);
+ public void force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn() {
+ bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
+ * local transaction(s).
+ */
+ public void force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn() {
+ bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
}
/**
@@ -207,48 +340,187 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
* If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
* bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
* we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
+ *
+ * Note that payment_secret (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
*/
- public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ send_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) {
- long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, payment_hash, payment_secret);
+ public Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ send_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_hash, @Nullable byte[] payment_secret) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
+ *
+ * Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
+ * [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
+ * retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
+ * for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
+ * further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
+ *
+ * [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
+ * [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
+ */
+ public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ retry_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_retry_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- this.ptrs_to.add(route);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
+ *
+ * After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
+ * will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
+ * an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
+ * pending HTLCs for this payment.
+ *
+ * Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
+ * wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
+ * determine the ultimate status of a payment.
+ *
+ * [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
+ * [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
+ * [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
+ */
+ public void abandon_payment(byte[] payment_id) {
+ bindings.ChannelManager_abandon_payment(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
+ * generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
+ * the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
+ * would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
+ * never reach the recipient.
+ *
+ * See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
+ *
+ * Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
+ * [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
+ *
+ * Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
+ *
+ * [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
+ *
+ * Note that payment_preimage (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
+ */
+ public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment(Route route, @Nullable byte[] payment_preimage) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
+ * [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
+ * us to easily discern them from real payments.
+ */
+ public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ send_probe(RouteHop[] hops) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_probe(this.ptr, hops != null ? Arrays.stream(hops).mapToLong(hops_conv_10 -> hops_conv_10 == null ? 0 : hops_conv_10.ptr).toArray() : null);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(hops);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ for (RouteHop hops_conv_10: hops) { if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(hops_conv_10); }; };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
*
- * Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
- * or your counterparty can steal your funds!
+ * Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
+ * or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
+ *
+ * Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
+ * across the p2p network.
+ *
+ * Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
+ * for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
*
- * Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
+ * May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
+ * channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
+ * keys per-channel).
*
- * May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
- * be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
+ * Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
+ * counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
+ * [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
+ *
+ * Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
+ * not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
+ * create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
+ *
+ * Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
+ * the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
+ * implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
*/
- public void funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, OutPoint funding_txo) {
- bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, temporary_channel_id, funding_txo == null ? 0 : funding_txo.ptr & ~1);
- this.ptrs_to.add(funding_txo);
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[] funding_transaction) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), funding_transaction);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_transaction);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
- * Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
- * BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
- * seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
+ * Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
+ *
+ * Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
+ * ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
+ * or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
+ * containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
*
- * RGB is a node \"color\" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
- * to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
+ * Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
+ * `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
*
- * addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
- * incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
- * addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
- * only Tor Onion addresses.
+ * Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
+ * below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
*
- * Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
+ * If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
+ *
+ * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
+ * [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
+ * [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
+ * [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
+ * [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
+ * [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
+ * [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
*/
- public void broadcast_node_announcement(byte[] rgb, byte[] alias, NetAddress[] addresses) {
- bindings.ChannelManager_broadcast_node_announcement(this.ptr, rgb, alias, Arrays.stream(addresses).mapToLong(addresses_conv_12 -> addresses_conv_12.ptr).toArray());
- /* TODO 2 NetAddress */;
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ update_channel_config(byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[][] channel_ids, ChannelConfig config) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_update_channel_config(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), channel_ids != null ? Arrays.stream(channel_ids).map(channel_ids_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_ids_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_ids);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(config);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(config); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
@@ -259,53 +531,73 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
*/
public void process_pending_htlc_forwards() {
bindings.ChannelManager_process_pending_htlc_forwards(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
}
/**
- * If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
- * After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
- * to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
- *
- * This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
- *
- * Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
+ * Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
+ *
+ * This currently includes:
+ * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
+ * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
+ * than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
+ * the channel.
+ * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
+ * with the current `ChannelConfig`.
+ *
+ * Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
+ * estimate fetches.
*/
- public void timer_chan_freshness_every_min() {
- bindings.ChannelManager_timer_chan_freshness_every_min(this.ptr);
+ public void timer_tick_occurred() {
+ bindings.ChannelManager_timer_tick_occurred(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
}
/**
* Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
* after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
* along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
- * Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
- * HTLC backwards has been started.
+ *
+ * Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
+ * already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
+ * second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
+ * may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
+ *
+ * While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
+ * [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
+ * [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
+ * startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
*/
- public boolean fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) {
- boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, payment_hash, payment_secret);
- return ret;
+ public void fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash) {
+ bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
}
/**
- * Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
- * generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
- * should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
- *
- * You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
- * available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
- * reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
- * payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
- * privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
- * motivated attackers.
- *
- * Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
- * set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
- *
- * May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
+ * Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
+ * [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
+ *
+ * Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
+ * must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
+ * provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
+ *
+ * Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
+ * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
+ * event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
+ * the sender \"proof-of-payment\" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
+ *
+ * [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
+ * [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
+ * [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
+ * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
*/
- public boolean claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage, byte[] payment_secret, long expected_amount) {
- boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, payment_preimage, payment_secret, expected_amount);
- return ret;
+ public void claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage) {
+ bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
}
/**
@@ -313,34 +605,247 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
*/
public byte[] get_our_node_id() {
byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_our_node_id(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
- * Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
- * ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
- * operation.
+ * Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
*
- * All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
- * fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
+ * The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
+ * and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
+ * the channel.
*
- * Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
- * current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
- * ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
- * exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
+ * The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
+ * with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
*
- * Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
- * 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
- * 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
- * said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
- * any time it cannot do so instantly,
- * 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
- * 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
- * completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
+ * Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
+ * for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
+ * used to accept such channels.
+ *
+ * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
*/
- public void channel_monitor_updated(OutPoint funding_txo, long highest_applied_update_id) {
- bindings.ChannelManager_channel_monitor_updated(this.ptr, funding_txo == null ? 0 : funding_txo.ptr & ~1, highest_applied_update_id);
- this.ptrs_to.add(funding_txo);
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, long user_channel_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), user_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
+ * it as confirmed immediately.
+ *
+ * The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
+ * with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
+ *
+ * Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
+ * and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
+ *
+ * This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
+ * transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
+ *
+ * If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
+ * does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
+ *
+ * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+ * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
+ */
+ public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, long user_channel_id) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), user_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
+ * to pay us.
+ *
+ * This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
+ * [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
+ *
+ * The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
+ * will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
+ * passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
+ *
+ * See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
+ *
+ * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+ * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+ *
+ * # Note
+ *
+ * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+ * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+ *
+ * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+ *
+ * [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
+ * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
+ * [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
+ * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ */
+ public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ create_inbound_payment(Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
+ * serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
+ *
+ * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
+ *
+ * # Note
+ * This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
+ *
+ * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ */
+ public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_legacy(Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_legacy(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
+ * stored external to LDK.
+ *
+ * A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
+ * payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
+ * the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
+ *
+ * The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
+ * note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
+ * payments.
+ *
+ * `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
+ * received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
+ * before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
+ * sender \"proof-of-payment\" unless they have paid the required amount.
+ *
+ * `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
+ * in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
+ * After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
+ * pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
+ * invoices when no timeout is set.
+ *
+ * Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
+ * to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
+ * accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
+ * If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
+ * [`PaymentReceived`].
+ *
+ * Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
+ * set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
+ *
+ * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+ * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+ *
+ * # Note
+ *
+ * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+ * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+ *
+ * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+ *
+ * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
+ */
+ public Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
+ * serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
+ *
+ * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
+ *
+ * # Note
+ * This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
+ *
+ * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ */
+ public Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
+ * previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
+ *
+ * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ */
+ public Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ get_payment_preimage(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_payment_preimage(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32));
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
+ * are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
+ *
+ * [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
+ */
+ public long get_phantom_scid() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_scid(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
+ *
+ * [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
+ */
+ public PhantomRouteHints get_phantom_route_hints() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_route_hints(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.PhantomRouteHints ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.PhantomRouteHints(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
@@ -349,8 +854,10 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
*/
public MessageSendEventsProvider as_MessageSendEventsProvider() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_MessageSendEventsProvider(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
MessageSendEventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new MessageSendEventsProvider(null, ret);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
@@ -360,8 +867,10 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
*/
public EventsProvider as_EventsProvider() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_EventsProvider(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
EventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new EventsProvider(null, ret);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
@@ -371,27 +880,39 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
*/
public Listen as_Listen() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Listen(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Listen ret_hu_conv = new Listen(null, ret);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
- * Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block.
+ * Constructs a new Confirm which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+ * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Confirm must be freed before this_arg is
*/
- public void block_connected(byte[] header, TwoTuple[] txdata, int height) {
- bindings.ChannelManager_block_connected(this.ptr, header, Arrays.stream(txdata).mapToLong(txdata_conv_24 -> bindings.C2Tuple_usizeTransactionZ_new(txdata_conv_24.a, txdata_conv_24.b)).toArray(), height);
- /* TODO 2 TwoTuple */;
+ public Confirm as_Confirm() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Confirm(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Confirm ret_hu_conv = new Confirm(null, ret);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
- * Updates channel state based on a disconnected block.
+ * Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
+ * indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
+ * `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
+ * up.
*
- * If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate
- * in the shutdown.
+ * Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
*/
- public void block_disconnected(byte[] header) {
- bindings.ChannelManager_block_disconnected(this.ptr, header);
+ public boolean await_persistable_update_timeout(long max_wait) {
+ boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_await_persistable_update_timeout(this.ptr, max_wait);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(max_wait);
+ return ret;
}
/**
@@ -401,6 +922,34 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
*/
public void await_persistable_update() {
bindings.ChannelManager_await_persistable_update(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
+ * callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
+ * should instead register actions to be taken later.
+ */
+ public Future get_persistable_update_future() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_persistable_update_future(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.Future ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.Future(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
+ * [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
+ */
+ public BestBlock current_best_block() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_current_best_block(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ org.ldk.structs.BestBlock ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.BestBlock(null, ret); }
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
@@ -409,8 +958,10 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
*/
public ChannelMessageHandler as_ChannelMessageHandler() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_ChannelMessageHandler(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
ChannelMessageHandler ret_hu_conv = new ChannelMessageHandler(null, ret);
- ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
@@ -419,7 +970,21 @@ public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
*/
public byte[] write() {
byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_write(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
+ /**
+ * Constructs a new Payer which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+ * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Payer must be freed before this_arg is
+ */
+ public Payer as_Payer() {
+ long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Payer(this.ptr);
+ Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+ Payer ret_hu_conv = new Payer(null, ret);
+ if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+ return ret_hu_conv;
+ }
+
}